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Abstract 
 
 
Historiographical understanding of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland in 
the late seventeenth century has advanced little since a spate of interest in the 
institution in the early twentieth century. This is despite the development of research in 
other, related areas of Scottish history in the same period. This thesis helps to resolve 
this problem in demonstrating the importance of the convention in the period 1651-
1688 in two main areas whilst having much wider significance for understanding later 
seventeenth-century Scotland. 
 
Firstly, it shows that the royal burghs were committed to cooperative action. Although 
the crown was increasingly assuming responsibilities previously held by the 
convention, the burghs continued to see the importance of membership and 
participation in it, despite its inability to respond decisively to their increasing 
economic difficulties, a situation on which this thesis sheds much light. Their 
collective stance protected their relative independence, despite losing some of their 
privileges to an aggressively acquisitive landowning class. The burghs carefully used 
and regulated Edinburgh’s dominant position within the convention to ensure that they 
could be as effective as possible in these areas without allowing Edinburgh to always 
have its own way. 
 
Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that the convention played an important part in 
national politics despite an apparent decline in influence. Under the English occupation 
in the 1650s it was one of the very few national institutions to survive and it was 
successful in lobbying for the burghs’ interests and also as a consultative body for the 
regime. It continued to play an important role in national politics after the Restoration, 
enabling the burghs to present a single voice in parliament and before the king and his 
privy council, officers of state and commissioner. Although it was not always 
successful, it was even willing to take a stance in direct opposition to the crown, and 
its influence is demonstrated as increasing crown intervention in burgh affairs, often 
taken as a sign of royal absolutism, was accompanied with concessions aimed at 
ensuring urban support for royal policy. 
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provided. 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
In 1685, Alexander Skene of Newtyle, a former merchant and bailie of Aberdeen, 
published his Memorialls for the Government of the Royall Burghs in Scotland. He 
addressed the 1672 act of parliament which had transmitted many of the trading 
privileges of the royal burghs to burghs of regality and barony and wrote: ‘Let the 
Burrowes consider that the Convention of Burrowes … [is] now of little significancy 
by this late Act’.
1
 Similar attitudes have coloured the historiography of the convention 
of royal burghs in the period since the occupation of Scotland by English forces in 
1651. 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a spate of interest in the 
convention. Between 1866 and 1918 the convention itself published its records from 
its beginnings to the late eighteenth century. Nationalists in the late nineteenth century 
seem to have viewed the convention as the last bastion of Scottish independence, a 
truly Scottish institution surviving the Union, for which ‘it becomes the duty of all 
loyal and patriotic Scotsmen to maintain … in its entirety and usefulness’.
2
 When the 
historiography of the Convention is studied, the name Theodora Pagan (née Keith) is 
unavoidable, and a great debt is owed to her for presenting the first in-depth works on 
the origins and role of the Convention. Although John Mackay had presented some 
work on these areas previously, Pagan’s work is more coherent, detailed and analytical 
and less obviously coloured by a political agenda.
3
 Three years before Pagan’s main 
                                                 
1
 Anon., Memorialls for the Government of the Royall Burghs in Scotland … (Aberdeen, 1685), 107. For 
details on Skene and the authorship of this work, see G. DesBrisay, ‘Skene, Alexander, of Newtyle 
(1621?–1694)’, ODNB [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/69912, accessed 25 Aug 2009]. 
2
 J. Mackay, The Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1884), 88. 
3
 Pagan, Convention; T. Keith, ‘The influence of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland on the 
economic development of Scotland before 1707’, SHR, x (1913), 250-71; ‘The Origin of the Convention 
of Royal Burghs of Scotland, with a note on the connection of the Chamberlain with the Burghs’, SHR, 
x (1913), 384-402; ‘The Trading Privileges of the Royal Burghs of Scotland’, The English Historical 
 2 
work, J. D. Mackie and G. S. Pryde produced a study into the relationship between the 
membership of the convention and parliament.
4
 
 
Other than the last mentioned, these works focus overwhelmingly on the convention’s 
role as a regulative body, particularly focusing on trade, though Pagan also discusses 
the internal politics of the burghs. Even though Mackay was challenging those who, in 
light of changes in the political and social situation of the time, ‘call into question the 
utility of the Convention at the present day, these changes, in their opinion, rendering 
its continuance as a representative institution unnecessary’, he fails throughout the 
book to comment on the significance of the convention.
5
 Pagan does so more 
effectively, though there is little discussion of the convention’s role on the national 
political front: in the conclusion she dismissively states that ‘politically … the 
convention was of little account’.
6
 Even Mackie and Pryde, while discussing the 
convention’s role in coordinating the burghal estate in parliament, fail to discuss the 
implications of this, while in the period covered by this study, they allege that the 
convention was losing even this role. Thus the overwhelming view of the convention is 
of a body that had little influence beyond its administrative role and which was 
concerned mainly with matters of trade, a view continued with W. M. Mackenzie’s 
1949 book on the Scottish burghs.
7
  
 
This may be partly due to the traditional views of the Scottish parliament, which has 
been rather undervalued until relatively recently. The two main studies prior to the last 
                                                                                                                                             
Review, 28 (1913), 454-471/678-690. For other works by the same author which touch heavily on the 
role of the convention, see: ‘Scottish Trade with the Plantations before 1707’, SHR, vi (1909), 32-48; 
Commercial Relations of England and Scotland 1603-1707 (Cambridge, 1910); ‘Municipal elections in 
the Royal Burghs of Scotland: I: Prior to the Union’, SHR, xiii (1916), 111-25. 
4
 J. D. Mackie & G. S. Pryde, The Estate of the Burgesses in the Scots Parliament and its relation to the 
Convention of Royal Burghs (St Andrews, 1923). 
5
 Mackay, The Convention of Royal Burghs, vii. 
6
 Pagan, Convention, 262. 
7
 W. M. MacKenzie, The Scottish Burghs (Edinburgh, 1949). 
 3 
two decades were by C. S. Terry and R. S. Rait, published in 1905 and 1924 
respectively, which had a limited view of parliament as merely there to rubber-stamp 
royal wishes, particularly in granting taxes.
8
 Recent scholarship generally has a rather 
more positive view of the Scottish parliament as an important and, relative to earlier 
perceptions, powerful body. As early as 1965 Gordon Donaldson acknowledged that 
parliament was ‘not now confined to acceptance of the report of the committee of 
articles en bloc, and for the first time something like a regular opposition began to use 
parliament as a debating ground from which to challenge the king’s ministers’.
9
 Other 
general histories, such as those by Rosalind Mitchison and Keith Brown, express 
similarly positive, and similarly muted, views of parliament’s effectiveness, suggesting 
that crown management proves its own necessity, especially regarding a nobility 
whose interests could not be successfully attacked by the crown.
10
  
 
There is a general acceptance that, particularly during Lauderdale’s period in office, 
Scotland was ruled more absolutely than England or Ireland, and a British history 
published in 2007 clings to the drastically outdated view that ‘the Scottish estates 
proved a rubber stamp for most of Charles’s reign’.
11
 Thankfully this is now rare, and 
Raymond Paterson’s study of Lauderdale indirectly adds weight to the argument in 
favour of parliament as he states that government absolutism even under his subject is 
                                                 
8
 C. S. Terry, The Scottish Parliament, Its Constitution and Procedure 1603-1707 (Glasgow, 1905); R. 
S. Rait, The Parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow, 1924). 
9
 G. Donaldson, Scotland: James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), 359. 
10
 K. M. Brown, Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603-1715 (Basingstoke, 1992), 
13-20; R. Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage, Scotland 1603-1745 (Edinburgh, 1983), 71. 
11
 G. S. De Kray, Restoration and Revolution in Britain: A Political History of the Era of Charles II and 
the Glorious Revolution (Basingstoke, 2007), 54-5, 198. T. Harris, Restoration, Charles II and his 
Kingdoms (London, 2005), 419-21, acknowledges more of a role for parliament, but this is limited (to a 
lesser extent than by De Kray) in other works such as: M. Goldie, ‘Divergence and Union: Scotland and 
England, 1660-1707’, in B. Bradshaw & J. Morrill (eds.), The British Problem, c.1534-1707: State 
Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago (Basingstoke, 1996), 224-7; D. Patrick, ‘Restoration to 
Revolution: 1660-1690’, in B. Harris & A. R. MacDonald (eds.), Scotland: The Making and Unmaking 
of the Nation c.1100-1707 – Volume 2, Early Modern Scotland: c.1500-1707 (Dundee, 2007), 59. 
 4 
‘about as far from historical truth as it is possible to get’.
12
 Keith Brown and Alastair 
Mann have shown how it is Lauderdale’s own judgement (and that of other royal 
servants) of the extent of crown absolutism which has caused parliament to be viewed 
so negatively. It seems remarkable that such evidently unreliable commentators, who 
were probably basing their views on the king’s prerogative rather than the outworked 
reality, have been relied on so heavily.
13
 It is fortunate that specific studies on 
parliament, such as those in Brown and Mann’s collection, and notably Gillian 
MacIntosh’s work on parliament under Charles II, have been far more sympathetic, 
while of course acknowledging the strict limitations of parliamentary power.
14
  
 
Yet while parliament has benefited from this work, which has revised traditional 
perceptions to varying degrees, the convention has not seen a similar revision of its 
role. Burghal representation is often discussed, but the convention is often either 
written off as a largely unimportant body or, worse, is barely mentioned at all.
15
 The 
strongest exception to this is Alan MacDonald, whose study of the burghs and 
parliament to 1651 suggests that the burghs were a more significant and influential 
estate than is often presented.
16
 General studies on the seventeenth-century also tend to 
have little mention of the convention.
17
 MacDonald has gone some way to filling that 
gap before 1651, but for the later part of the century little work on it has been done. 
                                                 
12
 R. C. Paterson, King Lauderdale, The Corruption of Power (Edinburgh, 2003), 255-6, 258. 
13
 K. M. Brown & A. J. Mann, ‘Introduction: Parliament in Politics in Scotland, 1567-1707’, in K. M. 
Brown & A. J. Mann (eds.), The History of the Scottish Parliament Volume 2, Parliament and Politics 
in Scotland 1567-1707, (Edinburgh, 2005), 5-9; Paterson, King Lauderdale, 257. 
14
 MacIntosh, Parliament; Brown & Mann, The History of the Scottish Parliament; R. Lee, 
‘Government & Politics in Scotland, 1661-81’, Glasgow Ph.D. (1998). 
15
 Other than works already cited, see for example: J. R. Young, The Scottish Parliament 1639-1661, A 
Political and Constitutional Analysis (Edinburgh, 1996); J. Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern 
Scotland (Oxford, 1999); J. Goodare, The Government of Scotland 1560-1625 (Oxford, 2004); J. 
Goodare, ‘The Estates in the Scottish Parliament, 1286-1707’, in C. Jones (ed.), The Scots and 
Parliament (Edinburgh 1996), 11-32. 
16
 MacDonald, Burghs. 
17
 See for example: Brown, Kingdom or Province?; Donaldson, James V-James VII; W. Ferguson, 
Scotland’s Relations with England, A Survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1977); Mitchison, Lordship to 
Patronage. 
 5 
Some work has been done on resolving the general lack of Scottish historiography for 
the period, a problem David Stevenson identified in 1991. Economic history is 
dominated by T. C. Smout’s Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, and here at least the 
convention’s economic role is considered.
18
 Since Frances Dow’s 1979 book on 
Cromwellian Scotland, most work on the Interregnum has been ‘British’ history with 
little attention paid to Scotland. The convention has little place in it, despite being the 
only Scottish national institution, other than the courts, to survive the decade; this is a 
particularly odd omission in Susan Gillanders’ thesis, where the convention is only 
quite cursorily dealt with, given that it is a study of the burghs.
19
 Aside from the many 
works on religious history, the political history of Restoration Scotland has received 
more attention recently, but again the convention does not play much of a role at all in 
this historiography.
20
  
 
British histories of the period give some of the clearest indications of the underlying 
assumptions which have probably helped to keep the convention out of Scottish 
history. Though those covering the Interregnum are better in this regard, few of these 
histories make an attempt at a joined-up assessment of British history, even where 
links between English and Scottish situations are clearly evident. Stevenson’s desire 
                                                 
18
 D. Stevenson, ‘Twilight before night or darkness before dawn? Interpreting seventeenth-century 
Scotland’, in R. Mitchison (ed.), Why Scottish History Matters (Edinburgh, 1991), 37-47; Smout, 
Scottish Trade. Other economic studies covering the period have little on the convention, for example: 
B. Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660-1976 (London, 1977); G. Marshall, 
Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707 
(Edinburgh, 1980); I. D. Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution, An Economic and Social 
History c.1050-c.1750 (London, 1995); I. D. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition, 
c.1500-c.1760 (Basingstoke, 1997). The historiography of the economy of the period is more fully 
discussed in chapter 3. 
19
 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland; S. Gillanders, ‘The Scottish burghs during the Cromwellian occupation, 
1651-60’, Edinburgh Ph.D. (1999). For histories covering the Interregnum see for example: M. Bennett, 
The Civil Wars Experienced: Britain & Ireland 1638-1661 (London, 2000); A. I. Macinnes, The British 
Revolution, 1629-1660 (Basingstoke, 2005); L. M. Smith, ‘Scotland and Cromwell: A Study in Early 
Modern Government’, Oxford Ph.D. (1980); R. S. Spurlock, Cromwell and Scotland: Conquest and 
Religion 1650-1660 (Edinburgh, 2007). 
20
 MacIntosh, Parliament; C. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 1660-1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and 
Ideas (Woodbridge, 2003); Lee, ‘Government & Politics’; Paterson, King Lauderdale. 
 6 
that a deeper understanding of Scotland in the seventeenth century would result in a 
full British history, one which was no longer ‘English history, with some mention of 
the tiresome Scots, Irish and Welsh when they are making a nuisance of themselves’, 
remains unfulfilled.
21
 As has been seen, most of the British histories reflect a 
traditional view which saw Scotland as ruled more absolutely than England. If this was 
the case, then the influence of the convention would be very limited and so it could be 
more readily disregarded. The same applies to the 1650s, as the more complete the 
control exercised by the English regime, the less influence the convention could wield. 
Yet, as we have seen, recent Scottish work has challenged the extent of absolute rule, 
and so the convention’s role needs to be reassessed in light of this. 
 
In terms of early modern urban history, much of the work on Europe, whether general 
studies or examinations of particular towns, states or regions, uses a very similar 
approach. This seems to correspond, to a lesser or greater extent, with the model 
presented by Max Weber in his work on urban theory, The City. The approach focuses 
on the city as an individual entity and how it functions as such, though it is also quite 
comprehensive, covering the social, political and economic aspects of the city as 
entity. Even in looking outside the city this approach dominates as it extends only to 
looking at relationships with a city’s direct hinterland. The issue of urbanisation also 
features heavily. This model is evident in much of the urban history of Europe, both in 
what is included and in what is omitted, namely a study of inter-urban relationships.
22
 
                                                 
21
 Stevenson, ‘Twilight before night or darkness before dawn?’, 47. The problem is particularly 
noticeable in the latest British history of the period: De Kray, Restoration and Revolution. See also 
Bradshaw & Morrill, The British Problem; S. G. Ellis & S. Barber (eds.), Conquest and Union: 
Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (London, 1995); L. K. J. Glassey (ed.), The Reigns of Charles II 
and James VII & II (Basingstoke, 1997); R. Hutton, Charles the Second, King of England, Scotland and 
Ireland (Oxford, 1989). Tim Harris’ books are unusual in their attempts to link at least some aspects of 
the history of Scotland and England at the time: Restoration, Charles II and his Kingdoms (London, 
2005); Revolution, The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London, 2006). 
22
 M. Weber, The City, ed. D. Martindale & G. Neuwirth (London, 1960). For examples of this dominant 
approach see: P. Clark (ed.), The Early Modern Town: A Reader (London, 1976); P. Clark (ed.), Small 
 7 
Thus it is not surprising that few works mention the convention at all. It was unique, 
with no equivalent body anywhere else in Europe, and cannot be taken to be 
representative of European experience, which may have contributed to its omission.  
 
A more substantial body of work exists for the study of relationships between urban 
entities and the state, and from this more comparative material can be drawn in a study 
of the convention. This is one area where the Weberian framework has been 
expanded.
23
 Studies on political representation more generally also often include some 
consideration of urban representation, while there has also been some specific work on 
towns and government in particular states.
24
 Occasionally inter-urban relationships are 
mentioned within these studies, and even the convention receives some attention from 
Christopher Friedrichs, though it is a limited consideration relating mainly to 
opposition to state taxation, and the convention is not ascribed any particular 
significance.
25
 Of particular interest here is the work on England in the period covered 
by this study. Although much has been written within the standard urban 
historiographical framework, there is also much of value regarding relationships 
                                                                                                                                             
Towns in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1995); A. Cowan, Urban Europe 1500-1700 (London, 
1998); J. de Vries, European Urbanization, 1500-1800 (London, 1984); C. R. Friedrichs, Urban Politics 
in Early Modern Europe (London, 2000); A. Mączak & C. Smout (eds.), Gründung und Bedeuten 
kleinerer Städte im nördlichen Europa der frühen Neuzeit (Wiesbaden, 1991); D. Nicholas, Urban 
Europe, 1100-1700 (Basingstoke, 2003). 
23
 See for example: Friedrichs, Urban Politics; R. Mackenney, The City-State, 1500-1700: Republican 
Liberty in an Age of Princely Power (New Jersey, 1989); C. Tilly & W. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and 
the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000-1800 (Oxford, 1994). 
24
 N. Ball, ‘Representation in the English House of Commons: the new boroughs, 1485-1640’, 
Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 15 (1995), 117-24; P. Benedict, ‘French cities from the 
sixteenth century to the Revolution: An overview’, in P. Benedict (ed.), Cities and Social Change in 
Early Modern France (London, 1989); M. A. R. Graves, The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe 
(Harlow, 2001); A. R. Myers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789 (London, 1975); P. Sanz, ‘The 
Cities in the Aragonese Cortes in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods’, Parliaments, Estates and 
Representation, 14 (1994), 95-108; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Cortes, cities and procuradores in Castile’, in I. 
A. A. Thompson, Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern 
Castile (Aldershot, 1993), 1-72; R. Tittler, ‘Elizabethan Towns and the ‘Points of Contact’: Parliament’, 
Parliamentary History, 8 (1989), 275-88. 
25
 C. R. Friedrichs, The Early Modern City 1450-1750 (London, 1995), 55.  
 8 
between the town and the state, providing an as yet under-employed comparative 
framework for what was happening in Scottish towns under the same rulers.
26
 
 
The convention has also been given short shrift in Scottish urban history for the period, 
other than that from the 1920s discussed above. William MacKenzie wrote a survey of 
the Scottish burghs in 1949, which discussed the convention’s role in trade and 
regulation, and the erosion of the royal burghs’ privileges in the Restoration period. 
Yet it did not develop the discussion of the burghs’ role in national politics beyond 
suggesting that the creation of new burghs in the medieval period was in part a 
‘political device’.
27
  
 
More recent work has tended to follow the patterns of other European urban history. 
Iain Whyte has contributed much to the understanding of urbanisation in early modern 
Scotland, particularly regarding the spread of burghs of barony and market centres.
28
 
Issues of society and economy have been examined along with the relationships 
between burghs and their hinterlands, particularly local landowners, but largely within 
                                                 
26
 J. Barry, ‘Introduction’, and R. Howell, ‘Newcastle and the nation: The seventeenth-century 
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the usual framework of burghs as individual entities.
29
 Unsurprisingly this applies to 
work on individual burghs as well as more general studies, and though a number of 
good studies of particular burghs exist they have little engagement with wider issues 
relating to inter-burghal relationships or national politics.
30
 Michael Lynch has 
encouraged the discussion of these issues more than most, with the collection The 
Early Modern Town in Scotland covering many of the same issues as other works but 
also focusing on relationships between the burghs and the crown, a topic he also 
discusses elsewhere.
31
 He also provides, within a study of urbanisation and urban 
networks, a strong statement of the value of the convention as a political entity. Yet his 
description of the convention as presenting ‘the most co-ordinated’ political voice and 
being a ‘highly organised and coherent urban political lobby’ has not as yet been 
further explored, at least for the period after 1651, and so this aspect of its work 
remains poorly understood.
32
 
 
This study attempts to redress the balance, bringing the convention into the history of 
the Interregnum and Restoration in Scotland. It is essentially in two parts, the first 
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dealing with the convention’s interaction with its constituent members. Chapter one 
examines individual burghs’ relationships with the convention, looking particularly at 
the types of appeals which were brought to it. It looks at, in turn, intra- and inter-urban 
matters and then extra-urban disputes. It considers the extent to which government 
took on roles regarding individual burghs which the convention had previously held 
and whether or not burghs were bypassing the convention in their appeals. It also 
considers the key question of the encroachment of landowners on burghs’ privileges. 
Chapter two reflects on some of these issues in relation to Edinburgh’s dominant role 
in the convention, looking at how this position was policed and challenged by the other 
burghs, how the crown interfered in Edinburgh’s internal affairs and the effect this had 
on the burghs. Chapter three then considers urban finances, providing an examination 
of the economic condition of the burghs, the effect this had on the convention and the 
impact the convention had on their condition. 
 
The second part of the thesis looks at the convention’s role in national politics in the 
period. Chapter four contains an assessment of the convention’s position and activity 
in the Interregnum, considering the challenges it faced under the new regime and its 
ability to adapt to and thrive under these conditions, gaining a great deal of influence. 
One of the problems of the historiography of the period is that it has tended to view the 
1650s as an anomalous period, from which the Restoration period was somewhat 
divorced.
33
 The following chapters aim to draw links between the two periods, 
demonstrating that there were many continuities. Chapter five addresses the 
convention’s activity in parliament, looking at its influence, its attempts to ensure 
strong and united representation for the burghs there, its successes in legislation and 
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the struggles it had protecting the burghs’ interests against the landowning estates. The 
chapter also provides further evidence of the strength of parliament in relation to the 
crown, demonstrating that it was capable of acting in opposition to the crown. Chapter 
six then examines the convention’s relationship with the crown, again reflecting on its 
influence and how it sought to provide effective representation for the burghs, to the 
extent of opposing the crown. It will consider the crown’s attempts to secure a more 
absolute form of government by interference in the burghs and how this affected the 
convention. 
 
Regarding sources, none of the previous studies of the convention used individual 
burghs’ records. Given that the convention would not exist without its individual 
members, the relationship between the two is crucial, while the individual burghs’ 
records can contain further evidence of the convention’s activity on a national level. 
With this in mind, a sample of seventeen burghs was taken, as indicated on the map 
following this introduction. The sample included the five largest burghs, Aberdeen, 
Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Perth. The other burghs were divided into two 
categories, mid-sized, assessed to pay between £1 and £3 of every £100 on the burghs’ 
tax roll, and small, paying less than £1 of every £100. Some geographical balance has 
been sought as well. While there is slightly higher representation from the burghs with 
the most easily-accessible archives from Dundee, this in part reflects the high 
concentration of burghs in the centre-east of the country. Of the mid-sized burghs, 
Inverness was chosen from the north, Montrose from Angus, St Andrews and 
Kirkcaldy from Fife, Stirling from the centre, Ayr from the west and Dumfries from 
the south-west. The smaller burghs chosen were Banff from the north-east, Forfar from 
Angus, Pittenweem from Fife, Peebles from the Borders and Dumbarton from the 
west. 
 12 
 
Overall, this study demonstrates that the convention cannot simply be ignored in the 
period. It was not, therefore, ‘of little significance’ but was a crucial part of the activity 
of the royal burghs, and thus of the urban and economic life of Scotland. Yet it was 
much more than simply an inter-urban regulatory institution. It played an important 
role in coordinating the action of the burghs in national politics and was thus an 
important part of the political system of the nation. Despite its contemporary critics 
and its historiographical obscurity, it was a significant body in late seventeenth century 
Scotland. 
 13 
 
Map 1 
The royal burghs, adapted from P. G. B. McNeill & H. L. MacQueen, Atlas of Scottish 
History to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1996), 228. Campbeltown was not erected until 1700, 
while Cromarty (located north-east of Fortrose) was removed from its position as a 
royal burgh in 1685. The underlined burghs constitute the sample taken for this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Individual Burghs and the Convention 
 
The little that has been written on the convention of royal burghs has tended to focus 
on the records of the body itself, or to refer to it while considering parliament and the 
crown, thus focusing on the records of those bodies. While these two levels of study – 
from the perspective of central government and the convention itself – do indeed shed 
a great amount of light on the convention, there is a third level without which any 
understanding of it will always be limited. Just as parliament was not an establishment 
independent of its members, the convention did not exist in isolation. Indeed, without 
its constituent member burghs it would not have existed at all. Thus it is of vital 
importance to examine the relationship between individual burghs and the convention. 
 
Edinburgh has been examined separately in chapter two because of its unique position 
as the ‘standing committee’ of the burghs. Its relationship with both the convention 
and the crown operated largely in a different way from that of other burghs. Yet even 
in the way that other burghs responded to Edinburgh’s dominance among the burghs, 
the importance of their relationship with the convention is clear. They participated in 
the removal from the provostship of Lauderdale’s close associate Sir Andrew Ramsay 
in 1673 and thus helped to protect some level of independence from the crown for 
Edinburgh and the convention. They recognised its position of influence and 
approached it for aid. Significantly, some occasionally challenged its influence and the 
way it exercised it. Other burghs were not content to simply sit back and allow 
Edinburgh to run things for them – they were engaged in the work of the convention. If 
it was not valuable to them, there would have been no value in challenging Edinburgh 
when that burgh was perceived to be overstepping its bounds. 
 15  
Though individual burghs were often turning to parliament and the crown for 
assistance rather than to the convention, it still received many appeals from them. Its 
ability to respond effectively did not always match the need, due at least in part to the 
economic condition of the burghs which shall be discussed in chapter three. Despite 
this, the burghs continued to rely on the convention. Pagan’s assertion that politically 
the convention was ‘of little account’, which seems to have been largely accepted, does 
not stand much examination.
1
 This assessment has been made without close scrutiny of 
the burghs’ own records and without the consideration that, in spite of the convention’s 
limitations and changes in its relationship with the burghs, it was still viewed by them 
as important. In order to assess this relationship, the matters the burghs took to the 
convention, covering inter- and intra-urban matters and extra-urban disputes, will be 
considered – as well as those which they did not take. 
 
Inter- and intra-urban matters 
Disputes between royal burghs were occasionally raised and, though some went to the 
privy council, the convention was more usually the arbitrator. Some cases which came 
to it were brought by merchants, such as the Dundee merchant who complained against 
Nairn for imposing a fine on him, and the merchants of Edinburgh who complained 
that the magistrates of Cupar, Dunfermline, Linlithgow and Inverkeithing ‘does much 
prejudg tham in thair mercatis by imprisoning them and fyning tham’ with the claim 
that their measures did not conform to the standard.
2
 These incidents would suggest 
that some merchants at least had confidence in the convention’s abilities as an 
arbitrator, confidence which may have come from successful outcomes of the burghs’ 
continued appeals in situations of dispute. 
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The majority of these appeals seem to be clearly within the bounds of the convention’s 
authority as the body which regulated weights and measures and acted against 
unfreemen trading illegally. The convention’s own records have numerous accounts of 
disputes coming before it on these matters. Problems with customs exacted at another 
burgh’s market, often by one particular group, arose a few times. In 1675, the 
commissioner from Selkirk complained against the cordiners of Peebles for exacting 
‘ane extraordinar custom’ from Selkirk’s shoemakers, though no resolution is 
recorded. A complaint was made by Dumfries against illegal practices in Perth’s fairs 
which were affecting its merchants’ purchase of linen, and the convention ordered 
Perth to act legally. A much wider complaint was made by Cullen against Banff for 
‘certain prejudices susteaned be them anent the wplifting of severall customes dew to 
them of certain fairs and mercats’, which was met with a counter-complaint against 
Cullen’s supposed interruption of Banff’s right to regulate weights and measures in the 
fairs of Banffshire.
3
 Complaints were also made against burghs allowing non-residents 
and unfree persons to continue trading, such as those from Glasgow (against Renfrew), 
Stirling (against Perth) and Aberdeen (against Kintore and Inverurie) seeking the 
enforcement of acts of parliament and of burghs regarding the requirement of 
burgesses to be resident in their burghs.
4
 
 
Not all appeals made it as far as the convention. In 1658, Peebles was summoned by 
Edinburgh for holding a market at ‘Brighousknow’ to the prejudice of Edinburgh’s 
customs. After meeting with Edinburgh’s council, its commissioners to the general 
convention were asked to raise the matter there. However, before this could be done 
they met again with a committee from Edinburgh and though no resolution was made 
it did not reach the convention. After a further summons by the burghs’ agent was 
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apparently ignored, Edinburgh remitted the matter to the convention. However, with 
no general convention meeting in 1659 it was never raised, though Peebles appears to 
have been able to continue holding markets there.
5
 Dundee also dealt directly with 
Perth in 1670 when exorbitant customs were being uplifted by some persons at its 
market, rather than going through the convention.
6
 But though burghs could obviously 
resolve problems among themselves, it is clear that they still recognised that the 
collective decision of the convention could be acknowledged and adhered to by both 
sides in a dispute.  
 
Even when supplications did not relate to matters obviously within the convention’s 
remit it often intervened. When ‘great heats and animosities’ arose between Dundee 
and Brechin over an escaped prisoner, the convention took it upon themselves to step 
in and act as peacemaker.
7
 In 1657, Pittenweem received £114 from the convention to 
defend a legal action Crail had begun against it and its privileges at Fife Ness, one 
burgh going to the court of session and the other to the convention.
8
 Clearly these 
burghs did not have a conception that certain matters were outside the convention’s 
jurisdiction and recognised its ability to arbitrate in many cases. However, there were 
cases where this is not so evident and the convention was avoided. When a dispute 
arose involving Kirkcaldy, Burntisland and Kinghorn concerning ferries across the 
Forth, Kirkcaldy expected it to be moved at the convention, but instead the other 
burghs took it to the privy council which referred it to the court of session.
9
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The most significant dispute of the period, that between Glasgow and Dumbarton over 
the rights to the customs dues on the Clyde, only very briefly came before the 
convention. This probably does not represent a feeling that it was too major an issue 
for the convention to resolve, but was rather a hangover from the 1650s as its influence 
in such matters was weakened by English intervention. It may have been competent to 
judge at least after the Restoration but, having lost some of its regulatory authority 
under English rule, the matter was taken out of its hands. In 1652, Dumbarton’s 
council recorded that the English customer at Glasgow  
doeth claime rycht and Intromett with the customes of this brucht within the 
river of clyde with the anchorage and tunage of schipe and uther veshells 
cumeing in to the said river wher unto this brucht hes the undoubted rycht 
conform to ther infeftment and charter.
10
 
Having sent a commissioner to Edinburgh to explain its rights, Dumbarton appears to 
have regained some right to collect the dues, for in 1657 Glasgow purchased a 
suspension against it for charging Glasgow’s merchants for customs. As the customs 
and excise were governed by the English authorities with the convention having less of 
a regulatory role, it is not surprising that the action was primarily played out in the 
courts.
11
 Supplication was made to the 1658 general convention, but it was initially 
referred to the following particular convention and then, with both burghs absent, to 
the next general convention which, in 1659, was not allowed to sit for reasons 
considered in chapter four. In the meantime, Glasgow continued to pursue the matter 
before the courts. Dumbarton also supplicated the council of state and the earl of 
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Argyll in the hope of adding political weight to its claim, but Glasgow would not 
compromise to reach an amicable solution.
12
  
 
Dumbarton clearly retained some right over the dues, as Glasgow felt it necessary to 
prosecute it, while it sought to recover the dues collected by a lieutenant in the garrison 
when he left the burgh. Yet after the Restoration, Dumbarton protested vigorously at 
the wrongs done by the council of state in taking its privilege to the dues from it.
13
 
This was presumably to give a strong impression that it was the victim in the matter. 
However, Glasgow ‘purchast ane new infeftment of thair former pretendit liberties and 
priviledges’, with new claims added, and the matter was then taken before the session, 
with further attempts at negotiating a solution and appeals also made to the privy 
council to try to shorten the action.
14
 In early 1666 the matter was finally settled in 
favour of Glasgow which was released from paying dues to Dumbarton for its own 
vessels but had to pay it ‘such ane sowm of money therefor as they think fitting’.
15
 
Dumbarton appears to have considered making a further claim to the dues in 1685, but 
this apparently never went beyond its own council.
16
 Rather than the convention being 
bypassed in this decision due to any lack of confidence in it, a case which was 
appropriately begun in the courts due to the situation in the 1650s was simply 
continued there. 
 
Internal disputes were often settled by the convention but could also involve the privy 
council or even parliament, and there is no clear pattern of who should resolve these. 
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Even the English regime during the Interregnum was called on by some burghs to 
resolve problems. Glasgow appointed agents in London, as well as two in Edinburgh at 
one point, and went to the regime to seek assistance after the fire of 1652, getting a 
grant of £1,000 sterling (£12,000) from parliament and abatement from its cess which 
was to be paid towards repairs.
17
 Perth also had an agent in London and was prepared 
to make representation to the English governor of Perth and the council of state, even 
on the issue of repairs to the tolbooth for which, if any outside help was to be sought, 
application would usually be made to the convention.
18
 Montrose applied to the army 
for an ease of quartering and cess as early as 1652, issues in which a burgh might have 
expected to go directly to the regime but in which the convention was also appealing.
19
 
 
Increased royal interference in burghal affairs does seem to have resulted in a growing 
proportion of disputes going to the privy council in the 1680s, but this translation of 
appeals away from the convention in the Interregnum continued straight after the 
Restoration. When Aberdeen’s council had a dispute with its crafts in 1661, and the 
crafts complained against the council in 1675, both cases went to the privy council for 
arbitration, perhaps because the crafts would be less willing to submit to the decision 
of the merchant-dominated convention.
20
 This may also have been the case in 1659, 
when the convention was ordered by General Monck (after a supplication to him by 
the merchants) to resolve a dispute between the magistrates and the crafts over the 
establishment of a merchants’ guild, and the crafts appeared reluctant to submit to its 
decision.
21
 In 1662, when Dunfermline complained against its craftsmen taking control 
of elections, the matter had to be resolved by the court of session, and in 1680 
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Burntisland’s crafts went to the session hoping for the establishment of a deaconry, 
with the convention’s agent appointed to help the magistrates of the burgh defend 
against this.
22
 However, crafts did sometimes submit to the convention’s decision, as 
in the establishment of a merchants’ guild in Dumfries when the deacon convener of 
the burgh’s crafts was given permission by the convention to seek an amicable 
settlement with the council, suggesting that its influence was not only with 
merchants.
23
 
 
Problems in Montrose between some merchants and the magistrates and council saw 
the complainants seizing the opportunity presented by the sitting of parliament to 
bypass the convention. Difficulties within Montrose’s council came to the attention of 
the general convention in July 1660, when some merchants from the burgh made a 
complaint against its magistrates and council in relation to the craft deacons of the 
burgh. The complaint was referred to a particular convention and it was decided that 
no action could be taken until the next general convention or the meeting of any 
‘competent judicatorie’, though exactly what that refers to is unclear. Both sides were 
told to keep the peace, and any that failed to do so would find themselves prejudiced in 
the decision of the convention. In the particular convention in December 1660, a 
committee of six burghs was appointed to go to Montrose to try to resolve the dispute, 
either due to the urgency of the matter or due to a fresh complaint, perhaps after the 
town council’s ruling on the matter in August. The matter arose in the convention as it 
sat alongside parliament, and the magistrates of the burgh were given until 12 February 
to present their case, though the convention did not sit again until 16 February.
24
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At this stage matters were very much remaining within the jurisdiction of the 
convention, as would be normally expected unless a party continued to refuse to 
submit to their decision in which case the court of session or privy council might get 
involved, perhaps as the ‘competent judicatorie’ referred to. However, the sitting of 
parliament gave the complainants an opportunity to try to bypass the convention, and 
on 13 February a petition was submitted by the merchants to the articles. Their plan 
backfired, as the articles recommended to parliament that the matter should be remitted 
to the commissioners of the burghs, and this decision was approved. A committee of 
burghs then reported to the convention and sought their approval of their view on how 
the matter should be resolved before it was presented to parliament. Parliament then 
accepted their report, and an act was passed to which the council adhered.
25
 The 
merchants’ attempts to bypass the convention may have shown their lack of confidence 
in that body’s ability to resolve their dispute, but the incident reveals that the 
convention was still able to make clear decisions and that parliament recognised its 
expertise and authority in such matters, just as the English authorities did in the 1650s, 
as evidenced by their remission to the convention of the dispute over the merchants’ 
guild in Kirkcaldy.  
 
Problems between magistrates and councils could also be settled by either the 
convention or the privy council. In the Interregnum, the convention was successful in 
dealing with a dispute between Perth’s council and a former provost which arose in 
1652 over debts incurred by the burgh. It sent commissioners to settle the issue, with 
accusations of misuse of the common good and over-borrowing proving unfounded.
26
 
Again in 1657, intervention was required in Perth in a dispute over the form of the 
council and, despite some opposition from the crafts, the convention’s ruling 
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prevailed.
27
 The same year some merchants in Culross complained against abuses by 
the magistrates of the burgh, most of whom were craftsmen. After nearly 18 months 
and further complaints that they were admitting unsuitable persons as burgesses, the 
convention successfully ruled in favour of the merchants, as might be expected, setting 
out the new constitution of the council.
28
 In the longest-running electoral dispute of the 
period, between some inhabitants of Perth and Sir Patrick Threipland of Fingask, 
provost of the burgh for a number of years, the privy council were the main 
arbitrators.
29
 Such issues did come up regularly and, certainly until the 1680s, were 
often dealt with, generally successfully, by the convention. It was often able to resolve 
electoral problems, settling disputed elections in many burghs including Dunfermline 
in 1662 and Inverness in 1676.
30
 Two disputes within Jedburgh came, first from the 
burgh clerk in 1661 who complained of being illegally deprived but did not appear to 
press his case which was thus settled in favour of the burgh. The second concerned an 
election which was found to be faulty but allowed to stand due to the chaos caused by 
the ‘long trubles of this kingdome’, and the convention’s decision to allow the matter 
to be fully settled by a committee of visiting burghs was accepted.
31
  
 
A more complicated dispute arose in Brechin between the magistrates and council, 
who wanted to erect a merchants’ guild in the burgh, and a party of merchants and 
crafts opposed to the plan who were supported by the bishop. The bishop was also 
accused of electoral irregularities by the merchants. As Brechin was one of five royal 
burghs which still operated in part as ecclesiastical burghs, with the bishop having 
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some say in elections, the convention’s jurisdiction in matters relating to its 
constitution was not so clear cut.
32
 However, after a committee of five local burghs 
considered the matter and set out rules for its elections, including the establishment of 
a dean of guild, the convention’s authority was accepted by both parties.
33
 Another 
good example of the convention’s ability to settle internal disputes and the respect in 
which it was held was the major dispute in Inverness among the council and 
inhabitants over the election of the magistrates and council. After the issue was 
brought before the convention, an unusually large committee of 12 burghs and the 
burghs’ clerk (with seven as a quorum) was appointed to hear the different parties and 
find a compromise, with power to establish a new constitution for the burgh. An 
agreement was reached and all parties submitted to the decision.
34
 
 
It is clear that there was irregularity in the resolution of internal disputes, with even 
parliament being asked to intervene on occasion, but the convention’s authority and 
ability to act in these matters seems to have been widely recognised. However, the 
number of internal disputes going to the privy council, in relation to those going to the 
convention, did increase in the 1680s, with major disagreements in Glasgow between 
the council and the maltmen and in Culross between certain inhabitants and the 
magistrates both requiring lengthy deliberations before the council.
35
 This can perhaps 
be accounted for by the increased royal interference in the burghs’ affairs and the 
associated decline in the convention’s influence. Yet it is interesting that, given the 
strength of royal authority since the Restoration, it took until the 1680s for this to 
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happen. The convention was undoubtedly seeing its authority and role among the 
burghs challenged, yet while the burghs did use the privy council as a forum for 
settling problems they seem to have continued to recognise the influence and ability of 
the convention in many of these matters. However, given the changing situation in the 
1680s, there was still some concern in the convention that they were losing influence 
among the burghs and in 1686 the privy council received a letter from the king stating 
that  
the commissioners of our royall burroughs of that our ancient kingdome have 
humbly represented to us the great troubles and expences they are put to by 
many needlesse or malitious complaints before our Privy Council, and 
therefore humbly desire that wee may allow them to hear and to arbitrate in 
such matters in the first instance which wee believe they mean (during our 
pleasure) and leaving ane appeale from their arbitration to our Councell.
36
 
The response of the council to this is not recorded, but no clear resolution seems to 
have been made. There is something of a paradox here, as the burghs were calling for a 
reassertion of the convention’s position as their representative yet it was the burghs 
who were using other judges. Even if a degree of necessity and expediency had driven 
them to use the council, they seem to have viewed the convention as the ideal judge in 
their disputes. It was certainly not being ignored by the burghs and was continuing to 
show at least some, if increasingly limited, effectiveness in dealing with their 
complaints. 
 
While disputes were not uncommon, these were of course not the only causes of 
burghal appeals to the convention. There were areas where it lost significantly to the 
crown and parliament before the 1680s, namely in granting impositions and voluntary 
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contributions to individual burghs. In the first half of the century, burghs would go to 
the convention to ask its permission to approach the king for an impost on particular 
goods or at a particular bridge in order to raise money for a building or repair project. 
This was not a statutory requirement, but was standard practice.
37
 However, in 1653 
Montrose went straight to the English regime in asking for liberty to place an 
imposition on each boll of malt traded in the town to pay off some of its debt, 
something the convention would traditionally have given licence to appeal for. 
Edinburgh also went to the regime, being granted an imposition on ale and beer in 
1653 to defray its debt.
38
 After the Restoration, burghs appealed to the privy council or 
directly to the king for such imposts, and a tradition that had disappeared during the 
Interregnum never returned. Glasgow borrowed £1,000 sterling (£12,000) to give as a 
gratuity to those, particularly secretary of state Melfort, who had helped them gain an 
imposition from the king on various types of alcohol, to be put towards defraying their 
debt.
39
 Inverness even went to parliament in 1681 in its appeal for an imposition on 
certain goods crossing its bridge, in order to raise money to build a new bridge, though 
this seems to have been unusual.
40
 This general trend may indicate a little less regard 
for their fellow burghs on the part of the appellants and perhaps a weakening of urban 
solidarity, as they were not seeking the consent of the burghs whose merchants would 
be penalised by such impositions. 
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Voluntary contributions had also traditionally been warranted by the convention and 
this role was also almost entirely lost to the privy council.
41
 This simply shows that the 
other bodies had wider influence and could authorise collections from a wider 
constituency than that of the convention. It is clear that the convention had not entirely 
lost influence in this as it occasionally played a role in the contributions, with Dundee 
waiting for the convention’s approval of a warrant to Inverkeithing before taking a 
collection in 1666 and the convention often recommending that the burghs adhere to a 
contribution already granted by the council.
42
 There were still instances where the 
convention, as well as recommending to other burghs that they should contribute to a 
collection, actually authorised one, such as in 1669 when the burghs were 
recommended to ‘contribute a favourable supplie’ for building projects in Burntisland, 
Kinghorn, Culross, Forres and Nairn.
43
 These five burghs could not each expect to 
receive a large amount from this collection, further indication of why the convention 
was little used in such appeals. Dumbarton did appeal for a voluntary contribution 
through the whole burghs for aid with its flood defences, but the petition was 
seemingly not even discussed in the general convention and the appeal appears to have 
been fruitless, perhaps a reflection of the convention’s acceptance that this was no 
longer its preserve.
44
 
 
With the loss of its ability to act regarding imposts and voluntary contributions, the 
convention does seem to have grown in importance as a source of handouts. Such 
grants were made throughout the period to meet various needs and, other than the odd 
gift from the crown such as the gift of £162 sterling (£1,944) for St Andrews’ pier and 
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bridge, were the preserve of the convention.
45
 These contributions were not granted to 
many burghs, and seem to have become accessible mainly to those with a major 
project on their hands, such as Aberdeen’s harbour and Inverness’s and Dumbarton’s 
stone bridges. For small burghs with small projects this would mean that few sources 
of help existed, and the convention’s grants could have been a lifeline for them. Grants 
in the earlier part of the period, such as the 300 merks (£200) given to Whithorn for 
harbour repairs in 1660, were rare, but they did increase in the late 1670s and 1680s.
46
 
This was perhaps a reflection on the financial struggles of the burghs which will be 
considered in chapter three. 
 
Many of the grants were made after a visit from a committee of local burghs. Their 
usefulness as a gauge of the condition of the burghs, when considered alongside 
handouts, requests for reductions in proportions of the tax roll, exemptions granted and 
dues discharged, shall also be examined in chapter three. A visit was not a guarantee 
that aid would be forthcoming, however; of three visits commissioned in 1673, only 
the report from Ayr is recorded in the convention minutes. And although its condition 
was found to be ‘verie low’ and was recommended to the general convention in 1675 
(indicating how long this process took), neither the convention minutes nor Ayr’s 
council minutes record any aid being given.
47
 Many of the results of visits are not 
recorded by the convention, but others did result in aid being given. Two reports 
remain of visits to Renfrew and Montrose in 1688, and in that year Montrose was 
granted £25 sterling (£300) ‘to relieve their necessities’, while Renfrew received 500 
merks (£333 6s 8d) to help it rebuild its tolbooth.
48
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A visit was not a prerequisite for awarding money to a burgh, with many simply 
responses to appeals. Inevitably, as with visits, not all appeals were successful. 
Presumably due to the volume of these requests, the convention does not seem to have 
been able to answer all of them successfully. In 1669, help for three burghs was to be a 
head of the missive for the next convention but was apparently never raised. No 
answer was recorded to Crail’s request in 1680 and Pittenweem in 1688 had its request 
refused, though it was recommended to the privy council for aid. All grants were 
conditional, Whithorn being ordered to repay its grant when it was found not to have 
been used properly, though it later received another grant of the same value, £10 
sterling (£120). As in this case, many grants were given as set sums of anything up to 
600 merks (£400) to St Andrews for their relief or even £600 to Linlithgow in defence 
of an action by the duke of Hamilton concerning its port at Blackness. Some were paid 
from the revenue that the agent received in fines for absence. In 1680, Arbroath and 
North Berwick each received a quarter of the fines that the agent collected for absence 
from that general convention, a further £400 from the fines three years later and, after 
North Berwick was granted £200 in 1685, Arbroath received the same amount in the 
following year as the fines paid by Ayr and Irvine for their absence.
49
 Interestingly, the 
£400 was granted to Arbroath after a vote to determine whether it should be 
proportioned among the burghs by the tax roll or given from the fines, showing that the 
burghs recognised that using the fines in this way would be less of a burden on them 
than an extra imposition.
50
 These were not easy gifts to get. St Andrews paid so much 
in gaining the grant of 600 merks that it had to be stented on the town in order to be 
repaid, though the actual amount is unfortunately not specified in the council minutes, 
while its reduction in the tax roll the following year was also gained only ‘with great 
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difficultie and pain’.
51
 This indicates how important to the burghs these gifts were, and 
shows that the convention had not lost all ability to assist the burghs, who in turn had 
not lost all faith in the convention. Despite losing its role in granting contributions, it 
could still be effective in giving help to the burghs. 
 
Many appeals for help, however, went directly to the privy council or parliament rather 
than going through the convention, again suggesting that to some extent it was losing 
some of its influence with individual burghs. Many such appeals were from the larger 
royal burghs, the ones with the influence and money to pursue things without the 
weight and finance of the convention behind them. In 1663 Perth commissioned its 
provost to take a list of grievances to parliament ‘and attend those in power for 
redressin the same’. The list contained numerous items relating to the burgh’s losses in 
the 1640s and 1650s, and of course there was no obligation on it to seek the 
convention’s help on this – though perhaps if it had the lack of parliamentary action on 
the issue could have been avoided.
52
 Both Aberdeen and Dundee appealed directly to 
the court, respectively via Lauderdale concerning a fear of misrepresentation before 
the king and the conservator representing losses to him, and did not seek the 
convention’s help.
53
 Larger burghs also bypassed the convention on matters other than 
requests for aid. In 1667, Dundee’s commissioner to the convention of estates was 
instructed to concur with Aberdeen’s commissioner on the customs of the plaiding, 
and though the issue did not arise in the estates it suggests that the two burghs were 
less concerned with working with the other royal burghs than they were with 
protecting their own interests in that trade.
54
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The larger burghs were not the only ones to bypass the convention in appeals. Some 
smaller burghs represented their losses, particularly from the early 1650s at the hands 
of the English armies, to parliament in 1661. One of them, Anstruther Wester, asked 
the convention’s concurrence in its appeal which related to the loss of shipping and 
thus trade and which sought exemption from cess and other public burdens. On the 
report of neighbouring burghs which confirmed its ‘most deplorable’ condition, the 
convention agreed to help. A few weeks later, parliament referred this petition back to 
the convention, along with others from Anstruther Easter, Crail and Kilrenny.
55
 
Parliament was presumably not willing to allow complete exemption, but would allow 
the convention to exempt them from its tax roll – which would mean that the other 
burghs would be required to cover what they were not paying. Anstruther Wester’s use 
of the convention did not gain it its desired exemption, but unlike the other burghs it 
did show some faith in the ability of the convention to positively influence parliament 
in its favour. 
 
In the same session of parliament, Crail, Kilrenny and Anstruther Easter, this time with 
Pittenweem, sought to have their rights to fishing in the Northern Isles and elsewhere 
confirmed, and to be preferred to foreigners in fishing and buying fish.
56
 The 
convention might have wished to be involved in the representation of this issue as 
something of interest to other burghs involved in fishing, but it seems to have been 
bypassed as these four burghs recognised that they could approach parliament directly. 
Though other burghs may not have gained the same benefit as if they had gone through 
the convention, they were spared the time that it would have taken for it to deliberate 
and present a case. Some of the matters which bypassed the convention were clearly 
outwith its jurisdiction, such as St Andrews’ appeal to parliament in 1685 for help for 
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the guard bridge to be repaired. This was granted ‘furth of some vacand stipend’, and 
though the convention was often approached for help with building projects, 
parliament or privy council had to authorise the use of vacant ministerial stipends.
57
 
 
Despite the involvement of the crown and parliament, a large number of appeals still 
came to the convention, many relating to financial issues. Some of these were clearly 
within the convention’s usual jurisdiction. It was occasionally asked to approve a 
burgh’s conduct in setting its common good, in its capacity of ensuring that the 
common good of the royal burghs was properly used. Throughout the period, requests 
for advice in improving parts of burghs’ common lands and particularly in the sale or 
long-term leasing of it came to the convention. Most requests concerned the setting of 
land for terms longer than a year, which burgh records show was the usual length of a 
tack. Some, such as Selkirk’s request to sell a mill to a local laird, were approved after 
reports from local burghs. Queensferry’s request to sell part of its common ground, 
however, was rejected and it was told to improve the ground so that it could be set for 
the highest possible price instead. Brechin was permitted to set its common lands and 
moor with advice of the bishop. Other requests, such as Haddington’s in 1687, appear 
to have been made retrospectively.
58
 All these cases indicate that the burghs recognised 
that the convention retained an important role in legitimising the use of their own 
common good, even when it was to relieve their own burgh in increasing revenue or 
paying debts. When their proposals were not accepted, the burghs were willing to 
accept the convention’s ruling, despite its lack of legal authority to rule in these 
matters, a strong indicator of their continued sense of a place – or even a need – for the 
collective action and opinion of the burghs. In order to retain their wider privileges, 
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they had to continue to act in a manner appropriate to a royal burgh to stay within the 
convention, indicating its continued importance. 
 
Another type of appeal regularly and unsurprisingly brought before the convention was 
for a reduction in the proportion of the burghs’ tax roll paid by an individual burgh. 
Glasgow protested at being raised by £3 in the stent roll in 1683, with Kirkcaldy, 
Montrose and Elgin also protesting at their proportions being raised. Glasgow’s 
commissioner went so far as to take instruments against the burghs’ clerk for refusing 
to extract an instrument against the convention ‘for their illegall proceeding in that 
affair’, perhaps because it had also decided that alterations to the roll would not be 
considered for another five years, though this action does not seem to have gone very 
far.
59
 One cannot read too much into this as regards the relationship between the 
convention and individual burghs, as it was only natural that each burgh should try to 
limit the proportions of taxation and other burdens it had to pay. Yet there were 
attempts to put external pressure on the convention for a change in the tax roll. 
Aberdeen in 1670 instructed its commissioner to the general convention and 
parliament to appeal to the latter if its proportion was raised – when it was raised, it 
repeated the instruction. However, its commissioner advised against this course of 
action, suggesting that ‘to goe to the parliament for consultation (as matters stand) 
would doe little good and might prove of dangerous consequence’.
60
 The fact that it 
would even consider going directly to parliament on a matter which was the 
responsibility of the convention shows a level of disregard for the convention and a 
willingness to bypass it when a favourable answer was not given. 
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Again, such action was not the preserve of the larger burghs. In 1680 Pittenweem 
decided that its commissioner to the next session of parliament should ‘petitione for 
ane ease of the heavy burdings imposed on this burgh now when all our able 
neighbours are fled and removed’.
61
 In 1682, after failing to gain anything from 
parliament, Pittenweem was granted 100 merks (£66 13s 4d) by the convention for its 
relief and was given a significant reduction in its tax proportion the following year. 
They seem to have been forced to recognise that a direct appeal to parliament was not 
as beneficial as an appeal to the convention, which dealt with such matters.
62
 In 1681 
St Andrews also went to parliament to seek its help in getting a reduction of its 
proportion in the burghs’ tax roll, and though parliament was unable to force the 
convention to do anything, it did recommend to it that the petition should be acted on 
in St Andrews’ favour. The convention granted the burgh 600 merks for its relief in the 
following year’s general convention, and at the alteration of the tax roll its share was 
significantly reduced, suggesting that a direct appeal to parliament could reap rewards 
in the convention for the burgh in question.
63
 There is thus a suggestion that these 
burghs were losing faith in the convention, but recognised that its decisions would be 
respected by parliament and resigned themselves to accepting it.  
 
Appeals for enrolment also came to the convention, with eight burghs enrolled as royal 
burghs after the Restoration. All of the burghs enrolled in the period had charters 
granted much earlier. However, as MacDonald argues, a charter itself was no 
guarantee of access to either convention or parliament. In 1550-1651 at least, the 
convention had the final say, through the process of enrolment, over which burghs 
were erected in reality as royal burghs. Five of these eight burghs were enrolled in 
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1661, three of them (Fortrose, Cromarty and Wick) ten days after appearing in 
parliament for the first time, while Kintore had first been in parliament in 1579 and 
Inverurie in 1612. This, with the fact that these five had their commissioners’ 
qualifications scrutinised by the convention eight days before they were actually 
enrolled, might suggest that the convention was presented with a fait accompli and had 
to enrol them. Such a view is perhaps supported by the enrolment of Inverbervie just 
20 days before that burgh first appeared in parliament in 1670.  
 
On the face of it this could be challenged. MacDonald suggests that the convention 
was not troubled by the failure of Kintore and Inverurie to enrol due to their irregular 
attendance at parliament. Both Rosemarkie (enrolled with Chanonry as Fortrose) and 
Cromarty sought admission earlier than their eventual enrolment, in 1656 and 1660 
respectively, when there was no Scottish parliament and when enrolment may have 
been seen as the access simply to trading privileges or to representation with other 
northern burghs in a British parliament. Kirkwall had also sought admission in the year 
previous to its first appearance in parliament in 1670. Yet Kirkwall and Inverbervie 
must have been summoned to the 1669 session of parliament. This was the first session 
of Charles II’s second parliament and it seems unlikely that a burgh would be 
summoned to the second session in 1670 when the parliament had already begun and 
elections had been held. They were clearly not present, and unfortunately the sederunt 
of the 1669 session does not include absentee burghs, while the treasurer’s accounts of 
the period do not give enough detail to determine whether or not they were summoned 
that year or even when the precepts of summons were issued.
64
 However, on the 
assumption that it is most likely that they were summoned, of these seven only 
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Fortrose and Cromarty sought enrolment before being considered parliamentary 
burghs, and even they sat in parliament before their enrolment. This challenges the 
contention from the earlier period that the convention had the final say in which burghs 
could go to parliament, and thus effective control over which burghs were erected as 
royal burghs, suggesting that the crown was seeking more control over the 
composition of the estate and taking this away from the burghs themselves. 
 
This does not change the fact, however, that these burghs still sought enrolment in the 
convention. Whether or not anything can be assumed from the fact that Kirkwall and 
Inverbervie did it before they actually sat in parliament is unclear; it may be that they 
felt it would give them legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the estate. But it is 
significant that they sought it at all, and this suggests that they saw an inherent value in 
membership of the convention. Parliamentary representation was clearly not the 
advantage they sought, though access to the trading privileges of the royal burghs may 
have been attractive. It is not too hard to imagine that all seven saw the convention as a 
useful and probably influential body, and saw the potential good that collective action 
could do them now that they had access to parliament.  
 
Stranraer was a more unusual case, having gained its charter in 1617, but despite its 
best efforts never having been admitted to convention or parliament due to Wigtown’s 
opposition, which caused the suspension of its erection in 1629. However, in the 1680s 
Wigtown pressured it to enrol or pay part of Wigtown’s tax burden due to the 
competition it posed, presumably acting on the strength of its charter of 1617, and 
perhaps having been encouraged by the 1672 act which transmitted many of the royal 
burghs’ trading rights to burghs of barony and regality. After a visit from Ayr to try to 
resolve the dispute Stranraer stated in 1683 that it would rather enrol than ‘haue any 
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dependence upon the burgh of Wigtown’, appearing in parliament for the first time two 
years later as perhaps the only burgh to be pressured into enrolment against its own 
will. Unfortunately it is not clear when its position changed from a desire to be 
enrolled to not wanting enrolment; but if it was trading largely on the strength of its 
royal charter, this may have been its undoing as it gave Wigtown the leverage to force 
it to bear the burdens of a royal burgh as well as enjoying the trade which troubled 
Wigtown.
65
 
 
Extra-urban disputes 
The area of disputes between the royal burghs and landowners and unfree burghs has 
received a fair amount of attention from historians, though not necessarily with much 
mention of the convention itself. Yet this is a key part of the burghs’ relationship with 
the convention as it covers a vast proportion of the appeals from the burghs. The 
assumption in older works seems to have been that the threat posed by unfree burghs, 
particularly after the 1672 act in their favour and in accordance with the frequent 
complaints of the royal burghs, was an active one.
66
 More recent work has tempered 
this, questioning the extent of the activity and thus the threat of these burghs, while not 
denying it. The growth in baronial burghs and market centres in the late seventeenth 
century, well documented by both Lynch and Whyte, was certainly a challenge even 
though not all new centres were a success. As Lynch described it, this represented ‘a 
marked shift in the control of the economy from town to country’.
67
 The threat varied 
between royal burghs, but so many new market centres could only take trade away 
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from the royal burghs’ own markets, one of the major complaints of the royal burghs.
68
 
Aberdeen was one burgh which seems to have suffered from the promotion of Old 
Aberdeen, which prospered and grew in population, with a ‘thriving merchant 
community’ as Aberdeen struggled and saw a declining population.
69
 Yet Whyte also 
points out that this growth in ‘rural service centres’ indicates ‘an expansion of internal 
trading activity within the Scottish economy’, which could suggest that these centres 
were not so much taking trade as creating it.
70
 Interestingly, a contemporary merchant 
believed that the erections of new centres would be unsuccessful in creating trade, as 
the proliferation of markets would mean that no market would be large enough to 
attract the foreign merchants who had frequented them, occasionally from Holland, 
France and Flanders as well as England and Ireland.
71
 
 
Though it may have varied regionally and been overstated at times, the threat from 
new market centres to the royal burghs was a genuine one. There is less certainty over 
the threat to the royal burghs’ foreign trade after the 1672 act. Brown suggested that, 
despite the merchants’ fears, ‘competition did not particularly damage the royal 
burghs’.
72
 Smout noted that very few from these unfree burghs were engaged in 
foreign trade except on a small scale to England and Ireland, and that ‘those in the 
burghs of regality and barony were usually less interested in trade than the great nobles 
who pressed their claims for their own ends’, nobles who, while promoting trade 
particularly if they were owners of coal and salt works, largely consumed their own 
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imports rather than selling them on.
73
 It was the landlords who drove the erection of 
these new centres, and again good research has been done on their activities as 
entrepreneurs, often based around coal and salt works which then developed their own 
burghs for exporting these commodities ‘outwith the trammelling monopolies of the 
Royal Burghs’.
74
 It is thus not surprising that the vast majority of cases of dispute, and 
a large proportion of all matters, that came before the convention concerned royal 
burghs and local landowners and their baronial burghs and market centres – a pattern 
set in the late sixteenth century which continued and increased after the Restoration.
75
 
 
Claims regarding economic competition from local landowners and burghs were not 
the only external problems the burghs faced. Some of these others were economic 
issues if not relating to direct competition, concerning impositions on burghs, 
particularly by shires. Perth did not go to the convention in a dispute over someone 
who had gained a gift of imposing customs on linen, cloth and yarn, but after a brief 
hearing at court delayed the case, a settlement was made directly with him, removing 
any potential requirement for help from the convention in future.
76
 However, the 
convention was clearly willing to support the burghs regarding customs at markets, 
including those outwith the royal burghs, which must have been an encouragement to 
burghs facing this and similar situations. The agent and all the burghs resolved in 1665 
‘to proceed against heritors for exacting exorbitant customs at markets’, a problem 
which had been raised in the 1650s but on which action had been delayed due to the 
hiatus in the administration of justice before the Restoration. Nairn actually had control 
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of its markets taken away by some gentlemen, and gained the convention’s aid in their 
recovery.
77
 Dundee and several other burghs complained against the card manufactory 
in Leith for making illegal demands that merchants should sell only their cards and 
demanding oaths from them, and a petition was sent by the convention to the 
exchequer. In 1688, a number of cases were to be given assistance by the agent 
regarding various impositions. The bishop of the Isles was exacting new customs on 
fishing, some merchants were being charged for importing ‘wooll cards’, and some 
others were applying to be free of an imposition on brandy.
78
 
 
Some of these cases relate less to aggressive landowners and more to a national 
economic policy which was seeking to promote manufactures with the use of 
monopolies, but such landowners were able to encroach on a burgh’s privileges in 
more ways than simply establishing new burghs or market centres and the convention 
was often called on to help the royal burghs in these other cases as well. In 1678, 
Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Aberdeen successfully helped Wick gain an act of the privy 
council against Caithness, which was demanding that the burgh pay part of the shire’s 
public dues, when it actually paid with the royal burghs. Ayr and Irvine also 
complained against their shire for imposing a ‘locality of corne and strae contrare to all 
law and custome’, and the agent was commissioned to take the matter to the privy 
council.
79
 Kintore and Inverurie in 1669 had also had the help of the burghs’ agent in 
their successful action before the privy council against Aberdeenshire for charging 
them with part of the shire’s cess and for a levy on horses from which they were 
exempt.
80
 Ayr, however, had previously acted alone in appealing to the privy council 
for relief from the excessive amount of excise the shire was demanding from it, and the 
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quartering it had been subjected to for not paying. Though Ayr gained an act of council 
in its favour, the shire continued to demand the sum and the following year another 
successful appeal to the council was made, though this did not stop the shire seeking 
permission to levy an extra imposition on top of the excise two years later.
81
 Whether 
this case had given Ayr a recognition of the difficulty of taking on such cases alone, or 
Irvine’s involvement in the later case prompted them to seek convention help, its 
independent action in the earlier matter does not suggest any lessening of its reliance 
on the convention. That the landed classes were trying to cause royal burghs to pay a 
share of the shire tax and other dues might suggest that the shires were struggling to 
pay their own share. However, given the more direct and aggressive ways in which 
landowners were trying to encroach on royal burghs’ privileges it seems more likely 
that trying to avoid paying their share is another symptom of their aim for economic 
gain at the expense of the royal burghs. 
 
This is also seen in direct encroachments, which were not uncommon and which 
almost certainly had economic gain in mind: for example, in 1668 Selkirk was given 
assistance by the convention in prosecuting a laird for ‘violentlie’ encroaching on its 
common good; the following year Renfrew received 20 dollars (£58) and the agent’s 
help against two lairds who had taken possession of its common lands; while in 1680 
the convention agreed to help Dysart defend against two landlords who ‘intend by 
reasone of thair waik and mean condition … to take away their haill common good’.
82
 
The exact nature of the violence involved in Selkirk’s case is unclear, but there were 
other cases of violence being used against royal burghs. The motives behind the assault 
by some gentlemen on Elgin’s tolbooth, in which one resident was killed and burgh 
officers wounded and in prosecution of which the convention gave its assistance, are 
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unclear.
83
 However, the larger attack in 1664 on Aberdeen’s fishing on the Don was 
almost certainly an attempt to remove the burgh’s ability, if not its right, to take 
advantage of the fishing. As its commissioner was to report to the convention, 
the Earle of Marr and certaine wther noblemen & free holders wpon the water 
of done with ther associats & attenders had latlie convocat in armes about tuo 
thousand five hundreth men horse and foutt and had come doune and violentlie 
brockin downe the croves wpon the water of done belonging to the said burgh 
and therby incroached wpon the Townes priviledges and liberties they being 
superiors of the saids croves.
84
 
Given the size of the attack it is hardly surprising that, after appeal was made to the 
convention, the burgh was given the support of Edinburgh’s dean of guild and one of 
its commissioners, as well as a sum of money, to prosecute the offenders and redress 
the damage done.
85
 
 
These cases show that the convention’s aid in such matters was valued, though Dundee 
appears to have had a tendency to favour independent action, as in disputes with the 
shire over its attempts to establish a ferry at Broughty (which would provide 
competition for Dundee) and with the laird of Blackness over his use of some land to 
which the burgh believed it had the rights.
86
 Precisely why it should have any 
reluctance to approach the convention for assistance is not clear, especially as it was 
the body which sought to ensure that burghs’ common lands were properly used. It 
could be that these cases were considered straightforward enough that a burgh of 
Dundee’s size did not need help. This would be supported by the fact that the cases 
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above in which Ayr, one of the middling group of burghs in terms of wealth, did not 
seek convention aid (against the shire) were very quickly and easily settled by the 
privy council – smaller burghs, on the other hand, would have been less able even to 
pursue simple cases with their meagre common funds. However, while this may work 
as a general rule, its applicability to Dundee is less easy. Its size alone does not 
account for it, as Aberdeen sought help from the convention. The fact that Edinburgh 
never approached the convention for help in this period is not particularly informative, 
given that its greater financial strength and influence would enable it to pursue its own 
cases more effectively, especially with the courts sitting in its own burgh. As shall be 
seen below, Dundee did not seek aid from the convention in much more significant 
cases which it then lost, while it was not in a strong financial position. It could be that 
its previous status as the second most wealthy burgh had left a sense of pride in its 
independence and a desire to retain that despite its changing situation, or simply that 
Dundee did not trust in the convention’s ability to resolve matters – though any faith in 
the burgh’s own ability proved misplaced. 
 
Other external disputes related to the constitutional rights of the royal burghs. A 
number of burghs had disputes with the local sheriff regarding their respective 
jurisdiction over prisoners. Royal burghs were obliged to keep prisoners on behalf of 
the sheriff, but the burgh magistrates had shrieval jurisdiction within their own burgh. 
As discussed in chapter six, in 1688 the king allowed the burghs to refuse to take any 
prisoners sent from shires without sufficient supply being given for their maintenance. 
However, some of the problems were much more fundamental than that, as in 
Kirkcaldy’s case in 1683 when it complained successfully to the privy council that the 
sheriff depute was encroaching on its privileges by summoning and fining its 
 44  
inhabitants for being disorderly, when this was its responsibility.
87
 Though the burgh 
decided not to involve the convention in this – perhaps because it considered it a 
straightforward matter of asserting the extent of their jurisdiction – Rothesay did seek 
the convention’s aid in 1664 when the sheriff of Bute committed a riot, ‘releiveing 
[them] of thair prisoneris without thair ordour and beating of thair saidis magistratis, 
and wtheris incivilities’.
88
 
 
In at least two cases the authority of a royal burgh was challenged by a hereditary 
constable, who had rights of criminal prosecution within certain areas, such as that 
around the castle of Dundee, which could overlap a burgh’s own jurisdiction. Forfar 
approached the convention in 1673 and received the assistance of Perth, Dundee and 
Montrose in defending an action by the earl of Kinghorn over the constabulary of the 
burgh. The assistance was conditional: if the earl’s rights were valid, Forfar would give 
up the case; otherwise it would receive 100 merks (£66 13s 4d) and the agent’s help in 
the action, which was eventually requested by Dundee and Perth. After three years it 
won the case at the expense of losing the customs of one of the fairs in the burgh.
89
  
Incidentally, Forfar had in the previous year bypassed the convention completely in 
taking an appeal against a local laird directly to the privy council, indicating that any 
individual burgh did not necessarily favour one avenue of appeal over another.
90
 It 
seems significant that the more important of these appeals, both in terms of the subject 
matter and the opponent, went to the convention, which was obviously regarded as 
necessary and able to provide assistance.   
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Dundee’s battle with Charles Maitland of Hatton, Lauderdale’s brother, over the 
constabulary of that burgh was unsuccessful and perhaps highlighted the folly of their 
unwillingness to seek the aid of the convention despite the seriousness of the case. 
Hatton had been granted the estate of Dudhope after the death of the earl of Dundee. 
Mackenzie, in describing how the favouring of Hatton added to Lauderdale’s 
unpopularity, wrote that having obtained the Dudhope estate, ‘he did use it somewhat 
rigidly, and obtained such decreets before the session, that they were believ’d to be 
innovations of our law’.
91
 In December 1675, the burgh treasurer was sent to 
Edinburgh to get a commission from the privy council to hold an assize and try two 
thieves, taking Charles I’s charter to the burgh stating that the provost was the 
principal sheriff in the burgh and its territories. It was obviously concerned that Hatton 
would challenge its right to judge in this case. Its concern was justified, as both Hatton 
and the earl of Southesk, sheriff of Forfarshire, appealed to the privy council claiming 
jurisdiction, and the case was settled in favour of Hatton though Dundee’s shrieval 
rights were apparently left intact. After the burgh failed to hand over the prisoners, 
made more difficult by their escape, Hatton’s legal action resulted in three people, 
including the provost and dean of guild, being removed from office in December 
1676.
92
 Losing may have been a factor in further disputes with Hatton, relating to 
certain lands and fees Hatton claimed from the burgh and the jurisdiction of the 
tolbooth in the late 1670s, and his attempts to impose a minister on the burgh in the 
early 1680s. While at least some of the earlier decisions were decided in Hatton’s 
favour (with his brother still secretary of state and king’s commissioner), the latter was 
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decided in favour of the burgh despite the support of the bishop of Brechin for 
Hatton.
93
 
 
None of these matters was brought to the convention. The matter of the minister seems 
to be far from the convention’s usual activity, and previous cases had also not been 
brought to it. Kirkcaldy had given in to the wishes of Rothes, the chancellor and sheriff 
of Fife, in 1670 when he recommended a candidate as its second minister, though only 
after initially ignoring his wishes and discovering his unhappiness with that rejection. 
Fountainhall also records that the earl of Haddington had won a similar case against 
the burgh of Haddington.
94
 Yet, though religious matters were not the usual territory of 
the convention, the root issue was the same as in the other cases: the desire of local 
nobility or gentry to encroach on the jurisdiction of royal burghs. It is debateable 
whether or not the involvement of the convention in the cases against Hatton would 
have helped it much, given his indirect influence at court and direct influence as lord 
treasurer depute and a lord of council and session. But the added weight of the other 
burghs, in a matter which could potentially set a precedent against their rights, may 
have made a difference.  
 
Despite the result of Dundee’s actions against Hatton without the convention’s aid, it 
failed to seek such aid in 1686 when it again had to defend the magistrates’ right as 
sheriffs within the burgh. This time the opponent was John Graham of Claverhouse, 
who by a charter of 1684 was made the new constable of Dundee (Hatton having 
become earl of Lauderdale on his brother’s death) and also ‘first magistrate’ of the 
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burgh, an honorific title. Dundee protested against this to ensure that its privileges 
were not interfered with, and Lauderdale tried to raise an action against the provost for 
obstructing the constable. This would suggest that Claverhouse, like Hatton before 
him, had the favour of the crown. Although Claverhouse was confirmed in a case two 
years later as first magistrate, meaning ‘that he [should] have the precedence of first 
honor payed him befor the provest by all persones whomsoever within the said 
burghe’, the burgh was successful in retaining the privileges and jurisdiction of the 
magistrates.
95
 There seems to be a clear connection between all of these cases and the 
general trend of landowners seeking gain at the expense of the royal burghs, indicating 
that their tactics in assaulting urban privilege extended far beyond the creation of new 
burghs and markets. 
 
Another important case which did not come to the convention related to Glasgow’s 
rights regarding their elections. Glasgow was in a similar situation to Brechin, with the 
parliamentary and trading rights of a royal burgh but not having full freedom in 
elections, as the archbishop nominated its provost and bailies. The burgh had already 
tried, and almost succeeded, to free itself from this control (exercised by the dukes of 
Lennox in periods when there was no episcopacy) when it was made a royal burgh 
earlier in the century.
96
 In 1670, in a hiatus between archbishops, the dean of guild was 
commissioned to go to London to petition the king for the burgh to have free elections, 
‘as also to act and doe all things possible to obtain the right of the bailliarie and 
barronye of Glasgow, or quhat else may augment the liberties and priviledges of the 
burgh’.
97
 Essentially, the burgh’s desire was for the archbishop’s jurisdiction to be 
completely removed. There is no record of any appeal even being made to the 
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convention for support in this matter, but this may have been due to the fact that it 
needed swift action to have the matter represented to the king before an archbishop 
was in place to oppose its design. The dean of guild was sent to London in May, 
whereas it would have had to wait until at least July, when the next general convention 
was held, before a petition could be made, by which time the dean of guild was already 
on his way back. In the end it did not receive freedom of elections until after the 
Revolution, in 1690.
98
  
 
Glasgow’s case does not suggest the same stubbornness as Dundee seemed to display 
in avoiding the support that the collective burghs could offer. One other case relating 
to elections, this time showing more aggression from the landed classes, was resolved 
with convention support. In 1675 the agent was asked to support Arbroath which was 
trying to defend against the earl of Panmure whose servants were preventing the town 
from accessing some of its lands, and also against the earl of Airlie who appears to 
have been trying to take control of its elections. The former matter was resolved in its 
favour by the privy council, and the latter seems to have also been resolved as it 
reported no further problems, though the means of resolution are unclear. In its 
petition, Arbroath specified that its poor condition meant that it was unable to afford to 
pursue the action.
99
 This and similar clauses in many appeals from smaller burghs 
would suggest that money was a factor, if not the sole reason, behind a burgh’s 
decision whether or not to seek the convention’s aid. That does not mean that the 
convention had been reduced to a charity for the smaller burghs – Aberdeen’s case 
against those who attacked its fisheries on the Don indicates that the convention was 
still willing to support even the larger burghs in cases where their liberties were 
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challenged, perhaps because it wished to avoid a precedent being set for other 
landowners to mount such challenges against other royal burghs. 
 
The convention’s jurisdiction in all of these disputes was limited. It could try to 
enforce legislation, but if a perceived encroachment on a burgh’s liberties and 
privileges was not clearly outside legal boundaries, or if the transgressor would not 
submit to the convention’s ruling, the dispute had to be taken to the court of session or 
the privy council. Even in its enforcement of laws against individual unfree traders, it 
could not guarantee effectiveness, and this could explain why Aberdeen went to the 
privy council in 1662 to seek help against unfree traders, apparently without appealing 
to the convention for assistance.
100
 Yet this is quite surprising as, although in general 
anyone who was not a burgess or resident in a royal burgh was not technically under 
its jurisdiction, such cases usually gained the assistance of the convention as they 
concerned the liberties and privileges of the royal burghs as a whole. Even more 
surprising is that in 1670 the burghs’ agent said that he would assist Aberdeen before 
the court of session against unfree traders but would not do so on the common account 
of the burghs, even though the convention gave pensions to advocates to work on the 
burghs’ behalf.
101
 Why this should be the case is not clear, as cases like this, and those 
against landlords and unfree burghs, were usually brought before the convention. The 
majority of disputes regarding a burgh’s hinterland involved trade and economic 
competition from unfree burghs and markets, giving clear evidence that many 
landlords were active in challenging royal burghs and seeking to establish their own 
economic centres. Though protecting the burghs’ privileges in trade was so evidently 
the convention’s job, this was surely also the case in many of the matters detailed 
above which went to other bodies. The reason that so many cases continued to be 
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brought to the convention was almost certainly that there was a general recognition of 
the convention’s expertise, given that many of the members burghs were facing these 
problems, in handling them.  
 
While not all other appeals to the convention were fruitful, it seems that if a burgh 
sought help with a particular case of competition it would not be turned away. Some of 
this involved helping burghs to resist the foundation of new centres. Stirling in 1678 
took its own action in gaining an act of the exchequer ‘discharging any burgh of 
barronie or regalitie within two myles of the said burgh’.
102
 Dundee also, as it tended 
to, acted alone in trying to stop Hatton after it was informed that he had gained a 
signature for establishing Rottenrow (also known as Hilltown), trying to resolve the 
matter with him personally. This proved unsuccessful and the burgh was erected with 
Dundee’s attempts to take it in feu also unsuccessful, though it managed to buy it from 
Graham of Claverhouse fifteen years later.
103
 Nairn gained the assistance of the agent 
in 1669 against two lairds who were trying to establish a market at Auldearn, with 
apparent success as the parliamentary records do not record the establishment of a 
market there in 1669 or during any other sessions. Ayr in 1663 gained the assistance of 
Aberdeen, Linlithgow, Dundee and Glasgow in appealing to the commissioner against 
the grant to the earl of Eglinton for erecting the citadel there as a burgh of regality, 
though with little success judging by Eglinton’s parliamentary ratification in 1670.
104
 
 
Most actions with which the convention assisted were against burghs and market 
centres which were clearly already established – whether legally or not – and generally 
the help would take the form of the legal expertise of the agent, and usually (though 
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not in the case of Aberdeen in 1670) it would be on the common charge of the 
convention. For example, in 1669 the agent was ordered to assist Aberdeen and 
Linlithgow in prosecuting their actions against adjacent burghs of barony for usurping 
their privileges. In 1684 the agent was called to help Lanark against villages whose 
inhabitants were trading in restricted commodities to its prejudice. This came on the 
same day as the convention decided to assist Wigtown against heritors of the shire who 
were holding markets and damaging its own and who had 
pactioned amongst themselfs and resolved utterly to destroy the said burgh, and 
in order thereunto had intented action of reduction of their priviledges which 
they have upon their expenses defended all the last winter session.
105
 
Wigtown had clearly been acting alone in the matter initially, but this would almost 
certainly have been an interim measure to protect the burgh as best it could until the 
burghs in the general convention could offer their more substantial support. 
Aberdeen’s action against Kintore and Inverurie, however, did not gain convention 
support but instead saw those burghs enrolled in 1661, as discussed above, on the same 
day as Fortrose and Cromarty, despite Inverness’s action against those burghs.
106
 Some 
general actions were also supported by the convention, as in 1675 when Glasgow and 
some other burghs, with support of the agent and advice of Edinburgh and adjacent 
burghs, were supported in their case against unfree burghs which were taking the 1672 
act and claiming more rights than it actually gave them.
107
 
 
In a slightly stranger case, it appears to have been an unfree burgh, namely Greenock, 
which approached the convention. Its residents had already caused problems, with 
Renfrew and Inveraray in 1660 being ordered to force those they had made burgesses 
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to become resident in their burghs, presumably after complaints from other 
neighbouring burghs.
108
 After the 1672 act, however, Greenock seems to have 
attempted to get involved in trade, and it did so illegally in the view of Glasgow, 
Dumbarton and Renfrew. These three burghs did not appeal to the convention for help, 
despite their recognition that the matter was to the prejudice of all the western burghs, 
and it seems clear that this was because they were able to pursue the case on their own 
expenses, meeting after they had been pursuing the case in the winter of 1675-6 to 
settle the accounts together. As well as taking the case to the privy council, having 
initially seized a ship at Greenock, Glasgow decided to ask the archbishop to act in 
their favour in London. It seems that after this initial action, Renfrew and Dumbarton 
withdrew, though it was not until December 1676 that the privy council ruled against 
Greenock.
109
 However, Glasgow still seemed to be encountering problems, for in 
January 1677 it established a committee to consider action against Greenock, which 
the following month supplicated the privy council asking not to be prosecuted for its 
illegal trading but to be allowed to give its bonds and caution not to do so in future, 
which Glasgow accepted.  
 
A year later, differences still existed as Glasgow again tried to prosecute Greenock, 
and then in December 1679 Greenock remarkably approached the convention. It 
submitted an account of the differences between it and Glasgow and a group of burghs 
was ordered to go to Glasgow to settle the matter.
110
 As no more is recorded it can be 
presumed that the differences were indeed settled. Although the three royal burghs had 
decided not to use the collective resources of the convention, deciding with apparently 
sound reason that their own resources were sufficient, Greenock clearly recognised the 
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convention’s authority and ability to resolve the dispute with a resolution that would 
be binding on the royal burghs involved. It was willing to submit to its ruling, even 
though it was itself not a part of that body. This appears to be the only example in the 
period of an unfree burgh approaching the convention except in cases where one had 
been granted a voluntary contribution by the privy council and wanted to ensure it was 
collected among the burghs, though the slight possibility that others approached it and 
got no response cannot be entirely discounted. Yet the uniqueness of this example does 
not remove its interest; even if Greenock was the only non-royal burgh to show such 
respect for the convention’s rulings, it was under no obligation to do so at all. 
 
As many of these examples suggest, the convention’s direct involvement in such cases 
was often fleeting. An appeal would be made to it, some money might be granted and 
the agent would be assigned to help the burgh in the legal process, then he and the 
burgh would essentially be left to get on with it. The process for the burgh bringing the 
case was not so simple, and some cases took a long time to resolve. One of only two 
items recorded in the minutes of the convention during parliament in 1672 is a 
complaint in September from the provost of Dumfries that the earl of Nithsdale and his 
son, the Lord Maxwell, had erected a market near the burgh with no warrant. The 
convention recognised the threat not only to Dumfries but to the estate – should this set 
a precedent – and appointed the agent to provide assistance and ‘if neid beis to deburse 
and expend such sums of money as shall be thought requisit’.
111
 The problem had 
arisen in August when Maxwell had, in name of the act which transmitted some of the 
royal burghs’ privileges to burghs of regality and barony, appointed markets at two 
places including Bridgend of Dumfries, where he then set up a tron, as well as 
allegedly offering free customs for a year and ordering his tenants not to use the royal 
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burgh’s markets. Although the case was seemingly decided very quickly in the burgh’s 
favour by the privy council in November, February of the following year saw it 
continuing to act in the privy council and appealing to the provost of Edinburgh and 
the burghs’ agent to continue in their assistance. By July 1674, Dumfries was still 
pursuing the case before the court of session and was given a grant by the convention 
to help it do so. In November 1676, with the case still ongoing, the burgh took matters 
into its own hands as a bailie took a party of inhabitants to Bridgend to drive any cattle 
found there to Dumfries to be sold in its own market place. It was not until a year later 
that the case was finally settled, and for 1,000 merks (£666 13s 4d) and relinquishing 
their claim to any right at two other weekly markets in the region, Nithsdale gave 
Dumfries the benefit of the market at Bridgend.
112
  
 
The convention’s role in this case, as in others, was certainly deeper than its own 
minutes suggest and must have eased the burden on Dumfries somewhat. It was still an 
expensive case to pursue. The commissioner’s daily allowance while at Edinburgh was 
£4, while on the occasions later in the case when an assistant commissioner was 
required, he cost a further 5 merks (£3 6s 8d) per day. The provost’s charges at one 
winter session came to £175 14s, which, with the case lasting five years, would be a 
significant outlay for the burgh.
113
 Though it is not clear how much money the 
convention was able to grant, it is not likely to have been much, especially compared 
to the total cost of the case, yet it would have helped and was clearly considered worth 
applying for. 
 
Linlithgow’s dispute with Bo’ness indicates that the convention could do more than 
just leave a burgh to get on with a case after providing the initial support. The position 
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of Bo’ness as a potential access for traders from the west of Scotland to the Forth and 
thus the North Sea may have increased the importance of defending against it, 
suggesting that some of the royal burghs’ problems came from their own merchants – 
an issue examined below. From the very start it seems clear that the convention 
recognised that the threat of Bo’ness, some of whose inhabitants were trading illegally 
to the prejudice of many burghs on the Forth, in particular Linlithgow, could set a 
precedent for other unfree burghs. While it was Linlithgow which appealed to the 
convention and was to receive particular help, the resolution was to ‘concur with any 
burgh wronged by unfree traders’.
114
 This continued to be the understanding of the 
burghs regarding this action even after the 1672 act extended the legal bounds of 
Bo’ness and other burghs’ trade, as illustrated by Aberdeen’s instructions to their 
commissioner as late as 1680. He was told ‘not onlie in this effair bot also in the like to 
concurr … for the interest of the royall burrowes … for ye know what prejudice wee 
sustaine by Peterhead and Fraserburgh’.
115
 
 
Bo’ness had been granted the status of head office of the customs precinct of the upper 
Forth in the customs reorganisation under the English occupation. In 1656 Tucker 
stated that it, ‘next to Leith, hath of late beene the cheife port … in Scotland’, with 
Dutch merchants using it to avoid the customs at Leith.
116
 It was clearly flourishing. 
The dispute with Linlithgow escalated in 1662 when Bo’ness claimed the existence of 
a signature erecting it as a royal burgh, and Linlithgow protested that they had freedom 
of trade within the whole sheriffdom. A particular convention, apparently called to 
discuss only this matter, again recognised that it was of ‘werie great importance and of 
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generall concernment to the whole burrowis’ and agreed to concur with Linlithgow in 
defending its liberties. Linlithgow was also still attempting to have the customs office 
moved to its own port of Blackness, for which it gained the promise of the support of 
the agent and any other burghs present in Edinburgh when the action was brought to 
the exchequer. Some initial success was reported to the convention in 1665, with an act 
of the exchequer for merchant goods (anything which only royal burghs were allowed 
to trade) to be unloaded only at Blackness, while progress was continuing in stopping 
the erection of Bo’ness as either a royal burgh or a burgh of regality.
117
 
 
After a period of quiet on the matter, Linlithgow came again to the convention in 1669 
seeking its help before council and session as Bo’ness was ‘vsurping and incroatching 
wpon ther priviledges’ again. The convention decided to do all it could at the next 
parliament to get acts to remedy the situation and suppress ‘incroachments and 
invasions’ by unfree burghs.
118
 Despite acts of 1662 and 1678 in favour of Blackness, 
the erection of Bo’ness, at the duke of Hamilton’s request, as a burgh of regality in 
1668 and the act of 1672 seem to have ended the action. However, in 1680 Linlithgow 
accused Bo’ness of trading in commodities that were still the privilege of royal burghs 
and the convention again agreed to help it before the exchequer, as well as going to the 
king to get a representation from him to the session, as it was a matter of general 
concern. Linlithgow also received £600 to help them in the action, though with little 
apparent success.
119
 
 
The actions against Bo’ness certainly had mixed results, with Linlithgow’s struggles 
indicating the strength of the Hamilton interest that was against it and its burghal 
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allies, but the less prominent action by Stirling against Kilsyth and particularly Falkirk 
was a greater indicator of the strength of the landowning interest. The convention in 
1671 supported this action and wrote to Lauderdale asking him to appeal to the king to 
protect the royal burghs’ liberties against the unfree burghs, but the case was remitted 
to parliament and almost exactly a year later many of their privileges were 
communicated by parliament to the unfree burghs.
120
 
 
Though the convention’s actions show that there was a strong sense among the burghs 
of the need to work together and combine their resources in defence of their privileges, 
the case of Bo’ness also indicates a deep problem for it. In 1662, all former acts 
against merchant burgesses having a part in ships or goods with residents of unfree 
places, threatening them with loss of their freedom and £100 fines, were ratified. The 
magistrates of all burghs were ordered to cause their burgesses to obey these acts, with 
specific orders given to seven burghs – Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow, Glasgow, 
Dunfermline, Culross and Queensferry – whose merchants were partnering with 
unfreemen of Bo’ness.
121
 This does not seem to have made much of a difference. Sir 
Robert Sibbald in 1698, in considering how Scotland’s economy might be improved 
(with a particular emphasis on shipping and fishing), noted that, while Bo’ness had 
thirty ships compared to none previously, with some other sea ports doing well, other 
burghs ‘have fewer ships then they has, because the mater of Trade in these places is 
much failed be what it was’. Seamen were simply moving to where the trade was, and 
merchants, while retaining their place in their home burghs, seem to have done the 
same.
122
 Smout has shown that Edinburgh merchants were trading through unfree 
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burghs all along the Forth as far as Bo’ness, which was also an important access point 
to the North Sea and thus northern European markets for merchants from the west, 
particularly Glasgow, Ayr and Dumfries. These merchants were acting thus ‘even 
though the prosperity of their own towns might be hit by the rivalry of the unfree port 
they patronised’. Yet though this spread of trade away from the royal burghs may have 
affected them, Smout suggests that it ‘often accompanied an expansion and not a 
contraction of the activities of the royal burgh merchants’.
123
 Some of these merchants, 
with those of Edinburgh and Glasgow particularly active in this way, were also taking 
trade away from other royal burghs. They were certainly profiting from it: 22.3% of 
investment in the Darien project in the 1690s came from merchants from Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. This was less than half of what came from landowners, but was 
significantly more than merchants from all the other burghs put together, who 
contributed only 4.9%, part of just 7% from those burghs in total. Unfree burghs could 
contribute just 1%, indicating that smaller burghs ‘were not the ones with money to 
burn’.
124
 
 
The merchants of smaller burghs simply could not compete. Those in Montrose, a mid-
sized burgh, seem to have been forced to act as mere middle-men or agents for 
merchants from Edinburgh in particular, who were buying grain from local landowners 
and taking this trade from Montrose’s merchants. Smout suggests that merchants in the 
small or middling burghs ‘were becoming more and more content to receive their 
foreign imports indirectly from the Forth and Clyde’.
125
 This may well be the case, but 
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given that such a situation could affect the revenue of one of those other burghs, it 
seems unlikely that the burghs themselves were so content. 
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between the convention and individual burghs makes it clear that, 
despite an increasing role for the crown and even parliament, and some decrease in the 
influence of the convention, the burghs still greatly relied on it, and this cannot be 
ignored or underplayed. Yet it also displays the problems the burghs were facing. The 
landowners who promoted unfree burghs and new market centres were posing a threat 
to the royal burghs and their privileges through these means and in other ways. There 
does not seem to be much evidence that the inhabitants of these unfree burghs were 
exercising a great volume of trade. The report into the condition of the royal burghs in 
1692, discussed in chapter three, suggests that the trade they did have was largely 
inland, and not foreign, trade. However, this merely underlines a more subtle problem 
for the convention in trying to protect the burghs’ rights. Not only were the landowners 
an evident threat, individual merchant burgesses of some of the royal burghs were 
taking advantage of the act of 1672 and using unfree burghs for their own trade, further 
undermining the collective and individual position of the royal burghs. 
 60  
Chapter 2 
Edinburgh and the Convention 
 
One of the features of the convention was the dominance of Edinburgh. Neither 
Mackay nor Pagan in their rather different accounts of the convention particularly 
consider this issue, and the discussion of it has generally amounted to the recounting of 
facts such as its allocation of two commissioners compared to the one sent by other 
burghs. MacDonald is the exception to this rule, giving a whole chapter to ‘Edinburgh: 
The Capital and Parliament’ in The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland, with a specific 
examination of its role as ‘the convention’s standing committee’.
1
 That examination 
runs only to 1651, and through the Interregnum and into the Restoration period 
Edinburgh’s dominance remained and seems to have grown in some aspects, as 
parliament and conventions of estates sat more regularly and the peripatetic nature of 
general conventions almost disappeared. Paradoxically this was also the period which 
saw the greatest challenge to Edinburgh’s economic dominance among the burghs as 
the focus of trade shifted westwards and Glasgow grew rapidly. Yet while there were 
some challenges to Edinburgh from within the convention these were generally not 
serious, perhaps due to the level of extra responsibility Edinburgh bore with its 
dominance. The greatest challenge came from outside, as central interference impacted 
upon the capital more than any other burgh; given Edinburgh’s position, this would 
inevitably have some impact on the convention. 
 
Edinburgh’s dominance 
Given Edinburgh’s economic position within Scotland, as the largest burgh with the 
greatest share in foreign trade, its dominance of the body which governed most of 
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urban Scotland and regulated that trade does not seem unreasonable. Ian Whyte shows 
that while urban growth generally ceased after the early seventeenth century, 
Edinburgh (and Glasgow, which shall be discussed below) continued to grow. 
However, he also points out that Scotland is different from England and Ireland in that 
it ‘was not characterised by a single over-large primate city’, with the combined 
populations of the next four largest cities equalling or exceeding Edinburgh’s.
2
 It 
would thus have increased in size in relation to most of its nearest challengers, which 
in turn might be expected to have strengthened its relative economic position. 
However, Whyte and Lynch both suggest that after the Covenanting regime collapsed 
Edinburgh struggled economically. Its grip on trade at others’ expense ‘slackened 
markedly’, the burgh suffering a ‘spectacular collapse’ in the 1650s, which was 
perhaps a factor behind Glasgow’s rise.
3
 Although Glasgow and Aberdeen have been 
shown to have recovered well in trade during the 1650s, as discussed in chapter four, it 
seems that the other west-coast ports and Montrose also raised their share of trade, 
while even Dundee suffered less than the Edinburgh area.
4
 Yet all this must be set 
against the economic dominance of Edinburgh before the civil wars. Even though its 
relative position may have declined, Smout claims that it ‘easily’ remained the 
wealthiest town in Scotland and that, by the end of the century, Edinburgh merchants 
had spread their economic net over many burghs, as discussed in chapter one, 
seemingly reversing the trend described by Whyte after the 1640s.
5
 
 
This advantage in size and wealth could alone account for much of the burgh’s 
dominance in the convention. But Edinburgh was also the capital of Scotland, where 
the privy council and the court of session sat (making it the centre of the legal 
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profession), as did parliament and conventions of estates. These would of themselves 
have brought wealth into the city, with high consumption of luxury goods.
6
 They 
certainly meant that Edinburgh itself could pursue its own business very efficiently; 
committees of bailies and councillors were regularly established to give particular 
advice to its own commissioners during the sitting of parliament, in much the same 
way as the convention sought to brief the commissioners from the whole estate.
7
 But 
the presence of these bodies in Edinburgh also meant that the corporation was at the 
front line for the royal burghs in any political or legal action. Whether as an estate or 
individually, such action would have to go through the city, and so the corporation as 
represented in the convention was always likely to lead the line. As MacDonald put it, 
‘the burghs saw Edinburgh as their first line of defence, the guardian of their rights and 
privileges, their watchtower’.
8
 
 
In some ways this Edinburgh-centrism weighed heavily on the burgh. The council 
considered itself to have certain responsibilities regarding the king’s commissioner and 
other officers of state when they came to Edinburgh from London, going as far as 
Berwick in an abortive attempt to meet the commissioner there at the end of 1660.
9
 
Such trips were regularly made, with groups of burgesses sometimes required to 
provide armed guards. In 1663 a committee of three was ordered ‘to goe to Berwicke 
and meitt his Majesties Commissioner and to salute him in the Touns name with all 
dewtifull respect as becometh’, while some of the neighbours in the town were to meet 
them at Musselburgh and ‘convoy them to the Toun in solemne maner’.
10
 Similar 
attention was paid on the commissioner’s departure for London. The council meeting 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 132. 
7
 ECA, Edinburgh Council Registers, SL1/1/20, f.218v; Edinburgh Council Registers, SL1/1/21, f.119r; 
Edinburgh Council Registers, SL1/1/22, f.40r. 
8
 MacDonald, Burghs, 117. 
9
 Edin. Recs., 1655-1665, 222-3, 225. 
10
 Ibid., 322. 
 63  
on 31 December 1662 was cancelled as the whole council was ‘convoying his 
Majesties Commissioner in the entrie of his journey for Londoun’, while in 1678 some 
‘honest creditable nighboures’, along with the council, were to be given horses to 
accompany Lauderdale ‘some mylles af the citie in order to his jurney’.
11
  
 
In 1685 the privy council actually ordered the council to have the militia company 
ready to welcome the commissioner. The following day the council ordered that each 
captain have ten men 
in good order and equipage with partesans waiteing on the Magistrats at the 
water gaite at the receptione of his maties his Comissioner And appoynts the 
rest of the traine bands of the Cittie to be in ther armes in best apperill the day 
of the Incomeing of the Comissioners grace as also appoynts the Baillies of 
Leith & Cannongate to have ther Companies in radines.
12
 
This would have made an impressive display for the commissioner, and unsurprisingly 
had been seen before at the welcome of James, duke of Albany and York, as 
commissioner in 1679. Each of the 16 captains was to have 60 men ready, with the rest 
of the militia companies to be ready to obey the provost’s orders for receiving James. 
This was considered such a necessity that the captains were to be fined the remarkable 
sum of 1,000 merks (£666 13s 4d) for failure to obey, and each man 500 merks (£333 
6s 8d) for failure to attend. Interestingly the provost had already received specific 
instructions from the convention to congratulate James on its behalf upon his arrival, 
indicating that it recognised that Edinburgh’s actions could be used for the good of the 
burghs more generally.
13
 In 1677, however, the convention decided to send a 
committee of burgh commissioners to Edinburgh to meet Lauderdale with those from 
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that burgh, clearly having decided that as good an impression as possible needed to be 
made on behalf of all the burghs.
14
 
 
Feasts were also held at great expense, with one for the commissioner and parliament 
on the king’s birthday in 1661 being funded by a tax of £700 sterling (£8,400) on the 
inhabitants of the burgh. The actual final cost was slightly lower than this, but was far 
exceeded by the £14,779 15s 10d spent on a feast for the duke and duchess of York 
and the nobility in 1680.
15
 Members of the administration in Scotland and their 
servants and hangers-on were often made burgesses of Edinburgh without having to 
pay the usual dues associated with this. Feasts were usually given on these occasions, 
and this seems to have happened in most burghs. However, due to the close association 
with Edinburgh that these figures had, the numbers made burgesses were far greater 
than seen elsewhere. In 1679 the duke of Buccleuch and Monmouth was made burgess 
along with 72 attendants, while later the same year James and 117 attendants were 
made burgesses.
16
 Many people in high position, such as officers of state or lords of 
session, were made burgesses. Charles Maitland of Hatton’s appointment in 1675 
shows that it did not always follow immediately after their accession to high office, as 
he had been appointed a lord of session in 1669 and treasurer depute in 1671.
17
 But by 
1679 it seems to have been accepted by the council that those in high office should 
also be burgesses, as the lord clerk register and any lords of session not already 
holding that position were to be made burgesses.
18
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Edinburgh was of course not the only burgh which made a particular effort to impress 
and honour important members of the administration. As has been said, the practice of 
giving away burgesships gratis was common, while Glasgow made extensive 
preparations for a guard of honour when James visited the burgh, spending over 
£4,000, including nearly £1,600 on gifts for him and his servants when given their 
burgess tickets.
19
 Yet because it had far more opportunity to do so Edinburgh made 
these efforts far more often. Although it was expensive, it did also accord unique 
opportunities to display loyalty to the crown and hopefully gain a sympathetic ear for 
the promotion and protection of the burgh’s interests. Given the importance of 
Edinburgh’s position among the royal burghs this could have served the interests of the 
estate well. 
 
The more regular sitting of parliament and the fact that the administration remained 
firmly focused in Edinburgh were the major reasons for the severe limitation of the 
peripatetic nature of the convention after 1660. While particular conventions sat in 
Edinburgh, the general convention (usually beginning on the second Tuesday in July) 
had customarily moved from burgh to burgh, spreading the burden of sending the 
missives and hosting commissioners. More importantly it made access easier for 
outlying burghs and allowed more burghs the chance to represent their issues strongly 
to the convention. In the 1650s two out of the six general conventions were held 
outside of Edinburgh. The first three had all been there during the period of uncertainty 
over the right of the convention to continue meeting, and once the situation had 
become clearer it seems that the customary movement was deliberately resumed. 
However, between 1660 and 1688 Edinburgh hosted all but five of the 33 conventions 
of all burghs; those which sat during parliament or a convention of estates were not 
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always officially termed ‘general’ conventions.
20
 These were all between 1671 and 
1674 (except at Aberdeen in 1665) and were held in the other main burghs. One was 
the abortive convention at Stirling in 1674 which was followed by another full meeting 
at Edinburgh in August. In some parliamentary years Edinburgh hosted two full 
conventions. While there were advantages for the convention in meeting in the burgh 
which was the centre of power, this state of affairs also meant that Edinburgh had 
much greater opportunities to present its agenda and for this to dominate. This was 
enhanced by the fact that Edinburgh was the only burgh to have two commissioners at 
meetings of the convention. Edinburgh’s council also used the traditional right of the 
host burgh to appoint the moderator of the general convention as a supernumerary 
member – but stretched this to apply to particular conventions as well. Being in its 
home town this was not a financial strain for the council. It meant that Edinburgh had 
three representatives at almost all meetings of the convention in the period, as well as 
their assessors (assistants and advisors who could also stand in for a commissioner in 
the event of their inability to attend), and would doubtless use its numerical weight to 
its advantage. Neither of these matters passed unchallenged, as shall be seen below, 
but the challenges were fruitless and this increase in Edinburgh’s dominant position 
was maintained. 
 
Incidentally and predictably this prominent position was also seen in parliament, where 
Edinburgh was one of the burghs represented on the articles at every session in the 
period and on almost all committees. This included the committees for taxation at the 
conventions of estates and those for trade, while the commission for trade established 
in 1669 had Edinburgh’s provost and three of its bailies, with only four other burgh 
commissioners. This prominent position was limited in James VII’s parliament, where 
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Edinburgh was not on the committee for controverted elections, that in 1685 for 
discussing the affair between the royal burghs and burghs of barony and regality, or 
that in 1686 for considering trade and the mint. It is not clear why this should be the 
case given that both provosts at the time were crown nominees and thus it seems 
unlikely that James would have a problem with the burgh. Yet despite this anomaly it 
is clear that its pre-eminent position in the convention extended to the activity of the 
burghs in parliament.
21
 
 
There are many ways in which Edinburgh’s dominance in the convention was worked 
out in practice, in general administration and in specific action on behalf of the estate 
or individual burghs, often at the request of these burghs. MacDonald highlights how, 
before the 1650s, it was used as the ‘standing committee’ of the convention. It was 
lobbying the crown (and being consulted by it in burgh matters) through the privy 
council and almost certainly using its access to legal expertise in actions before the 
court of session. Its seal was also used to represent the consent of the whole burghs, it 
kept the records of the convention, had its clerk as the convention’s clerk, and was 
responsible for summoning particular conventions, as well as acting as the burghs’ 
leader within parliament.
22
  
 
Gillanders suggests that this influence among the burghs was weakened in the 1650s 
due to Edinburgh’s support for the Engagement, yet it remained prominent.
23
 In 1652 
it stepped in to prevent the English commissioners discharging the staple port at Veere, 
and after the 1653 general convention was disbanded a committee of the council was 
                                                 
21
 RPS, 1661/1/13, 1663/6/5, 1665/8/7, 1667/1/6, 1669/10/6, 1669/10/149, 1678/6/16, 1681/7/7, 
C1681/7/3, C1681/7/23, 1685/4/9, C1685/4/9, C1685/4/37, 1686/4/7; Edin. Recs., 1681-1689, 83-4, 
123, 153. 
22
 MacDonald, Burghs, 117-22. 
23
 Gillanders, ‘The Scottish Burghs’, 15. 
 68  
sent to Lilburne to find out why, successfully gaining his consent for a new meeting.
24
 
In 1654 Edinburgh successfully fought against the threatened imposition of magistrates 
on the burghs.
25
 Towards the end of the decade it took action on behalf of the burghs 
against someone who was posing as a privateer for Sweden and had seized two Dutch 
ships. When the trial date was changed, thus making it difficult for an appointed 
committee of burghs to attend, Edinburgh was given chief responsibility to follow the 
matter through.
26
 On other occasions, Edinburgh was given a lead role in dealing with 
particular issues such as the matters of the law regarding debtors and creditors and coal 
pricing.
27
 While much of this was done on the request of the convention, some was 
clearly done on Edinburgh’s own initiative. It had a clear willingness to assist other 
burghs, with its provost and clerk, William Thomson, in London acting on behalf of 
the burghs, though in the latter case this was on the direct request of the convention 
and the provost was accused by the council of being self-serving on his return from his 
second trip in 1658.
28
 Other burghs seem to have acknowledged the influence of 
Edinburgh, with Montrose asking it to work with the agent to have some of the burgh’s 
dues suspended.
29
  
 
This prominence continued throughout the Restoration period. It meant that 
Edinburgh’s dominant role was being put to the advantage of all the burghs, and that 
such a pre-eminent position bore with it great responsibilities. For example, as its 
provost was almost always the moderator of any convention, he could sign things on 
behalf of all of the burghs.
30
 Edinburgh’s position as the largest economic player 
among the burghs, coupled with this administrative role, meant that it was often called 
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upon to advance sums for the use of the convention. In 1660 it took the initiative and 
advanced £1000St (£12,000) to William Thomson who had paid the same sum to the 
king on behalf of the burghs.
31
 In 1682 it advanced various sums due to the clerk and 
others who had served the convention.
32
 On other occasions the burgh was in such a 
financial position that it could not afford simply to advance certain sums, and actually 
had to borrow to be able to pay. Within a month in 1661 £3,400 was borrowed to pay 
Lauderdale’s pension from the burghs and £300 sterling (£3,600) was borrowed as a 
particular convention had deemed it essential ‘for the necessarie affaires of the 
Burrowis’.
33
 These sums were borrowed on the basis that they would be repaid with 
each burgh bringing its proportion to the next convention, but as with any loan there 
was an element of risk for Edinburgh. Its administrative duties did come at a cost but 
meant that it could maintain its dominance.  
 
One of Edinburgh’s duties and privileges was in calling conventions. As shall be 
discussed more fully in chapter four, during the 1650s it regularly had to approach the 
English authorities to gain permission for the convention to meet. It was given direct 
responsibility by Monck for calling a general convention in 1657, which it did with the 
advice of 24 burghs it summoned for the purpose.
34
 More commonly this was at the 
specific order of the convention, when it was known that an issue would need to be 
discussed before the next general convention. Thus, in 1660 Edinburgh was 
empowered to call a particular convention of as many burghs ‘as can convenientlie be 
had’ when William Thomson returned from London; in 1679 it was to call one on 
receipt of a letter from Lauderdale about the conservator; while in 1683 the provost 
was to call one on the 50 sous French tax, and any other ‘emergent and important 
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affaire’, whenever he saw fit.
35
 While this did ensure that these matters could be dealt 
with at the most opportune time, it also gave Edinburgh considerable power in 
ensuring that things were done when it suited it. It certainly made sure that it was very 
clear, in a missive in 1676, that it was simply following the convention’s instructions 
in calling a meeting about the French tax at that particular time.
36
  
 
However, the convention also gave Edinburgh the right to call burghs on the off-
chance that anything of import arose, thus giving it power to determine not only when 
particular conventions should be held but also what should be discussed there. In 1668 
the provost was empowered to call up to 23 of the burghs closest to Edinburgh on any 
business which emerged, and this became a common, though not constant, entry in the 
minutes of the general convention in the late 1670s and early 1680s.
37
 Though it was 
the provost as moderator of the general convention who was given the right of calling a 
particular convention, he did consult the burgh council and it ultimately made the 
decision.
38
 Although this right gave Edinburgh a lot of power in relation to 
determining the timing and agenda of conventions, it is clear that the calls made were 
indeed responses to situations affecting all of the burghs. The first in the period 
resulted from complaints from magistrates of other burghs about the conduct of the 
excise collectors, and shows that Edinburgh was not merely working to its own agenda 
but was listening to and acting on the concerns of other burghs.
39
 This was seen again 
in 1680 when Linlithgow’s provost informed the council ‘that he hes a matter of 
importance to communicat wherin the state of the Royall Borrowes stands concerned’ 
and, with Edinburgh’s own provost having some issues to take to the burghs, a 
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particular convention was called; at the beginning of the period Linlithgow had 
prompted another particular convention over an alleged patent of erection for 
Bo’ness.
40
 A number of particular conventions were called when matters emerged 
relating to the staple port and conservatorship, the French tax or other matters relating 
to trade.
41
 Conventions were also called before the sitting of parliaments and 
conventions of estates, Edinburgh being specifically told in 1662 to call the burghs to 
meet two days before parliament to ensure uniformity within the estate. It did this 
regularly and occasionally dates were also changed, the general convention being 
moved forward in 1678 and back in 1681 to coincide with the sitting of these bodies.
42
 
While Edinburgh had a great deal of influence along with its duties, there is little in the 
calling of conventions to suggest that it was used in any partisan way. 
 
Sending the missive for conventions was the responsibility of the host burgh. Given 
the large numbers of particular conventions in the period, with almost all general 
conventions also held in Edinburgh, the capital wielded a great deal of influence in this 
matter. Most of the articles in the missive were decided upon by the previous 
convention, with a committee including Edinburgh set up in the general convention in 
1673 specifically to draw it up, but other items could be added. In 1672 a committee 
was appointed by Edinburgh to ‘Considder what is fitt to be insert as heads of the 
missive to be direct to the Respective burrowes anent the generall Conventione of 
burrowes’.
43
 The council was able to alter the missive when it saw fit, adding the issue 
of the French tax in 1681 and a postscript in 1684 calling for the commissioners to 
come instructed on seeking the restoration of the summer sitting of the court of 
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cession.
44
 And as Edinburgh’s clerk was also clerk to the convention, the burgh could 
also have a say in what went into the missive on the few occasions when the 
convention was held in other burghs. In 1673 Perth appointed a clerk ‘to duble als 
maney lettres as will be necesare for sending to the othr burrowes conforme to the 
patron [i.e. pattern] sent by the clerk to ther meetings’.
45
 Edinburgh was thus able to 
have a hand in all of the major administration of the convention. Although there are 
examples of the burgh using this to its own advantage, such as instructing the 
commissioner sent by the convention to transact the capital’s business at court, there is 
no reason to assume that it was acting against the interests of the burghs. 
 
The burgh also had a hand in many of the committees established by the convention, 
another indication of its dominance and influence. When a committee was sent to visit 
a burgh which had appealed to the convention either for financial support or help in 
resolving a dispute, the neighbouring burghs were often chosen to visit. Edinburgh 
thus does not feature heavily on such committees except when they were to relatively 
local burghs or in particularly important or long-running cases, such as Lanark’s 
election of a ‘disaffectit’ commissioner in 1660, the long-running dispute between 
Montrose’s merchants and crafts in 1661 or Glasgow’s appeal for aid in 1688. Four 
commissioners were sent by Edinburgh to meet with other burghs to resolve a dispute 
in Perth.
46
  
 
When a committee was appointed to act on a major national issue, a commissioner 
from Edinburgh was included almost without exception. It was one of the three burghs 
sent to meet with Monck at Berwick in December 1659, a crucial meeting for ensuring 
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that the burghs’ commitment to keeping the peace was made known and that they were 
viewed favourably in the settlement of the government.
47
 Committees regularly met 
during conventions either to decide how to proceed in a matter or to prepare addresses 
to the king, the burghs’ agent at court, the privy council, exchequer or treasury on 
matters relating to the staple port, the French tax or other issues in which the burghs 
felt the need to represent their grievances.
48
 On two occasions, the general convention 
in 1660 and that which sat during parliament the following year, a committee was 
established simply to receive certain papers which were presented and thus prevent all 
the burghs from having to consider everything without it being filtered – again, 
Edinburgh sat on these committees.
49
 Even when it was not named on a committee 
discussing significant affairs, it was not always unrepresented. In 1661 a committee 
was established to consider how to promote trade, and although not one of the 
Edinburgh commissioners was on it, it was instructed to consult with Edinburgh 
merchants and advocates.
50
 Again, in 1676 not one of its commissioners was on a 
committee to resolve a major dispute in Inverness, although its clerk was appointed, 
while in 1681 it was not represented on a committee established to present the burghs’ 
opposition to a monopoly on salt before the articles; but of course, Edinburgh was 
already represented on the articles and Aberdeen was the only burgh represented on 
both committees. The convention certainly ensured that a dominant Edinburgh would 
be a busy Edinburgh, and its expertise and influence were put to good use and 
perpetuated through these means. 
 
One of the reasons for Edinburgh’s extensive role in convention administration, and 
another means by which its dominance was exercised, was in the use of its own clerk 
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as clerk of the convention. Thomson in the 1650s and in 1660, as seen in chapter four, 
showed that the convention was willing to use its clerk to do more than prepare the 
missives and keep the register. He acted as its agent in London, and was given such 
important roles as speaking to the two rival claimants for the position of conservator in 
July 1660, to find out whose claim of right to the job was valid.
51
 He was deposed as 
clerk of Edinburgh in August 1664 after failing to get the signature of those taking the 
tack of an imposition, leaving the burgh with no security for a two-year tack duty of 
80,000 merks (£53,333 6s 8d) per annum. No new clerk was officially appointed until 
Thomas Young in December 1665.
52
 Interestingly Thomson remained clerk of the 
convention until the general convention of 1666, when he was deposed having 
‘deserted his charge by absenting himselfe and withdrawing his service att this tyme 
without any laufull cause made knoun to the convention’ and for the mysterious 
‘sundrie vther weightie causes’; Young was appointed in his place.
53
 It seems likely 
that the other burghs in the convention were willing to retain Thomson after his 
deposition in 1664 due to his good service, though the lack of an alternative clerk in 
Edinburgh itself presented them with little option. The 1666 general convention was 
the first since the appointment of Young, so as soon as they could, Edinburgh made 
sure that its current clerk was once again clerk of the convention – and Thomson’s 
failure even to turn up would suggest that he knew that his time as clerk was over. 
 
When Edinburgh again changed its clerk after Young’s death in 1668, electing William 
Ramsay, son of the provost Sir Andrew Ramsay, and an advocate James Rocheid as 
conjunct clerk, the convention followed suit in the usual manner. Ramsay was 
considered too young to hold the office in the burgh alone and was clearly the 
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beneficiary of his father’s position. It does seem to be unusual that someone would be 
put into the position on the understanding that he would not actually do the job until he 
was a bit older (aged twenty-four, which was not until 1673), and it seems clear that 
his father wanted him to benefit more from the salary than the experience of following 
Rocheid. Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that the convention chose to 
appoint Rocheid, not Ramsay, as its clerk.
54
 Thus one member of Edinburgh’s council, 
the crown-favoured Sir Andrew Ramsay, was prevented from gaining too much 
influence, while the burgh retained its traditional privilege.  
 
Rocheid twice fell foul of crown-favoured provosts and was removed. Sir Andrew 
Ramsay in 1673 obtained a crown order to that effect, until his own fall from grace the 
same year, which seems to have put paid to his son’s enjoyment of the position. Sir 
George Drummond, who had been recommended as provost by the king in 1683, 
removed Rocheid between 1684 and 1686 appointed his own son as conjunct clerk in 
his place.
55
 On both occasions Rocheid returned to office and he appears to have 
become a very significant figure and taken on a similar role in relation to both 
convention and capital in the 1680s as Thomson had in the 1650s and early 1660s. In 
March 1680 the burgh decided that it was ‘expedient and fitt at this tyme to petition his 
Majestie for such things as may advance the Comon good and interest of this city, And 
having experience of the faithfulnes and care of [Rocheid] … and of his knowledge in 
the Comon affaires of the good toun’, it appointed him commissioner to London to 
petition Lauderdale and seek his help and advice in petitioning the king.
56
 This was all 
very well for the burgh as it had an experienced and knowledgeable man with legal 
training representing its affairs at court, but it presented a potential problem for the 
                                                 
54
 Edin. Recs., 1665-1680, 46, 81, 160; RCRBS, iii, 609, 611. 
55
 Edin. Recs., 1665-1680, 152; Edin. Recs., 1681-1689, 81-3, 130-2, 162-6; RCRBS, iv, 50, 65. 
56
 Edin. Recs., 1665-1680, 395. 
 76  
convention which had lost the same man as its clerk – as he was writing letters from 
London at the end of July, it was without its clerk for one particular convention and the 
general convention in July.
57
  
 
In March 1686, very soon after being restored as burgh clerk, Rocheid was again sent 
south due to the many ‘pressing and important affairs to be done at Court before the 
down sitting of the ensewing sessione of parliament’.
58
 He was there again in June 
1687 and finally made his report before the council in September.
59
 With such long 
absences, the convention could have been greatly disadvantaged but it recognised the 
possibilities that his presence in London afforded. Just over a month after his departure 
in 1686, he was asked in a letter to ‘continow in his dilligence and caire of the royall 
borrowes concernes and frequently put the lord secretary of stait in mynd of the 
same’.
60
 He had not yet been restored as clerk to the convention and, for his previous 
good service both as clerk and since his removal from that office, he was reappointed 
in the general convention that year despite his apparent absence (not accepting the 
office until the following year, though this may have been done by proxy).
61
 Given his 
long absences, it is somewhat surprising that it was not until 1688 with Rocheid 
present that, at his request, the conjunct clerk of Edinburgh Aeneas McLeod was also 
appointed conjunct clerk of the convention. It is unclear how the convention operated 
in Rocheid’s absence, but two things are evident: Edinburgh’s dominance was such 
that it could control the convention’s clerk with little input from the rest of the burghs, 
depriving him of office or them of his services; but the convention was also able to use 
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him, although sent solely by Edinburgh, to its advantage at court. Edinburgh was pre-
eminent but this was by no means entirely prejudicial to all the burghs. 
 
As well as the convention making use of those, like Rocheid, sent by Edinburgh to 
court, it also sent at least one representative of Edinburgh as its own commissioner. In 
July 1688 Magnus Prince, the crown-appointed provost, went to London to 
congratulate the king on the birth of his son and take a letter which assured James that 
the burghs would be loyal as he had made ‘our interest your owne’, a show of loyalty 
despite the king’s Catholicism which was almost certainly aimed at securing his favour 
towards burgh interests.
62
 Prince’s report to a particular convention in November 
shows that he had also negotiated a number of other affairs relating to the estate – 
presumably those agreed by the commissioners from nine burghs appointed in July to 
‘draw wp such privat instructions as is necessar to be moved at court for the weel of 
the burghs’.
63
 The fact that the convention sent Edinburgh’s provost is a further 
indication of its pre-eminence, and that this was partly due to its influence and that of 
its provost and, particularly when the crown had actually appointed him, the closeness 
of the provost to the crown. But if this was a result of its dominance in the convention, 
it may also have served to further it. Three days after being commissioned by the 
convention, Prince received instructions from his own council to represent its affairs. 
The council do not seem to have attempted to abuse the system by pursuing its own 
business at the convention’s expense, but it did present an opportunity to ensure that 
the interests of Edinburgh were given as good a hearing as those of the estate, 
potentially increasing its favour before the crown and the benefit gained from it in 
relation to the other burghs who were only represented collectively.
64
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The role of Edinburgh’s council as the standing committee of the convention meant 
that, as well as being prominent in working with other burghs on committees 
established by the convention, it also worked alone on behalf of and in the name of the 
rest of the estate. One key role in this respect was as a correspondent both from and to 
the burghs. The convention would often ask it, or at least its provost, to keep 
correspondence with certain persons, either on specific occasions or to get regular 
information from agents. Thus in 1660, when Lauderdale was appointed as the burghs’ 
agent at court, Edinburgh was given the task of keeping him informed of what 
particular matters had arisen and, by inference, receiving correspondence from him 
regarding such matters. This instruction was repeated in 1664 with a particular 
emphasis on the issue of trade and navigation.
65
 The provost was later called on to 
write to James VII’s secretaries of state, who also acted as agents.
66
 Edinburgh was 
often asked to send letters or treat directly with other influential figures, such as 
officers of state or the privy council.
67
 By the 1680s these instructions were generally 
directed exclusively to the provost, though he was often given very specific directions 
which would have negated the need for the burgh council to advise or oversee him.
68
 
His position in relation to the crown meant that he was a suitably influential figure to 
fulfil this task, presumably on the assumption that his good standing would give a 
good impression of the burghs generally. This status seems to have been widely 
recognised, with the conservator writing directly to him as seen below, while he was 
also asked to write to the magistrates of Veere concerning the protection of the staple 
port in 1683.
69
 
 
                                                 
65
 RCRBS, iii, 526, 574-5. 
66
 RCRBS, iv, 41, 71, 87. 
67
 RCRBS, iii, 547-8, 577. 
68
 RCRBS, iv, 25, 31. 
69
 Ibid., 37-8. 
 79  
Effective communication of course requires a two-way flow of information and, as 
well as calling particular conventions when necessary, Edinburgh wrote to the burghs 
to communicate information it had received. When the council of state in 1658 and 
1659 produced acts concerning salt, Edinburgh’s council ordered its clerk to get some 
copies of the act and send them to ‘the principall burrowis therin concerned’.
70
 In 1664 
a letter to Lauderdale asked him, if anything concerning the burghs came to his 
attention, to tell the provost of Edinburgh specifically to communicate it to the rest of 
the burghs. Whether or not this indicates a concern that this might not happen without 
specific instruction is not clear, though in 1661 Edinburgh had communicated to the 
burghs a parliamentary decision for the raising of £12,000 sterling (£144,000) towards 
the payment of the lords of session’s salaries, displaying some aptitude in conveying 
information to the estate.
71
 
 
If non-burghal correspondents wished to bring a matter to the attention of the 
convention, they would also send it to Edinburgh. In 1663, the conservator wrote to the 
provost concerning the proposed move of the staple port from Veere to Rotterdam, and 
after the letter was produced to the council, a particular convention was called. Later 
that year Thomson directed a letter from Lauderdale to the council, concerning 
Lauderdale’s ‘great willingnes to serve the Royall borrowes and especiallie the guid 
towne of Edinburgh
’
, and requesting Scots charters regarding trade with France and 
England to be sent to help him pursue the burghs’ interests.
72
 The following year a 
supplication was produced at another particular convention by one of Edinburgh’s 
commissioners, having been sent there by Scots merchants and factors in France 
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asking for the convention’s help in defending them against the French tax.
73
 As well as 
Edinburgh being the main trading centre – and the subject of Lauderdale’s favour, 
perhaps because it had just bought the citadel of Leith from him – it seems that it was 
widely recognised, if never officially appointed, as the standing committee of the 
convention from outside as well as inside.
74
 
 
The burgh also took a leading role in action concerning matters of policy or legal 
affairs which affected the estate, both of its own accord and at the behest of the 
convention. It was asked to find and extract papers relating to particular issues, such as 
the fishing trade in 1660, for consideration by the convention and representation to 
Parliament, and the French tax in 1687 (at the behest of the privy council).
75
 In 1661 
the provost, with the later approval of the convention, dissented in the name of all the 
burghs from an act passed in parliament in favour of the justices of the peace, which 
was feared might affect the privileges of the royal burghs. In 1663 it led the 
representation to the commissioner, Rothes, against the requirement placed on skippers 
and their passengers to take oaths that they were not trafficking money; the delegation 
of Ramsay, Thomson and Wedderburn, clerk of Dundee, was successful as Rothes 
asked the convention to draw up an act requiring burghs to be strict against such 
trafficking. In 1673 the convention appointed Edinburgh and the agent to assist the 
maltmen in opposing any new gifts sought against their privileges, again using its 
influence and legal expertise to pursue the interests of the whole estate.
76
 
 
In 1672 the convention’s agent informed the council that a gift of a monopoly on 
tobacco had been granted by the king to a laird. In the valid fear that ‘it maks both a 
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bad preparative for laying on impositions upon uther imported commodities and that it 
wald tend to the uther rowine of the trad of tobaco not only in this place bot als in the 
wholl kingdome’, several burghs had engaged advocates to attempt to prevent the 
passing of the gift through the exchequer ‘and therfor craved that the Councell wald 
countinance the said propositione and grant ther concurrence therto’.
77
 One of 
Edinburgh’s bailies and its clerk were then appointed to assist the town’s advocates in 
trying to prevent the passing of the gift. This action seems to have failed, with gifts on 
tobacco, salt and brandy being a key grievance against Lauderdale in 1673 when they 
were removed under pressure from members of all estates. Yet it may have been a 
factor in an act of a particular convention in 1675 which ordained that Edinburgh, with 
the agent, should prevent any gift presented to the exchequer in favour of any person 
for a monopoly or any other gift prejudicial to the burghs. This act remained 
throughout the period, appearing in the general missive each year and also in the 
instructions given by burghs to their commissioners.
78
 
 
One matter in which Edinburgh took the initiative was the campaign for the restoration 
of the summer sitting of the court of session, which had been removed by parliament in 
1681.
79
 In April 1684 it added this to the general missive, asking each burgh to 
send your Comissioner sufficiently instructed to concure and assist with them 
in representing to authority the meny and almost innumerable inconveniensyes 
That the wholl Kingdome especially the royall borrowes and particullarly this 
Cittie lyes under for want of the sumer sessione which hinders the circulatione 
of trade and causes a deadnes of trafficque through all the corners of the 
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Natione dureing the most and best pairt of the year And that some effectual 
course may be taken for geting the samyn restored.
80
 
This was clearly a matter of great importance to Edinburgh itself, perhaps partly 
because of the trade lost with the absence of the court, and in this sense it is not 
surprising that Edinburgh took the initiative, but it was also recognised as a matter 
affecting the burghs as a whole. Before the general convention had had a chance to 
discuss it the burgh had written to the officers of state on the matter, pre-empting to a 
degree the decision of the convention that Edinburgh’s provost and commissioners, 
with any other commissioners ‘as can conveniently be had’, should represent it to any 
authority with power to redress the situation.
81
 Over the next three years the issue 
appears regularly in the council minutes, with a committee appointed and appeals 
made to the lords of the articles in 1685 and the whole of parliament in 1686. These 
efforts were successful and on 26 May 1686 the ‘Act appoynting the dyets of the 
session’, which would come into effect the following November and stated that the 
court of session would sit from 1 June to 31 July, was passed.
82
 It is not clear why, but 
despite sending a letter to the king the same day thanking him for the passing of this 
act, Rocheid was evidently asked the following year, when going to court, to ensure 
that it was actually restored, and he was able to report success.
83
 
 
While this action was undertaken in both its own interests and those of the convention, 
Edinburgh put both the effort and the finance into it. Just before the passing of the act 
restoring the summer session, the treasurer was appointed to pay out any sums the 
provost or bailies ordered on that account, as the action would ‘inevitably coast money 
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to severall persones’.
84
 The sums that were paid were not small. The lord clerk register, 
viscount Tarbat (who was ‘addicted to the intrigues of political life’ and was thus 
perhaps easily persuaded to support a cause), was given £2,460 as a gratification for 
his help in the matter.
85
 This is insignificant compared to the £10,000 given to 
secretary of state Melfort for ‘so good and proffitable service done to the good Town’, 
with the provost wishing to ensure that those who had aided its cause would have no 
reason to complain of Edinburgh’s ingratitude.
86
 Undoubtedly such generosity would 
have placed it in a good position should it need their help in future, but given that this 
was a matter of concern to all of the burghs it again indicates Edinburgh’s importance 
to the convention, and may well have helped it should Edinburgh represent it before 
these figures again. 
 
Individual burghs as well as the convention of course recognised the value of 
Edinburgh’s dominant position, its geographical position at the centre of power and its 
influence. The convention did ask Edinburgh to act on individual burghs’ behalf in a 
number of the disputes detailed in chapter one, such as in 1664 when it asked its 
magistrates with the agent to help Rothesay in the dispute with the sheriff of Bute. A 
similar case was also referred to Edinburgh, and any other burghs present at the time 
the case was brought, when the convention agreed to Elgin’s request for help in 
prosecuting some gentlemen who had attacked its tolbooth. Again in 1668 Edinburgh 
and any other burghs present were asked to assist Selkirk in its action against a laird 
who was encroaching on its common good. Individual burghs also approached it 
directly for assistance. As seen above, Linlithgow’s provost twice came to Edinburgh 
when he had an important matter to discuss, both times leading to particular 
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conventions being called. Dumfries wrote thanking Edinburgh’s provost for helping to 
procure the act of convention supporting its action against Nithsdale and Maxwell. 
Dundee sought its help in 1669, along with that of some other burghs, in supporting its 
petition for redress for the town’s losses. Inverness also approached it directly when 
the laird of Culloden ‘suspendit the said Brugh agains his payment of any stent for his 
land there within brugh’, and a committee was appointed to assist Inverness’s 
commissioners in the case.
87
 Edinburgh was thus providing its legal expertise and 
influence and ensuring that burghs were not prejudiced by having to act alone. 
 
Financial issues were also brought to Edinburgh’s attention for assistance, such as 
Aberdeen’s unsuccessful attempts for its proportion of the tax roll not to be raised in 
1670, to which end its commissioner spoke with the provost and some other 
commissioners.
88
 St Andrews made a particular point of seeking its financial assistance 
for repairs to its harbour in the late 1650s and, although it also went to Glasgow and 
others, great effort was expended in getting Edinburgh’s help. It was not particularly 
generous in this case or in the voluntary contribution for Dundee in 1672, giving 
barely more than Glasgow in either case or Aberdeen in the latter, while compared to 
its proportion of tax its contributions were paltry.
89
 Yet the very fact that it gave to 
these appeals, and paid a far higher proportion of the burghs’ tax and missive dues than 
any other burgh (even allowing for the increase in Glasgow’s proportion), again 
indicates the reliance of the other burghs on Edinburgh; the more it was able to pay, 
the more money was available for individual burghs’ projects and the less the rest of 
them had to pay in tax and dues to the convention. 
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These appeals for support were actually encouraged by Edinburgh. In a missive for a 
particular convention in 1661 regarding the election of a new conservator, the 
commissioners were to come instructed on this issue and  
any thing els relateing to the estaitt of burrowes or your awin particular burg 
since about that time the publict iudicatories will be sitting and yow may 
assuredlie expect from us all the assistance quhich we ar able to performe.
90
 
Though giving such help would have incurred expense for Edinburgh, it does indicate 
again that it was willing to use its position for the benefit of the burghs in general and 
in particular cases. The other burghs, for their part, were happy to take advantage of 
Edinburgh’s position and relied on its wealth and expertise, using its dominance to 
their advantage when they could. For Edinburgh, giving its assistance may also have 
served to maintain the sense that it was the dominant partner in the convention, one 
without which the other burghs could not operate quite so well. 
 
Inevitably, Edinburgh also used its position for its own gain, and indeed it would be 
astonishing if it did not. In the 1650s it demanded that the customs exacted in each 
burgh should be recorded in a table that conformed to the one used in Edinburgh, and 
that its merchants should not be charged more than any others. Complaints from its 
merchants arose a few times in the decade and were dealt with by the convention, 
presumably because of the great importance of Edinburgh to the country’s trade.
91
 It 
also used Lauderdale and the convention’s other agents at court for its own ends. In 
1654 it went beyond this, asking William Thomson, who had been chosen as 
commissioner to parliament by the East Lothian and border burghs, to ‘assist and 
informe the Touns commissioners at all occasiouns’ effectively giving it three 
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commissioners.
92
 It has been seen above that Lauderdale expressed his concern for the 
interests of Edinburgh over and above those of the burghs as a whole, even though it 
was the convention that employed him as agent. This close relationship continued 
throughout the period, and in 1679 and 1680 the burgh thanked him for his 
‘continowed caire of the generall concerns of this city’ and sought his concurrence in 
making appeals to the king.
93
 The main issue at that time was Edinburgh’s desire for a 
new imposition on ale, which it gained thanks to Lauderdale’s help in negotiating with 
the gentlemen of the shire and lords of session, who were concerned that such an 
imposition would have a detrimental impact on them. For his assistance, he was 
controversially given the very large gratuity of £6,000 sterling (£72,000), the same 
sum paid for Leith citadel, though there is no clear connection.
94
 The burgh’s influence 
was also used in 1661 in delaying the meeting of the commissioners of parliament for 
commerce, so that its merchants and crafts could meet and ‘debeatt and compose their 
awen differences’ and try to find a resolution without these differences being made 
public.
95
 No consideration was made of whether or not any other burghs might benefit 
from the earlier meeting of the commissioners, as avoiding any embarrassment was the 
prime concern of the council. 
 
Neither of these cases, while demonstrating Edinburgh’s use of its influence for its 
own ends, obviously impinged on the other burghs, though the possibility is there that 
in allowing Edinburgh to pursue its own ends both the committee of parliament and 
Lauderdale were distracted from helping the convention or other burghs. However in at 
least two cases Edinburgh acted in a way that may well have directly prejudiced other 
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burghs, and certainly used its position to ensure that things were done its way. One of 
these cases related to the payment of pensions from the convention to various people 
including lawyers and the secretary of state. In 1685, after a consideration of the 
‘manie heavie and insupportable burdens’ on the burghs which were apparently 
leading some to near-ruin, it was decided that all pensions except those to the clerk, 
agent and the servants who attended the general and particular conventions should be 
rescinded. Any ‘persons in publict trust, lawers and others’ to be employed by the 
convention would be gratified ‘according to their qualetie and pains’, and paid only for 
particular cases they dealt with.
96
 This does not seem an unreasonable decision, given 
the fact that many burghs were struggling financially and thus less able to pay their 
share of the convention’s expense, but it was passed only with protests from 
Edinburgh’s commissioners against the removal of pensions to the secretary of state 
and lord advocate. A marginal note in the scroll minutes states that the insertion of this 
protest was forbidden by the clerks, but the register does record that the assessor to the 
merchant commissioner and the craft commissioner both protested.
97
 In the following 
general convention in 1686, Edinburgh got its way and the secretaries of state had their 
pensions restored, with MacKenzie, the lord advocate, receiving his again in 1688. It 
may well have been in the convention’s interest to be giving these pensions, as it was 
noted that the secretaries of state had performed good services to the burghs, which 
services might have been required in future, while MacKenzie’s services were 
necessary ‘to maintain the trew interest of the royall borrows and to advyse them in all 
affaires of law and other difficult caises’.
98
 Yet the incident does show that Edinburgh 
was able to have its way in the face of contrary opinions among the majority of the 
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burghs, even when those contrary opinions were based on such grounds as financial 
necessity. 
 
The other case concerned the staple port. In 1671 the convention decided to write to 
Lauderdale communicating grievances against Dordrecht, which was then the staple 
port, and complaining of the prejudice the burghs suffered by its settlement there. It 
decided to work with him and the conservator to have it moved, with two obvious 
alternatives: Veere, from where the staple had been moved only in 1669; and 
Rotterdam, with which town some merchants were illegally trading throughout the 
period, and to which town some burghs seem to have wanted to move the staple port 
both in the 1670s and in 1684, when the convention sought favourable terms for such a 
move.
99
 Perhaps due to the pressing issues of the 1672 act in favour of burghs of 
barony and regality and the opposition to Lauderdale in 1673, it was not until July 
1674 that the convention consulted with the conservator concerning the proposed 
move, and a year later it was decided that it would be returned to Veere.
100
 Within this 
whole process there seems to have been very little negotiation among the burghs or 
with any rival contender, such as Rotterdam, to try and get the best terms of settlement, 
and there was no indication that the king had been given the opportunity of 
determining the outcome, as in 1668 when the original change was made.
101
  
 
This lack of negotiation may be explained by Edinburgh’s action in April 1674, when 
the council received a letter from the conservator asking its opinion on the settlement 
of the staple. A committee was appointed to confer with merchant burgesses of the 
burgh who traded with the Netherlands, and it decided that Veere was the best place. 
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The council then told the conservator its opinion and said that it would write to 
Lauderdale and inform him of its opinion so that the king’s favour for a move could be 
sought.
102
 In this action Edinburgh effectively resolved the matter before the 
convention had had a chance to consider it fully. It had already made its decision clear 
to both the conservator and Lauderdale, who could then put pressure on the rest of the 
burghs to accept it. Incidentally, the conservator at the time, Henry Wilkie, was an 
Edinburgh merchant, which may also have given the burgh more influence in the 
matter and been a reason behind his decision to consult it first. However, one cannot 
infer too much from this in relation to Edinburgh’s dominance, as he, like the other 
conservators, appears to have been nominated by the king.
103
 
 
Edinburgh’s challengers 
While Edinburgh was not shy of using its dominant position within the convention to 
its own ends, even being prepared to ignore the opinions of the rest of the estate, this 
did not often happen in such a way as to prejudice the other burghs. This may explain 
the small amount of opposition to Edinburgh from within the convention itself. This 
lack of opposition is particularly noticeable in the case of Glasgow, one burgh which 
might have been expected to attempt to challenge Edinburgh’s dominance. 
 
The rise of Glasgow, particularly in the second half of the seventeenth century, has 
been well documented. The convention’s tax rolls, though not an entirely accurate 
means of assessing the burghs’ relative wealth, do show Glasgow going from one 
among four burghs which were much smaller than Edinburgh but above all the others 
in 1649 to being clearly ahead of Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth in 1692, though still 
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paying less than half the amount Edinburgh paid. In 1612 it had been below all of 
these burghs, though close to Perth, while in 1556 it had been only eleventh on the tax 
roll and not even the wealthiest burgh on the west coast.
104
 The 1692 figure matches 
Whyte’s assessment that Glasgow in the 1690s had just under half of the population of 
Edinburgh. Smout concludes that, as ‘Glasgow became a most enterprising pioneer 
both in industry and commerce’, trading to the east through Bo’ness and the west and 
south through its major new port and dominating the other west coast burghs, its 
population probably rose in number and certainly in wealth.
105
 Lynch explores some of 
the factors behind Glasgow’s rise, other than the oft-quoted Atlantic trade, which he 
argues may have been based on a platform of growth since the 1630s and was aided by 
its ‘relative immunity’ from the disasters of the 1640s which, along with the shift in 
trade from the Netherlands to England, contributed to the slackening of Edinburgh’s 
grip on trade. He also cites the purchase of the barony of Provan in 1669, a year before 
its most spectacular rise in the tax roll.
 106
 Although this would have increased the 
burgh’s population and wealth, there had been no change in the roll since 1649 and 
thus it would be risky to assign too much significance to this in Glasgow’s rise. An 
appeal to the convention in 1688 suggested that the burgh was struggling due to its 
increased share of taxation, as it was no longer flourishing due to ‘the great addition of 
burden imposed wpon them within this few years’.
107
 Its proportion was not raised 
until 1705, but it was not reduced before then and if it was struggling at this point it 
was surely only a temporary blip. 
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This rise caused Glasgow to jostle for a position of higher status among the burghs to 
match its increased financial contributions and growing status in trading terms. One 
area in which this was seen was in arguments over precedence in the riding of 
parliament, which shall be discussed in chapter five. Yet while Glasgow was clearly 
interested in its position within the convention and wanted to ensure that its rise in 
population and wealth were recognised in its status, its dealings with Edinburgh do not 
suggest that it challenged that burgh’s dominant position. Admittedly it was still only 
half its size and did not have its advantages of resident legal expertise and positioning 
at the centre of power, but given the extent of the one’s dominance and the other’s rise, 
some challenges might be expected. Glasgow successfully petitioned in 1661 for a 
resident of Leith to be made a burgess of Edinburgh in order that he ‘may be capacitat 
to keip ane Inne for lodging of Glasgow people’, suggesting that Edinburgh recognised 
that Glasgow had some influence and had residents frequently there either for trade or 
on legal business. Certainly in 1657 it had had two agents there pursuing its affairs, in 
which it acknowledged the help of Edinburgh’s provost, and the council minutes 
throughout the whole period indicate that commissioners went to Edinburgh very 
regularly, probably more so than from other burghs.
108
 There were disputes between 
the burghs, such as that in 1674 when Edinburgh’s merchants considered themselves to 
have been ‘groasly abused by the magistrats of Glasgow when they had occasione to 
bring weynes and uther goods [from the] new port of Glasgow’. Though Edinburgh 
threatened to take the matter to the privy council it decided to deal with provost Bell of 
Glasgow ‘that the saids injuries be fryndly takin away’, which seems to have 
happened.
109
 This dispute was apparently no more than a straightforward trading 
dispute and not any attempt to undermine Edinburgh’s position. McGrath argues that it 
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was only once Glasgow obtained the right to choose its own magistrates in 1690 that it 
was fully able to challenge Edinburgh’s economic position, and this may also have 
been a factor in its failure to challenge the capital’s position in the convention.
110
 
 
Though Glasgow was happy with its position in relation to Edinburgh, perhaps 
acknowledging the latter’s good standing in relation to legal and political affairs and 
content with its growing share in trade, partly at Edinburgh’s expense, it was clearly 
influential within the convention. Its provost presented a paper of overtures ‘relating to 
the matter of tread, fisching, manufactores, schiping, mint, and companies of 
marchantis’ during parliament in 1661, and the convention accepted them and decided 
to present them to ‘the lordis and wtheris of the comissioun for tread that thair 
approbatioun may be had thairto’.
111
 In 1671 Glasgow’s then provost William 
Anderson was appointed as the convention’s agent to court – surprising given that a 
representative of Edinburgh would more usually have been chosen. It is possible that 
the fact that Anderson had been nominated and continued as provost by the king in 
1670 and 1671 (during a vacancy in the archbishopric) caused the convention to decide 
that he would have more influence even than Sir Andrew Ramsay, who was merely an 
associate of Lauderdale.
112
 This may indicate some rise in Glasgow’s influence within 
the convention, but its only direct challenge to Edinburgh was very minor: in 1681, it 
agreed to the delay in the general convention by two weeks (which was to coincide 
with parliament) ‘on these termes that the magistratis and toune counsell of Edinburgh 
pretend not to any power or jurisdiction for altering the ordinary day of the generall 
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convention in tyme coming’.
113
 This protest was echoed in the convention’s register 
which stated that 
albeit the provest of Edinburgh did be himself alter the dyett of the last generall 
convention in respect the Parliament did ensue, and for which the convention 
did return him thair thanks, yet the samen shall be no preparative quhairby the 
provest of Edinburgh may alter the useuall dyett in tyme coming except when 
the lyke case exists.
114
 
Such statements were warnings to Edinburgh not to abuse its position, but do not 
exactly constitute a challenge to that position. 
 
Other burghs also addressed the issue of Edinburgh’s dominance of conventions. 
Inverness seems to have been unhappy at the fact that general conventions were 
usually held in Edinburgh and perceived that the convention was falling somewhat out 
of touch with its constituent members. In 1652 its commissioner proposed that 
conventions should be held in different burghs around the nation ‘to the intent that the 
stait of each burgh may be the better knowin to the haill burrowis’, a motion that was 
approved and perhaps contributed, once the political situation stabilised, to general 
conventions being held in Haddington and Glasgow.
115
  
 
The Restoration period then saw another slackening of the peripatetic nature of the 
convention, and if in the early 1650s this had been a concern of some burghs, it could 
be expected that this concern would increase or at least remain after 1660. However, 
there are few references to this anywhere in the convention’s minutes. Kirkwall was 
exempted in 1685 from any fines for its absence from conventions due to its distance 
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from Edinburgh, an indication that it was struggling with Edinburgh’s geographical 
dominance. The only direct challenge came the same year from Inverkeithing, whose 
commissioner protested that the appointment of the general convention to meet at 
Edinburgh or anywhere other than there ‘might be but prejudice of ane act of 
Parliament in favouris of the said burgh of Innerkeithing anent the meeting of the 
burroues at that burgh as he alledges’.
116
 This may have been a reference to a statute of 
1487 which stipulated that commissioners from the burghs should meet annually at 
Inverkeithing, though it would be a very odd demand given that the statute was 
changed in 1533 to refer to Edinburgh instead.
117
 The protest did not refer to a more 
recent act, as the only mentions of Inverkeithing in the records of parliament that year 
were in the sederunt and in their protest for precedence over any burgh erected since 
king William’s reign, an equally peculiar request, which since the beginning of the 
reign of James VI had been aired only once previously, in 1681.
118
 Thus the challenge 
over the location of conventions probably says less about serious challenges to 
Edinburgh’s dominance than it does about a attempt to gain influence on 
Inverkeithing’s part, or the civic pride of a once more important burgh. 
 
One burgh which did challenge Edinburgh’s dominant position was Aberdeen. In the 
1650s it is clear that Aberdeen was willing to work with the convention, but 
particularly wanted to protect its own position. It was willing to do this before the 
English commissioners, trying to ensure that no royal burgh gained privileges that 
would be prejudicial to it, as well as before the convention, where it was ready to 
oppose articles such as the alteration of the stent roll. On one article in 1654 
Aberdeen’s commissioner was told ‘to give nothing, but seek for our selfs’. In the 
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same instructions the burgh complained that it had paid the highest proportion for 
something unspecified and got nothing good from it, while ‘other burrowes that did 
pay little got more good (as Edinburgh)’.
119
 
 
Aberdeen was particularly keen to resist Edinburgh’s dominance, instructing its 
commissioner in 1655 to ensure that Edinburgh’s privileges were not favoured ‘above 
any other Brugh’. It was unhappy at Edinburgh’s dominance of particular conventions, 
as the capital was perceived to be pursuing its own gain. In 1659 Aberdeen complained 
against the scope of particular conventions, claiming that those with a general clause 
(which allowed matters not specified in the missive to be discussed) meant that ‘some 
few burrowes meiting with Edinburgh doe what they list’.
120
 It complained again in 
1659 at Edinburgh’s calling of a particular convention despite the general convention 
not sitting and not giving it licence to do so, and also at the short notice given for the 
convention, suggesting that it feared that Edinburgh would try to work things to its 
advantage. This fear was repeated early in 1660 when they pressed for two 
commissioners to be sent to London, with only one from Edinburgh. This did not 
happen and Aberdeen’s protest was not accepted, causing a great deal of bad feeling in 
the burgh council.
121
  
 
Aberdeen also appealed to the English commissioners for the establishment of a 
supreme judicatory in the north so that it would not have to go to Edinburgh (though 
this was never raised as the 1653 general convention was broken up by the English).
122
 
This is extremely significant as, if successful, it would have ended Edinburgh’s 
dominance as the legal centre of Scotland, causing lawyers and money to move north 
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and making Aberdeen or whichever northern burgh it settled in a focal point for other 
burghs north of the Tay. This could have been a seismic shift in the political geography 
of the royal burghs and would have undoubtedly shaken Edinburgh’s position – at 
worst, it could have led to factionalism between those burghs which focused on it and 
those in the north which used the alternative legal centre. 
 
The dispute over commissioners to London in 1660 was repeated after the Restoration. 
In 1665 Aberdeen’s commissioner to the general convention was instructed to ensure 
that if any commissioners were sent from the burghs to the king to seek redress on 
certain particulars, one ought to be from it or another northern burgh. It did not want 
both to be from Edinburgh or the south or west,  
ffor thes many years bygane they have inhansit and monopolizit the burrowes 
priviledges in that and any thing that wes done notwithstanding it wes upon the 
burrows common charges the samen was still for behove of the burgh of 
Edinburgh or burghs adjacent therto wheras the north part of the kingdome is 
different fra the remanent part in ther trade and grevances.
123
 
No commissioners were sent by that convention, but Aberdeen was clearly still 
convinced that Edinburgh was dominating the convention to the extent that it pursued 
its own interests at the other burghs’ expense and to their detriment; in 1678 it stated in 
its instruction to its commissioner to a particular convention that it would refuse to pay 
for commissioners to the king if one was not sent from Aberdeen.
124
  
 
This fear was reflected in the instruction to its commissioner in 1670 that he should 
oppose any attempt by Edinburgh in parliament to alter the standard size of salmon 
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barrels, which it was Aberdeen’s privilege to keep.
125
 It was also afraid that the tax roll 
would be altered in favour of the southern burghs and its proportion was indeed raised. 
Similarly in 1683 it was hoping to have its proportion of the tax roll diminished and 
told its commissioner that if he was not successful he should attempt to delay the 
alteration of the roll until the convention met ‘in some place be north Edinburgh and 
nearer to our selves for ther may be small hopes of our getting any good done ther in 
that mater’.
126
 This fear that the convention sitting in Edinburgh would somehow be 
less likely to move in its favour was proved unnecessary, as its proportion of every 
£100 of tax was reduced by £1.
127
 The perception of southern dominance, particularly 
by Edinburgh, was perhaps not helped by the often poor communication between 
Edinburgh and the north. In 1657 Aberdeen complained that it was ‘wrongit and 
neglectit in not getting the Burrows missive’.
128
 This situation clearly arose regularly, 
and in 1667 it appealed to the privy council of the prejudice it sustained by the 
‘miscaryeing of missive letters and be the not tymous deliverie and receaving returns 
of the samen’. This was a problem suffered by nobles and gentlemen in the north as 
well as the burgh, and it successfully gained a warrant from a postmaster to be 
appointed there and foot posts to be employed.
129
 
 
As well as challenging Edinburgh and using these means to prevent it abusing or 
increasing its dominance, there is also a sense of competition in some of Aberdeen’s 
actions. In 1658, on hearing of Edinburgh’s submission to the council in London of 
‘certane particulars for the ease and good’ of Leith, its commissioner there was asked 
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to petition for an ease of its burdens.
130
 A similar ideas was repeated in 1670 when its 
commissioner to parliament was told 
to informe yorselfe if the toune of Edinburgh and other royall burghes intends 
new ratificatione of ther priviledges or if they have done the same since his 
Majesties hame cominge And if it be neidfull for us to doe the same.
131
 
 
Aberdeen seems to have been the only burgh to oppose Edinburgh regularly, though it 
is possible that other northern burghs did support some of its attempts to stop the 
convention being so focused on the south. There was one issue in which some sort of 
concerted action was taken against Edinburgh and in which Edinburgh felt the need to 
go on the defensive, but ultimately its position was maintained. At the general 
convention in 1660 an act was passed stating that Edinburgh should stop having three 
commissioners at particular conventions, and only have that number at general 
conventions in their own burgh.
132
 One of these, generally the provost, was the 
moderator, but this act indicates that he was not seen simply as a supernumerary 
chairman but as an active representative of his burgh. In 1663 Edinburgh chose three 
commissioners – including its provost Sir Andrew Ramsay and his predecessor – to the 
convention which was to sit at the time of parliament, with this remarkable instruction: 
And becaus that at some tymes certane commissioners of Burrowis have made 
scruple and questioun whither the Lord Provest of this Brugh sould be admitted 
as a commissioner by and attour the other twa commissioners quhilk the 
Counsell thinkis ane unnecessarie and unjust scruple for many weightie 
reasones and contrair to the practise of the Royall Burrowes these many years 
bypast Theirfoir the Counsell thinks fitt and ordains that incaice any such 
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questioun sall be made and so insisted upoun as that the remanent 
Commissioners sall refuise to accept or admit the said Lord Provest that in that 
caice both his Lordship and the uther twa commissioners sall remove themselfs 
from and desert the said meitting as they will be answerable to the Counsell.
133
 
Edinburgh had never had the right to have more than two commissioners at a 
convention, except the annual general convention in July and only then if it was held 
there. The conventions before and during parliament are rather more difficult to judge, 
as those in the Restoration period sometimes happened instead of the annual one. This 
could explain Edinburgh’s desire to make sure it was not challenged, as the usual 
general convention did not meet in 1663, and indeed no challenge arose. But this lack 
of a challenge seems to have encouraged it to ignore the act of 1660, and from the 
particular convention of May 1664 onwards, it almost always sent three 
commissioners.
134
 The challenge was never repeated even though Edinburgh was 
clearly flouting an act of the convention, further evidence that its dominant position 
was accepted by the burghs as Charles II’s regime took hold, perhaps because of its 
influence with that regime. There is not much evidence that Edinburgh made a habit of 
taking advantage of its pre-eminence among the burghs, despite Aberdeen’s fears, and 
the limited challenges reflect both that and the fact that its influence, expertise and 
wealth was relied on by the convention. Yet even Aberdeen’s opposition to Edinburgh 
suggests that Aberdeen recognised the effectiveness of the convention. It would not 
have been worried about what other burghs gained if nothing of use was being 
achieved, and would not have worried about the danger of abuse of Edinburgh’s 
position had there not been something worth protecting. 
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The reliance on Edinburgh left the convention vulnerable to the capital’s greatest 
challenger. It’s closeness to the crown did give it influence there, but also meant that it 
was open to greater interference by the crown than the other burghs. Thus the very 
thing that made Edinburgh so useful to the convention opened it to indirect 
governmental interference. There is some evidence which suggests that the English 
regime also attempted to limit the capital’s influence in the 1650s. Stewart recounts 
how in 1651 colonel Lambert appointed himself governor of Edinburgh in place of a 
provost, allowing himself to name two of the bailies and five councillors, and the fear 
of a loss of their liberty and power caused most to swear the oath of loyalty to the 
regime so that they could regain control of elections.
135
 In meeting with the English 
commissioners at Dalkeith, Edinburgh was allowed its customary two commissioners, 
but Glasgow and Aberdeen were allowed the same, though were only allowed to send 
one to Edinburgh to elect commissioners to go to England.
136
  
 
More significantly, Edinburgh was threatened with removal of its superiority over 
Leith, which was confirmed only once its loyalty to the regime was secured ‘through 
its hospitality towards the English’.
137
 It was threatened again in 1655 if the burgh’s 
debt to the college of justice was not repaid, and again in 1656 when plans were being 
made to build a citadel at Leith, and Edinburgh was ordered ‘ather to big that Cittidaill, 
or ellis to lois thair libertie and superioritie’. In the former case promises of repayment 
were made and not fulfilled, but in the latter it was forced to pay £5,000 sterling 
(£60,000) towards the building of the citadel.
138
 Further attempts were made by Leith 
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itself in application to parliament in 1653, and in 1655 by Monck in writing to 
Cromwell, to give Leith freedom as a burgh in its own right. In the latter case the 
desire was to encourage trade, prevent smuggling as a means of avoiding Edinburgh’s 
customs which then deprived the regime of excise, and particularly to encourage 
English settlers to remain in the town. Thomas Tucker, in surveying many of the 
burghs in his report about Scotland’s excise in 1656, felt that freedom from Edinburgh 
would allow Leith to rival it within a few years. Certainly losing its port could have 
severely damaged Edinburgh’s wealth and thus its position among the burghs.
139
 These 
attempts failed and Edinburgh’s superiority over Leith remained. 
 
These were not insignificant attempts to reduce Edinburgh’s influence, but it suffered 
far more interference under Charles II and James VII. Some of this again related to the 
citadel at Leith. In 1662 the rights to it were given to Lauderdale. The council was 
concerned that this gift ‘might prove verie prejudiciall to the rights and priviledgis of 
this brugh’, and attempts were made to convince Lauderdale to delay the passing of the 
gift through the exchequer and presumably not to accept it at all.
140
 Perhaps because of 
the fact that this was a royal gift, Edinburgh did not find much support in its aims, 
even from its legal advisors, and eventually wrote to Lauderdale to tell him that it 
would not oppose the gift as it was ‘nothing doubtfull of his Lordships favorable 
respects to them and that he will be and continue to be a freindlie nighbour’.
141
  
 
His intentions in getting the gift were almost certainly not at all friendly. Both Whyte 
and Donaldson went so far as to say that he ‘blackmailed’ the burgh with the threat of 
developing Leith into a rival trading centre, something that Edinburgh could not 
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countenance due to the threat to its trading interests and position among the burghs.
142
 
Two months later Lauderdale offered to sell the rights to the citadel to the provost on 
behalf of the burgh, as he was intending to dispose of it to the highest bidder. It seems 
likely that this had been his plan all along and the council felt it had little option but to 
purchase it, to prevent it from falling into other competitive hands. Lauderdale valued 
the rent of the citadel at £3-4,000 sterling (£36-48,000) per annum, which seems 
extortionate, and offered to sell it for £6,000 sterling (£72,000) – which, given the 
supposed rental value, must have seemed an offer too good to be true. Edinburgh 
accepted, but the sum was so great that both the common good and the imposition on 
ale and wine were put up as security. Its rights to the citadel were ratified in parliament 
that year, but it is clear that it had been very expensively abused by the crown, in the 
person of Lauderdale.
143
 
 
There were numerous smaller actions which directly affected Edinburgh’s position and 
made it clear that its influence was nothing compared to that of the crown. One 
example is in the crown’s orders for certain persons to be made burgesses, such as 
viscount Chillingworth in 1681, though this was normally the prerogative of the 
provost and magistrates.
144
 The crown also removed from Edinburgh the rents of the 
bishopric of Orkney, which it had purchased in 1642, successfully recovered from 
sequestration by the English commissioners, and which were used for the payment of 
its ministers. In 1661 the council heard that there was ‘all appeirance the rents would 
certainlie be taken from the Counsell and applied for the maintenance of the Bishops 
of the place. The Counsell eftir grave consideratioun of their owen great necessities 
and danger of being destitute of ministers’ appealed to Lauderdale and the officers of 
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state, but it was unsuccessful and was left with the fear that it would be unable to pay 
its ministers’ stipends.
145
 The burgh’s ratification in parliament in 1662 stated that it 
would be allowed to uplift an imposition on imported wine and on liquor because 
such hes been thair affection to his majesties’ service and the present 
constitution of the government of the church, that they have freely surrendered 
to his majestie the bishoprick of Orknay and bishoprick and deanrie of 
Edinburgh, which wer formerly allowed to them for maintenance of their 
ministers, by all which the condition of the toun is so meane that without some 
mark of his majesties’ bountie they will hardly subsist.
146
 
Clearly the suggestion that Edinburgh had ‘freely surrendered’ their rights  was 
spurious, as it had effectively been presented with a fait accompli. However in 
suggesting that Edinburgh had shown extraordinary loyalty to which the crown had 
responded with extraordinary generosity, the crown may have been strengthening its 
psychological grip on the burgh while sending a message to the other burghs that 
loyalty was profitable. This would suggest that the crown was recognising and using 
Edinburgh’s influence among the other burghs to get a message across. 
 
This may also help to account for the attitude to Edinburgh in attempts to prevent the 
meeting of conventicles and other seditious groups. Other burghs were singled out by 
the privy council, notably Glasgow and others in the west, where religious dissent was 
widespread, and all burghs were asked to take bonds of security from their inhabitants 
stating that they would not attend conventicles.
147
 Yet Edinburgh was set apart for 
particular attention. In 1661 the convention inserted an order from parliament for the 
oath of allegiance to be taken and the act for the royal prerogative to be signed by all 
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magistrates and councils at their next meetings, ‘and particularlie that the provest of 
Edinburgh sie it forthwith done be the magistratis and councell of Edinburgh’.
148
 The 
following year the privy council ordered the magistrates to take note of everyone who 
lodged in the city each night because ‘many disaffected persons to his Majestys 
government and interest doe daylie and continuallie resort and haunt to the burgh of 
Edinburgh, that thereby they may the more secretly and effectuallie cary on their 
wicked designes’.
149
 The fact that Edinburgh was the capital may well have 
contributed to the presence of some seditious groups, and gives another explanation for 
the particular efforts made by the privy council to keep it free from them. At times of 
rebellion the bailies were ordered to be particularly alert as to who entered the burgh. 
The magistrates were often asked to give bonds of security for keeping the burgh free 
of conventicles and were often fined for their failure, though their successes were 
acknowledged and received thanks. This was such a burden on them that the rest of the 
council in 1673 agreed to relieve them of responsibility for the bonds (and any 
resulting fines), which were then taken on by the burgh.
150
 In 1681, after a riot in 
Edinburgh, it offered to raise a company of 108 men as security for the town, to 
indicate that it was serious about keeping the peace. This was accepted by the privy 
council, presumably much to the relief of the burgh; the council had threatened that if 
it did not deem the security offered to be satisfactory ‘they would beseech his Majestie 
that the judicatories might be removed to some other place in the kingdome where they 
might be in safety’.
151
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These concerted efforts to keep Edinburgh free of sedition certainly had roots in a real 
fear that such sedition could affect the burgh, and did not directly affect the 
convention. But any other burgh hearing reports from the privy council of this pressure 
being put on Edinburgh could be expected to respond by redoubling its efforts in 
maintaining loyalty, meaning that Edinburgh’s influential position could be used as 
proxy. A more direct means of influencing Edinburgh, and thus of affecting the 
convention, was interfering in its electoral procedure, particularly regarding its 
provosts. Again, of course, Edinburgh was not the only burgh to have its internal 
politics meddled in – Glasgow’s provost was nominated by the king when there was no 
archbishop to do so, while in 1666 Ayr was ordered by the privy council to continue its 
provost in office for another year.
152
 Yet until James VII’s prohibitions on elections, 
discussed in chapter six, Edinburgh did experience more regular interference than any 
other burgh. The first indication of this was in 1660 when provost Sir James Stewart 
was imprisoned on the orders of the king. The council was thrown into a panic as it 
tried to find out why he was imprisoned (which was due to his opposition to the 
Engagement) and ‘what way the Counsell sall behave themselfs or what sould be their 
cariage thereanent’ in terms of its administration of the burgh without a provost, and 
perhaps to avoid further censure.
153
 
 
The close interest taken by the crown in Edinburgh’s internal politics meant that the 
burgh went to the privy council when faced with a dispute over its elections in 1661, 
where other burghs might have gone to the convention. That year the merchants and 
crafts had had a long-running disagreement which the council had failed to resolve. 
When it came to the election of the magistrates some of the crafts refused to vote and 
then protested against the result, but the privy council endorsed it and further appeals 
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ruled in favour of the magistrates, though the dispute between merchants and crafts 
continued into the court of session.
154
 While it was probably the crown’s interest in its 
politics that caused Edinburgh to approach the privy council on this matter, doing so 
may well have opened it to further interference, allowing the crown to feel that it could 
continue to meddle. Some interferences were fairly small, such as the 14-month 
restraint on holding a clerk’s election after the deposition of Thomson, which left the 
burgh without a clerk and the convention with a clerk who was not in a burghal 
position.
155
 On a number of occasions the privy council sent members as observers 
when there was a fear that ‘some disordors might fall out at the electione’, to ensure 
correct procedure was followed and the election passed peacefully. This potentially 
allowed the crown to ensure that those candidates it favoured most would be elected by 
the application of indirect pressure through the councillors’ presence.
156
  
 
More serious interference came in 1674, when the crown ordered the cancelling of the 
election due to the rather minor offence of holding the election on Michaelmas (which 
fell on a Tuesday) instead of the first Tuesday after Michaelmas. They had done this 
simply because, having made the leets, they did not want to be left without a council 
for a whole week, yet the crown interpreted it as ‘a factious designe’. Although the 
privy council accepted this explanation Lauderdale claimed that there had been other 
faults in the exercise of government in the burgh which also went against the king’s 
commands. Despite its protests of loyalty and many complex negotiations the crown 
would not give in. In August 1675 the restriction was removed and an election 
permitted, evidently so that it could not be said that a whole year had gone by without 
an election and in order to return the magistrates and council to their ‘former good 
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temper’. After a number of people were barred from holding office for trying to 
promote their own faction against the magistrates, a further election was held at the 
usual time with the earl of Linlithgow, treasurer depute Hatton and the lord clerk 
register all present.
157
 This incident may have had something to do with the 
convention’s letter to the king in 1674, against which the provost James Currie had 
protested and was thus kept in office, as Lee suggested.
158
 It may also have had 
something to do with the opposition to the crown-favoured Sir Andrew Ramsay which 
had resulted in his removal from office only nine months before, which will be 
discussed below. The removal of Ramsay may have caused concern that there were 
opponents to the crown within Edinburgh which, especially after the convention’s 
letter with which some within the burgh may have been in favour, it wanted to ensure 
did not get the opportunity to take office or even run for office and thus encourage 
further opposition. 
 
In the 1680s Edinburgh suffered direct interference before most other burghs, having 
George Drummond nominated as provost by the crown in 1683 when it stepped in to 
mediate in some disputes regarding previous administrations’ use of the common 
good. He was continued provost in 1684, in the presence of privy councillors, while 
the following year Thomas Kennedy was nominated by James as provost. 
Interestingly, James seems to have been satisfied that the burgh’s council was now 
sufficiently fixed as to ensure its loyalty, and in 1686 Kennedy and the dean of guild 
were ordered to remain in office but the elections for the rest of the magistrates and 
council were allowed to continue as normal. The following year, Magnus Prince was 
nominated provost by the king, but again elections for all other positions were allowed 
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to proceed. He was re-elected in 1688 apparently without much interference from the 
crown, and there appear to have been no observers at elections since 1685. Essentially 
the only problem for the burgh, other than the imposition of the provost, was the delay 
in holding elections which meant that some office-holders were remaining in office for 
slightly more than two years. As they took an oath on assuming office that they would 
remain for only two years, some in 1687 had to protest that they were not in breach of 
their oath, as they were there only in obedience to the king.
159
 
 
The problems of this interference for the convention were indirect but nonetheless real. 
Given that Edinburgh was so dominant in the convention’s business, having a crown-
nominated provost would mean that crown interests also gained a prominent and even 
dominant hearing in the convention. Thus convention policy was in danger of 
becoming less focused on the interests of the royal burghs and more on those of the 
crown. This may in part explain why there was so little opposition voiced from the 
convention to the 1672 act commuting many of its trading privileges to burghs of 
regality and barony. The provost of Edinburgh at the time, who presumably also acted 
as moderator of the convention during parliament as he had previously, was Sir 
Andrew Ramsay, the favourite of Lauderdale, who had been provost since 1662 and 
could not be expected to speak directly against a policy which favoured Lauderdale so 
much.
160
 Intriguingly, two days after the act was passed, Ramsay was awarded the 
right to hold two annual fairs and a weekly market at Linton in East Lothian, just a few 
miles from Haddington, North Berwick and Dunbar.
161
 It seems remarkable that the 
leading figure of the burghal estate should even seek such a warrant which was so 
evidently opposed to the interests of the estate, given the protests arising from the 
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burghs against new market centres. However, it cannot be assumed that this was some 
form of bribe for stifling burgh opposition to the earlier act. Yet if Ramsay was indeed 
acting in Lauderdale’s interests (or his own) rather than the estate’s, this could shed 
further light on the upsurge of opposition to him within both Edinburgh and the 
convention in 1672 and 1673. This was well documented by contemporary observers 
and also in secondary literature and formed part of the opposition to the liberties many 
saw Lauderdale taking.
162
 
 
The reason expressed for the opposition to Ramsay which arose in the council election 
of 1672 was his promotion to be a lord of session, which riled those who felt that 
Lauderdale was corrupt as Ramsay had no legal experience and was clearly appointed 
only as Lauderdale’s crony. The dean of guild argued that, according to acts of 
parliament and privy council, holding this office barred him from being provost and 
voting for the magistrates. Others also protested but Ramsay was re-elected and 
Lauderdale wrote to say that he would be reporting the ‘factious protest’ against him to 
the king.
163
 The following February the act limiting the provost to two years in office 
was restored. This was almost certainly another attack on Ramsay who was now in his 
eleventh consecutive year, though he did sign the act; but if there was enough opinion 
within the council in its favour even he would struggle to resist. The 1673 election was 
then preceded by the king’s removal of James Rocheid from his office as clerk, on the 
grounds that he had been behind the factious attempts to remove Ramsay the previous 
year. Further attacks were made on Ramsay’s position during the election but with an 
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assurance from the chancellor that Ramsay could stand and in the presence of the earls 
of Linlithgow and Kincardine and the lord advocate, he was re-elected.
164
 
 
However, the removal of Rocheid appears to have given the other burghs the 
opportunity to get involved and assist in the removal of Ramsay. In parliament later 
that year there was a great deal of opposition to Lauderdale from members of all 
estates, in which the burghs played a crucial role as shall be seen in chapter five. One 
of the key issues pursued by the burghs was the indictment of Ramsay, of which they 
were almost certainly the instigators even though the earl of Eglinton and Hamilton 
presented the articles to parliament. This was probably a case of the burghs 
recognising the need for the influence the nobility wielded to front their assault, as well 
as being a means of getting round the fact that Ramsay was still in position as the 
leading member of the burghal estate. In the end Ramsay was not indicted, though he 
was soon forced to resign both as provost and as a lord of session. However, the 
burghs had achieved other aims, including getting a letter from the king to Edinburgh’s 
council, brought by the provost of Aberdeen and other burgh commissioners, asking 
for Rocheid to be restored as burgh clerk as it would be advantageous to all of the 
burghs.
165
  
 
Conclusion 
For as long as Ramsay had been provost, the crown had had a major stake in the 
convention. The opposition to him from among the other burghs does not really reflect 
opposition to Edinburgh’s position, as it was far too useful to them. Indeed, opposition 
came from within Edinburgh as much as from other burghs. Rather, it reflects how 
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influential Edinburgh was in that it could be used by the crown to get a degree of 
control in the convention, while also showing that the burgh was influential enough to 
play a key role in opposition to the perceived liberties Lauderdale was taking, 
expressed through opposition to his favoured provost, Ramsay. To an extent this 
episode reflects the wider issues surrounding Edinburgh’s relationship with the 
convention. The crown’s interference was more damaging than other burghs’ 
opposition to Edinburgh’s position, as it was generally seen to be advantageous to 
them in the various roles it played. There was some concern that it was abusing its 
influence, but there is little evidence that this was the case, despite the opportunities it 
had, though undoubtedly Edinburgh was able to enhance its dominance in exercising 
its responsibilities, such as in sending commissioners to court on the burghs’ behalf. 
This would suggest that the capital had a great deal of respect for the convention and 
its fellow royal burghs, all of whom recognised the convention’s importance, and was 
willing to bear the sometimes onerous burdens of its position for the sake of the estate 
as well as itself. 
112 
Chapter 3 
Urban Finances and the Convention 
 
Considering the assaults on the trading privileges of the royal burghs discussed in 
chapter one, the question of what condition they were in financially must be 
considered. If the burghs were struggling it must follow that the convention’s ability to 
help them would be limited, as it could give out only what they were able to put in. 
Burghs could also be expected to struggle more in attending the meetings of the 
convention. Yet as well as the burghs’ financial condition having an impact on the 
convention, we must consider whether or not the convention had an impact on the 
burghs’ condition. It did have an official role in preventing the wastage of the common 
good of the burghs and, as seen in chapter one, was prepared to support them 
financially. Pagan, having suggested that the convention was politically quite 
unimportant, followed this by observing that it was important in its administrative role 
and in contributing to Scottish progress by its financial assistance (directly and in 
representations regarding trade). This has not been backed up by more recent research 
which has tended to criticise the burghs’ economic policies, as shall be seen below. If 
Pagan’s definition of ‘Scottish progress’ is taken to encompass the royal burghs, her 
observation does not hold much weight under an examination of the burghs’ own 
records of their financial state; the convention may have helped burghs stay afloat, but 
it does not seem that many of them were progressing.
1
 
 
While this chapter will include some discussion of the 1650s, in order to show trends 
across the whole period, chapter four contains a fuller discussion of the economic 
condition of the burghs in that decade. The financial pressures on them were very 
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different as Scotland was contributing towards the payment of a large occupying army, 
while incorporation with England obviously had implications for Scotland’s trade. The 
convention was thus required to respond in different ways, which shall be examined 
separately. 
 
Financial condition of the burghs 
Many of the appeals to the convention mentioned in chapter one were made with the 
claim that the burghs in question needed help because they were too poor to help 
themselves. Even Glasgow, the economic success story of the period, appealed for help 
in 1675, which may account for some of the scepticism historians have expressed 
about the appeals, as discussed below. Some appeals, however, have a ring of 
desperation about them which was accepted as an accurate reflection of the situation. 
For example, after Ayr’s appeal in 1671, the burghs decided to seek a remedy ‘for 
preventing the outter rowin of that ancient burgh so fittlie situat for trade’.
2
 Some of 
the actual supplications remain in the convention records in Edinburgh City Archives 
and provide good examples of the range of problems that the burghs were claiming to 
have. In 1675 Crail presented a long list of problems: public debt of over £2,700 on top 
of six of the previous twelve months’ cess and money owed to the burgh’s agent; a 
common good which covered less than half of the interest on their debts; no 
magistrates for the previous four years as those eligible feared that creditors would 
hold them personally responsible for the debt; a ruined harbour and pier; inhabitants 
leaving; and a severe decay of trade and fishing with very few ships left. Haddington, a 
much larger burgh, also complained of a lack of trade, with local unfree markets taking 
its trade and causing its inhabitants to leave so that they did not have to pay their share 
of the public burdens due by the burgh. It also complained of ruinous buildings, a large 
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amount of debt and poverty among its inhabitants. Both Crail and Arbroath in 1684 
threatened that they would not be able to remain active among the burghs in paying 
dues and attending meetings, Arbroath also stating that its common good was 
exhausted, that it had considerable debt and had a need to repair its harbour and 
tolbooth.
3
 Irvine had similar complaints in 1688, suggesting that the burgh was 
threatened with ruin because of the decay of its trade caused by a ruined harbour which 
it could not afford to repair. This was due to its debt and lack of funds from its 
common good; while the situation had encouraged Saltcoats, a nearby burgh, to take 
much of the trade from Irvine.
4
 
 
These examples give a flavour of some of the problems that the burghs claimed to be 
facing. The source most often used by historians to consider the burghs’ condition is 
the survey of all the royal burghs undertaken by the convention in 1691-2. The results 
of this would of course be a product of the conditions of the previous years and 
decades and it is thus very relevant for this study though it falls outside its period. The 
commissioners in 1691 were given detailed instructions to examine the common good 
and debt of the burghs, the condition of their trade, shipping and housing, their ability 
to maintain their public works and pay stipends, and what competition they faced from 
unfree burghs in their area. All but five burghs were visited, almost all reported 
expenditure which exceeded their income, and all but three reported that they were in 
debt: Dunbar was actually owed money, mostly from ‘ther owne decayed burgesses’, 
and its trade was negligible; Lochmaben had no public works to maintain and thus no 
need to incur debt; and Dingwall had sold most of its common good to pay off debts, 
and had no more debt as it could no longer get credit. 
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Many of the burghs were overspending by so much, with debt that was in many cases 
many times greater than their income, that simply servicing the debt would have been 
very difficult. Of the burghs whose debts were recorded, only Queensferry’s was less 
than its common good. Pittenweem, Renfrew and Elgin were among a number of 
burghs which imposed these sums on their inhabitants, Elgin imposing a deficit of 
around £2,200 in one year; though this suggests that some burghs had inhabitants who 
were not struggling as much as their corporations and could afford to cover their 
losses. However, other burghs were simply unable to even service their debt. Due to 
overspending, caused in large part by interest payments, Aberdeen claimed to be 
contracting £7-8,000 of debt annually, Jedburgh £500 and Kirkcudbright and Selkirk 
around £300 each. Stirling had not paid interest on £23,000 of debt to its own hospitals 
since 1680. Many of the burghs complained of the competition from local unfree 
burghs, some attributing this to the near complete collapse of their trade, while many 
claimed to have neither foreign nor inland trade. Interestingly only six burghs actually 
asked for their proportion of the tax roll to be reduced, including Perth, Dingwall who 
claimed to be near the point at which it would have to resign its privileges, and 
Fortrose which had already attempted to.
5
 Given that there may well have been some 
exaggeration elsewhere in the report, this may give a better sense of the reality of the 
situation. The burghs were certainly struggling, and the smaller ones were in a very 
poor condition, but there were not many who were so desperate that they thought it 
worth their while to specifically ask for their proportion of the tax to be reduced. 
 
The claims of the 1692 report in particular have often been taken at face value. Pagan 
attributed the burghs’ problems to misappropriation of the common good by 
                                                 
5
 ‘Register containing the state and condition of every burgh within the kingdom of Scotland, in the year 
1692’, Miscellany of the Scottish Burgh Records Society (Edinburgh, 1881), 53-157. ECA, Moses 
Bundle 244, contains a summary of the 1692 report produced in 1699, including lists of the debt, 
common good and discharge of most burghs. 
116 
magistrates, as well as the loss of trade (particularly in the east), damage done to 
harbours by storms and the challenges of unfree burghs. MacKenzie also accepted the 
claims stating that almost all royal burghs were operating outside their means, with 
burghs of barony and regality having a disastrous effect on nearby royal burghs.
6
 More 
recently, however, the accuracy of the report began to be challenged and the claims of 
poverty and lack of trade were assumed to be exaggerated. Smout criticised those 
historians who relied on the ‘gloomy and prejudiced’ report, not ignoring the 
difficulties but suggesting that they had been overstressed.
7
 In Scottish Trade on the 
Eve of Union, 1660-1707, a more complex picture emerges of trade that was growing 
in many areas, but was often dominated by Edinburgh, Glasgow or landowners, rather 
than the merchants of other royal burghs or even the inhabitants of unfree burghs. 
Overall he presents a picture of revival from the 1640s and 1650s until the 1680s, 
though it was only after 1689 that the real difficulties began. He states that  
Hardly anyone in these years even mentioned the word ‘decay’, and even the 
royal burghs who were later to explain to everyone how the loss of their trading 
privileges plunged them into immediate ruin, hardly got beyond occasional 
murmurings.
8
 
 
More recent work has tended to follow similar lines. That trade was not in such 
desperate straits as previously accepted is now clear. Graham highlighted the growth in 
maritime trade particularly across the Atlantic, though perhaps giving more credit to 
the new ports in challenging the royal burghs’ monopoly, while Woodward suggested 
that Scottish trade with England was strong as early as the 1660s.
9
 However, 
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difficulties in trade are still acknowledged, and while an element of exaggeration in the 
burghs’ complaints is accepted as likely, particularly concerning the challenge from 
unfree burghs, more credence has been given to their claims. Cullen and Smout stated 
that, except on the Clyde, ‘Scottish growth faltered’ in the second half of the 
seventeenth century.
10
 Whatley stated that by the 1670s ‘Scots could enjoy conditions 
that had not been bettered since 1603’, yet went on to say that two decades later urban 
Scotland had ‘entered a period of severe difficulty’.
11
 Aberdeen certainly saw a major 
decline (in both volume and price) in its plaiding trade. Even Glasgow was near 
bankruptcy in 1690, while the rise of the burghs of barony was not so great as to 
compensate for the decline in many of the royal burghs, some of which never 
recovered from the 1640s and 1650s. Whatley makes it clear that the growth in trade 
should not be overstated and largely accepts the burghs’ complaints of the 1690s, 
suggesting that the problems some burghs faced in finding magistrates to serve 
indicates genuine hardship.
12
 Whyte, considering populations, noted that many larger 
burghs other than Glasgow and Edinburgh were declining, but other burghs were 
growing and the overall picture was one of modest growth or stagnation rather than 
decline. Yet he does accept the picture presented by the 1692 report that, particularly 
in the middle-rank royal burghs and in contrast to Bo’ness, a growing burgh of barony 
which was getting a lot of trade (as seen in chapter one), trade was declining and with 
it the condition of the burghs.
13
 Lynch’s view is that the greatest crisis among the 
Scottish burghs was in Edinburgh. He also makes it clear that the growth of Glasgow 
was at the expense of other burghs, particularly on the east coast, while Dundee 
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declined severely after the 1670s and Perth never recovered from the 1650s. Perth is 
also highlighted as a complainant of the challenge of local market centres, though the 
impact of these varied from burgh to burgh. Considering the apparent fall in population 
in some small and medium-sized towns, Lynch also suggests that 
the complaints made by many burghs in the 1692 reports of abandoned or 
ruinous properties, falling trade and general urban decay, which are often 
treated with scepticism by historians, begin to ring true.
14
 
 
The claims of completely decayed trade may well have been exaggerated. Certainly 
this would have been an area where it would have been easier for the burghs to 
exaggerate, not necessarily having clear evidence of the state of their trade to present 
to the convention’s commissioners. The details of common good and debt perhaps 
support the more sympathetic recent historiography, as most burghs presented their 
accounts to the commissioners, while debt would have required recording. These 
figures would surely have been much harder to manipulate, giving weight to the claims 
of decay. Yet even if the claims of poverty in the 1692 survey have a ring of truth 
about them, they do not give an indication of how the burghs got to that stage through 
the period covered by this study.  
 
One way this can be examined is to combine different types of appeal to the 
convention. Requests for reduction in stent are unreliable, as Smout points out, as it is 
only to be expected that a burgh would pretend ‘to be as poor and decayed as possible’ 
to have its own proportion reduced.
15
 Not only this, but such requests, even in years 
when the roll was actually altered, are rarely recorded in the convention minutes. Some 
were noted in 1661, but it seems that due to the number of such requests they were not 
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all recorded.
16
 However, even if these requests are not included, the numbers of grants 
given, visits ordained by the convention to burghs complaining of poverty, discharges 
of sums owed by burghs and exemptions from attendance at conventions can all be 
compared to assess the condition of the burghs. This cannot produce a perfect 
statistical result, with the records of conventions at the 1672 and 1673 parliaments 
respectively incomplete and missing. However, this data, found in Appendix I, can still 
provide a better sense of the condition of the burghs than simply looking at trade 
records, as much of the historiography has done, requests for reduction in stent or the 
results of the 1692 study. 
 
The results of this examination do in some ways concur with the consensus in the 
historiography. The final eight years of the period saw more grants awarded and far 
more burghs discharged of missive dues and particularly fines for absence than any of 
the three previous decades, with as many visits ordained as in the whole of the 1650s. 
It is surprising that fewer exemptions were granted than in the previous decades, but 
this is more than balanced by the huge numbers of burghs which had their fines for 
absence discharged. There are, however, some slightly more surprising results. The 
figures in all categories in 1661-70 are far lower than in 1671-80, when trade is 
generally thought to have been strongest, and are similar in most respects to those from 
the 1650s. It could be argued that this was simply because the convention in these two 
decades, with the burghs still struggling with the effects of civil war and occupation, 
could not afford to provide much assistance. This may well be the case for the 1650s, 
as thirteen visits were ordained yet only one burgh was actually given a grant to help it, 
while Dumfries was not helped as there were no funds available. On the other hand 
less appeals went to other bodies in the 1650s than in the Restoration period, and it 
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seems that overall it was not as difficult a decade for the burghs as some have 
suggested. The absence of any visits to burghs in 1661-70 suggests that fewer burghs 
were even appealing to the convention in this decade. The decision to ask burghs to 
give voluntary contributions, rather than giving direct grants, also suggests that the 
burghs felt that this course would be more profitable than simply handing out a sum of 
money, which would imply that there was money available in the burghs to be 
collected. Overall, the figures suggest that the burghs in the 1650s, and certainly the 
1660s, were not in such a poor condition, and that while trade may have picked up in 
the 1660s and 1670s, the condition of the burghs was already declining noticeably in 
the 1670s.
17
 
 
In terms of the sizes of the burghs, the vast majority were small, paying less than £1 in 
every £100 on the burghs’ tax roll, a category which accounted for forty-eight of the 
sixty-four burghs in the 1670 and 1683 rolls, or 75%, having gone up from 62% and 
65% in 1612 and 1649 respectively. The eleven mid-sized burghs – which were all, 
except Kirkcaldy in 1683, paying between £1 and £3 of every £100 – accounted for 
17% (reduced from fifteen burghs at 28% and 25% in 1612 and 1649), with the five 
largest making up the remaining 8%. Of the 203 occasions specific burghs were named 
in this examination, 173 were small burghs, including all of the exemptions. These 
may skew the figures as it could be expected that any appeals for exemption from a 
large or mid-sized burgh would be less likely to be accepted as the Convention relied 
more on these burghs. If exemptions are excluded, seventy-eight (72%) of the appeals 
were from small burghs, twenty-six (24%) from mid-sized burghs and only four (4%) 
from the five largest burghs. This suggests that, although mid-sized burghs accounted 
for a higher proportion of these appeals than their overall numbers, the appeals were 
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proportionally what might be expected from small and mid-sized burghs. Both 
categories of burgh seem to have been struggling economically, but it is harder to 
judge from these appeals how much the largest burghs were struggling. Edinburgh and 
Dundee at least, as seen in chapter one, were less likely to appeal to the convention. 
Glasgow accounted for three of the four cases involving a large burgh. This cannot be 
taken to mean that Glasgow was struggling more than the others, as it saw its 
proportion of the tax roll more than double between 1649 and 1683.
18
 Therefore, to 
assess the situation of the larger burghs, other means are necessary. 
 
These details from the convention’s records can be combined with data from the 
burghs’ own records to enhance further our understanding of the condition of the 
burghs. Looking at the common good accounts of a burgh can give a sense of whether 
it was operating outside its means, and as well as the burghs examined in the sample 
for this project there are at least summaries of the accounts of many burghs in the 
exchequer records in the National Archives of Scotland and some details in printed 
records. This is, again, not a perfectly reliable means of looking at the condition of the 
burghs, as the detail in accounts varies greatly and Dundee at least had information 
recorded in more than one set of accounts. Debt can also be examined, though this also 
carries its difficulties. Some burghs did not include debt at all in their accounts, so 
records of interest being paid must be relied on. Others did not even record this, 
though the council minutes show debts being incurred and repaid. Debts owing to a 
burgh are often not recorded either, but the examination of council minutes and 
accounts of the burghs in the sample has revealed very little lending by burghs. While 
this means that a high level of accuracy is unattainable in terms of the amounts of debt 
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and the extent of profit or loss being made on common good each year, a general 
picture can be built up to add to that gained by the appeals to the convention. 
 
Appendix II contains the balances of the accounts of fifteen burghs for most years 
between 1651 and 1688, and the record of their debt in the years when totals were 
recorded. It includes all five of the largest burghs, six mid-range burghs and four small 
ones, with a range of regions covered. Unfortunately among the small burghs covered 
in the survey for the thesis and those in the exchequer records, few have surviving runs 
of accounts, which means that the largest category of burghs has the fewest examples 
in this examination. Unsurprisingly the results show great variation, though there are 
some trends and some interesting exceptions. 
 
Only eight burghs have more than one balance recorded from 1651-60, with most of 
them having mixed fortunes but Aberdeen, Dumfries, Dundee and Stirling generally 
doing quite well in their balances. Dundee successfully reduced its debt from just 
under £39,000 in 1652-3 to just under £27,000 in 1656-7. However, by 1659-60 it was 
back to only £1,300 under the original amount. Perth also saw a rise in its debt from 
just over £28,500 in 1655-6 to just over £40,200 in 1660-1. However, while Stirling’s 
debt rose by £1,400 over two years in the middle of the 1650s, by 1660-1 it was 
reduced by £8,200 to £18,200. It seems that some of the larger and mid-sized burghs 
were not too adversely affected by the 1650s. Edinburgh, however, appears to have 
struggled much more with the situation than other burghs. After a negligible profit in 
1651-2, all of the six years recorded after that showed deficits, while its debt reached 
£708,000 in 1660.
19
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After the 1650s, some burghs seem to have been almost constantly in deficit. Dundee 
saw profit in only one year (1681-2). Its debt peaked at £46,678 13s 4d in 1667-8, with 
a drop to £15,134 13s 4d by 1681-2 showing that its financial difficulties were being 
effectively managed. Unfortunately there is no record of how these debts were repaid, 
with no extra sources of income recorded in the burgh’s accounts or its council 
minutes. There were three standards ways of paying off debts – further borrowing, 
impositions, and stents on the inhabitants, all of which are discussed further below. 
The first would obviously not reduce overall debt, while the second would require a 
warrant from the crown and would almost certainly be included in treasurer’s accounts 
or council minutes, meaning that the most likely scenario in this case is that Dundee’s 
inhabitants were stented to help pay these debts off. Whether or not this was the case, 
the situation seems to have turned round after 1682 with major deficits and its debt in 
1688-9 rising again to around £31,200. Perth also struggled throughout the period, 
with the few years at the end of the 1660s and 1670s where it saw profits in its 
accounts also seeing the debt rise by over £13,000 to £61,733 6s 8d. The smaller 
burghs Elgin and Forfar also saw almost constant deficits in these years, though 
without levels of debt it is hard to gauge their true situation; Dundee was also 
operating on annual deficits while reducing its debt. 
 
Much of the data, however, suggests that the 1660s, particularly the later years, into 
the 1670s, were years of some success for the burghs, which confirms the view of the 
more recent historiography. Some burghs took longer to pick up than others, with Ayr 
showing profits in almost every year of the 1660s, a decade in which Dumfries 
struggled, after which it saw profits until 1677. Edinburgh saw profits every year 
between 1665-6 and 1673-4, with its debt in 1677 reduced to under £440,000. Also 
unsurprising is the increase in problems for the burghs in the latter part of the 1680s, 
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with Dundee’s debt rising significantly in this decade. What is perhaps surprising is 
that these problems actually seem to have grown in the 1670s or even earlier. In every 
year recorded since 1668-9 Montrose recorded a deficit, though the highest came in the 
1680s. Stirling’s decline also seems to have begun, judging by its deficits, at the end of 
the 1660s. However, while it was not making profits, its debt was at least being 
serviced until after 1678-9, having been only £100 different in 1654-5 and 1678-9, but 
more than doubling by 1686 to over £55,588. Ayr also seems to have been struggling 
since the mid-1670s, a period in which the burghs have been considered to have been 
doing quite well. Edinburgh also, having seen profits between 1665-6 and 1673-4, had 
deficits in every year recorded after that. 
 
This general picture of difficulties in the 1680s should be tempered, however, with 
Perth, despite its constant deficits, seeing a reduction of its debt from £82,903 6s 8d in 
1678-9 to just over £51,000 in 1687-8. Glasgow’s accounts do not show constant 
deficit, but there is a suggestion, with three out of six years from 1679-80 showing 
deficits, that things were getting more difficult in the 1680s. Its council minutes do 
seem to echo this, as it increased its excise on malt in order to defray the burgh’s debt, 
which included at least 20,000 merks (£13,333 6s 8d) to the Archbishop of St Andrews 
alone.
20
 Glasgow had, however, experienced only a few deficits before this, two of 
which came in the early 1670s, just after it had built its new port which may partly 
explain them, and throughout the period its accounts show that it was regularly able to 
pay off debt from the common good.  
 
The most surprising examples which do not seem to fit the picture of difficulties in the 
1680s are St Andrews and Peebles. In every year recorded after 1674-5 (seven totals, 
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two of which covered two years’ accounts) St Andrews saw profits, some of which 
were surprisingly large for a burgh which had an annual common good income of 
between £2,000 and £2,500. Balances are recorded for Peebles for eleven of the 
fourteen years after 1675-6, including all of the 1680s, and despite its deficits 
throughout the 1660s, all of these years show profits. Its common good does seem to 
have increased significantly in this period, but as it amounted to between £2,500 and 
£3,000 some of its profits are even more impressive than those of St Andrews. Neither 
burgh appears many times in the list of appeals in Appendix I, although St Andrews 
had its proportion on the tax roll reduced so that by 1692 it was little more than a sixth 
of what it had been in 1649. Its profits may simply have been insufficient to pay off 
debts and do the work required to maintain the burgh. Peebles on the other hand may 
just have been an unusual case of a thriving small burgh, despite the small reduction in 
its proportion in 1692, perhaps benefiting from overland trade with England.
21
 
 
Interestingly, Banff also records profits through the mid-1680s. However, close 
examination of the accounts reveals that around half of the income was money 
gathered from the inhabitants, often several times a year, to pay both its share of the 
national assessment and the convention’s missive dues, as well as, in 1688, the charges 
of the burgh’s commissioner to the convention and its minister’s stipend. By the end of 
the decade, despite these sums being included (in itself unusual among the burghs), it 
was seeing losses. Judging by the small amount of detail recorded in the council 
minutes Banff’s common good income actually increased in the 1670s with a new fair, 
and remained steady from then on. Yet it seems clear that even regular impositions on 
the inhabitants could not ease the burgh’s difficulties.
22
 Unfortunately not enough 
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detail remains in Peebles’ and St Andrews’ records, but this provides another 
possibility for their apparently anomalous balances. 
 
The general picture given by these figures is that the 1650s were far from disastrous 
for most burghs, while many saw some recovery in around the first decade and a half 
after the Restoration. As much of the historiography suggests, by the mid- to late-
1680s their economic condition was getting more difficult, but these figures suggest 
that the decline seems to have begun for most burghs in the 1670s. This may indicate 
that the competition of the proliferating unfree burghs and market centres may actually 
have had a greater impact than many historians have allowed, particularly after the 
1672 act. Even if the effect on foreign trade was indeed minimal, more legal market 
centres would mean that people had more places to take their products for sale, which 
should mean in turn that the revenue from petty customs in the royal burghs would be 
reduced, reducing the value of the common good. The records of the amounts for 
which the common good of burghs were set would give a better idea if this were the 
case, but those of Ayr, Glasgow and Stirling, represented in graphs in Appendix II, 
indicate that the situation is not as simple as this as there is no clear pattern of decline 
after 1672. There are many difficulties to a fuller study of trends in income from tacks 
of common good, not least the irregular recording of it by many burghs. A deeper 
examination into the condition of the burghs, with a full consideration of the reasons 
for their apparent struggles, would be better placed to assess this data properly; but it is 
clear that there are no simple explanations for the deteriorating condition of the burghs, 
and that it certainly cannot be entirely blamed on the 1672 act and competition from 
unfree burghs. 
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Even at times when the burghs seem to have been doing quite well, there was still 
clearly a residual problem with their debt, which only got worse by the end of the 
1680s. Almost all of the sixteen burghs in the thesis sample have clear evidence of 
debt, rather than just those for which totals are recorded in Appendix II, though 
inevitably to varying degrees. As seen above in the appeals to the convention, debt was 
often mentioned as one of the difficulties a burgh was undergoing. The only 
intervention recorded was in 1677 when the convention approved an act of Jedburgh’s 
council for borrowing money from neighbours and gentlemen to defray their debts and 
expenses, presumably an issue of some controversy within the burgh.
23
 The convention 
was concerned that the burghs’ common good was properly administered and would 
presumably consider debt when appeals were made, but they were not in a position to 
intervene directly simply to help deal with a burgh’s debt. 
 
Urban long-term debt was not a problem unique to Scotland. Across Europe towns 
resorted to borrowing when it was not possible to raise sufficient sums of money 
quickly enough through taxation. As in Scotland, levels of debt well above annual 
revenue was not uncommon, and neither was failure to meet interest payments.
24
 As 
seen above, almost all of the burghs were struggling with debt by 1692, some to the 
extent that they had to borrow simply to cover interest payments, and this was not a 
new problem in the 1690s. The only small burgh to show debt totals in Appendix II is 
Dumbarton, whose debt in 1681-2 was £4,800, much more than double the income 
from its common good in the same year which was unexceptional at just over £1,890.
25
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Stirling, a mid-sized burgh, saw its lowest debt in 1660-1, totalling £18,200. This was 
around three times more than the income from that year, which was just over £6,700, 
while the income in 1686-7 was just over £4,200, when its debt reached more than 
thirteen times this sum at £55,000.
26
 The large burghs seem to have been no better off. 
Perth’s lowest debt in the period was around £28,000 in 1661-2 while its highest was 
almost £83,000 in 1675-6. In those years its income was £22,000 and just under 
£47,000 respectively. The latter total was unusually high, partly due to Perth’s habit, 
apparently not particularly common practice among the burghs, of including sums 
borrowed in the main accounts. However, in the same year Perth also indicated that it 
was in credit to the sum of £12,000, which would partly account for the drop in their 
debt in subsequent years.
27
 Dundee, despite being valued above Perth in the tax roll 
and a more significant trading burgh, had a much smaller common good. Its lowest 
recorded debt in the period was around £15,000, in 1681-2 when its common good 
income was just under £6,400. Its common good in 1667-8, however, was only £5,500 
when its debt had reached almost £47,000, eight and a half times its income.
28
  
 
The only other burgh to show any debt totals is Edinburgh, and the extent of it is 
staggering. The lowest total shown in its council minutes was around £440,000 in 
1677, after its common good had brought in only just over £38,600. The debt was just 
over eleven times the income, but with interest rates at 6% the common good income 
was higher than annual interest (£26,400). The highest debt shown was around 
£708,000 in 1660, with the income from its common good in 1660-1 totalling only 
£28,500, a mere 4% of the debt; interest on it would have been more than £40,000.
29
 
The common good income would of course be required to pay far more than interest, 
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and the extent of Edinburgh’s problems at this time is evident in its struggles to pay its 
ministers’ stipends; by 1653 it had borrowed over £25,000 for this purpose. In 1659 
£4,000 was borrowed to pay off part of £10,400 owed to the ministers, on the same 
day that the treasurer was shown to have paid £23,000 simply for interest on the 
burgh’s debt. The provost and other members of the council advanced 25,000 merks 
(£16,666 13s 4d) the same year to pay the ministers, and a year later it was shown that 
the £86,281 of debt contracted since 1650 was mainly to pay their stipends. 
Edinburgh’s problems only got worse with the reinstatement of the bishops, as 
discussed in chapter two, as it had had the right to the income from the bishopric of 
Orkney for paying its ministers’ stipends and had to ask the inhabitants of the burgh 
for some scheme to supply the deficit of nearly 15,000 merks (£10,000) per annum. It 
did receive a permanent gift from parliament of an imposition on wine, but still had to 
borrow money to pay the arrears.
30
  
 
Interestingly, considering the extent of its debt, Edinburgh did not at the start of the 
period seem to have had too much problem gaining credit. It particularly borrowed 
from the senators of the college of justice, owing them £45,000 by 1654. Although it 
was pressed to repay its debt throughout the 1650s, even being threatened with losing 
its superiority over Leith if it did not pay, the debt was not paid and in fact it decided 
to borrow more in 1662 to make the total debt £10,000 sterling (£120,000), at which 
level it seems to have remained even in 1685. It also seems to have had a separate debt 
of around £75,000 to the college.
31
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There were occasions when credit was harder to come by. On at least one occasion the 
treasurer was asked to provide £300 sterling (£3,600) on his own credit, while a former 
treasurer was given a bond promising repayment rather than actually having the 
balance of his accounts paid directly to him. This was not uncommon among the 
burghs, and neither was the practice of borrowing money from other institutions within 
the burgh. By June 1688 the burgh owed 54,000 merks (£36,000) to the invalid money, 
and hospitals and funds dedicated to relief seem to have been favourite sources of 
loans for burghs, as were kirk sessions.
32
 Stirling was another burgh which seems to 
have habitually borrowed from its hospitals, to the extent that the hospitals, on their 
own accounts, were asked to lend money to each other, to borrow money to help the 
poor and even to give bonds for money owed by the burgh, with at least one of them 
getting into sizeable debt.
33
 This case demonstrates appalling mismanagement of a 
public fund, but the fact that such institutions had enough money to lend to the burghs 
suggests that while the corporations were struggling, enough people within the burghs 
were doing well enough financially to give money to these institutions. 
  
Edinburgh does, however, seem to have recognised that it could not always repay debts 
simply by borrowing and was certainly able to pay off a significant part of its debt. In 
1669 it was decided that the treasurer should set aside 20,000 merks (£13,333 6s 8d) 
from certain of the town’s rents to pay off creditors. Two years later however it was 
realised that this was ineffectual as only around 8,000 merks (£5,333 6s 8d) was being 
set aside. Another attempt was made in 1676, with certain parts of the common good 
again set apart to pay the burgh’s debts, and strict orders were given in light of the 
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previous failure for this money to be used only for this purpose.
34
 Yet although the 
debt was reduced between 1660 and 1677, by 1691 it had climbed to £771,000, 
indicating that it could not continue to manage its long-term debt effectively. 
 
Many other burghs were in a situation where they regularly had to borrow simply to 
pay off debts which were called in by their creditors, suggesting that some at least 
were on the brink of insolvency. Though the sum of its debt is not often clear, 
Kirkcaldy is a good example of some of the difficulties that the situation posed for the 
burghs. Impositions on certain goods, taxes on the inhabitants and loans were all 
employed to try to pay off debt. Even though not all of the debt was paid with other 
loans, the burgh does not seem to have made much of an impact on the overall amount 
as money to pay debt continued to be collected throughout the period. The burgh had 
to repair the harbour, the tolbooth and a bridge, and significant amounts were 
borrowed for these projects, while it also at times struggled to pay its minister’s 
stipend and other sums. By 1687 the debt was at nearly £26,000, in a burgh with a 
common good income in 1664-5 (the only year available) of only £1,100, though as its 
proportion in the burghs’ tax roll was raised in 1670 it may have improved by then. 
Not only this, but it regularly faced difficulties in actually getting the money from its 
inhabitants, with many deficient in paying despite the threat of soldiers being quartered 
on them or even imprisonment.
35
 Although debts were paid off at times, it is clear that 
the other expenses left the burgh in great and apparently increasing difficulty. 
 
Attempting to raise money through stents on inhabitants was widespread and provides 
further evidence of the struggles the corporations were having. Aberdeen and 
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Inverness, and to a lesser extent the small burgh of Rothesay, are notable in their use of 
this method, with sums of up to £16,000 in Aberdeen’s case being regularly imposed 
on the burgh. These sums were for payment of debts and interest, public dues such as 
the excise and even stipends, commissioners’ charges, convention dues, balances of 
treasurer accounts and public works, sums which should have been paid out of the 
common good income. Following an appeal from a resident of Inverness in 1663 the 
court of session decreed that stents could only be imposed after a meeting of the 
burgesses was called to show them why such an imposition was necessary and to seek 
their approval. The fact that, despite this safeguard, they continued to be imposed 
regularly in these and others burghs is another indicator of their necessity.
36
 
 
Some smaller burghs were also experiencing difficulties regarding their magistracy 
due to their debt. Pittenweem’s bailies refused office in September 1659 because they 
were unwilling to take the risk of being prosecuted for the public burdens laid on the 
burgh, with the lack of trade making these burdens difficult to defray. Two of them 
eventually took office as did the other two after being ordered to do so by parliament. 
Crail in 1675 was given some relief from the dues it owed the convention after it was 
found to have been unable to elect magistrates for four years due to ‘severall debts and 
captions against the said burgh and their magistratts’, and Dysart was in a similar 
position in 1687, having had no magistrates for three years.
37
 There are other indicators 
of the financial difficulties of the burghs. Anstruther Wester was struggling so much 
with its public burdens, due to a loss of its trade, that the convention agreed to help it 
appeal to parliament for a reduction until ‘they come to some treading quhairby they 
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may be in capacitie to beare burthen with the rest of the burrowis’.
38
 Ayr claimed an 
inability to provide any supply for repairing Dundee’s harbour ‘in respect of the bad 
condition of thair oun harbour and that they are not at present in condition to repair 
thair own works and ffarr less to grant supplie to ane uther Burgh’.
39
 
 
Bearing all these difficulties in mind, and before considering the effect that the 
financial condition of the burghs had on the convention itself, it must be considered 
that their difficulties should not be overstressed and there is evidence of burghs able to 
invest in various projects. Stirling paid £11,524 16s consistently between 1666 and at 
least 1676 to take in tack the excise of the shire and burgh, though this seems to have 
been unprofitable as in 1684, when offered it again, the council decided not to take it 
as it had incurred great loss through it in the past.
40
 As late as 1687 Aberdeen and 
Kirkcaldy combined to offer £500 sterling (£6,000) per annum for five years to take on 
some impositions the king had granted to the conservator.
41
 Some burghs were buying 
land, Dundee spending 17,500 merks (£11,666 13s 4d) to buy some from the laird of 
Blackness and Glasgow spending £32,300 to buy storehouses at Greenock from the 
royal fishing company.
42
 The most famous example of Glasgow’s success was the 
building of their new deep water harbour on the Clyde in 1669, having spent 13,000 
merks (£8,666 13s 4d) to buy the land from the laird of Newark, an investment that 
was both a result of and a contributor to their increased trade, including across the 
Atlantic.
43
 Glasgow should not be taken as representative of the conditions of the 
burghs in general, however, as it was clearly in a stronger position than most if not all 
others. Struggles seem to have been the norm, but chapter one has shown that many 
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merchants were very active in trading, using unfree burghs as well as royal burghs of 
which they were not burgesses. It seems that while many burghs were in a very poor 
financial condition some merchants were flourishing, to the detriment of their own and 
other burghs. 
 
The convention and expenses 
Given that the burghs were struggling financially, to the extent that some seem to have 
been at least approaching bankruptcy, the key questions here are what impact this had 
on the convention as a whole, and what impact the convention had on the burghs’ 
financial condition. Part of the answer to the latter question lies in the economic 
policies the burghs pursued, which had the potential to improve or limit the trade 
coming through the burghs. The government’s economic policies have been generally 
viewed sympathetically in the historiography. The effectiveness of these policies is 
accepted as limited, though there is some dispute over why this was the case: Smout 
argued that it was because ‘those common assumptions that directed policy were often 
ill-considered and unwise’, while Whatley and Devine both implied that the policies 
themselves were good. Whatley echoed contemporary observers in their criticism of 
the landed classes defence of their privileges, which further hindered a government 
which was simply unable to support its own legislation, while Devine suggested that 
the landed élites shared the crown’s desire for an increase in ‘national economic 
power’. Within these shades of opinion, however, this desire of the crown seems to be 
generally acknowledged. It was not pursuing its policies out of self-interest, but sought 
the ‘unleashing of Scotland’s overseas trading potential’ and the improvement of its 
manufacturing, in order to improve its economy.
44
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The attitude of the royal burghs has, by contrast, been viewed with almost complete 
antipathy. They have been seen as jealous defenders of ‘harmful’ privileges, with more 
interest in maintaining these and resisting competition than in ‘promoting new 
enterprises’. Even Keith in 1913 suggested that, ‘when after the civil war Scottish trade 
and industry began to grow along more modern lines [the convention] failed to 
develop with them’.
45
 Given the importance of foreign trade, the continued 
preservation of the staple port in the Netherlands has been seen as particularly 
symptomatic of the desire to keep trade in the hands of the merchant burgesses of the 
royal burghs, though Smout does acknowledge the benefit of the staple in giving 
merchants a place to land goods free of duty; in keeping it, the convention ‘may have 
been cannier than historians have usually allowed’.
46
 
 
Contemporaries attributed this conservatism to the merchants as a whole, which, given 
that the convention was made up almost entirely of merchants, is a plausible 
conclusion. More recent work, however, has been careful to acknowledge the disparity 
between the views of those with the most power within the burghs, as represented in 
the convention, and other, more progressive, elements within the merchant class. 
Devine goes as far as to say that the ‘Scottish merchant community on balance … 
favoured progress rather than privilege between 1680 and 1740’.
47
 This may be going 
a little far as regards the period of this study, as it is clear that the convention was still 
very firmly rooted in its protectionist principles. One burgh for which it could be said 
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to be true is Glasgow, where the merchants as a whole seem to have been particularly 
enterprising. In the 1690s they complained against the staple port as a hindrance to 
trade, and Smout describes the burgh as a whole as ‘a most enterprising pioneer both in 
industry and commerce’. He notes that two burghs which boasted of the grip the 
merchants had on government and the closed ranks of the merchants, Aberdeen and 
Ayr, were struggling in their trade. On the other hand, Glasgow had an unusual level of 
social mobility and a much more open merchant class, and he suggests that this is one 
among many reasons for Glasgow’s economic success. Where merchants were 
prepared to be more open and innovative, they were also able to be more prosperous.
48
 
This certainly seems to fit with the convention’s problem, discussed in chapter one, 
with merchants undermining the system it tried to protect by trading through burghs in 
which they were not burgesses, and even through unfree burghs. While the 
corporations were struggling economically, some merchants at least were prospering. 
 
As an aside, it might also be possible that the convention’s adherence to its 
monopolistic trade agenda prevented any increasing investment in the burghs by 
landowners. Clark and Slack have suggested that English towns by the end of the 
seventeenth century ‘were beginning to … welcome gentry interference for the 
economic gains which subsequently accrued’.
49
 The Scottish burghs were determined 
not to allow the landowners to interfere in their affairs, largely through the attempts to 
exclude their unfree burghs from trade. A study of the interaction between individual 
burghs and the landed classes would be able to determine this more fully, but it seems 
likely that the monopolistic agenda ensured that landowners did not support and bring 
business to the existing markets in the royal burghs, bringing neither profit or 
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investment to them. Instead they invested in developing their own market centres, and 
while merchants profited from their trade, their burghs did not.
50
 
 
Aside from policies which seem to have hindered the burghs’ growth, their 
membership of the convention inevitably involved expense. It has been seen above that 
Ayr was unable to provide a contribution for Dundee’s harbour repairs. Certainly 
financial difficulties would mean that burghs were less able to help each other, though 
the rise in grants awarded from 1675 indicates that there was still some willingness to 
contribute financially to other burghs. There are some indications that this willingness 
was decreasing, notably with Aberdeen’s attempts in 1671 to make sure it was given 
aid before Ayr was, though it expressed its desire to help Ayr above other burghs. It 
was unsuccessful in this and did agree to help Ayr, but continued to protest its own 
poverty and seek similar aid.
51
 In the previous year Pittenweem had refused to take a 
collection for Dundee after Dundee had refused to grant any supply for its own harbour 
in the late 1650s.
52
 The convention often had to remind burghs to uplift collections for 
other burghs, even when the privy council had awarded the contribution. Those which 
failed to give money would sometimes be asked to bring it to the following meeting of 
the convention, presumably to make sure that they did indeed provide something.
53
 
Some burghs were perhaps reluctant to allow money which could be used to support 
their own burgh to be collected for another burgh’s use, but in the convention as a 
whole there was clearly still a recognition of the need for mutual support despite, or 
perhaps because of, the difficult financial situation. 
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Yet even aside from the money that the burghs were expected to give to help each 
other, and the handouts provided for some burghs, membership of the convention 
entailed some significant expenses. As well as the expense in sending a commissioner 
to meetings, a few burghs incurred the expense of hosting the general convention. As 
seen in chapter two, the 1650s effectively ended the practice of holding general 
conventions in a different burgh each year, and all but seven (one of those being short-
lived) were held in Edinburgh. Unfortunately not much information remains regarding 
how much hosting the convention cost a burgh in this period. Glasgow paid someone 
£66 13s 4d for writing the missives to the burghs, as well as some other services, and a 
further £30 to the burghs’ post for delivering the missives. Some of this money may 
have been reclaimed, as Aberdeen’s clerks depute were told to claim the allotted £40 
for writing and sending the missives. Certainly when a meeting was not actually held 
in the burgh which sent the missives – as with Cupar in 1653 and Aberdeen in 1661-4 
– the convention paid the expenses involved.
54
  
 
Very little record of expense exists for the general convention which did eventually sit 
in Aberdeen in 1665, nor for that in Dundee in 1671. A little more detail is extant for 
that in Perth in 1673: £345 4s was spent initially on wine and confections for the 
meeting, when the treasurer was told to get meat and ale 
And doe everie thing for making the said conventione splendid, that no thing 
may be left undone that should be gon about And als Appoynts the heall 
comissioners to be heer from the severall burrowis, to be admittit burgesss suae 
maney as ar not alreadie burgesses.
55
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Several people were paid 20 shillings for attending and serving at ‘severall treats given 
by the toune’, and the treasurer’s accounts contain at least £466 11s 4d spent on the 
convention, though the accounts are not always clear on what items were for the 
meeting and it is likely that more was spent.
56
 A little more exists in Stirling’s accounts 
regarding its expenses when the burghs sat there in 1674, even though they were there 
for only two days and the only business done was to set up a particular convention to 
discuss the missive. The burgh gave one of its officers £50 for taking the missives to 
the burghs, with a further £241 6s spent at the convention and given to the provost (for 
an unspecified purpose), and most remarkably £874 2s 6d for giving the convention 
‘ane treat’.
57
 Glasgow the following year spent £76 on having the missives written and 
delivered, and a further £888 10s when the burghs were present.
58
 This is significantly 
more than at the end of the previous century, when banquets for the convention in 
Aberdeen and Glasgow cost just £190 5s 8d and £170 9s respectively. That in Dundee 
in 1587 cost just £81 0s 4d, with the total costs of the convention coming to £91 6s.
59
 
Given the evidently huge increase in expense by the Restoration period, there seems to 
have been a desire on the part of the hosts to impress the other burghs when they were 
present, and this would have been quite a strain on a mid-sized burgh like Stirling. 
This could explain why there were only one or two burghs which dissented about the 
fact that general conventions were almost always held in Edinburgh, as highlighted in 
chapter two. The fact that the general convention in Aberdeen also saw the second 
highest number of absentees in the period, some complaining of the distance they had 
to travel to get there, probably also accounts for this lack of complaint. 
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Simply attending the convention could be expensive for burghs and missive dues had 
to be paid, as well as the share of the sixth part of national taxation which was levied 
on the royal burghs. Pagan noted Sir George Mackenzie’s comment that many small 
burghs had been forced to become royal burghs (a somewhat exaggerated claim) and 
could not afford the expense of their responsibilities as such.
60
 There is some truth in 
this. Sending commissioners to the convention was not cheap and of course got more 
expensive the further away a burgh was from Edinburgh, where almost all of the 
meetings were held.  
 
Many burghs seem to have had a standard amount which they would pay their 
commissioner for each day of their absence, sometimes with horse hire allowed as an 
extra expense. These amounts were similar to, if sometimes a little lower than, those 
paid for commissioners to parliament in this period and preceding decades, and varied 
slightly depending in part on the size of the burgh. Ayr and Perth both allowed £5 per 
day, but Dumbarton in 1660 allowed only 40s plus £5 for horse hire. Perhaps partly as 
a consequence of the increased length of time commissioners had to be away at long 
sessions of parliament, or simply due to inflation, this sum was obviously deemed 
insufficient and by the 1680s had been raised to £3 per day.
61
 Dumfries also raised its 
allowance, which was £3 per day at the end of 1661 and within a few months had been 
raised to 5 merks (£3 6s 8d), at which level it remained until 1675 when it was raised 
again to the same level it had been for parliament or conventions of estates, £4 per 
day.
62
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These expenses alone did not represent a great expense for the burghs, even when the 
regularity of meetings is taken into account. Parliament, with its often long sessions, 
was more of a burden in terms of commissioners’ charges, as shall be seen in chapter 
five. In 1660, the total cost of Dumbarton’s commissioner’s charges, including his 
horse hire, was only £25, while Perth’s commissioner, away only seven days at the 
1683 general convention, had expenses of just £35.
63
 Obviously, the greater the 
distance a burgh lay from Edinburgh or wherever else the convention was being held, 
the greater the expenses would be in travelling costs and the number of days a 
commissioner was away from home. There were also other sums which commissioners 
had to pay, such as extracting acts of the convention and paying convention officials. 
Thus in 1683 Perth’s commissioner paid an extra £2 18s for the acts of the convention 
and £14 10s to the burghs’ clerk. Yet these only brought the expenses to £52 8s, while 
its expenses in 1686 and 1687 came to just £40 10s 8d and £45 18s respectively, a little 
less than amounts it paid in the 1660s. This would not have presented much of a 
burden to a burgh the size of Perth. Although its expenses of between £150 and £220 
in the second half of the 1670s would have made more of an impact, these were still 
small amounts in comparison to its income which was anything between £25,000 and 
£46,000 in the same period.
64
 As a much smaller burgh, paying less to its 
commissioners, Dumbarton’s expenses were understandably much less. In the early 
1660s it paid between £20 and £30, which would only have been around 1% of its 
income in any given year. This proportion was similar to the proportion Perth paid in 
the expensive years, so when the expenses rose to between £45 and £55 in the latter 
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part of the period it represented a larger proportion of its income.
65
 It was clearly still 
not a huge amount, but for a struggling burgh was not an insignificant annual outlay. 
For an even smaller burgh such as Forfar, which seems to have paid its commissioners 
similar daily rates and whose overall expenses would almost certainly not have been 
much lower than Dumbarton’s, but whose common good was less than half the size, 
the burden of attendance would have been much greater.
66
 
 
The costs of attendance did place a burden on many smaller burghs, though the 
amounts spent do not necessarily seem very high. Yet, crucially, burghs also had to 
pay missive dues, sums specified in the missive for each general convention which 
were mainly made up of the money the agent had spent on the convention’s behalf. 
Throughout its minutes one can find the agent’s accounts, detailing the total amount he 
was owed for the previous year, which could be anything from £2000 to £9000, though 
it was usually at the lower end of this scale. On top of this were sums spent, such as 
the £1000 sterling (£12,000) given to the king in 1660, which would be paid by the 
burghs on top of the standard agent’s, or missive, dues.
67
  
 
What these sums do not indicate is how able the burghs were to pay. Some burghs, 
such as Inverness in 1669, were put to the horn for not paying their dues, often due to 
an inability to do so; Inverness on that occasion had to impose the amount on the 
inhabitants of the burgh. Rothesay also had to stent its inhabitants to raise missive dues 
on at least two occasions.
68
 The convention’s own records also indicate that some 
burghs were having difficulty, with the agent told in 1677 to try to recover about 
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£2,000 ‘of desperate debts due be the insufficient burrows’.
69
 Two years earlier his 
predecessor, William Brown, had petitioned the convention stating that the ‘growing 
deficiencie of many burroues’ in paying their dues had ‘mor then ballanced any 
advantage ever I had for all the attendance I have given about your publict affaires’. 
He stated that he was no longer in a position to be able to afford to advance any money 
for them, as so much of his own wealth was ‘scattered and in the hands of the Burroues 
wherof a considerable pairt is desperate which I have small hopes ever to recover’. He 
ended by asking them  
to take some effectuall course for repairing my bygaine prejudice And for 
establisching a Casch for following your affaires for the futur And making me 
in some Competent and Creditable way to subsist in your service that 
henceforth it may not be a burdaine but a benefeit and incouragment to your 
honors.
70
 
Though the petition contains a note recommending it to the general convention that 
year, it does not seem to have been raised there. The following year Brown was asked 
to collect £4,500 sterling (£54,000) from the burghs to help in the attempts to remove a 
French tax on Scottish cargoes. Presumably due to the difficulties he had already had 
in collecting the money he was owed, and almost certainly with the recognition that at 
least some of these burghs were unable to pay, he refused and was removed as agent. 
The convention seem to have been very sympathetic to him and ‘having regard to his 
former services’ continued his pension.
71
 This suggests that it understood that his 
position was reasonable, even if it still wanted to try to collect the money. 
 
                                                 
69
 RCRBS, iv, 5. 
70
 ECA, Moses Bundle 210. 
71
 RCRBS, iii, 672-4. 
144 
It is much easier to get an impression of the burden the missive dues placed on the 
burghs by looking at individual examples. Dundee in 1679 had to pay £184 3s 4d in 
missive dues, yet this was only 2.3% of their income (just under £8,000) that year.
72
 
Perth in the same year paid a fairly standard £137 8s 4d for their missive dues, a mere 
0.5% of their income that year, which income was much lower than it had been.
73
 The 
following year Dumbarton paid £31 19s 8d, just 1.7% of their income that year.
74
 
When there were extra sums to pay, the smaller burghs would almost certainly have 
struggled most. In 1669, Dumbarton had to pay £63 16s as their share of £600 sterling 
(£7,200) given to the burghs’ commissioners to Holland, on top of £20 12s for the 
missive dues, in all coming to 5.2% of their income that year.
75
 As with the 
commissioner’s charges, these sums do not look too significant, but as an annual 
expense for an indebted burgh they would have represented a real burden. 
 
The full expense of membership of the convention inevitably becomes clearer when 
the different costs are combined. The total cost of Perth’s attendance at the general 
convention in 1683, once its missive dues were paid, was £187 7s, still only around 1% 
of their income.
76
 Dumfries, a mid-sized burgh, paid less in 1673 and 1675, when its 
charges were £232 3s 4d and £152 10s respectively. The closest complete years of 
accounts remaining are for 1662-3, with an income of £2733 6s 8d, and 1687-8 when it 
was £3919 5s. These figures suggest that it could have spent anything between about 
3.9% and 8.5% of its annual income at the convention, quite a large proportion of its 
income.
77
 The smallest burghs had the greatest struggles, Dumbarton in 1676 paying 
£169 14s 6d as the total cost of attendance, which represented 9.1% of its income that 
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year.
78
 The category which most needed the help of the convention, and which 
represented the largest number of burghs, were those burghs who could least afford the 
expense of their membership. 
 
Absences were perhaps an inevitable consequence of the combination of difficult 
economic circumstances and the expense of attending the numerous meetings of the 
burghs. Appendix III shows that the beginning of the 1650s did not see many 
meetings, with none in 1651, one general and one particular convention in 1652 and 
only one particular convention in 1653. However, in the next six years to 1659 there 
were five general conventions and eighteen particular conventions. 1660 saw many 
meetings, with two general conventions and five particular conventions, but in the rest 
of the period (twenty-eight years) there were only eighteen of the latter, not including 
those which were called particular conventions but actually comprised all the burghs 
during parliament or conventions of estates. Yet in this period there were thirty-four 
meetings of all the burghs, of which eleven sat at the time of parliament or the estates, 
some of these being extremely long. The effect of these numerous and long 
conventions on burghs which were struggling financially, given the expense of 
attending, could not be anything but detrimental.
79
 
 
Given this, it could be expected that the numbers of burghs staying away would rise 
throughout the period, or at least be high at the start of the period and then again after 
the mid-1670s, when burghs seem to have been struggling most. Yet as Appendix I 
shows, although many burghs’ fines for absence were discharged in the 1680s, the 
number of exemptions in that decade was the lowest in the period. Appendix III shows 
that there is also no pattern of absences increasing into the 1680s; there is even a hint 
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of a downward trend after the 1660s. Absences were high at general conventions, often 
between a third and half of the number of burghs enrolled. Given that the smallest 
burghs accounted for 75% of the total, and that they were not the only ones struggling 
with their finances, it is perhaps surprising that the number of absentees was not 
higher. As shall be seen below, there were also often extra circumstances at work in 
years when many burghs were absent.  
 
It is clear that more burghs attended conventions at the time of parliament or 
conventions of estates than at other times. This is least surprising in 1685 and 1686 
when the annual general convention began less than a month after parliament had 
adjourned, having sat for more than six weeks each time. It does however suggest that 
some burghs saw parliament as more of a priority than the regular meetings of the 
burghs, but this does not mean that they disregarded the convention. Rather it 
underlines the problem their financial difficulties gave the convention, suggesting that 
many burghs recognised that, in their inability to afford sending a commissioner to 
each meeting, they could prioritise parliament at which time they would also be able to 
meet with the other burghs. 
 
In terms of particular conventions, attendances seem to have been lowest in the early 
part of the period, and this can probably be ascribed to the remarkable number of 
meetings that were held. As the period went on, the numbers of meetings decreased 
and the numbers of absentees dropped. However, few small burghs were called to 
these meetings (which usually consisted of around twenty-five burghs) and those 
which were called were from areas close to Edinburgh. The most distant mid-sized 
burghs were also not generally called to particular conventions.
80
 This would help to 
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keep attendance relatively high, sparing these burghs the expense, many of which were 
the least able to afford it. It also ensured that a quorum was more likely to be reached, 
with only one of these meetings showing that no business was done when only six out 
of thirteen burghs were present and one other having no acts recorded; it is not clear if 
this was due to clerical error or a lack of a quorum, as the numbers needed for a 
quorum were not always specified. On the other hand, this could present a further 
problem for the burghs, as it would mean that the perspective brought to particular 
conventions was that of the central burghs, whose priorities may not have reflected 
those of the burghs from other areas. Thus while the absences from the convention 
were high but not as high as could be expected, they did present some difficulties for 
the burghs in ensuring that, other than when all estates met, the convention did not 
have representation from a significant part of its membership. 
 
When the reasons given for burghs’ absences are examined, it is clear that poverty was 
a major factor and it could be less expensive for them to take the fine imposed for their 
absence than it was actually to go. Inverness stated as much in 1685, that ‘because of 
thir troublesome and dangerous tymes quhen the armies were marching from every 
airth to the Kings hoast’, due to Argyll’s rising, and the fact that its commissioner was 
‘but lately come hame’ from parliament, the burgh was willing to ‘take their hazard of 
the fyne’ for not sending a commissioner.
81
 Not all excuses had a clear reason given, 
while some of the stated reasons do not seem quite so legitimate. Perth did not send a 
commissioner to a particular convention in 1677 as it was held at the time of its 
market.
82
 Both Dumfries and Dumbarton, in 1663 and 1675 respectively, did not send 
commissioners because it was not convenient for them to do so, and as neither is stated 
in the convention minutes as being excused it seems this reason was not regarded as 
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sufficient.
83
 On later occasions Dumfries also appears to have been willing to bear the 
fine when it did not send a commissioner due to having other burghal affairs to deal 
with and, even after the fine for non-attendance had been increased, it decided that 
nothing due to be discussed at a particular convention concerned it.
84
 Forfar seem to 
have felt the same for the second general convention in 1674 when it decided there was 
no need to send a commissioner, as did Kirkcaldy in 1665, stating that 
They ffand that ther was not any thing therin quherin they ware considerablie 
concerned And thairfor they concludit not to send any thither Bot rather to pay 
the fyne Inrespect of the grit distance of place
 
.
85
 
 
However these excuses cannot be taken to suggest that the burghs sought easy excuses 
to be free of their obligation to attend conventions as they represent only a small 
proportion of the reasons given. Like Inverness in 1685 some burghs were concerned 
about the safety of their commissioners if they had to travel, with the same burgh 
having decided not to send a commissioner in 1654 ‘in regaird of the troubles of the 
tyme and the great danger in the Jurney Southward’, sending a supplication by post 
instead.
86
 Dumbarton was excused from visiting Rothesay (as commissioned by the 
convention) the following year because of the dangers of travel, while Dumfries, 
having already appointed a commissioner in 1679, decided that he could not go 
without danger ‘in regaird of the troubles of the tyme’.
87
 These political instabilities 
were sometimes combined with poverty in excuses given. Banff in 1685 complained 
that encroachments by highlanders were leaving the burgh in a poor condition, while 
many inhabitants had been called up to the king’s host. The same year Elgin also 
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complained of the expense of preserving the burgh from ‘Louse Highlanders’ and 
furnishing the militia, for which purpose it had had to borrow money as the common 
good was exhausted and its inhabitants were being impoverished by unfree markets 
held too close to the burgh. It also stated that its distance from a sea port, and the 
expense of sending a commissioner to the recently-ended parliament and convention, 
made sending a commissioner more difficult.
88
 
 
The issue of the regularity of conventions may be expected to have been a factor in 
some absences, but other than the few times it was claimed that meetings were held too 
soon after parliaments, it was rarely mentioned directly. Perth did decide not to send a 
commissioner to a particular convention in 1676 because it felt that it had been sent to 
visit too many other burghs (including Montrose and Inverness) while other burghs 
‘doe not give so punctuall attendance’. However, the burgh wrote to express its 
willingness to attend all other meetings and agree with what was done at that one.
89
 
The most common reason given for not sending a commissioner was simply poverty, 
in which the regularity of meetings would have almost certainly been an unstated 
factor. Inverness in 1671 decided that its ‘straits and difficulties’ made it expedient not 
to send a commissioner, while St Andrews decided not to send one in 1685 as ‘the 
patrimonie is so low by the present troubles And that they cannot at present command 
monie for defraying of the Charge of ane Commissioner’.
90
 It had previously, in 1674, 
decided not to send a commissioner as it needed to use its common good to repair the 
harbour which had been damaged by a storm. Often burghs would ensure that they sent 
their missive dues even if they were not in attendance, and clearly considered that this 
was the key responsibility. Rothesay in 1687 was having difficulty paying its dues and 
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had a meeting to discuss how to raise the money for this, while deciding not to send a 
commissioner ‘in regarde of their povertie’.
91
 This was clearly also the case in 1688 
when Dumbarton was faced with the choice, having already spent £500 more than its 
common rent, of letting £58 18s 2d of missive dues go unpaid or sending a letter of 
excuse for its absence. It decided not to send a commissioner, with a former provost 
who was then living in Edinburgh to deliver the dues and its apologies but to let the 
burgh know if it would suffer any prejudice by its absence.
92
 This was clearly not a 
case of a burgh trying to escape its obligations and seems to reflect the attitude of most 
burghs even in their absence. While their own interests were clearly paramount, they 
did still consider themselves as part of a body of burghs and recognised the importance 
of participating, yet were hindered from doing so to a full extent by their poverty. 
 
The convention inevitably had to respond to these absences. When their excuses were 
not considered acceptable absentees were fined, but as seen above this was not always 
a deterrent to those tempted to stay away. The fine for absence was initially £20 and in 
1665 the convention ordered the agent to use ‘utmost extremity of execution’ in 
collecting the fines, as the ‘neglect of exacting the penalties occasions the absence of 
burghs from conventions’. This was clearly not considered enough to solve the 
problem and just two days later the fine was increased to £100 upon the consideration 
that 
the wnlaw laid vpon the absent burroues is so low that the most pairt of 
burroues doeth absent themselves of purpose quhen generall conventions are 
appoynted att any distant places.
93
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This was not always effective, and in 1679 the forty-six absences were the highest 
recorded in the period (in number and proportionally to the number of enrolled 
burghs). The convention ascribed these absences to ‘the not useing of diligence in 
exacting fynes imposed by the burrows against absent burrows’, and the agent was 
ordered then, and again in the particular convention later that year, to put to the horn 
any absentees who were not excused and did not pay. However, it appears to have been 
forced to recognise that many burghs simply could not pay that amount, as the 
following year the fine for absence from the 1679 general convention – but not any 
other – was reduced to £25.
 94
 
 
The convention did recognise that not all burghs were able to attend meetings and that 
it was thus sometimes unfair to impose fines. As Appendix I shows, many small 
burghs were granted exemptions, usually for three years but occasionally for five, 
while Kirkwall was given an apparently open-ended exemption due to their distance 
from Edinburgh.
95
 Fines were also sometimes discharged for various reasons. Those 
burghs which attended the particular convention in January 1675 to write an apologetic 
letter to the king after the 1674 letter (which shall be discussed below) were discharged 
of any fines for absence from previous meetings, perhaps to show that the burghs 
collectively favoured those who were loyal to him. In the general convention later that 
year all bygone fines were discharged, though absentees from that meeting and future 
ones would still be fined. There is no obvious reason for this, though again it could 
have been a way of marking the fact that, as they stated to Lauderdale, ‘the royall 
borrows are fullie returned to their duetie’ to the king.
96
 In 1686, as Appendix I 
indicates, all absentees from the conventions in 1684 and 1685 were excused and their 
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fines discharged. The twenty-six absentees from 1684 were considered too poor and 
unable to pay their fines, while the thirty-seven absentees from the 1685 meeting (not 
including the general convention during parliament) ‘wer absent upon the accompt 
they wer attending his Majesties host at that tyme for suppressing of the late 
rebellion’.
97
 Ayr and Irvine were both fined £100 for their absence in 1685, as the only 
burghs able to pay, but their fines were also discharged the following year. This 
presented a problem for the convention as their fines had been awarded to Arbroath 
which had appealed for help due to the loss of shipping, repairs to its harbour and the 
expense of upholding it, and this money would then have to be raised by other means. 
Unfortunately this is another case where the convention’s eventual decision is not 
recorded.
98
 
 
Some burghs were so concerned at their inability to afford the expense of being royal 
burghs that they tried to demit their position. In 1672, Anstruther Wester, Cromarty 
and Kilrenny all resigned their privileges as royal burghs, gaining acts of parliament to 
this effect after petitions were submitted by them claiming that their extreme poverty 
rendered them unable to bear the burdens that went with the privileges of being a royal 
burgh.
99
 Pagan, referring only to the parliamentary records, says that their desire was 
accepted and they were taxed with the shires instead of the burghs, and she suggests 
that parliament’s decision to allow burghs of barony and regality to have the trading 
privileges of royal burghs was an influence in their desire to withdraw.
100
 
 
Yet Pagan’s assessment of the situation is rather too simplistic. Pryde’s Critical List of 
the Burghs of Scotland contains no mention of any resignation by Anstruther Wester or 
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Kilrenny, and the 1705 stent roll shows that they were still being assessed with the 
royal burghs, and were thus still considered members of the convention.
101
 They did 
attempt to be removed, and seem to have considered that parliament’s acceptance of 
their resignation was enough. In 1679 they appealed for a refund of the proportion of 
the burghs’ tax they had paid that year. Despite visits and investigations and further 
appeals stating the acts of parliament accepting their resignation, they were continued 
as members of the convention, though some relief was given to both burghs to enable 
them to continue bearing the burdens of membership.
102
  
 
In 1681 they and Cromarty all appealed to parliament asking that the previous acts 
should be enforced. The issue was remitted to the privy council, who merely referred it 
to the convention and told it and the shire collectors not to take action in collecting the 
cess.
103
 Cromarty was eventually removed from the convention, and this only in 1685 
after numerous appeals from the burgh and an initial refusal. It was only after the 
convention accepted its appeal and removed it from its roll (while still pursuing it for 
bygone missive dues) that the original act of parliament was ratified.
104
 The 
convention’s unwillingness to allow these burghs to resign their privileges is not 
surprising, as it would lose their contributions to the estate’s share of public burdens 
and missive dues, while the 1672 act meant that they would still be able to carry on 
any trade. If the act was a motivation for their attempts to leave, it could be expected 
that more burghs would try it, and perhaps the convention’s intransigence helped 
prevent others seeking to do the same. Kintore did ask to be removed from the tax roll 
due to its poverty and inability to send commissioners, but this seems to have been 
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rejected without even reaching the general convention, and all the burgh gained was a 
three-year exemption.
105
 There is little evidence of other burghs seeking to be 
expunged from the convention, even when they claimed that their poverty was so great 
they might have to resign their privileges. 
 
Conclusion 
What is perhaps most remarkable in relation to the cases of Cromarty, Anstruther 
Easter and Kilrenny is that, despite the expense of attending conventions, the poverty 
of the burghs and the threat of competition, very few burghs did try to leave. The 
convention, in the face of fierce competition, was not enabling the burghs to flourish in 
trade due to its economic policies, and nor could it prevent their financial difficulties. 
Yet attendances also stayed remarkably high and the numbers of exemptions granted 
actually dropped in the 1680s. Though the numbers of burghs discharged from paying 
missive dues and particularly fines for absence rose dramatically, the majority of these 
came in three years when there were apparently exceptional circumstances. Despite the 
fears of the effect of the 1672 act, in which decade the decline in the burghs’ condition 
appears to have begun, attendances did not drop markedly, and the comment in 1685 
that ‘the Convention of Burrowes … [is] now of little significancy by this late Act’ is 
not echoed by the attitudes of the burghs towards their collective body as indicated by 
their behaviour.
106
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Chapter 4 
The Convention in the Interregnum 
 
The 1650s presented the convention with a new challenge in foreign occupation. After 
over a decade of conflict, with the devastation of civil war on home soil and the 
expense of Scottish armies in England and Ireland, Scotland succumbed to conquest. 
In little over a year after the defeat at Dunbar in September 1650, English forces had 
occupied lowland Scotland, and almost a decade of rule from London was under way. 
England may not have had a clear vision for how conquered Scotland would be 
governed when its armies invaded, but an incorporating union was soon put in 
motion.
1
 The English seemed to view this union as a favour to the Scots, an indication 
of their generosity and favour, an attitude Hirst describes as ‘paternalistic’.
2
 A report in 
Mercurius Politicus answered the question of how England would react if it was in 
Scotland’s position by stating that England would approve of such an incorporation 
‘without doubt, and be glad of it too, if England could reap so much benefit by an 
Incorporation with Scotland, as Scotland will have by this’.
3
 
 
Besides the suggestion that England would not really benefit from the union adding to 
the apparent paternalistic attitude, it was assumed that Scotland most certainly would 
benefit. If such benefits were clear when the Tender of Incorporation was presented 
early in 1652, it might be expected that the burghs would leap at the opportunity of 
some much-needed respite. They had put considerable resources into the Covenanting 
cause, and received little in return but significant losses of men and resources to the 
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war, Aberdeen in particular seeing direct attacks on the burgh, while shipping across 
the country suffered from storms and populations were hit by plague. The losses from 
war continued into 1651 with Charles II’s ill-fated march to Worcester and Monck’s 
army using the resources of the surrounding countryside and being quartered on many 
burghs.
4
 
 
The decade did not dawn well for the convention. Only nine commissioners appeared 
at the general convention at Cupar on 2 July 1650; forty-nine were absent, including 
the five main burghs. Due to the ‘imminent danger quherin the estat of kirk and 
kingdome within this kingdome at this tyme standis through the unexpectit aproches of 
the Inglisch armies to this kingdom both by sea and land’, it was decided to prorogue 
the general convention until July 1651. The convention felt obliged to lay the ‘privat 
interest’ of the burghs aside, and instead ‘prefer the publick weall of kirk and 
kingdome’, though given the tiny proportion of burghs present, and the absence of 
Edinburgh in particular, this statement merely masked the virtual impossibility of 
action.
5
 In the event the burghs were not able to meet again until August 1652 ‘in 
obedience to the declaratione of the commissioneris of the parliament of the 
Commounwealth of England’. During much of the intervening period the body which 
would have usually dealt with any urgent burgh affairs, Edinburgh’s council, was not 
sitting having fled the town at the chancellors recommendation after the battle of 
Dunbar.
6
 
 
Despite this unpromising beginning to the decade the convention continued to meet 
throughout the 1650s, and emerged as the only national Scottish institution to survive 
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the English occupation. As such, it is perhaps surprising that the one overview of 
Cromwellian Scotland, Dow’s 1979 book, does not give more space to the burghs; 
while they are relatively prominent in her account until 1653, they disappear somewhat 
thereafter. Yet the behaviour of the burghs and their representative body seems to 
warrant closer attention. In many areas business continued as usual for the convention, 
yet it could not claim to have retained complete freedom. Many adaptations to the new 
regime had to be made, as the burghs lost most of their representation in parliament 
and changes were made to trade and customs and excise laws. The convention seems 
to have coped with these changes, but there is evidence that it was not exactly 
flourishing, nor helping its constituent members to do so. 
 
Position and authority of the convention 
While the convention continued to meet, it did not do so with the same freedom to 
which it had been accustomed. The first functional convention of the decade was held 
on the orders of the commissioners from the English parliament. There was a particular 
aim in the calling of the meeting, as it was to choose seven commissioners to represent 
the burghs in London, but they took the opportunity to discuss other business. There 
was a worrying sign for the freedom of the convention, however, as the English judges 
ruled that four unqualified commissioners could continue to sit. Anstruther Easter’s 
was both unqualified and came with a limited and revocable commission, while those 
of Banff, Queensferry and Dornoch were not resident merchants. In normal 
circumstances these burghs would have been fined and the commissioners dismissed, 
but the convention was merely forced to accept the judges’ ruling with the protest that 
it should not affect its liberties in future.
7
 While the four burghs were let off due to ‘the 
tyme and occasione’, this particular liberty of the convention was reasserted with the 
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warning of a £200 fine for any burgh sending unfit commissioners, and other than 
some defects being ignored in the uncertain circumstances of 1660, normal practice 
was upheld throughout the rest of the decade.
8
 
 
It was only by the favour of the English administration that the burghs could convene, 
which would mean that any meeting which was not approved could be quickly ended. 
This was proved true when the general convention convened at Cupar in July 1653 
only to be forcibly dissolved because they had not informed colonel Lilburne, the 
commander-in-chief of the English forces, of their sitting.
9
 Dow relates this to the 
dissolution of the general assembly and the interruption of some synods and 
presbyteries, caused by a fear of large gatherings of Scots at a time when royalist 
forces were active in the Highlands.
10
 As such, it is not surprising that the convention 
would also suffer, with military expediency and security bound to take precedence in 
such a climate. The incident indicated to the burghs that they could not expect to be 
able to convene simply at their own agreement, and in September Edinburgh 
specifically asked Lilburne for permission to hold a particular convention, which was 
granted.
11
  
 
This was the pattern throughout the rest of the decade, Edinburgh often requesting 
specific permission for meetings to be convened. In October 1655 it asked the council 
of state for permission to hold a general convention, and if this was not forthcoming at 
least to get a particular convention to discuss trade.
12
 There seems to have been some 
uncertainty about the answer, or at least about the favour of general Monck towards the 
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burghs, as Edinburgh’s dean of guild went to him in March 1656 to ensure that the 
burghs could still meet, and to get a new warrant if necessary.
13
 Such uncertainty may 
have been warranted, as in 1657 the general convention did not meet until October, 
despite Edinburgh asking for a warrant as early as March, because the council of state 
was not sitting and Monck then delayed it. Business was not entirely halted in the 
interim, as a committee had been appointed to pursue certain issues, and this appears to 
have been allowed to continue without need of special permission from the general.
14
 
Again in 1658 permission had to be gained before the general convention could meet, 
but this was the last of the decade as Monck, presumably again for reasons of security, 
would not allow the 1659 general convention to sit.
15
 In the two years when no general 
convention sat, there were five particular conventions, and it seems that these were less 
subject to the authority of the English administration. Permission was sought at times, 
and they could also be subject to some interference as in February 1655 when one was 
brought forward a week on Monck’s orders, which may have caused some 
inconvenience to the distant burghs in particular.
16
 It may be that the smaller 
gatherings of burghs were considered less likely to be forums for sedition, or simply 
that the burghs took matters into their own hands and took a warrant for a general 
convention to include the authority to call particular conventions. In any case, the 
burghs were aware that their right to conventions of any kind was very much 
dependent on the favour of the English administration. It was with some satisfaction 
that a particular convention in 1660 announced the calling of a general convention on 
their own authority as their freedom to meet returned with the return of the king.
17
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There was another, indirect, limitation on the freedom of the convention, and that was 
the limited freedom of burghs in elections. Dow suggests that Lilburne was happy to 
allow a particular convention in October 1653, after the interruption of the general 
convention, because he wanted to soften the blow of the prohibition on burgh 
elections.
18
 Between the elections of 1652 and 1655 normal electoral procedure was 
suspended, thus ensuring that those who had accepted the Tender of Incorporation and 
taken the oath of fidelity to the English Commonwealth before being elected would 
remain in power. This meant that the administration could be assured of some degree 
of loyalty from the burgh authorities across Scotland, as in 1652 only those burghs 
which assented to the Tender were given licence to hold elections, and only those who 
took the oath would be allowed to elect or be elected.
19
 There was some opposition to 
the taking of the oath, such as by the provost and two bailies of Dumbarton, who were 
deprived of office because their consciences would not allow them to take the oath, 
though exactly what their problem with it was is not clear.
20
 The Fife burghs also 
protested against the oath due to their ‘tender consciences’ and the fact that they had 
already shown their assent to the union and promised their obedience. In Edinburgh, 
the radical Presbyterian Sir James Stewart would not take the oath and lost out to the 
moderate Engager Archibald Todd in the elections for provost, while another dissenter 
left a vacancy in the council.
21
 As well as securing burgh authority in the hands of 
those who were at least outwardly loyal to the English, these measures meant that the 
convention, whose constituent commissioners would be elected by these councils, 
would also be less likely to show dissent to the will of the regime. 
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After an order from Lilburne suspending elections in September 1653, William 
Thomson, clerk of Edinburgh and the burghs’ agent in London, was asked to 
investigate the matter. In October a particular convention gave him orders to find out 
why the order had been given and what the future intentions of the council were, and to 
try to ensure ‘the preservatione of the liberties of the burrowis heirefter’.
22
 In 1654 the 
threat of more direct interference in burgh elections rose when the commissioners for 
the administration of justice issued a warrant from the council prohibiting elections 
again but also allowing the judges to appoint magistrates, with assurances that this 
would not affect the liberties of the burghs in future. Thomson went to Cromwell and 
Edinburgh’s council sent committees to the judges and to Monck, while also appealing 
to parliament.
23
 The order was rescinded, but this meant that the same magistrates and 
council were to sit for a further year, causing the bailies of Edinburgh to protest that 
their personal fortunes would be ruined if they were to continue. The town promised to 
guarantee any losses their service incurred if they would sit for a month, until the 
matter was settled.
24
 As it was, they sat until 1655 when elections were resumed as 
normal after Thomson’s success in pressing for the restoration of this liberty.
25
  
 
This meant that the convention would at least theoretically have commissioners free 
from English interference. Indeed, in 1659 the former opponent of the English, Sir 
James Stewart, was elected moderator of the convention, having previously been re-
elected provost of Edinburgh in 1658.
26
 Yet this should not be taken as an indicator 
that Edinburgh’s council or the convention had become a threat to the English. In both 
1655 and 1658 the council of state was instructed by Westminster to remove any 
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magistrate, or other public official, ‘whom they shall finde to be dangerous to this 
Comonwealth and disaffected to the present Government or scandalous in their 
Conversation’.
27
 This could almost certainly be extended from individuals to 
corporations. If at any time there was a perceived threat to the regime from any burgh 
council or the convention itself, the freedom of the offending body would have been 
swiftly removed, as happened to the general assembly and, more briefly, some of the 
presbyteries and synods.
28
 
 
This may also have been the case in 1657 when Cromwell attempted to alter the 
charter of Glasgow, though his reasons for doing so are not clear. He wrote to the 
burgh asking it not to hold elections, and it consented, though on announcing the delay 
in the election the council protested 
that the said delay sould not be prejudiciall to the provest, bailleis and counsall 
of this brughe, anent the ordinarij electioune of magistratis thairin in tyme 
cuming as formerlie, conforme to the freidome and libertie grantit to this 
burghe.
29
 
Though the convention did not officially get involved in the case, the burghs seem to 
have collectively opposed Cromwell’s action. A letter was written by Disbrowe, 
chancellor of the administration in Scotland, to Thurloe, Cromwell’s secretary of state, 
reporting that Cromwell’s actions had ‘made a great noyse heere, and raysed feares in 
the burroughs, that it may be their turne shortly’. He said that any attempt to impose a 
magistrate on the burgh would be ‘lookt upon by many as a nigh breach of theyr 
priviledges setled by law, and confirmed, as they thinke, by the parliament in theyr 
petition and advise’. Acknowledging the desirability of having ‘a godly magistracy 
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setled in that borough, as in all others’ he suggested a compromise, that Cromwell 
could recommend a suitable candidate as a bailie and suggest that they choose other 
‘good men’, as this ‘might effect the end, without any noyse or trouble’.
30
 Monck and 
the council also protested, stating that the burghs ‘must not be alienated’, and in the 
end after a supplication to the council of state in February 1658 Glasgow was allowed 
to hold a new election without government interference.
31
 
 
From the very earliest days of the occupation, the burghs’ representations to the 
authorities indicated fears that their liberties and privileges, be that freedom from 
bearing burdens with the shire, the right to collect customs, or legal jurisdiction, would 
be taken away from them.
32
 Other than electoral restrictions, there were some threats to 
the freedom of the burghs, but these were limited. The attempts by the regime to limit 
the influence of Edinburgh, discussed in chapter two, may have been done with the 
intention of freeing the burghs from the capital’s dominance, but in reality would 
probably have deprived them of its expertise and the large share of the estate’s 
financial burdens it bore. More direct threats were against their privileges in trade 
(which will be discussed below) and the administration of justice. On the latter, the 
burgh courts were allowed to continue, presumably as allowing the burghs to impose 
their own legal jurisdiction would ease the pressure on the commissioners for the 
administration of justice.
33
 Perth, whose council was active in speaking to the governor 
to ensure the presence of the English garrison did not impinge on its liberties, passed 
an act against inhabitants pursuing legal action before any judges other than the 
‘ordinary judge’, presumably the court of session, and the burgh magistrates, to ensure 
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that its legal privileges would not be ignored in favour of appeals to any other body.
34
 
This was clearly a danger, as Forres discovered in 1655 when the baronial burgh of 
Findhorn took up legal action before the governor of Inverness. The convention 
described him as ‘not ane competent judge to them in such lyk caices’, and assigned 
three local burghs to help resolve the situation.
35
 
 
Smith suggests that the real threat to the jurisdiction of the burghs was with the 
appointment of justices of the peace in 1656.
36
 However, this threat does not seem to 
have been realised. Pittenweem returned from a meeting of the Fife burghs with its 
magistrates’ right as JPs within the burgh confirmed, though two of the bailies were 
not willing to accept this position. Edinburgh also protested to the council of state that 
the JPs would impinge on its magistrates’ rights, as well as cause confusion and hinder 
the administration of law, and again the magistrates’ rights as JPs within Edinburgh 
were confirmed.
37
 The convention was required on one occasion to assist in protecting 
a burgh’s privileges in this area, when in early 1660 Lauder complained that the 
commissariat court, which was their right to host as head burgh of the shire and was 
also described as ‘the mean of its subsistence’, had been removed from the burgh. 
Unfortunately this request came at a time when the convention could not do anything 
due to the absence of a council of state or any judges, but the agent and Edinburgh, 
with any other burghs present, were ordered to help when they could.
38
 
 
Just as the burghs were largely allowed to continue in their privileges, the authority 
and position of the convention was generally recognised and respected by the regime. 
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In January 1658 Kirkwall was recognised as a royal burgh by the council of state, 
having received a charter in 1486 but never been enrolled by the convention or 
attended parliament.
39
 However, the convention’s rights over enrolment were upheld 
and no pressure was put on them to enrol Kirkwall, which was also not included with 
the other northern burghs in the Parliamentary elections in 1658 or 1659, only being 
enrolled and represented in parliament in 1669 and 1670 respectively.
40
 
 
The burghs’ ability to uphold their privileges is also evident in their long-running 
opposition to the erection of a college of physicians, for which a charter had been 
granted in 1657. Although Craig does not even mention the convention in his account 
of the attempt, ascribing the opposition to Edinburgh, Glasgow and the universities, it 
played a central role. It was afraid that a college might hinder the jurisdiction of 
magistrates, particularly in Edinburgh, over physicians, as well as being of no use to 
the nation, the burghs in particular or even the ‘the advancement of the science of 
medicine itselff’. The physicians were forced to make significant concessions to the 
burghs, which were eventually accepted, with the burghs’ rights and authority intact. 
However, there may have been some bowing to the regime in the acceptance of the 
patent, even if the burghs did try to ensure it was on their terms; in 1660, with a new 
regime in place, Thomson was instructed to oppose any new attempts to erect a college 
of physicians.
41
 
 
Particularly notable is that on at least two occasions in early 1659 the council of state 
referred issues directly to the convention. Some merchants in Kirkcaldy appealed to 
the council regarding a dispute over their burgh election, and two Glasgow burgesses 
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complained against ‘injuries’ done to them by some tradesmen. In both cases the 
council considered the convention to be the ‘most competent judgis’, recognising both 
its authority and its perceived ability to deal with such issues.
42
 It is interesting that 
these issues were taken to the council of state in the first place, suggesting that there 
was perhaps a lack of confidence in the ability of the convention to judge competently. 
Yet the regime clearly recognised that the convention had its place and though it would 
have been indirectly affected by the interference in council elections and was meeting 
only on the grace of the council or commander-in-chief, its position and authority 
within these parameters were not challenged. However, though it even seemed to have 
the respect of the regime, the convention’s position was challenged simply by the 
changes in the political system. 
 
The greatest loss of privilege for the royal burghs under the new regime was the loss of 
their commissioners in parliament. Rather than having one commissioner for each 
burgh (and two for Edinburgh) sitting in a parliament in their own country, the burghs 
had to group together geographically to elect ten MPs to send to London – though 
Edinburgh was still allowed two. Even then, not all of the groups of burghs had 
representatives. In 1654 only eight were chosen for the burghs, and in 1658 two MPs 
were elected by more than one constituency, so the burghs only had six 
representatives. It is not clear why the full quota was not chosen.
43
 Some of these 
commissioners, as detailed by Dow, were English soldiers or civilians (usually 
members of the administration in Scotland) and so it might also be questioned how 
effective they were in representing their constituencies. Even the Scots who sat in the 
1659 parliament have been criticised as ‘totally inadequate as spokesmen for 
Scotland’, whose level of activity was no more than ‘inert quiescence’ except when 
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their position in parliament was under threat. Even then it is alleged their activity was 
no more than self-interested protection of their ‘entrenched positions’.
44
  
 
A rather different picture has emerged from a study of the commissioners from 
Scotland to the parliament in 1656. Although it is shown that the regime pulled 
‘personal, financial and military strings’ to ensure that suitable candidates were 
nominated, it also seems clear that the burghs were careful to choose influential 
commissioners who would be in a position to best serve the burghs’ interests. Some 
chose Englishmen, Edinburgh choosing Broghill, the popular president of the council 
in Scotland, and Inverness choosing the governor of the garrison, who may have been 
able to guarantee the employment which came from the construction of the fortress 
there. The burghs were not ‘pocket burghs’, tied to the Cromwellian interest, and 
neither were their commissioners incapable of representing their interests.
45
 Perth and 
Aberdeen felt it worth writing to their respective commissioners in 1657, both English 
colonels, with instructions on what to represent to parliament on their behalf.
46
 
Glasgow also seems to have been very aware of the potential benefit to the burgh of 
strong representation at parliament. In the 1659 election, only three of the eight burghs 
grouped with Glasgow (Ayr, Dumbarton and Rutherglen, whose commissioner had no 
commission) arrived to choose a parliamentary commissioner. Glasgow’s provost 
came to the meeting without a commission, bringing with him ‘six scoir’ people who 
voted and chose John Lockhart, commissar of Glasgow and a Scotsman close to the 
regime, who would evidently be particularly favourable to Glasgow. Dumbarton’s 
commissioner protested and refused to vote, seeking legal redress, but Lockhart 
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remained commissioner.
47
 This is a rare example of burgh working so obviously 
against its fellow burghs, but it does show the importance of good representation. 
 
While the burghs were able to instruct their parliamentary commissioners, the new 
system presented them with a new challenge. They were faced with a more centralised 
and distant government and drastically decreased opportunities for lobbying that 
government. Even the presence of a council of state in Edinburgh, answerable to 
London, has been said to have increased ‘the ability of London to control 
Edinburgh’.
48
 Although centralisation brought problems for the burghs, Gillanders 
suggests that it enhanced the role of the convention as the representative of the burghs 
and this seems to be an accurate assessment.
49
 The convention certainly did adapt to 
the changed circumstances and tried to maintain a strong burghal representation, and in 
many ways business was able to continue more or less as usual.  
 
Although the convention had had to deal with the court being in London since 1603, 
parliament and, significantly, the privy council had remained in Scotland, giving 
relatively easy access to the regime. In the 1650s, the protector and his parliament 
were in London, and though the commander-in-chief and the council of state were in 
Scotland, both of these had to refer to London frequently. In the commander-in-chief’s 
case, the frequent letters from Lilburne and then Monck testify to the extent to which 
these seemingly powerful figures had their hands tied by the need to refer to London 
on many issues.
50
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In this situation, the commissioners to parliament, when it sat, were of great 
importance to the individual burghs and to the convention as the body representing the 
affairs of the whole estate. As such, the convention saw fit to send instructions to them, 
a process reminiscent of the meetings of commissioners before and during parliaments 
or conventions of estates met in Scotland where the action of the burghs’ 
commissioners would be co-ordinated to improve their representation to that body.
51
 In 
1656 a committee for grievances was appointed, with fourteen burghs to meet ready to 
discuss the grievances of any burgh and call a particular convention, further increasing 
the available representation for the burghs, though its effectiveness is not known.
52
 The 
convention also appointed agents in London to represent the needs of the burghs to the 
protector and to parliament. Since at least 1652 William Thomson acted as both agent 
of Edinburgh and the convention, and was officially appointed as the convention’s 
agent in 1655. Representing both may have been too much for one man, especially in a 
time of uncertainty, so in 1659 George Downing was appointed the convention’s 
agent. Downing, an Englishman who was scoutmaster-general of the English army and 
had been an MP for Edinburgh, never took his place, and Dr Thomas Clarges replaced 
him in 1660. Clarges was Monck’s brother-in-law, had been an MP in 1656 and was 
elected for two groups of burghs in 1659, and had served the regime as agent for 
Scottish affairs in London.
53
 Although Downing did not take his place, these 
appointments show a recognition in the convention of the need for agents who 
understood how things worked in London, and in 1659-60 had the favour of the 
dominant political figure, general Monck. There may also have been a recognition that 
an Englishman so close to the regime might not always be a reliable representative of 
the affairs of the Scottish burghs, for in 1660 Thomson was retained as agent and sent 
                                                 
51
 RCRBS, iii, 428-9, 482-3. 
52
 Ibid., 421-2. 
53
 Ibid., 364, 397-8, 480, 481, 499, 500-2; ECA, Council Registers, SL1/1/17, f.349r; ECA, Council 
Registers, SL1/1/18, ff.208r-209v; Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, 150, 185, 238-40. 
 170  
very specific instructions.
54
 This meant that the convention had general representation 
from a source close to Monck as well as more specific representation from someone 
who would be more familiar with the needs of the burghs. 
 
The agents in London would be of particular significance for the smaller burghs, who 
could not afford to send their own. Some larger burghs had agents in both London and 
Edinburgh, and, as has been seen in chapter one, burghs were willing to bypass the 
convention and appeal to other authorities, perhaps indicating uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of the convention. This does not mean that some burghs were not willing 
to work with the convention for the good of the estate, but it does suggest a recognition 
that they could pursue other options to get help and that the convention was not 
necessarily the most effective one. Certainly on some of the major issues, such as trade 
and the problem of the laws regarding debtors and creditors, which hit the burghs hard 
as they had been major lenders, the effectiveness of the convention was limited.
55
 This 
did not stop it from going to the council of state with issues ranging from convoys to 
protect Scottish shipping to the grievances of Selkirk. Yet the pre-1650 records of the 
convention demonstrate that on its usual business in its dealings with the burghs, 
things more or less continued as usual.
56
 It also showed a willingness to work with 
others on some issues, though these were issues of national importance such as 
problems with the trade in and prices of coal, the minting of copper coins and a pursuit 
against the Scottish estates for repayment of a supposed debt of £30,000 sterling 
(£360,000). On the first of these it had gone to the gentry, suggesting a recognition that 
it was not able to achieve what it wanted alone and a need for further help in pursuing 
the issue. However on the latter two occasions the gentry appear to have shown the 
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same recognition, which suggests that they recognised that the convention still had 
some influence with the regime and would be able to achieve something.
57
 
 
Despite this continuing and often effective work, even those burghs which did not 
appear to invest in their own representatives in London and seemed more willing to 
use the convention, perhaps showing more faith than others in its efficacy, were not 
entirely happy with the level of representation it gave them. As seen in chapter two, 
Inverness in 1652 proposed that conventions should be held in different burghs around 
the nation. Aberdeen pursued its own interests, while concerned at Edinburgh’s 
dominance and fearing that it would be used to promote the capital to the detriment of 
others, particularly in particular conventions and Edinburgh’s perceived monopolising 
of commissioners to London. Yet Edinburgh appears to have been willing to use its 
influence for the good of the burghs, showing the respect it had for the convention. The 
protests against Edinburgh, clearly aimed at ensuring the convention continued to 
represent all the burghs, suggest that the general consensus was that it was still an 
important body. Even the sederunt lists suggest this, as although the levels of non-
attendance were quite high for general conventions, they are comparable to those of 
the 1620s, in which decade the burghs had not been suffering from war; and relatively 
high levels of absence from particular conventions can be at least partly explained by 
their increasing regularity.
58
 Most burghs were willing to go to the expense of sending 
commissioners because they considered it worthwhile, particularly as it remained a 
means of representation. 
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Finance, trade and customs 
However, there were already signs that on some national issues the convention’s 
influence and effectiveness was weakening, and some burghs, particularly the larger 
ones, were more than willing to look elsewhere for representation and assistance. The 
limitations of the convention were particularly noticeable in issues of trade and 
finance, as it was no longer able to support schemes to build or repair the common 
buildings of burghs and was showing weaknesses in its role as the protector of their 
trading privileges. 
 
There can be little argument that the burghs had suffered greatly during the years of 
war before the 1650s, and economically they were hit particularly hard. Lythe 
described the wars as ‘an economic disaster of the first magnitude’, while Whyte said 
that 1638 ‘heralded the start of a 15-year period of disaster for the Scottish 
economy’.
59
 There has been less unanimity about the success of the Cromwellian 
union on the trade of the burghs. Keith’s views of the early twentieth century that 
Scotland benefited little from it due to the ‘devastated and wasted’ state of the country, 
with little import or export trade and wide destruction of shipping, were widely 
accepted until Devine’s study of Aberdeen and Glasgow showed that these larger 
burghs at least benefited.
60
 However, these were the burghs which were in the best 
position to benefit simply due to their size and relative wealth even after the years of 
war. The smaller burghs were in a much more difficult situation, and with the 
convention relying on the general economic health of the estate for the means to 
function fully and support its constituent members, who were its only source of 
                                                 
59
 S. G. E. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh, 1960), 64; 
Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution, 281. 
60
 Keith, Commercial Relations, 53-70; T. M. Devine, ‘The Cromwellian Union and the Scottish 
Burghs: The Case of Aberdeen and Glasgow, 1652-60’, in J. Butt & J. T. Ward (eds.), Scottish Themes: 
Essays in honour of Professor S. G. E. Lythe (Edinburgh, 1976), 1-16. 
 173  
revenue, it is unsurprising that burghs started looking elsewhere for financial 
assistance.  
 
In the 1650s many complaints to the convention, and also directly to the English 
authorities, related to the loss of trade the burghs were continuing to suffer and a desire 
for abatements or relief from the cess and from free quartering, which the burgh would 
have to pay for. These were burdens which must have been especially hard to accept 
given their limited representation in government; at other times representation went 
hand in hand with the burdens they carried. While these complaints must be treated 
carefully as a degree of exaggeration is likely, they cannot be rejected out of hand as 
hyperbolic, and there are indications that the burghs individually and collectively were 
indeed in a difficult economic condition. Chapter three has demonstrated, however, 
that this condition was not worsening for all burghs in the 1650s. Some of the larger 
and mid-sized burghs seem to have been doing reasonably well, or at least not 
declining greatly. Both Perth and notably Edinburgh were struggling, however, with 
debts rising significantly through the decade. 
 
Bennett highlighted the example of Irvine as a burgh which entered the 1650s having 
paid large sums to various regiments and the Scots army in 1650-1, some of which 
were borrowed and remained unpaid. It was proving unable to function properly, such 
as being unable to pay its schoolmaster, and by the end of the decade was seeing debts 
called in.
61
 Such problems were widespread, with the cost of garrisons and the 
astonishingly high levies at the beginning of the decade, with the English initially 
trying to raise two and a half times the monthly assessment of 1649-51, giving no 
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respite from the years of war.
62
 Even though the amounts assessed did drop, 
Pittenweem’s appeals for ease of its assessment, which began in 1651, resurfaced in 
1656. By this time it had fallen behind in payments and incurred debts in trying to pay 
its arrears, but the burdens were such, combined with the loss of trade, that all four 
magistrates elected in 1659 refused to take office.
63
 In 1657 St Andrews also appealed 
for an ease of its cess, and by 1659 was borrowing money to pay for some small 
arrears on it.
64
 
 
Dow notes, when discussing the absence of some burghs at Dalkeith and Edinburgh in 
1652-3 that smaller, poverty-stricken burghs, including the Fife fishing burghs, had 
traditionally been excused from the Scottish parliament, and thus their poverty was 
nothing new. Their poverty may indeed have been nothing new, but Dow’s evidence 
for this is flawed; MacDonald makes it clear that these were exemptions from 
conventions but explicitly not parliament.
65
 It was not only small Fife burghs that were 
struggling. Dumbarton complained that it was unable to pay the cess and sought 
exemption or a reduction of the amount. It also complained about the burden of 
quartering, particularly as the shire would not help it bear the cost of the garrison.
66
 
Peebles also sought relief from the cess, with some success, and noted particularly the 
losses sustained by the quartering of soldiers. It actually went to the gentlemen and the 
minister of the parish and asked them to subscribe its grievances, presumably to add 
authority to its claims.
67
 Beginning in at least 1652, when it also complained about 
quartering, Montrose regularly appealed for an ease of its assessment. Although it was 
not until 1660 when it was called to pay its share of the £1,000 sterling (£12,000) 
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which the convention granted to the king that it announced that it simply could not 
afford to pay, the heavy burdens of the 1650s must have contributed to this inability. It 
was in some debt in 1653, asking for the right to levy an imposition to help defray this, 
and in 1658 it asked to be allowed more time before paying its missive dues to the 
convention.
68
  
 
The large burghs were also not without their financial problems. Edinburgh appealed 
directly to Cromwell and parliament on a number of occasions for relief from its 
burdens, as well as appealing to the administration in Scotland.
69
 Aberdeen, which was 
recovering in terms of trade, petitioned the regime on a number of occasions for an 
ease of quartering (which it wanted to be done on fair proportions with the other 
burghs) and abatements of its assessment, claiming in 1654 that it could not afford to 
pay. It also twice aimed at stopping the convention from altering the stent roll. The roll 
remained unchanged, which might be taken as a sign of success if Aberdeen had 
thought its proportion might be raised, but on two other occasions it told its 
commissioner to try to have its proportion reduced, in 1655 telling him that if it was 
raised he was to protest and leave.
70
 Glasgow, which was also recovering somewhat, 
successfully gained an abatement of its cess in 1653 but continued to appeal regularly 
for more abatements, and also appealed a number of times for an ease of quartering.
71
 
Perth was also apparently struggling to pay its assessment as it appealed to the regime 
for abatements, help with its ‘losses’ and aid to repair its tolbooth. By 1656 it had 
incurred debts of nearly 40,000 merks (£26,666 13s 4d), for which the interest paid 
was just under £1,900, and although the levels of debt at the start of the decade are not 
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clear the two full sets of accounts for the decade show a rise and little repayment. 
Despite attempting to exercise greater control over treasurers’ spending by ordaining 
that the council had to agree before anything was spent, in three sets of accounts (one 
for only a half year) from 1654 to 1656, the treasurer twice overspent by more than 
£1,000 and on the third occasion by more than £2,000, while in 1659 nearly £1,500 
was overspent.
72
 
 
Though it has been seen in chapter three that the convention was not often able to take 
direct action to help the burghs financially, it did try to help them alleviate these 
problems. It presented requests to Lilburne in 1653 and parliament in 1656 for an ease 
of the burghs’ assessment, on the latter occasion asking not that a sixth of their 
assessment be taken off as Gillanders suggested, but that their share of one-sixth of the 
total assessment be reduced  
in respect that thair whole schippis being takin by sea … and thair estaitis at 
home distroyed be the warres, and wtherwaies exhaustit be extraordinar 
burdingis, and thair tread and traffique almost whollie lost, and the maist pairt 
of thair herberies demolisched by the violent lait storme and want of meanes to 
wphold the samyn.
73
 
The convention considered the alteration of the burghs’ tax roll in recognition of the 
fact that the burdens which lay on them may have caused some to be paying a 
proportion which they could not afford, but as it was unable to get an abatement of the 
estate’s assessment this was never done.
74
 It also sought to help individual burghs 
where it could, representing the cases of Sanquhar and Lochmaben before the army 
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treasurer and English commissioners respectively when they were assessed for more 
than their share on the tax roll, while it successfully intervened in the dispute over 
Perth’s common good and debts.
75
  
 
The regime itself was not blind to the needs of the struggling burghs. Once a burgh 
accepted the Tender of Incorporation it was officially taken into the protection of the 
English parliament, which meant that the army could no longer demand free quarter 
and soldiers would have to give satisfaction for their expenses. Although this seems to 
have taken a while to come into effect, and on occasion free quarter was claimed 
illegally, it seems to have worked as appeals for relief from quartering disappear from 
the records.
76
 So many abatements were granted in 1653 that, of the monthly cess from 
July to October, only £789 19s 4d was to be collected of the burghs’ share of £1519 
10s, barely half the total. This does not include Pittenweem’s reduction from £10 
sterling (£120) to £7 sterling (£84) which is recorded in their council minutes, and so 
the figure collected was almost certainly even lower. It is interesting that the north-east 
and centre-west, around the two burghs shown to have been doing well, Aberdeen and 
Glasgow, received few abatements.
77
 In 1654, Monck asked Cromwell for a reduction 
of the cess in Scotland, saying that, as the countryside was so poor, if the full £10,000 
sterling (£120,000) was to be collected the burghs would have to bear the brunt, ‘whoe 
are soe impoverished through want of trade, and the late troubles, that it will quite 
breake them’.
78
  The administration in Scotland appears to have recognised the 
inability of the burghs to deal with the burdens imposed upon them and was not 
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unwilling to act on their behalf, yet the convention’s pleading for a reduction in the 
burghs’ proportion was not heeded. 
 
None of this should lead to the assumption that the burghs were entirely ruined and 
desperate. Devine has shown that Aberdeen and Glasgow were recovering some of 
their trade, but suggests that Dundee never recovered from the wars and the sacking by 
Monck’s army. However, it has more recently been suggested that the severity and 
long-term impact of the sacking are ‘largely a Victorian myth’.
79
 Yet Dundee’s 
treasurer and guild accounts show that more money was coming in than going out. 
Indeed, as shown in Appendix II, debts of nearly 60,000 merks (£40,000) in 1652-3 
were reduced to around two-thirds of that in 1657-8. The debt then rose sharply again 
almost to its former level, and 1660 was the first time since 1651 that the treasurer 
overspent; ironically it was the payment of £890 as their share of the £1,000 sterling 
(£12,000) to the king that seems to have caused this overspending.
80
 In 1653 both 
Montrose and Pittenweem used the common imposition of a merk on each boll of malt 
traded in the burgh, though only Montrose applied to Lilburne for permission to do so, 
to pay their debt and public burdens.
81
 Aberdeen asked its commissioner to the 
abortive general convention that year to find out what measures (specifically 
impositions) other burghs were using for ‘defraying thair publict burdens and debtis’, 
so that it could do the same.
82
 
 
Despite the fact that not every burgh was in a desperate condition, there were clearly 
problems for the burghs. This filtered through to the convention which had no funds 
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available to help Dumfries in 1658, as shown in Appendix I. If there was little ready 
money available in the burghs and their assessment needed to be paid, the money 
available to the convention was limited. In 1654 the agent was asked to act against any 
burghs which had not paid their share of the dues, suggesting that some were slow in 
paying, presumably due to the other commitments on their finances. The struggle to 
collect dues seems to have continued and perhaps worsened as, at the general 
convention the following year, it was decided that any burgh which did not pay its 
dues until it was horned would also have to pay the charges of the horning. The 
shortage of funds available was also shown by another part of the same act which 
decreed that any burgh which employed the agent on its own business would have to 
pay him itself, with only action taken for the benefit of all the burghs to be charged on 
the common charge, while in 1657 it was decided that no financial assistance would be 
given to any burgh until its accounts were checked.
83
  
 
The convention clearly felt the strain of the demands placed on its finances and was 
looking to ensure that no help was given to a burgh unless it was really needed. Yet the 
fact that the convention itself was under such constraints suggests that, unless burghs 
were deliberately concealing their healthy finances, which seems rather unlikely, the 
burghs themselves were also struggling and really did need the convention’s 
assistance. This came to a head in 1656 after a storm which did great damage to many 
burghs’ harbours. There were so many supplications for aid that the convention could 
not help, and all supplications for help with repairs to harbours, kirks, bridges and 
tolbooths were continued.
84
 So many burghs needed help at the same time that too few 
other burghs remained able to do so. Although this situation was unusual in its 
severity, the impotence of the convention makes it unsurprising that burghs were 
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beginning to look elsewhere rather than coming to the convention when they needed 
financial assistance. 
 
One way for the convention to improve this situation would have been to improve 
trade, thus strengthening the burghs’ financial position and, by extension, that of the 
convention itself, though Gillanders asserts that it was unable to make much of an 
impact in this area. Although one of the desires of the burghs, free trade with the rest 
of the Commonwealth, was granted in 1654, Devine noted that there is little indication 
of a growth in trade between either Aberdeen or Glasgow and England, while Hirst 
observed that Scottish trade made little impact on the English economy and Keith 
suggested that free trade was for Scotland ‘economically unsuccessful’.
85
 As well as 
granting free trade, the regime sought to place a system of customs and excise on 
Scotland that brought it in line with England.
86
 One of the commissioners for the 
excise, Thomas Tucker, reported that the trade and commerce of Scotland was in a 
poor state, which would limit the excise that could be collected. The new system 
would in theory improve revenue for England but also, if it worked, give a fair and 
equal excise system to the country, thus removing any potential disadvantage and the 
perceived habit of the collectors of the Scottish excise to work for their own gain rather 
than that of the state.
87
 Why he was surprised at this habit is unclear, given the fact that 
the collectors had taken the excise in tack and were thus seeking profit from it, but he 
obviously recognised the potential for and probably the reality of abuse and extortion 
in the extant system. 
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Individual burghs clearly recognised the need to improve trade and the desires 
presented to the English commissioners in 1653 by a sizeable group of burghs 
reflected this, calling for free trade and the establishment of manufactories. Jedburgh 
and Stirling produced more parochial desires on trade, the former asking for freedom 
from border tariffs on ‘four footit beastis and all vther kynd of merchandize’
 
and 
Stirling for only its inhabitants to be allowed to trade in the burgh. A less narrow 
desire was presented by the other group of burghs, which asked for manufactories to be 
established and that ‘able and well qualified workemen be induced to come from 
England and ioyne with those in this Nation in these adventures and undertakeings’.
88
 
Incidentally, Dundee’s guild was also trying to stimulate trade by encouraging an 
influx of people, in this case merchants, and lowering the fee for entry to the guild as 
an enticement.
89
 
 
These manufacturing ventures never took off, but there were some Englishmen, mostly 
soldiers, who made an impact on the trade of the burghs, if not entirely positively. 
English soldiers were given the right to trade in Scotland without the usual 
requirement of becoming a burgess of a royal burgh. It is impossible to know exactly 
how many seized this opportunity, but some certainly seem to have done so. Monck 
wrote to Cromwell in early 1655 complaining that Edinburgh’s superiority over Leith 
was causing the English who had settled and were trading there to leave the town in 
order to find better trading conditions.
90
 Some appear to have settled in Aberdeen as 
well, as that burgh twice instructed its commissioners to conventions to appeal for help 
against Englishmen, particularly soldiers, who were trading in the town but not bearing 
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any of the burdens that for a burgess went with the privileges of trade.
91
 Even before 
these petitions came to the convention it was acting on the issue. In 1653 instructions 
were sent to Thomson in London showing ‘that treading is now almost wholly takin 
out of the handis of free burgessis and gild bretheren within the saidis burrowis be 
such as have no freedome within the samyn free burrowis and bear no portable 
chairges thairin’.
92
 By 1654 it seems to have recognised that it would not be able to 
prevent the soldiers from trading, and one of the articles on trade sent to its 
commissioners at parliament stated that soldiers should be allowed to trade only within 
free burghs and be subject to the laws of these burghs, and in 1656 this was repeated 
with the request that they also adhere to Scots weights and measures and bear a share 
of the public burdens of the burghs.
93
 These requests are unsurprising and, given the 
fact that the burghs needed trade to be in burgesses hands in order to receive the 
revenue required to pay their public dues, they are reasonable requests. It is also 
unsurprising and indicative of the problem that this situation posed for the burghs that 
in 1660 they instructed Thomson to seek the repeal of the act.
94
 
 
The convention was active in trying to improve the trade of the burghs, largely by 
lobbying parliament but also in other ways, such as trying to encourage the former 
admiral depute to compile a volume of papers on maritime affairs to help the burghs in 
their overseas trade.
95
 A large proportion of their effort in lobbying parliament was 
focused on trade issues. The group of burghs in 1653 had appealed for ‘absolute 
Restraint’ to be put on the export of wool, skin and hides as a means to encouraging 
manufactures. The prohibition was put in place, but the manufactures were not 
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established to compensate for the loss of trade, and the convention was forced to 
regularly appeal to parliament to have it lifted. It was unsuccessful and in early 1660 
was still appealing to Monck to allow the export of these goods until manufactories 
could be established.
96
 Its appeal to parliament in 1654 also concerned the continuation 
of the staple, licence to import commodities, especially bay salt from France and 
Spain, and imports and excise to be charged the usual Scottish customs. On other 
occasions it was appealing for uniformity of the measures for salt and grain, 
‘purchasing’ the help of the council of state to achieve this.
97
 While the excise system 
was changed, the convention had some success on these other matters, though the 
allowance of the importation of bay salt raised a new difficulty. 
 
In December 1656 a battle began against the tacksmen of the bay salt, who despite a 
prohibition were importing so much salt that they had gained a monopoly and were 
charging exorbitant customs. The commissioners at parliament were asked to seek 
redress, and a committee was sent to the council of state and any other competent 
body.
98
 The convention seems to have had some success as the tacksmen were ordered 
to behave, but it was forced to complain again in October 1657 that the tacksmen were 
not accepting the conditions imposed on them. It went back to the council of state and, 
after getting an act in its favour, to parliament in 1659.
99
 The regime, or at least its 
representatives, was clearly willing to help the convention and the convention still had 
some influence, but perhaps due to the distance from the centre of power there were 
those who continued to resist the council’s decisions. 
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Coal was another commodity which exercised the convention throughout the 1650s. In 
1654 the convention and some gentlemen of East Lothian gained the support of 
Lilburne against the coal masters who were over-charging for their coal. The judges 
ruled in favour of the burghs and the agent and a committee of burghs were tasked 
with enforcing the set prices and measures. A commission was given by the regime to 
some people to regulate these prices and measures, but as some of them were 
‘coalmaisteris and heretouris of coall heughes’ who would benefit directly from the 
sale of the coal, the abuses were greater than they had previously been. Later the coal 
masters were found to be selling their coal to some unfreemen who were monopolising 
the coal, with the help of some burgesses, and the convention asked each burgh to find 
and punish the transgressors.
100
 The convention was also brought into a dispute over 
the export of coal from Alloway, and decided to help whichever side was offering the 
best price on the coal and the best advantage to the burghs, before asking the 
commissioners for the administration of justice not to make a decision between the two 
parties without hearing its position.
101
 
 
While some of its lack of success on these issues was due to the intransigence of the 
tacksmen of the salt and the coal masters, the convention was clearly struggling to 
make an impact on the trade policies of the regime, particularly regarding the export of 
certain prohibited commodities and the trading of the English soldiers. Part of the 
problem was certainly the fact that English interests were paramount for the regime, 
but Theodora Keith also suggested that a ‘devastated and wasted country, weighed 
down by heavy taxation, could not within the short space of six years adapt itself to 
new trade regulations and tariffs’.
102
 Yet the improving trade of Glasgow and 
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Aberdeen suggests that some burghs at least were adapting well to the new conditions, 
and there is evidence that, despite its struggles to make an impact on national policy, 
the convention was doing the same and was working round the new trade rules and 
system of customs and excise to its own ends. 
 
As well as using Englishmen who would have been more familiar with the system as 
agents, keeping an agent in London and instructing the burghs’ commissioners, the 
convention tried to ensure that the intricacies of English trade law did not hinder its 
aims. The issue of the salt brought this to the fore, as the commissioners in London 
were asked in 1656, ‘efter tryall of the laws and practickis of England to endeavour the 
redres thairof’, and in the following year, they were thanked for their work. They were 
clearly heeding the instructions, and were again asked to find out if any similar case 
had arisen in England, who had ruled on it, and what legislation was in place to deal 
with it, asking for any such legislation to be sent north.
103
 There was a clear 
recognition that action was needed to familiarise the burghs with English law and 
practice in order to make progress on issues of trade. 
 
The burghs also sought to adapt to the new system of customs and excise in order to 
maintain their privileges and monopolies. When the excise was farmed out, the burghs 
realised that as it was farmed out by shire (except Edinburgh, which was allowed to 
collect its own excise), they were in danger of losing their privileges of collecting 
excise, and attempted to exclude anyone else from bidding for them. This failed, and 
Dow records that Dundee ended up as the only other burgh whose customs were 
farmed out separately.
104
 However, this is only part of the story. Although the burghs’ 
main aims had not succeeded, and the tacksmen in Aberdeen at least seem to have used 
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their position to squeeze as much money as possible from the excise, some burghs took 
the initiative and commissioned individuals to take in tack the excise for both burgh 
and shire. Of the burghs in the survey, Aberdeen, Ayr, Dumbarton, Dumfries, 
Glasgow, Peebles and Stirling all record attempts to take it on at least one occasion (it 
being set for anything from a few months to a year at a time). Aberdeen was clearly 
unsuccessful, having bid for it in 1655, 1656 and 1657, Dumbarton could not compete 
with the amount others offered and no outcome is recorded for Ayr and Peebles. As 
they never again attempted it is likely that they could not get it. Dumfries only record 
taking the excise once, in 1656-7, but it is Stirling and Glasgow which show particular 
innovation.  
 
In 1655, 1656 and February 1657 Stirling sent a commissioner with one from the shire 
to take the excise, but arranged with the shire’s commissioner to effectively split the 
two, so that the burgh only paid for its own. In April 1657 the following year’s excise 
was set, but the burgh was unable to get it at an acceptable rate, so it simply negotiated 
with the new tacksman and took the burgh’s excise in tack from him instead. Glasgow 
also sent commissioners in 1655 to take the excise of town and shire. It is clear that 
they did so ostensibly as private citizens rather than in the burgh’s name (presumably 
to get round the regimes unwillingness to set it to the burghs) as, upon their return, 
they ‘frilie demittit the same in the townes favouris’. As it only wanted the excise of 
the burgh, the council then set up a committee to set that of the shire to anyone who 
wanted it. Early in 1657 they attempted to take the tack of the burgh’s excise 
separately, and though unsuccessful on this occasion, in April 1657 it succeeded and 
the shire and burgh excise were separated for that and the following two years.
105
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The situation with the excise does indicate further willingness on the part of the 
burghs, with varied levels of effectiveness, to use the new system to their own 
advantage and to uphold their privileges. They also recognised that within the new 
system they needed to ensure that they were not being disadvantaged, and in 1659 the 
convention began to call for cess to be exacted on equal proportions with England as 
Scotland was paying over the odds.
106
 It was apparently beginning to recognise its 
place within the union and decided to act within that structure to ensure that Scotland 
was not treated any differently than England. It was adapting to the new system in 
order to try to keep its privileges, but was using many of the same methods as before, 
an indication of its adaptability. Action against unfree traders was common throughout 
the decade, and the convention was also quick to act against burgesses who were 
trading outwith the jurisdiction of free burghs and to enforce the regulations for 
standard weights and measures.
107
 It may not always have been successful, perhaps not 
often on the major issues of national policy on trade, but it certainly was not crippled 
by the need to cope with a new system of trade and excise laws. 
 
‘The most faithfull to us … in this Nacion’
108
 
The convention’s adaptation to the new regime was something that clearly would have 
taken some time. The fact that it had to seek out information regarding English trade 
laws and practices shows that it required effort, but this was something it was clearly 
willing to expend due to the prospect of reward. This prospect, the hope of exploiting 
the system to the gain of the estate, may have been over-optimistic but it may also have 
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accounted for the apparent loyalty to the new regime. Various means of demonstrating 
loyalty were employed by the burghs beyond their assent to the English rule. 
Edinburgh wrote to Cromwell in 1653 ‘to ingratiate the poor Toun in his Excellence 
favors’, in the hope of having its desires fulfilled. Prominent members of the regime 
were made burgesses, though this seems to have happened less regularly than in the 
Restoration period, perhaps demonstrating the limitations of that loyalty. Edinburgh, as 
well as willingly awarding burgessships, was also asked to do so by the commander-
in-chief.
109
 This loyalty was recognised by Monck who, in asking Cromwell not to 
over-burden the burghs with the assessment, stated that they were ‘generally the most 
faithfull to us of any people in this Nacion.’
110
  
 
This seems to have been borne out in practice, as central interference in the burghs’ 
affairs was limited. The convention continued to meet, mostly freely, the staple port 
remained at Veere, burghal elections were largely allowed to continue and the 
threatened imposition of magistrates was never carried out. Burghs were allowed to 
continue their impositions, Edinburgh’s rights over Leith remained and the attempt by 
Cromwell to alter the charter of Glasgow was thwarted by Monck and the council of 
state in Scotland, eager not to alienate the burghs. What is not clear is whether these 
measures encouraged and retained the loyalty of the burghs or were a response to their 
loyalty. It seems likely to have been a combination of the two, with the loyalty of the 
burghs being secured by concessions and then rewarded with further concessions, most 
obviously the permission to hold elections which may have secured their acceptance of 
the Tender. In this particular concession Dow suggests that the English were seeking 
order and good government in the burghs, but that it in turn strengthened the loyalty of 
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the burghs, and it can be assumed that other concessions had a similar effect. 
Interestingly, among all the appeals for abatements of cess, the positive response to 
Perth states that the council of state should allow it to keep the assessment it collected 
until its losses were satisfied, ‘that town having [shown] and yet are willing to shew 
their affection to the state’. Loyalty clearly had its rewards, and Perth’s ‘affection to 
the state’ must have been made more secure by this grant.
111
 
 
This should not be taken to mean that the burghs were wholeheartedly in favour of the 
regime. To a large extent it was self-serving loyalty, stemming from an understanding 
that co-operation with the regime was necessary if a burgh was to survive and flourish. 
The responses to the Tender of Incorporation in 1652 show that most assents were 
merely that, with no indication of enthusiasm. They recognised that they had little 
choice. There may have been an element of bullying in achieving their acquiescence, 
Dow suggesting that the ‘implications of English military control, rather than the 
exercise of brute force’ caused most burghs to accept the Tender. Edinburgh’s 
acceptance of it, having seen Lambert claim control of the provostship and part of the 
magistracy and council, supports this view.
112
 It is also shown in the regime’s actions 
over Leith, which are described in chapter two, when it threatened Edinburgh three 
times with the loss of its superiority there unless it acceded to its demands. 
 
The burghs’ resignation to their circumstances, rather than innate approval of union, 
can be inferred from the fact that only five out of forty-four responses showed 
enthusiasm for the prospect of union.
113
 Glasgow was the only burgh to dissent, though 
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the arrival of nine companies of English horse and foot caused a change of heart and it 
assented within three weeks.
114
 Other burghs stayed away without explanation, and 
Dow suggests that some of these, including Lanark which had presented doubts and 
scruples to the English commissioners and Kirkcudbright whose shire had dissented 
due to disagreements between the Tender and the Solemn League and Covenant, were 
almost certainly absent due to their opposition.
115
 Dumfries was another of those 
absent burghs, having stayed away from the meeting of the convention as it was  
mainlie intendit for the unione betuixt this natione and England And they 
sencing that ther commissionar mey aither be ensnared in that bussines or 
otherways be necessitate to attest against the procedor of the convention.
116
 
The burgh recognised that in refusing the Tender of Incorporation it would be going 
against the rest of the convention, and decided that it would be better for it to stay 
away altogether. As a result, it seems to have been prohibited from holding elections 
that year, though it was given permission to in November 1653, despite the general ban 
on burgh elections, presumably because it had since accepted the Tender. Some 
opposition to English rule seems to have remained, the deacons of the trades protesting 
against choosing the provost to meet with the other south-western burghs and elect a 
commissioner to parliament, but the burgh generally seems to have come to accept the 
regime. Its reply to Monck’s letter in November 1659 spoke effusively of its desire to 
keep the peace and demonstrate its loyalty.
117
 
 
Some of those burghs which assented to the English in 1652 showed limitations in 
their desire to co-operate with the union. The commissioner from Stirling wrote to the 
burgh stating that doing as it commanded him in accepting the declaration concerning 
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the administration of justice in February 1652, which deprived all Scottish judicatories 
of power, ‘is my grif [i.e. grief], and God knowis how I will be exponitt for takin such 
ane commissione’. He finishes his letter: 
Giff I had nott respeck to the towin, and ferin the evill suld fallin them, I wald 
never exceptit of the commissione, nor agrie to this peper, and suld hauif cost 
me quhat is deirist to me.
118
 
As seen above, Dumbarton’s provost and two bailies refused the oath and were 
deprived, despite Dumbarton being one of the burghs which had greeted the prospect 
of union with enthusiasm. The burgh did not take kindly to their dissent, fearful that it 
would reflect badly on it and cause it to be discriminated against by the regime. It 
attempted to show its loyalty by taking a list of the dissenters to the English 
commissioners, but even after this, once an election was permitted, a number of people 
dissented to it. Perhaps this was a case where religious conscience and political views 
clashed irredeemably.
119
 Not all were necessarily so principled, and Smith notes that 
there were always people ready to step in for those whose consciences troubled 
them.
120
 Some inhabitants of Pittenweem were also reluctant to accept English rule, the 
council disowning the actions of their commissioner ‘In complying quhith the 
englisches and subscryveing quhith them’.
121
 
 
Given the divergence of opinions among the burghs, it is surprising that Monck was so 
effusive in his assertion of their loyalty. Here the very existence of the convention may 
have helped them win his favour. In his protest to Cromwell over interference in 
burghal elections, Monck wrote: 
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all the burghes in Scotland (being incorporated into one body) were the very 
first that owned us and submitted to us, and have ever since lived peaceably 
under us, and whose interest is most agreeable with ours, by reason of their 
trade and traffick, and so more easily to bee interwoven with ours, and 
therefore more tenderly and carefully to bee cherished by us.
122
 
As well as supporting Smith’s assertion that the burghs gained concessions due to the 
‘chronic penury of the early modern state’, as the English needed the traders and thus 
the trade of Scotland if they were to support their occupation, this shows that Monck 
viewed the burghs as a single entity. He did so, despite the fact that not all of the 
burghs had been quick to submit to the regime, because of their corporate nature as 
expressed in the existence of the convention. There are indications, such as the attempt 
to remove the superiority of Edinburgh over Leith and the removal of the principal 
burghs’ rights to have their customs farmed separately, that the English were 
fundamentally opposed to some of the monopolistic rights of the estate. This merely 
highlights the extent of the concessions which were made, suggesting that the need to 
have a body like the convention onside, and thus the royal burghs as a whole, 
prevented further erosion of their rights.  
 
By 1660 then, the convention had become used to union, assured of its own place 
within the system and ready to at least attempt to make best use of it to its own ends. 
As seen in its requests to be taxed proportionally with England, Gillanders’ suggestion 
that it was coming to see itself within the context of union rings true.
123
 In this context 
the view of Dow and Buckroyd that the burghs wished to retain the union seems 
plausible, a view based on a the record of a meeting between the shires and burghs in 
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1660.
124
 The burghs had gained stability after years of war and some seemed to be 
recovering in their trade, so they may have believed that continuation of union would 
allow them to develop further. Buckroyd also suggests that the burghs had enjoyed 
greater influence because of the English regime’s opposition to the nobles, and pressed 
for continuation of the union in the face of Monck’s swing in favour of the nobility in 
1659 so that this influence could be maintained.
125
 It should also be noted that if 
indeed the nobles did react against a perceived growth in influence for the burghs, then 
their influence under the English could actually have contributed to a long-term 
weakening of their position (to a level even below that before 1650) as the dominance 
of the nobility grew.
126
 
 
However, if one of the leading figures in the union was beginning to favour the 
nobility, the burghs’ favour towards the union could be expected to cool. Furthermore, 
the political situation in early 1660 was far from stable. Although Monck promised the 
burghs that he would seek before parliament ‘what ever may be for the good 
Goverment and releiff of this nation’ along with the abatement of their cess and other 
burdens, there was no guarantee that there would be an outcome favourable to them.
127
 
In recording the proceedings of the burgh and shire commissioners (the latter including 
some senior nobles) the convention does not actually say that the burghs wished to 
retain the union. The first list of articles, drawn up by a joint committee, does include 
the fourth article: ‘That ane way may be thocht vpon for vniting the natiouns’. When 
the burghs amended these, they changed this article to read: ‘That the nation of 
Scotland may be governed by thair owin lawis’. The shire’s response was to change it 
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back to the original, only replacing ‘natiouns’ with ‘natione’, while it is recorded that 
not all of the nobles and gentlemen agreed to this article among themselves and had 
decided that ‘be reason of the importance thairof [it] is to be further advysed wpon’.
128
 
While the burghs’ version of the fourth article might imply an acceptance of the union 
with a desire to keep the laws of Scotland within it, this is unlikely and if anything it 
was some within the shires who were most in favour of keeping the union. The nobility 
who were present, who would have been unlikely to let the lairds drive the shires’ 
agenda, may well have seen a union under monarchy as the best route for their long-
term security. 
 
Conclusion 
The convention may have begun to accept its place within the union, because it was 
trying to exploit that position in order to achieve as much as possible for the estate of 
the burghs and its trade in particular. Yet its influence was limited, more so than its 
freedom, as the centre of power was taken away from Edinburgh, and the favour with 
which some within the regime viewed the burghs for their supposed loyalty did not 
mean that the convention could make an impact on such crucial issues as the heavy 
assessment, the changing customs and excise system and the export of some staple 
goods. There were some successes in lobbying and in many ways its influence on a 
local scale continued, but the lack of money meant that burghs began to look elsewhere 
for financial assistance. The often ineffective attempts to make a difference on a 
national scale should not be criticised, for the convention was trying to improve the lot 
of the estate by improving trade. But these same attempts may have limited its ability 
to help locally, and this would have affected the small burghs, those who were least 
able to help themselves, the most. It could also be argued that, even if the convention 
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had had more success in changing national policies on trade, the small burghs would 
have been unable to take full advantage due to their condition, and so they would lose 
both ways while the large burghs benefited disproportionately. The convention may be 
remarkable in its unique ability as a national body to survive through the 1650s, but its 
limitations are all too obvious and the beginnings of its decline are evident. Keith, 
though she may have rather simplistically ascribed it to ‘the decline in the economic 
fortunes of the nation’, rightly identified the 1650s as the beginnings of a ‘decrease in 
the influence of the convention’, which continued into the Restoration period.
129
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Chapter 5 
The Convention and Parliament 
 
The Restoration period, encompassing the reigns of both Charles II and James VII, has 
been portrayed as the period which saw a degree of absolute rule never previously seen 
in Scotland, first under Lauderdale and later more directly. It has also been noted that 
with the continued opposition of radical Presbyterians absolute rule was far from 
complete, and caused its downfall in 1688. As the introduction demonstrates, 
parliament has recently been acknowledged as having far more influence and power 
than has often been accepted.
1
 However, this revisionism has not extended to the 
convention. Where addressed, it has been described as ‘less effective’, while its 
influence in all areas was ‘eroded’, and the burghs ‘lapsed back into a more passive 
role in parliament’.
2
 Little has changed since Keith described how the convention was 
losing its influence to parliament and committees of trade, being less consulted and 
less representative of those involved in trade and industry, having its privileges 
reduced and influence in enforcing regulations removed.
3
  
 
The period saw the increase of many of the difficulties that the convention had begun 
to face in the 1650s. MacDonald notes that the period 1550-1651 saw ‘a growing level 
of interest in parliament’ from the convention, and after the Restoration it continued to 
seek to achieve as much as possible for the estate and its trade in particular.
4
 Its means 
of doing this and thus its effectiveness were severely hindered by crown policy, 
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especially until the end of Lauderdale’s dominant career as secretary of state, 
commissioner to parliament, president of the council of Scotland and, significantly, 
agent for the convention at court. It cannot be said to have been entirely ineffective 
during this period, but as the loss of most of its key trading privileges to the burghs of 
regality and barony indicates, it was failing to fully protect the burghs’ interests in the 
face of their other great rivals, the landowners. While the 1680s saw some return to 
influence for the convention on a national level, its ability to protect the burghs’ 
privileges on a local level was being lost under the cloud of increasing crown 
intervention in the affairs of individual burghs, which shall be examined further in 
chapter six. Thus the loss of confidence of the burghs, particularly the smaller ones, in 
their representative body’s ability to represent their local needs effectively continued 
from the 1650s. In parliament the burghal estate had a forum for representing its 
interests, and the convention sought to use this to its advantage. But individual burghs 
had the same forum and thus may have felt that they needed to rely less on the 
convention and could go straight to parliament. Yet the convention was continuing to 
represent individual burghs and the interests of the estate at a political level in the face 
of its many difficulties and even saw some success in achieving favourable legislation. 
Examining its role more fully should prevent it from being too summarily dismissed, 
while also giving further insight into the function and power of parliament. 
 
Representation 
Despite the difficulties it faced regarding its position in relation to both parliament and 
crown, the convention continued to meet before and during parliaments and 
conventions of estates throughout the period. Indeed, the burghs were apparently the 
only estate to have done so, with the express purpose of ensuring uniformity among its 
commissioners. The convention was protective of its right to meet, stating to both 
 198  
James VII and his commissioner before his first session of parliament that it had 
always been granted the privilege of meeting ‘apairt and by themselves as a third state 
of parliament
 
’.
5
 Given that the convention was so keen to retain this privilege under 
the new monarch, it could be expected that throughout the period it was being 
exercised. 
 
Mackie and Pryde, in their discussion of the correlation between the convention and 
the estate of burghs in parliament, argued that this was not the case. They suggested 
that as parliaments got longer after the 1650s this correlation was no longer so close, 
particularly from 1667, with 1681 an exception. While it was acknowledged that the 
surviving records may not be complete, the conclusion drawn was that the burghs were 
content with their ability to represent themselves directly to parliament and that they 
were in 1672 ‘obviously … becoming indifferent to the possibilities of their 
convention as a preparatory assembly’.
6
 While individual burghs did take advantage of 
their access to parliament, as shall be seen later, it is hard to believe that they would be 
so ‘indifferent’ to the convention when each burgh stood to lose from assaults on the 
privileges of their estate. 
 
When one looks beyond the register of the convention, it becomes clear that Mackie 
and Pryde are far short of the mark in their assessment. Differences between the 
commissioners at correlating parliaments and conventions are minor. Appendix IV 
shows the numbers of burghs recorded in the sederunts of parliament, conventions of 
estates and the convention of burghs, details which burghs were present at one meeting 
but not the other and shows differences between commissioners at the different 
meetings. Other than those detailed, any discrepancies in commissioners can be 
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explained by differences in spelling. On the nine occasions where sederunts of 
meetings of the estates and the burghs can be compared there are only ten instances of 
different commissioners. One of these was Selkirk in 1681, when, as shall be seen 
below, the convention ruled that the commissioner was ineligible before parliament 
sat, and parliament did the same a few days later. It is likely that his assessor sat in the 
convention before a replacement was elected for parliament. The numbers of 
discrepancies are so low that they are insignificant and probably have relatively 
mundane explanations, such as absence due to illness striking between the beginning 
of the different meetings. 
 
There are, however, some differences between commissioners to parliament and 
concurrent conventions and those to general conventions in the same years. This only 
seems to have happened around the time of Charles’s second parliament, between 1669 
and 1674, and the numbers involved were again small. Some burghs, such as 
Montrose, sent one merchant burgess to parliament and another to general conventions, 
so this does not represent any real divergence between meetings. Culross and Inveraray 
sent advocates who were resident merchants of the burgh and so the fact that Culross 
sent a different commissioner to general conventions is not particularly significant. At 
least three burghs (all very small) sent advocates to parliament, but sent no 
commissioner to the five general conventions in the period, though the one from New 
Galloway had previously been at conventions. Selkirk sent a laird, Whithorn the 
commissar of Wigtown and Forfar the sheriff-depute (James Carnegie) who was 
probably also the son of the earl of Northesk, and was admitted as a burgess of the 
burgh on the same day he was elected as commissioner to parliament. At the general 
conventions Selkirk and Whithorn attended, different commissioners were sent. Forfar, 
however, sent Carnegie to the only general conventions they attended in the period, in 
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1673 and 1674. There is thus some divergence, but it is not hugely significant, 
representing very few burghs with only two sending unqualified commissioners (i.e. 
not merchant burgesses) to parliament and different ones to general conventions. It is 
entirely possible that the small burghs who sent advocates (Kintore, New Galloway 
and Dingwall after its initial commissioner, the provost, died in 1670) would not have 
been able to send a commissioner at all.
7
 
 
Some burghs were recorded as being present at parliament but not at the convention, 
but these are again small numbers, not enough to indicate clear indifference to the 
convention. It is possible that at least some of them met with the rest of the burghs but 
were absent on the first day, thus not being recorded in the sederunt. If indifference to 
the convention had been a problem, it could be expected that the numbers of burghs 
absent from the convention at the time of parliament would have grown through the 
period. Instead, 1681, 1685 and 1686 saw very few burghs present at parliament and 
staying away from the convention. More intriguing is the small number of burghs 
which met with the convention but are not recorded as being present at parliament. In 
1661 a note at the bottom of the parliamentary sederunt states that commissioners 
present at most of the meetings, even if they missed the first, were on the sederunt, but 
this is the only time this is specified and so it could be that, in other sessions, some of 
those present at the convention but not parliament simply missed the first day. As there 
were very few burghs, it is also possible that the commissioners in question had had to 
go home early, while clerical error cannot be discounted.
8
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Mackie and Pryde cite three occasions – the convention of estates in 1667 and sessions 
of parliament in 1670 and 1673 – when no convention sat before and alongside 
parliament, while they seem to accept the evidence of the register that the burghs only 
met on two days during parliament in 1672, with only a brief acknowledgement that 
the records may be ‘defective’.
9
 In three of these cases the convention almost certainly 
did sit. On 2 January 1667 the council of Montrose decreed that its commissioner to 
the convention of estates should be relieved of any security he had to give at the 
convention of burghs if a threatened ‘double custome of plaidinge’ was imposed.
10
 A 
day earlier, St Andrews elected a bailie as commissioner to the convention of estates, 
but his commission was also to ‘meitt and convin with the rest of the commissioners of 
the burroues of this realme to be convined in the convention of the estates’.
11
 In 1673 it 
is clear that the convention met before and during parliament, as a number of burgh 
councils sent their commissioners to a particular convention as well as to parliament 
on receipt of a missive from Edinburgh, while other sources refer to the meeting.
12
 
Given the fact that these two conventions sat, and that it would be very strange for the 
convention to meet on two random days, it can probably be assumed that it did meet 
throughout the 1672 session of parliament, especially as no other general convention is 
recorded for that year and one of the two dates was 12 September, the day after 
parliament was adjourned.
13
 The only session for which there is no evidence of a 
convention yet uncovered is 1670. Yet even this cannot be assumed to be significant, 
as the burghs presumably decided that all important business and coordination of their 
position was done in the general convention that ended a mere fifteen days before 
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parliament sat, even though only twenty-seven burghs were present due to the 
proximity to parliament. There would also be precedent for the convention deciding 
not to sit before parliament, as it had not always done so in the past, sometimes in the 
likelihood that there was nothing pressing for it to discuss.
14
 
 
By the reign of James VII the convention still seems to have considered it normal to 
hold meetings before parliament, as the missive letters to the burghs display. If the 
records are complete, Mackie and Pryde were right to note that the convention’s last 
meeting during both the 1685 and 1686 sessions of parliament was weeks before 
parliament was adjourned.
15
 Again, however, it would be wrong to follow them in 
reading too much into this. The fact is that the convention did meet before and during 
both sessions, in which time it would have been able to ensure that the burghs were all 
seeking the same aims. If anything came up in parliament for which they were not 
prepared and on which the burghal position had not been discussed, it seems 
reasonable to assume that they would have convened again as an estate. Thus every 
case Mackie and Pryde cited can be challenged, and their assertion of the 
‘indifference’ of the burghs towards the convention holds very little water. Given the 
increasing encroachment of the landed classes on urban politics after the Revolution, 
their argument may stand for that period.
16
 But the convention continued to coordinate 
the burghs’ action in parliament and, as shall be seen below, was certainly not 
impotent in doing so. 
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Yet if the convention was still acting as a coordinator for burghal action in parliament, 
it seems strange that it did not make better use of the fact that there were burgh 
commissioners among the lords of the articles and on other committees commissioned 
by the articles and by parliament. Throughout the period the burghs had eight 
commissioners on the articles, and though they were still a minority against the landed 
interests of the nobility and gentry and the royal interests of the officers of state (and 
probably bishops), it is surprising that the convention did not do more to brief them 
and co-ordinate its representation. The apparent wisdom of this course of action was 
recognised by one contemporary commentator, who in 1685 called for the convention 
to appoint magistrates in the burghs to discuss the trade of commodities most in use by 
the burghs and how it could be improved, and to report to the convention so that it 
could make recommendations to the council of trade.
17
 It would certainly appear 
eminently sensible for a body which represented such a key trading interest as the 
burghs to ensure that a strong stance was made by its representatives on the body 
which formulated policies to be set before parliament for approval.  
 
A similar situation to that with the articles exists with other committees which were 
often appointed by parliament and included at least some burghal representation, the 
most important of these for the burghs being the committees for trade. One was 
commissioned on the same day as the lords of the articles in the first session of Charles 
II’s parliament, with twelve commissioners from each estate. Later in the same session, 
an extra-parliamentary council of trade was authorised by parliament at the king’s 
suggestion, and although unfortunately the numbers of commissioners from each estate 
are not included in the act of parliament the presence of burgh commissioners on other 
committees leads one to assume that they were represented there. This act showed that 
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the king and parliament were aware of potential conflict between the burghs, which 
may rightly have felt that parliament was sanctioning the removal of a degree of de 
facto responsibility from the convention, and the committee, by appointing the privy 
council as arbiter between the two parties.
18
 Despite the possible advantage to the 
convention, it did not directly instruct the burgh commissioners on the council to 
ensure that they were acting for the benefit of the estate. 
 
Another commission for trade was approved by parliament in 1669, with six nobles, 
seven shire representatives and eight burgh commissioners. This committee was 
approved after the lords of the articles had commissioned the same people (only with 
one less shire commissioner and one more burgh commissioner) ‘to consider what is 
fit to be done for ordering and improveing of trade within this kingdome’, and was 
presumably a product of their deliberations.
19
 The high number of burgh 
commissioners shows a recognition in the articles at least that the burghs needed to be 
included in discussions on trade, as the most qualified estate to advise on how best to 
advance it. Again the convention is conspicuous in its absence as an advisor or director 
to the burgh commissioners. A similar situation arose in 1685, when a sub-committee 
consisting of three from each estate (now including three bishops) was commissioned 
by the articles. Later, a commission of trade to negotiate with English commissioners 
was approved by parliament, consisting of four bishops, nine nobles (including 
Melfort), nine shire commissioners and only four from the burghs. It was intimated 
that any commissioner could ‘give in what proposalls or overtures they think fitt either 
to the lords of the articles or to the said committee of trade’, but despite this invitation 
the convention was again apparently silent.
20
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Yet in all of these cases there is probably a simple explanation. Given that the burgh 
commissioners on these committees would have been present at the convention, they 
would already have been well-versed in the burghs’ position on the issues at hand. If 
any one of them happened to be under-informed on a particular issue, his burghal 
colleagues on the same committee would still have been able to represent the collective 
position. They would not have been going in blind, without an understanding of their 
estate’s position; the convention could, probably rightly, assume that they did not need 
specific instructions, so the failure to issue any is probably insignificant. Given this, it 
is the alacrity the convention showed in 1681 in its communication with the burgh 
commissioners on the articles that is most surprising. As shall be seen below, in that 
session of parliament it issued very clear instructions to them. The reason for this 
evidently unusual behaviour is perhaps in the importance of some of the issues on 
which instructions were issued, such as the restoration of the royal burghs’ trade 
privileges and the qualifications of commissioners.
21
 In ordinary circumstances, it was 
simply unnecessary. 
 
In the area of appeals, there is some evidence that burghs were losing some confidence 
in the convention, if not indifferent to it. As discussed in chapter one, royal burghs 
appealing directly to parliament rather than using the convention was a feature of 
parliamentary sessions. This had been seen before, as MacDonald indicates that 
individual burghs gained many acts in parliament. These included ratifications and acts 
on other things which would not usually have been the realm of the convention, but 
also overlapped with the convention’s usual areas of involvement, such as the 
maintenance of bridges. However, the convention supported some of these causes and 
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in doing so added further weight to them.
22
 Some of the issues the burghs took to 
parliament after the Restoration were outside the direct jurisdiction of the convention, 
such as ratifications, though not all of them. The number and variety of appeals going 
to parliament which would usually have been dealt with by the convention does seem 
to increase, with it rarely being asked to support them. It seems that in many cases the 
lines between convention and parliament were beginning to become more blurred for 
burghs. These indications of their willingness to act alone in going to parliament rather 
than seeking the concurrence of the convention, even on issues in which it would 
usually be involved, may suggest a lessening confidence in the convention after its 
increasing ineffectiveness in the 1650s. Yet burghs did continue to use it, while 
parliament often referred these cases back to the convention. Parliament as a whole 
clearly recognised the influence, authority and efficacy of the convention, even if some 
burghs no longer did. 
 
An example of this in the early 1660s is the issue of precedence, a largely 
parliamentary issue which spilled over into the burghs’ meeting. It was often raised, 
particularly in relation to the riding of parliament before it sat. In 1661 both Glasgow 
and Inverness protested to parliament ‘that they be not prejudged of their precedency 
amongst the burrowes by the rolls of this present parliament’.
23
 Yet while this was 
primarily a parliamentary problem, even before it sat this had come before the 
convention at its meeting in December 1660. Glasgow was in dispute with St 
Andrews, Stirling and Linlithgow and Inverness with Haddington, Cupar, Kirkcaldy, 
Montrose, Anstruther Easter and Dumfries over their precedence in the riding of 
parliament, and the convention’s help was sought in resolving the issue. However, the 
burghs would not submit to the convention’s decision and they were told to bring their 
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cases to the next general convention or to submit, or the issue would be left alone.
24
 
The issue does not appear again in the convention records until 1663, when the same 
two burghs were still contesting precedence, though Inverness with only Haddington. 
Though the issue does not appear in the parliamentary register for that year, nor in 
1665 when the convention remitted the issue to the next general convention (after 
which no more mention is made), it is clear that early in the period the convention was 
seen by the burghs to have some authority over the issue of their precedence even 
within parliament.
25
 Yet it failed to decisively rule on the matter, making the resigned 
statement in 1661 that if the burghs would not ‘submit the contraversie to their 
decision … they wold not medl in the bussienes’ rather than taking a strong lead.
26
  
 
It should be noted that there is nothing innovative in parliament’s referral of this matter 
to the convention, nor in its inability to deal with it effectively. MacDonald 
demonstrates that in the previous century disputes over precedence were referred to the 
convention, which could rarely make clear judgements on the matter and thus allowed 
disputes to continue.
27
 This is essentially what happened in the Restoration period, and 
may have been a wise approach. Arguments between burghs over the status quo could 
conceivably have been less damaging to the unity of the estate than angering burghs by 
making decisions which prejudiced them and their status. The convention may well 
have been relieved when it was not asked to get involved in 1669 when Glasgow again 
protested its precedence, or when Inverkeithing did the same in 1681 and Inverness 
joined them both in protesting in 1685.
28
 It could be the case that after the early 1660s 
parliament and the burghs involved recognised that the convention was unable to rule 
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on the matter. As this had been the case in the past, too much should not be read into 
this in terms of the regard in which it was held by both parliament and burghs. 
 
It is likely that one of the reasons the convention was well regarded by parliament was 
that its representation of the burghs worked two ways. As well as representing the 
burghs to parliament, it was useful to parliament as a channel for communicating and 
enforcing decisions made there and relating to the burghs. This was again something 
that had been seen in the previous period. MacDonald notes that the implementation of 
statute was one of the convention’s ‘self-appointed roles’, and that it was ‘a willing 
participant in the process by which statute became supreme and central authority was 
enhanced’. Occasionally it did so ‘in response to commands, but usually … 
independently’.
29
 This remained the case after the Restoration and although in the 
earlier period it acted mainly to ensure the enforcement of legislation it had gained, it 
seems to have taken on a much wider role. 
 
The act of 1661 ‘establisching his Majesties authoritie’ was recorded in the 
convention’s minutes, along with the oath of allegiance and acknowledgement of the 
king’s prerogative, while later in the same session an order from parliament was 
inserted ordering all burgh magistrates and councils to take the oath and sign the act 
for the prerogative, while any who refused or delayed were to be removed from office 
and reported to parliament. This would also be communicated to the few absent 
burghs, and no burgh would then be able to claim ignorance of the order.
30
 In 1669 the 
agent of the burghs was called on by the convention to help enforce acts of parliament 
and convention against non-resident burgesses after a complaint was directed against 
Perth by the guild of Stirling, while an order was passed in 1671 to burgh magistrates 
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to put to execution various acts of parliament concerning linen, such as that of June 
1661.
31
 The agent was also ordered in 1678 and 1680 to put into execution acts of 
parliament, council and convention concerning the staple port.
32
  
 
These examples may not have related solely to individual recently-passed acts of 
parliament, and were not done at the behest of parliament but because they were in the 
interest of the burghs at that time. However, they do show how the convention could 
function as a means of enforcing parliamentary statutes among the burghs as it 
provided an already-established network of frequent communication and meeting. The 
convention clearly recognised the importance of using this network for this purpose as 
in July 1684 it recommended to all the burghs, after an appeal from some merchants in 
Edinburgh, that they buy a copy of ‘the whole acts of parliament lately printed be them 
of ane extraordinar letter and weel bound in folio’ for £24 a copy, a not-insignificant 
sum for a small burgh. How much this recommendation was followed is not clear, but 
in October Perth’s council authorised its treasurer to pay for a copy as ‘they wold be 
wsefull for ye toun’.
33
 
 
An important area in which the convention acted as an enforcer of parliamentary 
statute was the issue of commissioners. Even before the first session of parliament in 
1661, it is seen regulating the elections of parliamentary commissioners in order to 
ensure that none who were unqualified or might be ‘disaffectit to his Maiesties 
government’ were elected. In November 1660 a committee was dispatched to Renfrew 
after it elected unqualified persons to be magistrates and councillors, and it was given a 
warrant, if necessary, to hold a new election to ensure that none of these became 
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parliamentary commissioners. Another committee was sent to examine the 
magistrates’ election in Lanark, after its commissioner was discharged as a supporter 
of the Western Association in 1650-1 and disaffected towards the king, with the burgh 
told not to choose a parliamentary commissioner until the issue was resolved. The 
following month, Lochmaben was found to have commissioned two persons to 
parliament after two illegal elections, and it was ordered to elect a qualified person for 
the parliament and convention to follow. Nine burghs were investigated by the 
convention in January 1661 on suspicion of having unqualified commissioners, 
including the five which were not yet enrolled, as discussed in chapter one. All were 
found not to have done wrong.
34
 
 
Before the 1669 parliament the convention reiterated the regulations regarding the 
qualifications of commissioners to parliament and convention, that they should be 
‘actuall trafficking merchands, recidenters within ther burghs, bearing all portable 
charges with ther nighbours, and such as may tyne or win in all ther caussis’, in a new 
act which also demanded each burgh’s attendance at both meetings.
35
 That year 
parliament set up a committee for disputed elections, including that in Cromarty, 
which had three burgh commissioners, the same number as from the three other 
estates.
36
 The regulation of commissioners was within the jurisdiction of parliament, 
not the convention, and to an extent it is surprising that it was able to get away with its 
interventions in 1660. Fountainhall claimed that some were critical of the fact that, in 
1681, the court of session had ruled on Selkirk’s election when the case was brought 
by the convention, as it was parliament’s prerogative to settle such cases.
37
 However, 
the convention’s action in these cases demonstrates its desire to ensure that the estate 
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was proved loyal to the crown. The lack of protest from the king’s commissioner or 
anyone else in parliament may simply have been because parliament was glad, 
following a time of political upheaval, to have some of its work done so ably by the 
convention. 
 
Such an attitude was demonstrated when in 1678, as the numbers of disputed elections 
increased, the convention of estates showed a specific willingness to allow the 
convention to use its influence with the burghs to do some of its work in resolving the 
difficulties over certain burghs’ commissions. Before the estates sat the convention had 
shown its desire to be stringent in enforcing regulations regarding commissioners, and 
Whithorn’s was rejected as being non-resident and not a merchant.
38
 However, 
questions arose in the estates over the commissioners for New Galloway, Culross, 
Lanark, Linlithgow, Queensferry, Lochmaben and Rutherglen, though the latter was a 
mistake as the commissioner in question was no longer town clerk and thus no longer 
disqualified.
39
 The first three of these are claimed by MacIntosh to have been related to 
voter eligibility, though the parliamentary records suggest that all except Queensferry’s 
were questions of commissioner qualifications. Its commissioner was accepted when it 
was decided that it was acceptable for the inhabitants to elect him in the absence of a 
town council and magistrates, presumably missing due to the burgh’s public burdens.
40
 
 
On the first day of the estates’ meeting a paper was submitted claiming that fifteen 
burghs, including only Linlithgow and Rutherglen of the above and also Edinburgh 
and Aberdeen, had sent commissioners, ‘all persons who have no manner of trade 
within these respective burghs, and diverse of which have nether residence nor interest 
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therin’, though nothing seems to have come of this paper.
41
 However, only the 
controverted elections in the seven burghs went to the committee of debateable 
commissions, which consisted of six clergy, thirteen nobles, eleven shire 
commissioners and only nine burgh commissioners.
42
 That committee seems to have 
referred the elections in New Galloway and Culross and, contrary to MacIntosh’s 
statement, Lanark to the convention to be decided – the other complaints were 
discovered to be unfounded. Though this suggests that the estates recognised the 
convention as qualified judges in such cases, only one of the three was resolved by it. 
New Galloway’s commissioner was found to be unqualified, while the case of Culross 
was sent back to the estates and that of Lanark sparked some debate and was referred 
to the following general convention, where it was not discussed. Both of the latter were 
accepted by the estates on the report of the committee, while New Galloway’s 
commissioner was rejected.
43
 Though the convention had not exactly proved itself to 
be proficient in reaching a decision, its acts over eligibility were the standard for the 
committee which recognised its expertise in dealing with such matters and was willing 
to adhere to its decisions. 
 
In 1681 the commissioners for Rutherglen, North Berwick and Selkirk, among others, 
caused some problems for parliament, though it was claimed that there were twelve or 
thirteen burghs with non-resident and thus unqualified commissioners.
44
 North 
Berwick had apparently held an illegal election and despite attempts to defend him and 
challenge the qualifications (which MacIntosh suggests was due to the other candidate 
being a kinsman of Lauderdale) the commissioner was found to be neither a resident 
nor a merchant there. Rutherglen’s commissioner was found to be linked to the late 
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rebellion at Bothwell Brig and Selkirk’s, Sir Patrick Murray, to be neither resident nor 
merchant, so another was chosen and admitted.
45
 Incidentally, Murray had been 
commissioner for the burgh in each meeting of the estates from 1669 to 1673, and was 
clearly a victim of the tightening of the qualifications for commissioners in 1675. He 
may even have been one of the reasons the king wished to enforce the qualifications, 
as his letters from the convention in 1673 show that he was firm in his opposition to 
Lauderdale. Though there was obviously some encroachment by the shires, this was 
stamped out (as these disputes show) and there was not as much of a ‘blurring of the 
distinction’ between the shires and burghs as Goodare has suggested, at least not 
before 1689. The only example he uses is John Dempster of Pitliver, who sat for 
Inverkeithing in 1681 and whose commission was upheld that year despite a challenge, 
before sitting as commissioner for Fife in 1689. Dempster was indeed a burgess of 
Inverkeithing, and this case certainly does not represent an ‘invasion’ of the burghs by 
the gentry.
46
 Such an invasion seems to have happened in England, where patronage 
was widely used by the crown and landed classes before the Restoration and increased 
after it. The convention almost certainly helped avoid this in Scotland, as the English 
boroughs relied on patronage to gain influence, a function the convention fulfilled.
47
 
 
None of these disputes over qualifications was referred by parliament to the 
convention. This may in part reflect its inability to reach decisions in 1678, but it had 
proved more able before parliament as it had taken Selkirk to the court of session for 
breaking the convention’s rules in its election. Though, as seen above, some 
complained at the session’s ruling in a parliamentary matter, it was proved right as its 
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decision in favour of the convention’s qualification regulations was echoed by 
parliament.
48
 The convention’s presumptuous action in going to the session may also 
have contributed to parliament’s decision not to involve it in resolving the three cases, 
as may the fact that there was some opposition to the attempts to hold to the residency 
qualifications for burgh commissioners, even though the convention had sought to 
uphold them. 
 
Objections to Charles Maitland as commissioner of North Berwick, due to his 
connections to Lauderdale, may have caused some of this opposition. But the burghs’ 
disquiet may also have been connected to their fear in 1674, when the qualifications 
were asserted by the king, that non-residents were among the most qualified persons to 
represent them. It would have been heightened by the fact that, according to 
MacIntosh, this clampdown on qualifications meant that forty-three of the sixty burgh 
commissioners in 1681 had no previous parliamentary experience (the commissioners 
at the convention of estates in 1678 being the same as at parliament in 1673).
49
 Perth’s 
commissioner reported such dissent when he told his council that an act had arisen 
from the ‘Comittie anent double comissions’ which stated 
that none shall represent any burgh in parliament or convention bot such as are 
residenters burgesses and trafequeing merchants etc: wch wes against the mynd 
of many burgesses who Judged it some restraint upon their priviledges though 
most of us have alwayes observed it and are willing to observe it.
50
 
While this fear of burghal dissent may have been valid and prevented the convention 
from being involved in resolving the disputes, it did nonetheless show that it was still 
willing to enforce the qualification regulations. It fined Selkirk 1,000 merks (£666 13s 
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4d) for electing Murray as its commissioner, though the fine was later remitted in part 
and then the same amount given to the burgh as relief for its poverty.
51
 The convention 
would still act to enforce parliamentary legislation among the burghs, even when some 
of its members were unhappy with it. 
 
Though the convention was a useful tool for disseminating information from 
parliament to the burghs, and ensuring that parliamentary statutes were enforced, that 
did not mean that the convention simply followed parliamentary dictates. When 
Anstruther Wester, Cromarty and Kilrenny tried to demit their position as royal 
burghs, as discussed in chapter three, the convention clearly ignored parliamentary acts 
approving this. Only Cromarty was allowed to leave, thirteen years after parliament 
said that it could. The acts were felt to directly prejudice the convention, as it would 
have to bear these burghs’ contributions to the estate’s dues, while at the same time 
being minor enough that the burghs seemed to feel able to ignore them. Yet the 
convention was demonstrating a perhaps surprising willingness to stand in direct 
opposition to parliament in order to protect the interests of the estate.  
 
Sessions of parliament were more frequent and longer than they had been before the 
Covenanting parliaments in the 1640s, which also were regular and long.
52
 This may 
have provided many opportunities for individual burghs and the convention in terms of 
representation, but it also created a problem for both, which was the matter of expense. 
More frequent sessions of parliament would obviously mean more expense for the 
burghs in horse hire and other costs involved in getting a commissioner to Edinburgh, 
while the allied feature of longer sessions would greatly increase the overall costs of 
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accommodation and food and other day-to-day expenses. Representation for individual 
burghs and the estate alike came at a cost. 
 
For the larger burghs this may not have made too great a dent in their finances. In 1673 
the provost of Perth’s expenses came to £355 0s 2d, compared to the burgh’s income 
of just over £46,000 and discharge of almost £50,000. A similar expense in going to 
parliament in 1685 and £283 13s in 1686 would have made a bigger dent on those 
years’ accounts with income and expenditure of around £20,000 and £13,000 
respectively, but were still not exactly huge amounts.
53
 Even the expenses at the 
longest session of parliament in 1661, which came to at least £1,120, did not represent 
a large amount in relation to the flow of money through its accounts, though it would 
have covered most of the deficit at the end of that year.
54
 Dundee, where the flow of 
money through the accounts is much smaller than Perth, may have been more acutely 
aware of the impact of the expense of parliament. Expenses in 1661, 1662 and 1663 
reached £1,174 10s 8d, £906 and £687 respectively. On the first occasion this 
accounted for over one-eighth of all expenditure and well over that proportion of the 
income, and the latter two in the region of one-tenth of expenditure and a higher 
proportion of income. The charges in 1678 (over £1,100 compared to expenditure of 
£7,500 but an income of only £4,500) remained quite high, and these sums certainly 
made a significant impact on the financial health of the burgh.
55
  
 
For some smaller burghs the level of expenditure on parliamentary expenses in relation 
to the flow of money through the accounts seems to have been at a similar level to that 
of Dundee, as their commissioner’s expenses were much lower – presumably due to 
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lower daily rates for commissioners and only one commissioner going rather than a 
commissioner with others to advise and assist. Thus Montrose, a middling burgh on 
the tax roll, paid its commissioner £205 as his expenses in 1686, from an income of 
just under £3,000.
56
 Dumfries, another middling burgh, had its parliamentary expenses 
of £400 in 1663 balanced against an income of just over £2,700, though its expenditure 
was almost £3,500.
57
. Some of the smallest burghs’ expenses were at similar levels, 
such as Brechin and Arbroath whose expenses covered just over one-eighth of both 
their income and expenditure, and Peebles whose expenses were small both in relation 
to other burghs’ and the totals of its accounts, presumably due to its proximity to 
Edinburgh.
58
 However, many burghs, most of them small, seem to have faced real 
difficulties in financing their commissioners: Crail’s expenses in 1663 accounted for 
almost half of both the income and expenditure of the common good accounts; 
Dumbarton spent nearly a quarter of its income in 1661-2 on parliamentary expenses; 
Elgin’s income was outweighed by its commissioner’s expenses in 1661 while up to 
1681 they accounted for at least a third of income in a parliamentary year, and usually 
nearly a quarter or more of its expenditure; in making its accounts in 1663 Jedburgh 
reported the ‘overplus being 120
lb
 with the comissioners at parliament and conventions 
of burrowes thair fies yeirlie imposed Wpon the inhabitants be ane stent roll’; while 
Lauder in 1663 had commissioner’s expenses of £100 with a reported income of 
merely £20. Inverness, a mid-sized burgh, initially decided in 1670 that it could not 
afford to send a commissioner to parliament, though they eventually decided that it 
was important for it to do so and borrowed £20 sterling (£240) for that purpose. In 
1681, faced with a bill of £389 13s 4d as the first part of almost £650 owed to its 
commissioner, it had to stent it on the inhabitants as it could not afford to pay. Its 
                                                 
56
 AA, Montrose Treasurer’s Accounts, M3/2/22. 
57
 NAS, E82/17/5. 
58
 NAS, E82/45/5-6, E82/45/9, E82/5/5, E82/8/2. 
 218  
expenses for James’ parliaments came to a total of £1,161 1s 10d, almost as much as 
its income in any year from 1680 to 1684.
59
 
 
These circumstances occasionally put strain on the commissioners themselves. Due to 
the length of the session in 1661 someone was sent to relieve Montrose’s 
commissioner. The same year James Borthwick, a surgeon in Edinburgh and one of its 
commissioners, appealed to the council to be freed of attendance at parliament in 
future due ‘to the great prejudice not of himselfe onlie but many of his Patients’. 
Borthwick was nonetheless elected, but gained an act of parliament in his favour 
allowing him to demit his position.
60
 The burghs certainly suffered and it seems to 
have been common practice to limit the amount of money which would be granted to 
their commissioners each day. These amounts were similar to those paid between 1633 
and 1651, when parliamentary sessions were also long.
61
 In 1661 Rothesay set a limit 
of a mere 2 merks (£1 6s 8d) daily, Dumbarton paid £2, while Perth’s allowance to its 
commissioner was a much more substantial £5 daily, to which amount Aberdeen’s was 
raised (from £4) in 1673.
62
  
 
After the first session of parliament, the council in Montrose recognised that its 
common good would not be able to sustain a commissioner at a high daily rate due to 
the length of the sitting of parliament, and set the rate at 30s daily, nearly as little as 
paid by the much smaller burgh of Rothesay. However, on his return, its commissioner 
complained at this paltry sum and threatened to have the perceived wrong redressed by 
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parliament. To avoid a public hearing, the council agreed to double the rate to £3.
63
 
Yet the strain on Montrose remained, and in 1667 and 1669 it had to borrow money to 
pay at least part of its commissioners’ expenses, the latter after the 1669 commissioner 
was asked to pay his expenses from his own pocket on the promise of repayment.
64
 In 
1662, several commissioners in the convention which met during parliament 
complained that their burghs had refused to pay their expenses, and the convention, 
before the adjournment of parliament, ordered these burghs to give their 
commissioners ‘ane honorabill and competent sallarie for thair paines and charges’.
65
 
Most burghs seem to have complied with this act, with only Pittenweem requiring an 
order to pay its commissioner to the parliament and convention in 1663.
66
 
 
Two dangers for the convention are apparent from this struggle to fund commissioners 
at longer and more frequent sessions of parliament. The first is that burghs could 
decide not to send commissioners to parliament, thus weakening the estate when it was 
already a minority. As Appendix IV indicates, this seems to have been a problem after 
the first session, when burgh attendance dropped from sixty-one to thirty-nine. Lee 
suggested that this was probably be due to ‘distance, indifference, or hostility to the 
[Restoration] settlement’, but the simple problem of expense is at least as likely.
67
 The 
drop in attendance overall sparked an act of parliament threatening fines for each 
commissioner who did not attend, those from the burghs being threatened with a £200 
fine – considerably less than £1200 for each non-attending archbishop, bishop or 
nobleman and £600 for each shire commissioner, but nonetheless a significant 
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amount.
68
 MacIntosh suggests that the burghs’ reaction to this act may account for the 
rise in their attendance in 1663, but given that only three more burghs were 
represented, it is hardly an overwhelming response, indicating that the burghs were 
still struggling to fund commissioners.
69
 Throughout the period, however, burgh 
attendance at parliament was generally good, with less than ten burghs absent in eight 
of the thirteen meetings of parliament or conventions of estates. As in the 1640s, most 
burghs were willing to incur the costs of keeping their commissioners at parliament 
despite the economic difficulties many of them were facing.
70
 The lower attendances 
were between 1662 and 1667 inclusive, which was probably a result of three very long 
sessions at the start of the decade, and in 1673 when the confidence of the burghs in 
both convention and parliament to act on their behalf may have been at a low ebb due 
to the 1672 act concerning their privileges.
71
 Given that they were already in a 
minority facing powerful noble and crown interests which certainly did not always 
seek the good of the burghs, any low attendances at parliament cannot have been 
beneficial to the convention and thus the expense which burghs had to bear in getting 
there was, by extension, dangerous to the interest of the estate. 
 
The second danger stemming from the expense incurred by the burghs in sending 
commissioners to parliament was that the convention’s extra-parliamentary business 
could also suffer, again due to the absence of large numbers of burghs. Chapter three 
discusses absences at conventions in relation to the economic condition of the burghs, 
finding that there is no clear trend of increasing absences throughout the period and 
that, despite or perhaps because of their financial difficulties, the burghs continued to 
see value in attending. Some of the fluctuations in attendance can be linked to 
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meetings of parliament, and can be followed in Appendix III. Absences from 
conventions were highest in the 1660s and 1670s, when parliament or conventions of 
the estates sat most regularly (with nine meetings in the thirteen years after 1660), 
often for lengthy periods. There was significant improvement in attendances in the 
early 1680s and although after 1685 attendances dropped again, they did not fall to the 
levels of the 1660s and 1670s.
72
 The shorter sessions and less frequent sitting of 
parliament and conventions of estates (with only four meetings in fifteen years after 
1673) could explain this rise, though it could have also been influenced by the apparent 
increase in influence for the convention in parliament in 1681. For at least four burghs 
in July 1685, the expense of having recently had a commissioner at parliament was 
included in their excuses to the convention to explain their non-attendance.
73
 Given 
that the 1685 session of parliament lasted less than two months, compared to nearly 
seven months in 1661 and four months in both 1662 and 1663, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that at least some of the many absences from conventions in 
the period were due to similar reasons of the expense of keeping a parliamentary 
commissioner. These absences would then restrict the ability of the convention to 
reach a decision to which the estate could adhere, would increase their difficulties in 
communicating their decisions to all of the burghs, and would generally hinder their 
ability to function effectively. 
 
Legislation 
Despite the financial difficulties, it is clear that the burghs continued to meet together 
and the convention was able to coordinate the estate’s action in parliament, and in 
doing so proved to be more influential and effective than historians have tended to 
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allow. A chronological examination will demonstrate some success on the part of the 
convention in achieving favourable legislation, but will also show that it found itself 
ranged against formidable opponents in the nobility and the crown. Brown has 
demonstrated that the comparative representation of the burghs in parliament, 
particularly in relation to the nobility, was eroded between the unions of crowns and 
parliaments, and particularly after the Restoration when the rate of growth of the 
burghal estate slowed.
74
 It has also been seen in chapter one that landowners were 
increasingly seeking to gain new revenue and, presumably as a means to this, to 
improve the national economic power of Scotland, and their increased dominance in 
parliament provided a platform to make this possible.
75
 However, landed interests in 
trade included the burghs of regality and barony over which they had jurisdiction, and 
this brought them into direct conflict with the royal burghs who spent so much time 
and energy trying to protect their own interests and trading privileges from these 
unfree burghs. As has been noted by Whyte and Smout, the landowners’ seeking of 
revenue and their challenge to the royal burghs is seen in the large numbers of markets 
and fairs which were granted to them as unprecedented numbers of new burghs and 
non-burghal market centres were authorised by parliament in the period, leading to 
many complaints from neighbouring royal burghs.
76
 
 
At the beginning of the period the convention seemed to have a degree of optimism 
about its prospects of making an impact on government, as the particular convention in 
September 1660 called for all burghs to ensure that they sent commissioners to the 
                                                 
74
 Brown, Kingdom or Province?, 15; Brown & Mann, ‘Introduction’, 49. 
75
 Devine, ‘Union of 1707’, 26; T. Devine, ‘Scotland’, in Clark, Cambridge Urban History, 157-8. See 
also: Smout, ‘Scottish Landowners’, 218-34. 
76
 Whyte, ‘The growth of periodic market centres’, 13-26; Whyte, ‘The function and social structure of 
Scottish burghs of barony’, 11-24; Smout, Scottish Trade, 16, 72. See also RPS throughout the reigns of 
Charles II and James VII, and RCRBS in the same period. 
 223  
estates, with their expenses covered, or face prosecution.
77
 It recognised the need for 
the burghs to have good representation, presumably both to defend and promote their 
interests and privileges, while also pragmatically recognising that the larger their 
representation, the better impression the burghs would give of a willingness to serve 
king and nation, which would surely further their cause. In the same meeting the 
convention appointed Edinburgh to extract any papers relating to the erection of a 
fishing trade, which it wished to represent to parliament as an issue which would 
benefit the trade of the burghs and of the kingdom.
78
 At a subsequent general 
convention in December the English Navigation Acts demanded a response, so a letter 
was written to Lauderdale, representations were made to the officers of state and a 
committee appointed to discuss and report before parliament with all burghs asked to 
speak to their guild and ‘ablest’ merchants to ask their advice.
79
 Within a month of the 
downsitting of parliament, a further committee was appointed ‘to draw wp such 
overturis as they sall think most convenient to be presentit to the parliament’ regarding 
‘the promoveing of tread within burghs, and that incuradgmentis sould be given to 
merchandise and thair companies for that effect’, with power to consult with 
merchants, advocates and any others.
80
  
 
On June 12 1661 parliament passed seven acts relating to trade and manufactures 
which largely favoured the burghs, including one allowing for the erection of 
companies for promoting fishing.
81
 It certainly was not grudging in passing these acts, 
as the commission established to discuss trade contained twelve burgh representatives 
and was assigned ‘to call, for the advice and help of understanding, merchants or any 
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who can give best information in those affairs’.
82
 However, these acts did not go 
entirely the convention’s way. Contained within the ‘act for incourageing of shiping 
and navigation’ was the requirement that merchants take oaths before the customs and 
excise officers that they were adhering to the terms of the act.
83
 This was despite the 
convention, on hearing of the possibility of this clause in January and considering it ‘to 
be of most dangerous consequence not onlie to mens consciences but as they conceave 
of all probabilitie most preyjudiciall to his Majesties service’, appointing a committee 
to apply to the commissioners of excise to prevent this.
84
 Nonetheless, the 
convention’s organised and well-prepared approach to the issue must surely have aided 
the passing of these acts, as it presented a united front and clear proposals from the 
estate which knew most about and was most concerned with the issue. 
 
The burghs in 1661 also received a ratification of their rights, 
perpetually confirmeing in favours of the royall burrowes of Scotland, all and 
whatsumever charters, infeftments, confirmations, gifts, grants, donations, 
mortifications, decreits, sentences [and] acts of parliament or secreit councill, 
conceaved in favours of the saids royall burrowes of Scotland for their generall 
or particular conventions and other liberties belonging unto them, and all other 
writs and evidents whatsumever made, granted or conceaved … to and in 
favours of the saids burghs in relation to the generall or particular conventions 
aforsaids, in the haill heids, articles, clauses and conditions of the same 
conceaved in favours of the said royall burrowes.
85
 
It is interesting that this ratification did not just cover the rights of the royal burghs 
individually, but also the actions of the convention. It would seem likely that such a 
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wide ratification would inspire some confidence among the burghs in the ability of the 
convention, with this indication of royal approval, to successfully promote the interests 
of the estate. They certainly had the confidence to protest against the commission for 
the justices of the peace, both at its reading and remittance to the articles and when it 
was eventually passed by parliament. Although the parliamentary records suggest that 
the protests were relatively routine and simply stating their rights and jurisdictions 
against those of the JPs, the report to the convention by the provost of Edinburgh, who 
made the protest on behalf of the estate, suggests a genuine concern that the act ‘micht 
incroach wpon the priviledges of burrowis who ar justices of peace within thair owin 
boundis and liberties’.
86
 The protest may not have prevented the act from passing 
without any significant changes in the burghs’ favour, but it does indicate a degree of 
confidence in their status and influence as an estate. 
 
Another area where the burghs had some (temporary) success was in the matter of 
80,000 merks (£53,333 6s 8d) imposed on the burghs by the parliament in 1661 as 
their proportion of a foot levy raised in 1650.
87
 During the 1662 session of parliament 
the convention appointed a small committee to draw up a supplication against the 
payment of this sum, and within seven days an act was passed suspending payment 
until further deliberation at the next session of parliament.
88
 Unfortunately for the 
convention, it was only able to gain a reprieve, as after a petition by Lord Bellenden 
that the intended recipients of the money (who furnished ‘provisions and others’ for 
the king when he was at Stirling and Perth in 1650-1) were suffering from not 
receiving it, the suspension was remitted.
89
 However, this incident displays further that 
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the convention could be influential in providing a means for the burghs to collectively 
promote their interests within parliament.  
 
Legislation immediately after the Restoration does, however, demonstrate the power of 
the royal interest, one of the opponents the convention found itself up against. It gives 
the distinct impression of an attempt to appease the wrath of the returned king. This is 
hardly surprising, as the revolt against the monarchy which began in 1637 had ended 
in the subjugation of Scotland by the English, thus leaving those who had supported 
the Covenanters no lasting success to give them a basis for continued challenge to 
Charles II, while those who had supported the English regime could by extension be 
seen to be supporting the regicide of 1649. Furthermore, Charles II’s own brief period 
of personal rule in Scotland in 1650-1 had not been on his own terms. If revenge was 
on his mind, many of those in parliament stood to lose much. Thus on only the fourth 
day of the first session of parliament since the Restoration, Charles II’s prerogative in 
choosing the officers of state, privy councillors and lords of session was reasserted, 
followed by the assertion of his prerogative in making laws through the means of 
parliaments which only he could call.
90
 Later, the convention of estates of 1643 and the 
‘pretended parliaments’ of the 1640s were annulled.
91
 The convention recorded in its 
minutes the act of 27 February ‘for taking the oath of allegiance and asserting the royal 
prerogative’, while at the end of May a further act was passed ordaining all magistrates 
and councillors of burghs to take the oath and sign the act at their next meeting under 
threat of being ‘removed from publict trust’.
92
 The burghs were prepared to face 
upheaval in their government, with the potential of many people being excluded from 
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it, as happened in Dumfries, in order to satisfy the king, whose authority was made 
abundantly clear.
93
 
 
In 1663 a further act was passed in favour of the king’s prerogative, one which 
MacIntosh termed an ‘extraordinary innovation’, though she also suggests that it was 
sparked by parliament’s embarrassment over an attempt in 1662 to have Lauderdale 
and his faction excepted from a future indemnity, which the king annulled.
94
 This was 
the ‘act asserting his majesties prerogative in the ordering and disposall of trade with 
forraigners’, passed on the final day of parliament and giving the king complete 
control in trade, in granting gifts and monopolies and imposing any levy on foreign 
commodities.
95
 Perhaps equally extraordinary is the apparent lack of opposition, 
whether in the form of a protest or even a disgruntled expression in the convention’s 
minutes. The burghs must have been aware of the potential danger to them as the act in 
theory took away any voice they had in ordering the trade in which they had the prime 
interest. Any concern expressed in their meeting which met at the same time as 
parliament was not recorded in the final register. There is a possibility that the sudden 
appearance of this act on the final day of the parliament was designed to give the 
burghs no time to discuss the issue together and thus formulate some degree of 
opposition, though no attempt to delay the act seems to have been made and the 
particular and general conventions which met in May and June 1664 respectively made 
no mention of the act or an attempt to challenge it.
96
 However, it should be 
remembered that in one sense this act would change nothing from the 1650s. It was in 
that decade that jurisdiction over trade in Scotland passed out of the hands of any 
Scottish institution, with the act of union in 1654 stating that all laws on trade 
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throughout the Commonwealth would conform to those of England.
97
 Nonetheless, the 
passing of the act for the king’s prerogative in trade demonstrates that the burghs were 
unable to compete with the other interests at work in parliament.  
 
The 1663 session of parliament, despite this act, saw the continuing influence of the 
convention in issues of trade. On 21 June it decided to ask parliament to put ‘ane 
considerable excyse’ on commodities imported from England, as a response to the 
impositions laid on Scots goods by the English parliament, to try to press the English 
into restoring free trade. It also decided to ask the king’s commissioner and lords of the 
articles for the removal of customs on ‘lingit seed, brass panes, and irne pottis, [which] 
ar absolutlie necessarie for the vs of this kingdome’, but had not been excepted in the 
act of annuity.
98
 Though its more general request for the removal of the excise was 
unsuccessful, this request (ordained by the convention later the same day) was at least 
in part accepted and an act of parliament passed excluding linseed, hempseed and steel 
from the excise.
99
 The former request also seems to have influenced parliament as an 
‘act for an new imposition upon English commodities’ was passed. Yet even in this 
success the forces the convention was up against are evident. It was immediately 
followed by an act in which 
his majestie, with advice and consent of his saids estates of parliament, gives 
full power and warrand to the lords of his privy councill to abate or wholly take 
aff these impositions layd be the forsaid act upon the English commodities 
according as they shall be commanded be his majestie.
100
 
This was later followed with the act asserting the king’s prerogative in matters 
concerning foreign trade, and it is clear that the king was willing to allow Scotland to 
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oppose English trade, as long as he could overturn these acts, presumably in the event 
of an overwhelming demand from within England for alteration. Despite the fact that 
the act had such a dramatic proviso, the convention’s lobbying of parliament had been 
at least partially successful. 
 
Another situation arose in the same session when the convention decided to appeal to 
the commissioner for the removal of the excise placed on merchant commodities in 
1661 towards the king’s annuity, claiming that it was ‘totallie destructive to the tread 
of this kingdome’.
101
 Although the excise was not removed, an act was passed 
regulating the proportions of the excise paid by several shires and burghs, but the only 
burghs included were Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee.
102
 It is unclear whether or not 
the convention’s actions influenced the alteration of the proportions paid by these 
burghs, but it demonstrates that the convention was willing to directly challenge an act 
of parliament, even if it was unwilling to challenge one directly in favour of the king, 
namely that over his prerogative in trade. 
 
The next clear example of the influence of the convention in parliament comes in 
1669. MacIntosh relates how an attempt was made to regulate customs duties on salt, 
so that those who were previously exempted by using imported salt for fishing would 
have to apply for a rebate. The burghs successfully ‘worked to mobilise opposition, 
cajoling members of the other estates to join forces and unite against the proposed 
amendment’, though they were defeated by chancellor Rothes’ casting vote, made with 
an apology to the opposition. As Mackenzie suggested, those without direct interest 
would vote with the crown and help the act pass.
103
 Yet the burghs had shown their 
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ability for concerted action, even to the extent of mobilising members of the other 
estates to support them. The fact that they were working together to rouse opposition 
shows the convention’s influence, while the particular convention of December 1667 
sent grievances to the treasury in which the imposition on salt featured heavily, and the 
general convention in March 1668 agreed to send a delegation to present a paper to the 
exchequer regarding the imposition.
104
 The imposition of salt was something which 
greatly concerned the convention, and its influence was exerted to good effect, if 
ultimately fruitlessly, in parliament. 
 
Though the limitations of the convention had ultimately been exposed on this 
occasion, in 1672 the burghs’ clash of interests with the nobility led to an act of 
parliament which represented for them a much heavier and more significant defeat, in 
the shape of the ‘act concerning the priviledges of burghs royall’. This act claimed that 
the privileges of the royal burghs in foreign trade were ‘highlie prejudiciall to the 
common interest and good of the kingdome’, and particularly to the burghs of regality 
and barony. As a concession to the fact that the royal burghs paid one-sixth of public 
burdens such as taxation, they were allowed to keep the privilege of ‘wine, walx, silks, 
spiceries, wald and uther materialls for dying’.
105
  This concession can hardly have 
appeased the burghs, yet as with the 1663 act there is little sign of opposition in 1672. 
It has been suggested that the 1672 act had been part of an attempt by Lauderdale to 
‘curry favour with nobility, even at the expense of the other estates’.
106
 There is little 
doubt that Lauderdale stood to benefit from the act, but Lee noted that in 1675 he told 
his brother that it had been driven by the duke of Hamilton and that he was ‘passive’ in 
it. Whether it was the crown which introduced the act, and Lauderdale was 
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downplaying his role, or ‘a landowning lobby’, the power of the burghs’ opponents 
was overwhelming.
107
 
 
The issue had initially been referred to parliament by the court of session after Stirling 
had brought a case against Falkirk for infringements of their privileges, and the 
convention had supported it in this case, sensing an opportunity to reassert the royal 
burghs’ privileges against all encroachments. It had also in 1671 made representation 
to Lauderdale at court both in writing and directly through the provost of Glasgow.
108
 
When it had wind of a proposed act of parliament against the burghs it wrote to 
Lauderdale, while the instructions to Aberdeen’s commissioner to the convention 
before Parliament told him to  
advert to and oppose with the assistance of the burrowes and any other 
assistance ye may have the intenting or granting by the parliament of inhansing 
or monopolising any thing in favor of any persone tending to the incroachment 
of the liberties and privilidges of royall borrowes.
109
 
This instruction seems to relate particularly to acts in favour of individuals, and 
perhaps this helps to explain the apparent lack of opposition or protest on the part of 
the convention and the royal burghs. The scope of the 1672 act meant that they would 
be unlikely to gain support from any other quarter, as the rest of parliament stood to 
gain from the act. Not only this, but the one to whom they had made their 
representations, their agent at court and the king’s commissioner, Lauderdale, stood to 
gain personally from the act due to his interests in Musselburgh. As Mackenzie 
suggested, this may have turned the burghs against Lauderdale, but their silence 
suggests that they recognised their virtual impotence in the face of such opposition. 
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Even though there is virtually no record in the convention’s register of the meeting of 
the burghs before and during the 1672 parliament, their lack of protest in parliament 
itself is telling.
110
 
 
That is not to say that the burghs submissively accepted their fate. As chapter two 
describes, the opposition to the act may have been a factor in the opposition in the 
convention and Edinburgh to Sir Andrew Ramsay, provost of Edinburgh and 
Lauderdale’s favourite. As has been seen, Edinburgh’s clerk (James Rocheid, also 
clerk of the convention) was removed from his position by the king due to his 
perceived role in attempts to oust Ramsay in the 1673 burgh elections. Although no 
direct attacks on the 1672 act were made, the opposition to Ramsay and growing 
antipathy towards Lauderdale, fuelled by that act, spilled over into the convention at 
parliament in 1673, and into parliament itself. Unfortunately no record of this 
convention survive, but other observers kept some record of proceedings. 
 
A few days before parliament sat the burghs readmitted Rocheid as their clerk, which 
Ramsay 
contended against for ane howre together but was not able to carie on vote 
amongst ws wherewpon he removed from ws and thoght we should have broke 
wp all meeting it being his dew in Edenburgh always to preceed.
111
  
However, rather than adjourn the meeting, the convention continued to sit in direct 
defiance to Lauderdale, who believed that the restoration of Rocheid was ‘doon in 
great contempt’ to him. Though Lee has suggested that the burghs were not quite so 
unanimous in their opposition, he only identifies four commissioners who may have 
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sided with Lauderdale. The burghs’ determination to continue in opposition to 
Lauderdale is clear, but they were not content simply to rile Ramsay and get revenge 
on Lauderdale this way.
112
 Petty revenge was not the key issue for the burghs. Though 
the repeal of the 1672 act may have been beyond them, they had serious legislative 
aims which clashed directly with Lauderdale, and the attack on Ramsay’s position was 
a way of putting pressure on him to concede. The 1673 session of parliament saw a 
great deal of opposition to Lauderdale, led by Hamilton. Though the involvement of 
the convention in Hamilton’s party is difficult to gauge, given the lack of minutes, 
MacIntosh understandably surmises that their opposition in the days before parliament 
can probably be taken to mean that they were active in it. Sir George Mackenzie, who 
claimed to have been the one who encouraged the convention to retain Rocheid as 
clerk, stated that Lauderdale’s attitude after Ramsay’s departure from the convention 
caused the burghs to ‘gradually enter into the confederacy, and this did much heighten 
the courage and add to the numbers of Lauderdale’s enemies’.
113
 
 
One of the initial desires of the opposition was the removal of monopolies on salt, 
brandy and tobacco which had been granted to Lauderdale’s allies since the 1663 act 
establishing the king’s prerogative in foreign trade.
114
 This would have been a key 
issue for the burghs, perhaps more so than for the other estates, which would have 
considered these monopolies prejudicial to their privileges in trade, and the opposition 
was successful as they were soon repealed.
115
 Though the convention’s direct role in 
this is unclear, the fact that it ordered a delegation to go to Lauderdale thanking him 
for his action against the monopolies even before they were repealed and assuring him 
of its loyalty to the crown suggests that it had been active in opposing the monopolies. 
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However, it was content to support the crown again once its aims were met, so if 
Hamilton’s action against the monopolies was aimed even partially at gaining the 
burghs’ support for his party’s full legislative aims, he was ultimately unsuccessful.
116
 
 
The convention had achieved more than just the removal of the monopolies. This 
displayed the burghs’ importance to Hamilton’s party, and the influence they wielded 
in the threat of opposition to Lauderdale became clear even as the acts repealing the 
monopolies were passed. On 25 November, the same day on which the monopoly on 
salt was removed, Eglinton and Hamilton presented the articles of indictment against 
Ramsay to parliament, though the matter was then referred to the court of session.
117
 
As suggested in chapter two, the burghs may have recognised a need for noble 
influence in their campaign to have Ramsay removed, but it is also possible that these 
nobles’ involvement was motivated by the desire to retain the burghs’ support for the 
opposition party. On 29 November, the pressure to restore Rocheid to office within 
Edinburgh finally told as the king wrote to the burgh council in favour of his 
restoration as clerk. On 1 December, the day on which the brandy monopoly was 
removed (that on tobacco following the next day), Ramsay was forced by Lauderdale 
to resign, in ‘a move directly aimed at appeasing the burghs’. Though Fountainhall 
claimed that the duchess of Lauderdale had been bribed by the burghs, it is likely that 
Lauderdale was well aware of their importance to the opposition, and was willing to 
sacrifice his man, even though this lost him the influence over the leading figure in the 
convention. Lee states as much, saying that after writing to Lauderdale in gratitude for 
the passing of the monopolies, and asking him to represent their gratitude to the king, 
the king ordered Lauderdale to ensure that everything was done to keep the burghs 
                                                 
116
 NLS, Yester Papers, MS7034, f.48; MacIntosh, Parliament, 130-1. 
117
 RPS, A1673/11/1; NLS, Yester Papers, MS7034, ff.33a, 36-9, 41-7. 
 235  
loyal. The crown was made ‘aware of the importance of the burgh estate in parliament, 
even if historians have not always been’.
118
 
 
1678 saw further success for the convention, as it protested against the retention of an 
interest-relief clause for noblemen and gentlemen in the grant of taxation under 
discussion at the convention of estates, and the clause was left out.
119
 In the 1681 
session of parliament it was again active, protecting its interests against Hamilton 
when he and several other nobles and gentry sought a monopoly on foreign and inland 
salt. A committee was appointed to consult with lawyers and present reasons against it 
before the lords of the articles, and it seems to have been successful as no act was 
forthcoming.
120
 When the issue of the king’s supply was raised, Hamilton proposed the 
retention of a tax on annualrents and the addition of a chimney tax, both of which 
would be hardest on the burghs. The former proposal was removed from the draft act 
after the burgh commissioners appealed to the articles, and the final act showed neither 
of these proposals.
121
 Though the convention minutes do not discuss the matter, the 
very fact that the burgh commissioners were working together to protect the estate 
indicates the ability for and effectiveness of co-operation. A committee was also 
appointed by the convention to consider an act relating to the staple port, on which 
little detail is recorded, which was discussed by a committee appointed by the articles. 
The convention decided that a draft act was not fit to be presented to the articles, and 
nothing was done in parliament. The convention had to satisfy itself with including 
some items relating to the staple in a letter written to the king. Although only one vote 
decided that the act should not be presented and Perth, Aberdeen and Dundee all 
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protested, the convention was clearly seeking to fulfil its role in coordinating the action 
of the burghs.
122
 
 
The biggest issue for the burghs in the 1681 parliament was, however, the repeal, or at 
least alteration, of the 1672 act which removed many of their privileges in trade. It is 
likely that it was the prospect of this issue being discussed which caused Glasgow to 
send to parliament a bailie, the dean of guild and five others with their commissioner, 
the provost, plus anyone else he chose. This is an unusually high number of attendants 
and demonstrates that Glasgow at least viewed this as a crucial session of 
parliament.
123
 It was not wrong. Having met with the convention before parliament had 
sat, provost Glass, Perth’s commissioner, wrote to his council that James ‘recomended 
unanimitie amongst us in the kings concerne and then we neided not doubt bot he 
would protect us in our priviledges and grant more (if we neided or desired) nor what 
we injoyed formerlie’, while his council instructed him to concur with the rest of the 
burghs in the matter.
124
 Three days before parliament had even sat, the convention had 
resolved to make an address to the king’s commissioner, James duke of York, to offer 
its ‘cheerfull and heartie concurrence to what should be propposed’ and to ‘represent 
the heavie prejudice the royall burrows lyes under by haveing ther priviledge of trade 
communicate to the burghs of regality and barronie and by erecting the fishing 
companie’.
125
 Ten days later, on 4 August, the burgh commissioners on the articles and 
seven other commissioners were appointed to consider the two issues in consultation 
with lawyers and to decide whether it was fit to take them to the articles jointly or 
separately.
126
 The convention clearly had no doubt that either of these issues would be 
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presented by the burghs, though the issue of the fishing company (certainly the lesser 
issue from the burghs’ point of view) disappears from this point.  
 
On 15 August a petition of the burghs was given to the clerk to lie open for 
consultation. It drew attention to the fact that the burghs of regality and barony were 
exempt from the ‘great burdeings’ which the royal burghs had to bear 
wherby they are able to undersell and ruine the Royall Burrowes of the 
Kingdome who … cannot subsist or be preserved unless they wer again 
restored to ther ancient right and priviledges and all unfree men discharged and 
excluded from any interest in trade.
127
  
On 2 September the petition was remitted by the articles to a subcommittee appointed 
to consider the trade of the kingdom which contained four burgh commissioners as 
opposed to only three nobles, two bishops, two officers of state and two barons.
128
 
Although they were still in the minority, this is an unusually high proportion of burgh 
commissioners. The burghs were then called to explain exactly which parts of the 1672 
act prejudiced them, and to explain that prejudice.
129
  
 
Four draft acts on the issue remain in the National Archives of Scotland, mostly fitting 
with the minutes of the lords of the articles, which show the decisions that were made, 
though one called for the complete rescinding of the act insofar as it communicated 
trade to burghs of barony and regality.
130
 According to the minutes of the articles, the 
burghs seem to have been willing to concede 
that all persones shall have libertie to export out of the country their owne 
product, and lykwayes they conceded that all the lieges should have libertie to 
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export cornes, cattell, coull, salt, lyme and stone, albeit the same bee not their 
owne product, and lykwayes linnen cloath 
while retaining for themselves the privilege of exporting ‘hering and salmond … 
plaidding and fingrames’.
131
 In terms of imports, it was agreed in the articles that 
imports made by burghs of regality and barony should be sold only within the burghs 
to their inhabitants, and not to others.
132
 However, in its next meeting, the convention 
was informed by its representatives on the articles that the concessions were 
unsatisfactory as unfree burghs would still be able to import and sell their imports at 
fairs and on market days, which was considered ‘ane further strenthning of the said act 
1672, and further restricting of the burrows, and putting them altogither out of hopes to 
recover their antient priviledges’.
133
 Despite the burghs’ efforts, and James’ 
assurances, in the end nothing was done on this act, though judging by the report to the 
convention the burghs were probably happier with no change than with the proposed 
alterations. Some burghs were appointed to ask James if anything was likely to be 
done in parliament, and if the act was not to be rescinded to request that nothing 
should be done. When parliament was adjourned with no changes made, the burghs 
wrote to the king representing the losses they had incurred through the 1672 act.
134
 
 
Fountainhall suggested that the burghs had been ‘by the Court gulled with the hopes of 
getting ther priviledges restored … and in hopes of it … they crouched under the 
burden, and yielded to every demand of the Duke of York’. He then lists nine acts 
which were in some way prejudicial to the burghs and states that ‘all thir ware the 
rewards the Burrows got for ther cheap service to the Court’.
135
 This interpretation has 
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been generally accepted, but its acceptance seems to rely more on a traditional 
interpretation of the power of the crown than on any certainty that the burghs were 
‘sold out’ by James.
136
 The convention had clearly done enough, as James 
recommended to them, in presenting the case of a united estate, with its careful 
instructions to the burghs on the articles and their reports back to it. The articles were 
willing to make concessions, as were the burghs, at least in the area of exports. But 
there was apparently no question of the burghs of barony and regality being excluded 
from importing, and it seems likely that this had more to do with the landed interest in 
the articles and in parliament being unwilling to sacrifice a source of revenue rather 
than a commissioner who did not care to keep his word once he had got what he 
wanted – though one cannot assume integrity, just as one cannot assume its absence. 
Once again the convention had come up against powerful landed interests which 
prevented it achieving its desires, but again it had shown that it was not an entirely 
spent force, and could still mobilise the estate of burghs behind a cause and come close 
to a satisfactory result. The incident also displays the power of parliament and the 
limitations of the crown’s power, as the interests of the landed classes were on this 
occasion opposed to the crown’s stated desire, yet the landed classes defied the 
commissioner and had their way. 
 
Under James VII the convention once again brought up the issue of burghs of barony 
and regality during parliament. On 4 May 1685, which appears to have been the last 
day of the convention, though parliament continued until 16 June, it wrote to the king 
in reply to a letter in favour of a fixed salary being awarded to the conservator. This 
gave the convention the opportunity to represent and seek redress for the difficulties 
the burghs were facing in the loss of trade, partly due to the ‘great restraints and 
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prohibitions’ laid on Scottish trade by England and Ireland and also because of 
prohibitions within Scotland, but firstly because of the communication of trade to 
unfree burghs.
137
 Over a month later, the lords of the articles assigned a committee of 
eight commissioners, two from each estate with the officers of state as 
supernumeraries, to ‘meet and adjust the affaire betwixt the burghs royall and the 
burghs of regalitie and barronie’.
138
 Once again no legislation was forthcoming, and 
the fact that the committee was not weighted so much in favour of the burghs as that in 
1681 suggests there was less desire on the part of the crown (at least as represented in 
the commissioner) to act in favour of the burghs. It is also unclear exactly how much 
the broaching of this subject in the articles was due to effective lobbying by the 
convention, but it is safe to credit it with encouraging consensus and activity among 
the burghs in parliament, given its continued focus on the issue in its meeting. 
 
In 1686, as seen in chapter two, the convention, led by Edinburgh, saw success in the 
restoration of the summer sitting of the court of session, initially raised before the 
articles in 1685. In other issues it had little effect in terms of producing legislation, but 
it is again proved to be a body that was not impotent as it coordinated the action of the 
estate. Two weeks before parliament sat, a draft act against the burghs of barony and 
regality was approved in a particular convention and sent by it to secretary of state and 
soon-to-be king’s commissioner viscount Melfort, on receipt of a letter from him 
advising it that the king, ‘out of his earnest desyre to promote the interest and 
advancement of trade … has been graciously pleased to instruct his commissioner to 
concur in all things convenient that shall be proposed by yow for that effect’, but that it 
ought to act quickly as parliament was not likely to sit for long. A committee was 
assigned to consider all acts of parliament made in favour of the royal burghs over the 
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previous 100 years, to be presented to the next general convention, presumably to help 
it decide how it should best proceed in the session of parliament that would be meeting 
at the same time.
139
 
 
Two weeks later the general convention sat, two days before parliament. A reply was 
sent by Melfort, assuring them that the king 
has fullie instructed his comissioner in the affaire so as yow who on the 
account of trade and priviledge pay the sixth pairt of the cess of the kingdome 
may haue the benefit of that trade ye pay for, and his Majestie doubts not but 
the parliament will advise him justly in the matter and for your interest. 
Melfort also indicated that the king was 
not only proceiding in the matter of a free trede with England, but has 
instructed his commissionar in many things tending to your advantage … as I 
find in his Majesty a royall and generous inclination to restore your soe much 
decayed trade, and to doe all that may make the kingdome in generall, and most 
especiallie yow his royall boroughs, live in peace, prosperitie and plenty, soe I 
shall not be wanting to doe all on my pairt to promove a work his Majesty is 
soe much concerned in and by which yow will receave soe great advantadge, 
not doubting but as yow have always had your intire dependance on the croune 
when the concerne wes les minded, you will on all occasions, especiallie in this 
enshewing session of parliament, show the zealous duty ye have for the best of 
kings and most generous of benefactors.
140
 
The message from Melfort to the convention was clear: support the king’s interest in 
parliament and you shall have free trade with England, and the benefit of the trade for 
which you pay your tax. Perhaps the experience of 1681 had shown James that it was 
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not wise to promise, in so many words, what he could not deliver in the face of the 
landowning interests, namely the restoration of the royal burghs’ privileges in foreign 
trade. A similar offer was made to parliament, only with the clear indication that free 
trade with England would be given in return for the toleration of Catholicism, but 
parliament was unwilling to go against conscience for the sake of trade. What is sadly 
absent is any sense of what the burghs’ own position on toleration was, with no 
mention in the convention minutes and no parliamentary minutes remaining for that 
session. Whether or not it was willing to allow toleration for the sake of free trade, the 
convention’s actions in considering what should be offered to parliament concerning 
trade were to come to nothing.
141
 
 
Although the convention was not able to secure an act in their favour, the very fact that 
Melfort tried to use it as a means to secure the support of the burghal estate suggests 
that it was still recognised that the convention was effective in bringing consensus 
among the burghs in parliament. The fact that this failed and that James then felt the 
need to interfere in burgh elections (discussed in chapter six) to gain burgh 
commissioners who, as Mann suggested, ‘would become crown “lobby-fodder” in a 
future parliament’, may well indicate that his assessment of the convention was 
correct, and that the consensus it brought was simply not the consensus James would 
have liked.
142
 Certainly when it came to the ‘act for inbringing of his majesties 
supply’, the convention’s action seems to have been effective. It asked each 
commissioner to oppose the proposal to make up the quota for the king’s annuity by 
imposing two merks excise on each boll of malt brewed in the burghs for private use, 
while those ‘who are not heritors in the countrie’ would not have to pay. This clause 
                                                 
141
 Ibid., 63-4; RPS, 1686/4/6, 1686/4/11. 
142
 A. J. Mann, ‘‘James VII, King of the Articles’: Political Management and Parliamentary Failure’, in 
Brown & Mann, History of the Scottish Parliament, 205. 
 243  
did not appear in the act as it was later passed by parliament, a small victory for the 
convention which once again shows that it cannot be written off as an impotent and 
outdated body.
143
 
 
Conclusion 
This last case may only indicate small-scale opposition to parliament, but it does add 
another example of how the convention was far from a spent force in relation to 
parliament in the reigns of Charles II and James VII. Parliamentary sessions were more 
frequent and longer, which caused problems for the convention in terms of its 
representation both there and in its own meetings. It is certainly the case that 
landowning and crown interests proved too powerful for the convention on numerous 
occasions, as in 1672 with the act transmitting some of the royal burghs’ privileges in 
trade to burghs of regality and barony. There is some evidence of disillusionment 
among the burghs at their ability to have any influence in the face of such powerful 
opposing interests, which may have accounted for the attempts of some burghs to use 
parliament to their advantage, bypassing the convention and the interests of other 
burghs and the estate. Yet it would be wrong to write off the convention. It is true that 
it was not able to protect the burgh’s privileges and that it could not always push 
through the legislation it desired. Yet this should not be used as criticism of the 
convention, as no-one was able to push through their full legislative programme. Even 
the crown had to concede defeat at times, demonstrating the very real influence of 
parliament. Particularly in the early 1660s and in 1681, the convention was very active 
in discussing proposed legislation, coordinating the action of the burghal 
representatives and generally seeking to ensure that on key issues relating to the estate 
the burghs’ voice in parliament was a single voice, and it was one that at least on 
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occasion was heard, acknowledged and acted on. It is possible that without the 
convention, and thus without this united position, the burghs would have found their 
privileges eroded even further by the landowning and crown interests. 
 245  
Chapter 6 
The Convention and the Crown 
 
The efficacy of the Scottish parliament in the Restoration period may have been well 
demonstrated, even allowing for its limitations. Yet although parliament was certainly 
not there merely to rubber-stamp royal policy, there is of course no doubt that power 
lay primarily with the king and his arms of government in Scotland, his commissioner 
and the privy council. To widen the scope of this chapter slightly, the treasury, 
exchequer and judicatories can also be considered here as crucial to the administration 
of the kingdom on the king’s behalf.  
 
Some of the issues for the convention in dealing with the crown are similar to those in 
its dealings with parliament. The burghs faced the competing interests of the landed 
estates and the crown itself. They also had the opportunity of appealing directly to 
these other bodies, thus bypassing and potentially undermining the convention. They 
faced crown interference in their elections, particularly after Lauderdale’s reign as 
commissioner, which would impinge directly on the freedom of the membership of the 
convention. Despite these issues, its dealings with the crown again prove that the 
convention was far from an impotent, outdated body but was extremely active at court, 
privy council and the other arms of the administration in Scotland. It used a number of 
means to do this, including establishing Lauderdale as its agent at court, though of 
course it is not surprising that it was not always successful. Its action was not restricted 
to lobbying through various agents of the crown, and the convention could even be a 
forum for direct opposition to the crown. 
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The convention and government  
Just as parliamentary legislation immediately after the Restoration seemed to indicate a 
desire to placate the returned monarch, the convention’s actions in 1660 sought to 
ensure that as loyal a front as possible was presented to Charles II. William Thomson, 
clerk of both Edinburgh and the convention, went to him at Breda and ‘humblie 
representit to the Kingis Majestie the constant affectiones and dewtifull respectis of the 
burrowis’, presenting him with a gift of £1,000 sterling (£12,000) in the burghs’ name. 
Though he had not been expressly commanded to do this and gave the convention little 
choice, it readily approved his actions and ordered each burgh to pay its proportion of 
the money.
1
  
 
This was a huge sum for burghs still recovering from the civil wars, with trade still 
suffering. That year, Dundee’s common good income was £7,685 16s 10d, and its 
share of the sum given to the king was £890. With £785 4s 8d for commissioners’ fees 
and missive dues, it represented over 20% of its income and caused a shortfall of over 
£750.
2
 Some of the middling burghs like Ayr were only paying around 5% of their 
income for their share of this sum, though Burntisland, rated only just below Ayr in the 
tax roll, probably paid over 25% of its income. As usual, the smaller burghs felt it 
most. Anstruther Wester, with £36 to pay to Thomson, was probably paying around 
50% of its income that year, while the burghs at the very bottom of the pile, such as 
Lauder, probably saw the sums they had to pay exceed the income from their common 
good.
3
 That the burghs were willing to bear such great expense, with no protest 
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recorded, is surely a measure of the recognition of the need to ensure that they made a 
good impression on Charles. If any burgh had protested it would have been in danger 
of being marked out as ill-disposed to the king. Though the convention had not had a 
chance to decide the amount of money given, letters were written from the convention 
to the king to congratulate him on his safe arrival in Britain and its general behaviour 
suggests that it may not have acted differently if given a say in the matter.
4
 
 
This desire to prove loyal to the king to keep him favourable towards the burghs’ 
interests was seen again in 1664. The general convention that year asked the clerk to 
look at all the acts of burghs passed between 1637 and 1660 in order that ‘severall acts 
… which are derogatorie to his Majesties royall prerogative and unprofitable to the 
estate of burghs’ could be rescinded.
5
 In the event, no changes appear to have been 
made, but the aim of the convention is clear: to be seen to be doing all possible to 
protect the king’s interests and prove its loyalty. A further public statement was made 
when James, duke of Albany and York, arrived in 1679. Edinburgh’s provost was 
asked to present the convention’s address congratulating him on his safe arrival and to 
‘use such other expressions of respect to his royall highnes as in prudence he shall 
think fitt’.
6
 Similarly before parliament sat in 1685, the convention addressed James 
expressing its joy at his succession and promising to defend his  
royall right and prerogatives with such zeale as may prove that wee think 
ourselves thereto oblidged as good Christians alsweell as faithfull subjects, and 
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that not only all treasonable but even factious and seditious courses are no less 
impious then unlawfull.
7
 
The burghs also stated their dependence on him as a guarantee of their loyalty, and 
their approval of his choice of the duke of Queensberry as commissioner. Queensberry 
himself was addressed and congratulated on his appointment, of which the burghs 
approved as he ‘hes evidenced upon all occasions so much loyaltie to the monarchie, 
so much kyndnes to your native cuntrie, and so much prudence and conduct in the 
concerns of both’.
8
 Similar action had been taken in 1682 on the appointment of a new 
chancellor and treasurer, when a committee was asked to make an address to them and 
congratulate ‘his Majesties happie choice of thair lordships to those offices of state’.
9
 
In 1688, on the birth of James’ son, the convention sent the provost of Edinburgh to 
court to congratulate the king, again specifically stating its loyalty as the king made 
‘our interest your owne’.
10
 
 
These expressions were not necessarily unusual, but they do indicate a sense within the 
convention that positive action needed to be taken to assure the crown of its loyalty. It 
was doing what it could to secure crown favour for the burghs in the face of their 
competitors, whether landowners or English trading interests. The burghs did of course 
have an advantage over the former group, if not the latter; they had a forum through 
which their interests could be represented together. Where individual landowners could 
approach the king on their own, to get a united front on a particular issue would not be 
as easy as it was for the burghs. The convention regularly used that advantage to 
present issues to the king, whether at court or through the privy council. 
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Smout claims that the convention in the Restoration era was closely controlled by the 
crown, and although this is not clearly explained his equation of the convention with 
parliament in this issue suggests that he means that it was controlled mainly by crown 
interference in burgh elections, which shall be discussed below. He goes on to say that 
the convention ‘had been accustomed from the sixteenth century to express themselves 
freely on economic subjects, and though without direct control, they still had powers 
of influence’.
11
 This influence is evident in a number of ways, indicating a degree of 
flexibility in crown policy and the willingness and ability of the convention to attempt 
to direct that policy in a direction favourable to it. 
 
One of the difficulties for anyone in Scotland wishing to influence crown policy was 
the problem of an absentee monarch. The privy council, as the agent of royal power in 
Scotland, was thus extremely important and the convention recognised this and sought 
to take advantage. As early as September 1661, Edinburgh’s council summoned a 
particular convention to discuss complaints from various burghs against the collectors 
of the excise and seek remedy from the privy council for these unspecified abuses.
12
 
The individual burghs which had complaints must have recognised that the convention 
would be more effective in presenting their complaints than they would alone. 
Unfortunately the convention which sat on 16 September, only five days after the 
summons was issued and two months after the adjournment of parliament, has no acts 
recorded in the register. This was presumably because of the lack of a quorum, as only 
seven burghs appeared out of the sixteen which were called to meet, but it meant that 
no protest was made to the privy council and thus no action could be taken.
13
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Presumably some resolution was found, as the issue was not raised at the next 
particular convention in November. 
 
A decade later the general convention appointed six of the main burghs, or any three of 
them, to represent certain issues of trade to the privy council or exchequer relating to 
fishing, salt, coal and coinage.
14
 On this occasion they were unsuccessful in getting the 
issues raised before the privy council, but they persisted. After another four years 
Edinburgh, Perth and Linlithgow and the burghs’ agent were asked to apply to the 
council for acts of parliament regulating the quality of linen cloth, uniformity of 
measures and coal to be ‘putt in dew execution and inviolablie keeped hereafter’.
15
 
This petition does not appear to have had much effect, if indeed it was actually 
presented to the council, perhaps being lost in the furore over the convention’s letter to 
the king in 1674, which is discussed below. Yet it indicates the convention’s 
recognition of the need to use the council and also something of the removal of 
influence from the convention in regulatory matters, as it was obviously finding itself 
unable to enforce these acts. A similar appeal was made in 1679 for the council to 
enforce regulations on weights and measures, though again it did not appear to discuss 
it.
16
 Again the limitations of the convention as a regulator were displayed, probably 
due to the increase of markets outside royal burghs and thus outside the power of the 
convention. The issue of coinage was raised again in 1676 when the council was asked 
for a licence to bring in foreign coin at exchange rates the convention calculated and to 
mint the smallest denomination coins, due to the scarcity of specie. This was more 
successful. A committee was appointed by the council to consider issues of trade and 
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commerce and particularly the coinage, though no further outcome is recorded in the 
council registers.
17
 
 
The convention’s ability to influence the council was further displayed in 1681 in a 
long-running dispute with the masters of the revels, who were ‘oppressing [the 
burghs’] inhabitants and the whole cuntrie by charging them with horning upon their 
playing at games, such as cairds, tables, bullyearts, and the lyke other recreation, 
which the convention conceaves is not comprehended in their gift’.
18
 They were called 
before a meeting of the convention but refused to stop exacting money for these 
activities which the gift of their office, granted by the king, did not allow them to 
charge, and the convention decided to petition the privy council to have the gift 
restricted. This appeal was successful and the council issued letters against them, 
though by 1684 the master of the revels was again extending his gift further than it 
warranted. The convention assigned its agent to pursue legal action against him and to 
make a further appeal to the council, which was also successful.
19
 Leisure pursuits 
were causing more problems for the burghs in 1686. Five years earlier the privy 
council had granted a prohibition on the importation of playing cards, as someone 
claimed that they could make cards of a better quality than those imported. But in 1686 
the burghs complained that he had charged many innocent inhabitants with importing 
and selling foreign cards and the agent was ordered, with the assistance of Edinburgh 
and other nearby burghs, to submit a bill of suspension to the council against the 
charges.
20
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The convention also sought to interact with other parts of the royal administration, 
showing an understanding of which branch of the regime could serve its purposes best. 
The treasury was one part of the administration that received attention from the 
convention on a number of occasions. In December 1667 a particular convention 
submitted a lengthy list of grievances relating to French impositions on Scottish trade, 
which are discussed below, and the imposition of £12 on every boll of salt imported 
for any purpose except the fishing industry.
21
 Further petitions were made in 1669 
concerning the prohibitive effect of the amount of bullion to be paid on the export of 
staple goods, and in 1679 concerning the charges and expenses incurred by burghs 
which were furnishing baggage horses for the military and wanted the expenses paid or 
given as abatements from their assessment.
22
 This latter occasion is another example of 
individual burghs recognising the ability of the convention to appeal effectively on 
their behalf, especially where a number of burghs were facing the same problems. 
Another issue concerning the whole estate, which was also about national trade policy, 
was that of the royal burghs’ foreign trade. Even after trade was opened up to burghs 
of barony and regality in 1672, the convention tried to keep a degree of control and 
exclusivity, appealing in 1675 to the treasury for only the ports of royal burghs to be 
used for exports, and to the court of session against perceived invasions upon the 
remaining rights of the royal burghs. The former appeal was unsuccessful, and though 
it is not clear what the result of the latter was, if illegal encroachments were being 
made it is reasonable to assume that the rights of the burghs would have been upheld, 
as happened in the cases of Dumfries and Greenock in the mid-1670s, both detailed in 
chapter one.
23
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Appeals were also made to the exchequer, again concerning the imposition on salt just 
four months after it had been represented to the treasury, while in 1675 the agent and 
Edinburgh were ordered to prevent the passing of any gifts or monopolies presented to 
the exchequer which were prejudicial to the burghs.
24
 The admiralty was also the 
subject of an appeal from the convention, with the admiral depute informed of the 
prejudice sustained by merchants by the granting of passes to strangers and their ships 
as if they were Scottish. He was also asked to represent to the king the problem of 
Scottish passes not serving for the Mediterranean, which only English ones did – a 
clear case of the problem of having a monarch whose foreign policy was directed by a 
foreign country.
25
 Another issue of foreign policy was raised in 1683, after a complaint 
from a Scottish merchant that he was being impeded from importing goods into 
Hamburg, from which English subjects were barred. The convention saw this as a 
matter of importance for all the burghs, and decided to inform the chancellor and also 
write to the secretary of state in London to get a letter from the king to show that they 
were not actually subjects of England.
26
 
 
The convention often appointed certain people, usually advocates, at times on fixed 
salaries and at other times on a case-by-case basis. This would enable it to have expert 
representation and advice in cases concerning both the estate or individual burghs 
which sought assistance. For example, in 1669 the convention recognised that  
the priviledges, liberties and freedoms of the estate of royall burrows is cleirly 
asserted by known and determined lawes alredie enacted, sua that there remains 
nothing but the putting of the samen lawes to executioun, which by neglect and 
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carelessnes of some particular burghs hes suffered seuerall invasions to be 
made vpon their freedome by vsurped and wnjust interestes. 
It decided therefore to employ an advocate and a lawyer at £20 and £12 sterling (£240 
and £144) per annum respectively for ‘consulting, pleading and procureing for them in 
all causes quhairin they are concerned’.
27
 The defence of the royal burghs’ rights 
against burghs of barony and regality proved fruitless and actually seems to have 
contributed to the passing of the 1672 act against them, and in 1675 it was decided that 
it was unnecessary to pay salaries to advocates. It was decided that they would be paid 
only when employed on particular cases.
28
 Whether this was a case of disillusionment 
with the legal profession after the 1672 act, fear of employing advocates after they 
were seen to be acting seditiously towards the king and influencing the burghs’ 
opposition to him in 1674, or a fit of frugality, it did not last long. Within a decade a 
similar point to that made in 1669 was raised about the execution of laws in defence of 
the burghs’ privileges. Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, lord advocate, was appointed 
‘assessor’ to the convention in order that he might ‘espous and own their interest in 
consulting and pleading for them in all causes wherein they are concerned’. He 
received a salary of 500 merks (£333 6s 8d), with his servant to receive £5 sterling 
(£60) annually.
29
 The fact that it had such an experienced advocate to advise and 
represent it legally would have been of great benefit to the convention; that employing 
him meant that it had a royal appointee of influence on its payroll may have served it 
very well indeed.  
 
Other people were awarded salaries and pensions for service to the convention, to the 
extent that in 1685 it was noted that these pensions made up ‘a great pairte of the 
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missive dues’ which were causing many burghs great hardship. As seen in chapter two 
it was decided that all except the clerk, agent and servants who attended conventions 
should have their pensions rescinded, with anyone employed on the burghs’ behalf 
paid only according to the work they did. This was a controversial act, and the 
commissioners of Edinburgh protested. The following year, the secretary of state had 
his pension reinstated, as did Mackenzie two years later, due to his qualifications and 
‘how steidable and necessary a person he is to maintain the trew interest of the royall 
borrows and to advyse them in all affaires of law and other difficult caises’.
30
 As a 
means of protecting the interests of the royal burghs within Scotland and particularly 
before the courts, these advocates and other agents were clearly seen as valuable. 
 
The effectiveness of the convention in many of its appeals is not clear but they do 
indicate its ability to recognise and use the body which could most directly aid its 
cause. It thus showed a clear ability to deal with the problem of an absentee monarch 
by using his representatives in Scotland, which would presumably have saved it the 
expense of direct appeal to the king in London. However, it certainly did not neglect 
the possibility of direct appeals, as seen above with the secretary of state receiving a 
pension, and even recognised that going beyond his representatives in Scotland and 
directly to court might actually be a more effective means of achieving its ends. There 
is some irony in this, as this was one of the problems the convention faced itself, as 
burghs bypassed it to take issues directly to parliament or the privy council.  
 
One example of the convention appealing directly to court came in 1688, concerning 
the requirement for royal burghs to provide prison space for their shires. Many burghs 
were complaining that 
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they are frequently troubled by the shirreffs of shyers and justices of peace who 
sends in prisoners to their respective tolbuiths vpon suspition of slaughter, thift, 
and other crymes without laying doun a way for mentaining the saids prisoners, 
whereby the burden of ther mentinance lyes heavie vpon the saids burghs
31
 
The convention decided to appeal to the privy council, but it does not appear to have 
been brought up there. The appeal obviously reached the king, as later the same year 
both the convention and the council received letters from him stating that the royal 
burghs were allowed to refuse to receive or keep prisoners if assurances for the 
prisoners’ maintenance were not given. In the same meeting where it decided to appeal 
to the council a committee was appointed to ‘draw wp such privat instructions as is 
necessar to be moved at court for the weel of the burghs’ for Edinburgh’s provost (who 
brought the letters back from the king) to present at court. It seems likely that the 
convention decided to appeal directly to the king rather than going through the council. 
If this was its aim it was certainly effective as the privy council was given no 
opportunity to oppose the burghs’ wishes.
32
 
 
This was not the only occasion on which the convention sent its own commissioner to 
court. William Thomson, who had gone to the king in 1660, remained at court for 
some time that year, receiving detailed instructions as to the business he should raise 
before the king then returning in November to the gratitude of the convention.
33
 
Thomson’s fairly long-term appointment was unusual and more often individuals 
would be sent on a particular occasion with particular instructions for what business 
should be represented. One example of that is Magnus Prince, the provost of 
Edinburgh, as detailed above. It is possible that such commissioners, as merchants 
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themselves, would be going to London on personal business and the convention was 
taking advantage of the fact that men well-versed in the affairs of the burghs happened 
to be at court. However, on that occasion, and in 1671 when William Anderson 
(provost of Glasgow) was sent to court, they were not simply asked to represent 
burghal interests but were given very clear and topical instructions for the business 
they were to pursue.
34
 The latter appointment was during Lauderdale’s tenure as the 
burghs’ agent at court, which will be considered below, but the perceived necessity of 
having two agents, perhaps due to the brewing issue of the rights of non-royal burghs, 
indicates just how important the convention considered its representation there. 
 
While these occasional appointments undoubtedly boosted the royal burghs’ influence 
at court, the convention did not rely on them alone to present its interests to the king. 
Even while Thomson was in London in 1660, Thomas Clarges was working as the 
burghs’ agent there, having been appointed by the convention to represent it to Monck 
and parliament earlier that year, before being replaced by Lauderdale in November.
35
 
After Lauderdale’s demission of the office of secretary of state in 1680 the position 
surprisingly lay vacant until 1682 when it was decided that the new secretary of state, 
the earl of Murray, ‘is in ane fitt and suteable capacitie to doe good offices to the royall 
burrows’.
36
 The appeal concerning Scottish merchant rights in Hamburg went to 
Murray, but there were not many appeals specifically made to court until viscount 
Melfort was made joint secretary of state by James VII. The first correspondence the 
convention had with Melfort was at the time of parliament in 1686, when he wrote 
noting the king’s desire to act in favour of the royal burghs and their trade, mentioned 
in chapter five. The convention minutes do not record his official appointment as its 
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agent at court, but the following year the agent was instructed to pay pensions to both 
him and Murray.
37
 Melfort seems to have remained the burghs’ main point of contact 
at court and means of lobbying the king. The provost of Edinburgh wrote to him to 
find out how far a treaty signed with Denmark comprehended the trade of Scotland as 
well as England, raising once again the problem of a foreign policy determined by the 
wishes of a foreign country.
38
 
 
In the same meeting of the convention it was noted that Sir Adam Blair, Dunbar’s 
commissioner, was going to court, and he was asked to represent to Melfort the 
prejudice sustained by the royal burghs 
by the Dutch ther fishing within sight of land, contrair to the treaty betuixt his 
Majestie and States of Holland, and pressors they lye under by burghs of 
regalities and baronies, and the great imposts laid on the Scots goods by the 
King of Denmark and Swedden, and that he wold doe his outmost endeavor to 
obtaine some redress.
39
 
The convention was thus again using the attendance of one of its own representatives’ 
at London to ensure that clear instructions on a wide range of topics could be conveyed 
to its agent, perhaps saving money on the cost of a letter, but more likely recognising 
that personal representation would have greater effect and carry greater urgency. On 
the occasion mentioned above of Prince’s attendance at court in 1688, he returned with 
the letters regarding prisoners, an assurance from the king of his readiness to ‘promote 
the interest of trade and to procure the wealth and welfare of all our royall borroughs’, 
and with the news that the king’s letter to the privy council discharged the admiralty 
from forcing boats to take passes and safe conducts which were supposed to be 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., 58-61, 62-3, 69; ACA, Letter Books – 8/1 (Incoming), vii, f.45. 
38
 RCRBS, iv, 71. 
39
 Ibid., 71-2. 
 259  
voluntary. He also reported that he had treated directly with Melfort on the decay of 
trade and the burdens borne by the burghs and especially ‘the unsuferable prejudices of 
the burghs of regalities and barronies’, and a ‘designed imposition’ by Newcastle on 
Scots coal, which had successfully been hindered. It seems that Melfort’s role in all of 
this was central, and he was sent a letter of thanks for his effective support.
40
 
 
These examples display the effectiveness of the secretary of state as the burghs’ agent 
at court, especially when direct and personal representation was made to him by a 
commissioner sent by the convention. Interestingly, they also display the willingness 
of James VII to rule on behalf of the burghs. This had been displayed in parliament, 
with the presumed aim of securing their support for toleration. Yet even after this had 
failed, with the burghs remaining in opposition, James is here seen promoting their 
interests. It could be that his meddling in burgh elections, which will be considered 
below, had given him an assurance of their loyalty of which he could not be assured 
from the nobility and the shires, or that he was pursuing a ‘carrot and stick’ policy, 
granting concessions while fixing elections, to improve the burghs’ support for him. It 
may also have been driven by a desire to improve the trade of his northern kingdom 
and a recognition of the expertise of the royal burghs and the need to protect them in 
order to achieve this. 
 
The most important of the convention’s agents at court, because of his position, his 
longevity and his dubious favour towards the interests of the burghs, was the secretary 
of state for most of Charles II’s reign, Lauderdale. He was appointed as agent by a 
particular convention in November 1660, having already been asked in September to 
help Thomson present a letter to the king asking for the burghs’ privileges to be 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 81-5. 
 260  
maintained. Taking the large salary of 2,000 merks (£1,333 6s 8d) per annum, he 
replaced Clarges, with apparently no reason given to the latter to explain his 
replacement.
41
 This may indicate a degree of ruthlessness on the part of the 
convention, but it certainly shows political expediency. Clarges may have served it 
well for the short time he was in position, but despite his favour with the king he was 
neither Scottish (though he had served actively for Scottish constituencies in the 
Cromwellian parliaments) nor, most significantly, secretary of state for Scotland, and 
was thus not in a position of such great influence as Lauderdale.
42
 
 
After his appointment the convention contacted Lauderdale, and on occasion, after 
specific instructions were sent, committees were set up to correspond with him in order 
to follow his progress in fulfilling its wishes. He was also asked to inform it of any 
relevant matters which came up at court so that a convention could be called to discuss 
them.
43
 What is notable is that very rarely was a matter of an individual burgh’s 
problems, or any smaller issues, sent to him for representation to the king. Rather, 
more general issues of trade dominated the appeals. The two predominant matters, 
trade with England and French impositions on Scottish trade, will be considered 
separately as the convention used many means to try to influence policy on these. 
However, what this pattern of appeals to Lauderdale suggests is that the convention 
recognised that it was not necessary to present smaller issues to the king, as his council 
had the authority and ability to deal with them, while matters of foreign policy and 
English trade were best presented directly to the king who had the authority in the 
nation whose trade interests dominated these matters. One of the first occasions when 
Lauderdale was asked to represent a more general matter of the trade of the burghs was 
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in 1671. The convention wrote to him (with the crown-appointed conservator taking 
the letter and seconding it ‘with all his power and moyan’) to ask the king to 
‘recommend to the lords of session the mantinance of the just right of burrowes against 
the vsurpation made therwpon by burghs of regalities and barronie’.
44
 This was part of 
the action against burghs of barony and regality, sparked by the defence of Stirling’s 
privileges against Falkirk and Kilsyth, which led in turn to the act of 1672 in favour of 
the unfree burghs, as discussed in chapter five: on this occasion, the convention’s 
appeal to Lauderdale seems to have backfired spectacularly. It is not clear whether or 
not Lauderdale actually presented the appeal to the king, but as he stood to gain from 
the increasing trade of the burghs of regality and barony due to his interests in 
Musselburgh, it seems unlikely that he would. 
 
The convention may have been failed by Lauderdale and reminded again of the power 
of the landed interests which opposed the burghs’ trading monopoly, but it did not 
reject him as agent. It seems that he was too valuable an asset to be released, even 
though his large salary had not convinced him to intervene strongly on the 
convention’s behalf. It was quick to hint at the result of his support for the 1672 act, as 
the following year it wrote to him to represent ‘the great decay of the royall burrowes 
by want of trade and other heavie burdeens lying vpon them’.
45
 However, loyalty again 
became an issue in 1675 – this time not the loyalty of Lauderdale to the convention, 
but of the convention to Lauderdale and more fundamentally to the king, after the 
convention’s letter to him the previous year. In January the convention wrote to both 
parties apologising for the letter, telling Lauderdale that 
it is not the whole bodie of the burrows that have been guiltie of that irreverent 
and unduetifull returne which wes sent to his Majesties most gracious letter, 
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but a few turbulent persones, and wee heartilie thank your grace for keeping his 
Majestie in a good opinion of his royall burrows. Wee intend in the next to 
truble your grace by ane memoriall concerning some incumbrances lying on 
our trade, but wee thought it our duetie to take off the staine throwen on us 
befoir wee seek new favours from his Majestie.
46
 
 
The convention recognised that the matter of trade needed to be pursued, but also that 
it was likely that nothing favourable to it would be done without the king’s anger being 
appeased. As well as addressing the king directly to apologise, Lauderdale was in a 
perfect position to intercede before the king on its behalf. It is perhaps surprising that 
the issue of trade was raised so soon after the king’s anger was incurred, but again 
Lauderdale was in a useful position for the convention. It could warn him that the 
matter would soon be presented to the king and thus allow Lauderdale the time to 
convey its expressions of loyalty to him. At the general convention in July, a letter was 
written to the king informing him that the letter of 1674 had been erased, the 
regulations on qualifications renewed according to his wishes and, having thus assured 
him of their loyalty and obedience, that papers had been sent to Lauderdale ‘that these 
things which are burdeensome to our trade and prejudiciall to our just priviledges may 
be remoued by such effectuall ways as seems most expedient to your royall wisdom’. 
Again the utility of Lauderdale as agent is evident as the convention wrote to him 
concerning the matter of trade and asking him to ‘interceed with his Majestie that all 
effects of his Majesties displeasure may now cease, sieing the royall borrows are fullie 
returned to their duetie’. £30 sterling (£360) was also awarded to two of his servitors, 
presumably to increase his amenability towards the burghs’ cause.
47
 While no firm 
requests were made until at least November, and even those were decided by a small 
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committee appointed to write to Lauderdale, his intervention was seen by the 
convention as important in bringing it back into the king’s favour. The following year 
he was again asked to assure the king of its ‘constant adherence to and dependence 
upon him in all his royall concerns’ before the issue of the French impositions was 
brought up.
48
 Despite the fact that he represented the landed interests which caused the 
royal burghs so much difficulty in protecting their interests, Lauderdale was an 
important part of the convention’s system of lobbying the crown. He may have worked 
in opposition to it at times, but it is likely that much of its success in achieving its aims 
before the crown, and possibly parliament, was at least in part down to his 
representation. 
  
On a number of occasions the convention tried to cover all angles in its lobbying, by 
appealing to the privy council and other influential individuals to put as much pressure 
as possible on the crown to frame policy in a favourable way for it. Two predominant 
issues were trade with England and France, more prominent even than the problems of 
the communication of trade to burghs of barony and regality. The unfree burghs might 
be expected to have most exercised the convention, but there are a number of possible 
explanations why this did not dominate its lobbying. The very people it would lobby 
for change in this area after 1672, including Lauderdale, were those who theoretically 
stood to benefit from their burghs receiving trade rights. Appealing to them may have 
seemed futile until James came offering at least partial restoration of the royal burghs’ 
privileges from 1681. Matters of foreign trade, on the other hand, would not range the 
burghs against these landed interests and could potentially garner the support of any 
whose burghs of regality or barony were attempting to engage in this trade, or who had 
personal trade abroad. As Smout states of the privy council’s attitude to trade and 
                                                 
48
 Ibid., 658, 664-5. 
 264  
industry, ‘their opinions and their interests broadly coincided with those of the 
governed’, meaning that the royal burghs would have a sympathetic ear and ready 
support on certain issues.
49
 The king had prerogative in these matters after 1663, and 
as Scotland’s foreign trade was so much tied in with that of England in the eyes of 
foreign states (such as Hamburg and Denmark, as shown above, or France) because 
they shared a monarch, particular effort had to be made to counter the English trading 
interests and promote Scottish ones before the king.  
 
English trade was a matter to which the convention paid particular attention. Very soon 
after the English Navigation Act was passed in 1660, the convention swung into action 
in an attempt to have it act repealed so that ‘the same priviledg in treading with thame 
and they with ws may be allowed which both kingdomes formerlie injoyed with 
another, wtherwys that this kingdome wold be necessitate at this ensueing parliament 
to tak the lyke cours against thame’. The clerk was ordained to write to Lauderdale and 
committees were appointed to approach the chancellor, speak to the treasurer and other 
officers of state to have them write to Lauderdale, and to meet merchants to draw up a 
list of grievances and possible remedies for presentation to parliament.
50
 In November 
1661 Lauderdale reported to the convention that the initial lobbying had been 
momentarily successful as the king had repealed the English act insofar as it related to 
Scotland, before the farmers of the customs in England had put pressure on him to 
repeal this dispensation. The convention decided to write to the influential earls of 
Crawford, Lauderdale and Middleton to seek their concurrence with it and presented a 
petition to the privy council asking it to intercede with the king to keep the 
dispensation. The privy council had already been acting on the convention’s behalf, 
with its clerk, Sir Peter Wedderburn, granted 900 merks (£600) for his ‘great paines 
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and trubl’ in representing the matters of trade and navigation, as well as coal and salt, 
in London earlier that year.
51
  
 
On hearing that the act in favour of Scotland had been repealed, the privy council 
recommended to the provost of Edinburgh that he  
call for and convene with all diligence such commissioners of burrows as are 
necessar and able to give councill and advyce in that affair and to ansuer the 
reasons and information given in be the saids fermors, and that they appoint 
and commission some able and qualified person weill instructed to repair to 
London for negotiating of that busines which is of so great concernment.
52
 
This advice was heeded and in February 1662 a committee of seventeen burghs, with a 
realistic quorum of five, was appointed to meet ‘wpon all occasiounes quhen they ar 
called’ to correspond with Murray at court on this and all other affairs.
53
 The council 
clearly recognised the expertise of the convention in the matter and acknowledged that 
it had the main interest in it. The convention was not alone in its desire for the repeal 
of the English act, but it was driving the action of the Scottish lobbyists. After the 
privy council sent a letter to Lauderdale in favour of a further petition from the burghs, 
thus adding its influence to it, some progress was made with the Scottish act against 
English trade passed in parliament in 1663, discussed in chapter five.
54
  
 
English concessions were not forthcoming, and the following year Lauderdale was 
twice asked to continue his assistance before the king on the matter, with a petition 
made to the privy council to put the acts against English imports to execution.
55
 In 
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1665 the council wrote two letters to the king, on behalf of the Scottish merchants and 
seamen, representing to him the hardships they were suffering and asking for the 
repeal of the English acts, and the convention’s wide lobbying network was again 
called into action. Edinburgh’s commissioners reported that they had written letters to 
various people concerning the English trade, and the convention asked them to deal 
with Rothes, the king’s commissioner, plus any members of the privy council ‘and 
wthers quhom it may concerne for thair assistance for recoverie of the saids 
priviledgis’.
56
 
 
These attempts to alter the trading policy of England were ultimately unsuccessful. 
Though they had gained the king’s support in 1661, the power of the English trading 
influence was too great for Charles to alienate, and eventually the appeals petered out. 
Yet the ability of the convention to mobilise others to assist in its lobbying, including 
five years of very active support from the privy council despite the king’s failure to act 
after 1661, is evidence of its influence and the respect in which its expertise was held. 
A similar example is in the convention’s attempts to have French impositions on 
Scottish trade removed, to which end it gained royal assistance. Again it was 
ultimately unsuccessful, perhaps unsurprisingly given that it was attempting to alter the 
trade policies of a foreign nation.  
 
France in 1659 had imposed an excise of 50 sous on each ton of goods exported from 
France by foreigners. Perhaps due to Scotland’s ancient trading privileges with France 
Scots were exempt. However in 1663, after the Scottish navigation act discriminated 
against all foreign ships, this exemption was unsurprisingly removed. The convention 
again used Wedderburn, clerk of the council, sought the advice of Lauderdale and 
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wrote directly to the king. Within a few weeks the privy council wrote to the king, 
probably in response to the convention, asking him to intercede with the French king 
to have the impositions removed.
57
 Charles was apparently quick to respond and on 
hearing that he intended to send someone to France to negotiate it, the convention 
decided to pay him a gratuity of £300 sterling (£3,600), with more to be paid if he was 
successful. Somewhat paradoxically, a further imposition was placed on goods 
transported by Scots from France to raise this money.
58
 The matter dominated the 
convention’s appeals to the treasury in 1667, but by the following year no negotiator 
had been chosen. Perhaps to encourage swifter action, the convention decided to offer 
20,000 merks (£13,333 6s 8d) to anyone who successfully gained the removal of the 
imposition. The matter was raised again in the general convention in 1674, though the 
particular convention to which it was remitted never sat due to the controversy over the 
letter to the king. The following year Lauderdale was again asked to intercede with the 
king to find a course to have the imposition removed, with the reward for success now 
raised to £2,000 sterling (£24,000). Letters continued to go to Lauderdale asking him 
to intercede with the king and in 1676 the new French ambassador.
59
 To this point the 
convention’s extensive efforts were bearing little fruit, despite the support of 
Lauderdale, the privy council and possibly also the treasury. 
 
A renewed sense of urgency is evident in the general convention of 1676, and having 
heard complaints against the imposition at almost every convention for the previous 
twenty years it was decided that due to present circumstances and the benefit to the 
burghs and trade if it could be removed, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Glasgow and 
Queensferry would be entrusted with managing the affair. They were ‘to act and 
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negotiat the samen at the courts of England and France in what way and maner they 
think expedient’, and empowered to award up to £4,500 sterling (£54,000) on its 
removal. This was an astonishing sum, to be imposed on the burghs according to the 
tax roll, and the agent refused to collect it and was discharged, as noted in chapter 
three.
60
 Unfortunately the actions of the committee are not recorded until a report to 
the general convention in 1682 indicated that the provost of Edinburgh had been in 
direct consultation with the French ambassador. Letters were written to the king, the 
secretary of state and the ambassador, with £300 sterling (£3,600) advanced to anyone 
the convention appointed, to be augmented to £4,500 sterling (£54,000) if the 
imposition was removed. The ambassador to France (Lord, later viscount, Preston) 
began to negotiate on the convention’s behalf and it corresponded with him, thanking 
him for his efforts, while in 1684 the privy council wrote to the duke of Albany asking 
him to represent the matter to the king.
61
 The convention decided that it no longer 
wished it to be continually on the missive, so an advocate was appointed to go to the 
English and French courts to negotiate. The following year he reported and the 
convention agreed with his assessment that parliament should be asked to recommend 
to the king that the ambassador continue to seek the restoration of Scottish privileges 
in France.
62
  
 
Success was probably always unlikely in this case and was never forthcoming, but 
once again the convention demonstrated an ability to mobilise different parts of the 
administration in Scotland to act on its behalf. It was successful in getting the 
ambassador to treat directly with the French, which must have required the king’s 
approval, and again it showed that it was not willing to sit back and allow the burghs’ 
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trading interests to be damaged without trying to change things, whether it was a 
matter of interest to the nation or only to the burghs. While its success was inevitably 
limited given the interests which were arrayed against its own, both within and without 
Scotland, its influence remained and its expertise was respected. 
 
The convention in opposition  
In the face of prejudicial crown interests, the convention had on occasion shown its 
continued vigour in joining the opposition in parliament, as seen in chapter five. On 
these occasions the burghs were joining an established opposition, but at least once the 
convention showed direct opposition to the crown on its own initiative. It was only one 
occasion and the level of support for it within the convention is very hard to judge, so 
perhaps its significance is limited. Yet it does show that the convention, as a forum for 
bringing together the views of the burghs, could be very effective and could promote 
such an independent agenda for the burghs that it brought them into direct conflict with 
the king rather than experiencing mere suppressed dissatisfaction. 
 
In July 1674 Charles sent a letter to each of the burghs, before the general convention, 
expressing his desire to ‘mentaine the just rights and priviledges of all our good 
subjects’ and the royal burghs in particular. He complained that an innovation had 
been introduced, with burghs sending commissioners to the convention ‘who are not 
actuall residenters within these burrows comissionating them nor bearing 
propportionable charges with them’, and requested that the convention make sure its 
acts on commissioner’s qualifications were obeyed in future.
63
 The general convention 
closed soon after it sat, Charles later claiming that ‘although tymly notice wes given 
unto them that a letter from us would be soon with them, yet some factious persones 
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amongst them prevaled with the rest to make a suddain adjournment’, though the 
reasons for doing so were not made clear. Mackenzie suggested that it was actually 
those who later opposed the burghs’ reply that caused the adjournment because they 
‘wanted courage’.
64
 A further convention met in August to consider a reply to the king, 
with all the burghs summoned though it was not officially a general convention. Two 
draft replies were considered. That which was sent stated that in the interests of 
protecting the freedom of parliament by not limiting the burghs’ liberties the 
convention had always allowed non-residents to be elected where they could be 
‘serviceable to thair interest’. It stated that these non-residents had proved ‘to stick 
more clos to your Majesties interests and ours and [were] more capable to serve your 
Majestie’. A letter was also sent to Lauderdale asking him to present the letter and 
second the burghs’ desires before the king.
65
 
 
One of the reasons behind the king’s letter appears to have been a dispute with the 
advocates, who were unhappy at the appointment of unqualified people to legal 
positions. As seen in chapter five, some advocates were chosen by burghs as 
commissioners to parliament, though none of them were at the convention as 
commissioners in 1674. At least five burghs sent advocates, two of whom were 
burgesses of the burghs they represented. The other three were sent by very small 
burghs which may not have been able to send a commissioner otherwise, and it is 
possible that these burghs were convinced to commission advocates to get them into a 
position where they could challenge the king’s interest in parliament. The advocates’ 
grievance was probably more with Lauderdale than the king himself, but the king’s 
action in writing to the burghs was aimed at excluding them from representing burghs 
and having a platform for their opposition. Their contribution to the opposition to 
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Lauderdale in parliament in 1673, which the non-resident commissioner of Selkirk also 
supported, certainly contributed to the move against unqualified commissioners. 
Mackenzie suggested that as well as trying to exclude these opponents, the king sought 
to ‘engage the Burghs to an immediate dependence upon the crown’.
66
 Although no 
advocates were commissioners to the convention, some were present and drafted the 
burghs’ reply. Mackenzie claimed that the letter he drafted had been more dutiful 
towards the king, perhaps the unsent draft, but had been altered by some of his rivals in 
an attempt to make Mackenzie ‘unpardonable’ before the king. As it had Mackenzie’s 
name on it he claimed that the burghs ‘follow’d [it] implicitly’.
67
 This explanation may 
have been an attempt to attach all the blame to his rivals, and it is highly unlikely that 
the burghs were indeed so ignorant of the form of the reply. 
 
However, the level of support for the convention’s actions is hard to judge. Opposition 
to the letter was led by Thriepland, provost of Perth, and James Currie, provost of 
Edinburgh and preses of the convention. Edinburgh’s other commissioners also left, 
with those of Haddington and Banff. Thirty-seven burghs were absent, so if these were 
the only burghs which protested, those who approved the letters, with Aberdeen’s 
provost Petrie as preses, made up 37% of the total number of burghs, a large number 
but not a majority.
68
 With this in mind, the claim of the convention in January 1675 
that ‘it is not the whole bodie of the burrows that have been guiltie of that irreverent 
and unduetifull returne which wes sent to his Majesties most gracious letter, but a few 
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turbulent persones’, has some truth behind it.
69
 The king told the privy council in 
February that he had received letters from the convention and 
some of the most eminent borrowes, condemning, disclameing and detesting 
that letter in August last, therfor, for vindication of our authority and clearing 
of our borrowes, wee doe think it necessary that the cheeff actours and 
contryvers of that abominable letter be tried and punished by yow as so high 
ane offence doeth justly deserve.
70
 
In the end only the three leading commissioners were prosecuted and received hefty 
fines, with no burghs or advocates censured.
71
 
 
Aberdeen had originally sent its commissioner with the instruction that he should ‘hold 
out to the said conventione that it is the royall burrows of this kingdome ther bund 
duetie to give all due obedience to his Majesties gratious letter’.
72
 It was clearly not in 
support of Petrie’s actions and in January petitioned Lauderdale and the privy council, 
disclaiming the letter in order that 
the stain putt on the said burgh of Aberdein by their commissioner his being 
preses of the said meiting might be taken off in some measure, and that the 
Councill might be pleased to signifie the forsaid disclamation to his Majesty 
that they may no longer undergo the said reproach.
73
 
Dundee’s commissioner Forester was also, along with Petrie and the commissioners of 
Glasgow and Jedburgh, accused of being behind the letters. Though he died before 
action could be taken against him by the privy council, the burgh council still sought to 
distance itself from his approval of the letters, stating that 
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we disclaime disowne and deteast the said letter and hes cancelled expunged 
and extinguished the said George fforrester our lait comissioner his report made 
of the said convention That no record may be had thairof in tyme comeing to be 
extint to posteritie.
74
  
On the other hand, when Kirkcaldy’s commissioner reported from the convention and 
produced copies of the letters to the king and Lauderdale, they were read and approved 
by the burgh council. Glasgow initially supported its commissioner, another of the 
ring-leaders, by allowing and approving his report of what he had done. However, this 
was only a general acceptance and once it received details of the letters – and the 
king’s reaction – it was quick to disown what he had done claiming that ignorance had 
caused it to accept it initially.
75
 
 
The king’s response to the letter was in strong terms. Of the ‘factious persones’ he said 
that ‘instead of a most duetifull return, which we might justly expect to so gracious a 
letter wherein their owne interest and advantadge were only concerned, they did 
assume the boldnes to send us ane impertinent return’, with ‘insolent expressions 
wherewith wee have great reason to be heily dissatisfied’.
76
 Though Dundee’s removal 
of its commissioner’s report might suggest that it had given at least implicit approval 
to his actions, it would be overly cynical to assume that the convention’s rejection of 
the letter was merely a reaction to the king’s angry response. However it is likely that 
this was a factor, and it is clear that the sentiments expressed in the letters aroused 
more than a little sympathy. Aberdeen actually paid £200 to Petrie when he was 
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summoned before the privy council concerning his part in the affair.
77
 Certainly the 
majority of the twenty-eight burghs present must have agreed with the draft letter 
which was chosen to be sent.  
 
There is a letter in the National Archives of Scotland from the burghs to the king 
which is probably the other draft letter, as it contains much of the same material but 
with a different response to the king’s request. Rather than simply telling him that it 
would continue to elect non-residents, it says that the convention cannot yet give an 
answer as the matter would require the examination of both the acts of convention and 
parliament for which there was not time, while stating ‘we are not in a legall capacitie 
to make acts and constitutiones relating to our policie and government But at our 
generall conventions’.
78
 It seems that the convention wished to make some kind of 
point to the king and that problems arose when one group wanted to do it in a stronger 
way than the other. The division within the convention was not simply a matter of 
acceptance or rejection of the king’s letter, and at least some of those who left were not 
wholeheartedly in favour of the king’s demands. Certainly one of them, Robert Baird, 
dean of guild of Edinburgh, was not entirely subject to the king’s demands; in 1675 he 
was declared incapable of holding office in the burgh due to factionalism and operating 
against the king’s instructions.
79
 
 
There is no question that the king’s assertion of the regulations was correct, and both 
draft letters are therefore baffling. Since the convention had fought ‘royal endorsement 
of “lords, earls, barons and other gentlemen” to offices in burghs’ in 1590, its rules had 
been enforced,
 
so the convention’s suggestion that it had always allowed non-resident 
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commissioners was simply wrong.
80
  MacIntosh suggests the flouting of the rules was 
due to the advocates capitalising on ill-feeling amongst the burghs after the 1672 act 
and Lauderdale’s support of Andrew Ramsay, who had been removed as provost of 
Edinburgh the previous year. However, all but one of the non-resident burgh 
commissioners at parliament were elected before 1672. She also states that the burghs 
argued that ‘if no non-residents were permitted to serve on their behalf, many burghs 
would be forced to send unqualified men in their place’, backed up by the fact that 
forty-three of the sixty burgh commissioners to Parliament in 1681 were without 
parliamentary experience. Mackenzie believed that the burghs were right to desire that 
experts in law could represent them, while using the burghs’ trading expertise to 
ensure that trade did not suffer by having advocates in parliament.
81
 Having broken its 
own regulations, it is natural in one sense that the convention should try to protect or 
justify what it had done when the king challenged it, but on the other hand it seems 
foolish to oppose the king directly in a way that could clearly be seen as seditious 
when the king’s position was legally correct. 
 
Though it is hard to gauge what the extent of the opposition to the king was, it seems 
that even those who opposed the letter were not entirely happy with the burghs’ lot. 
The reason almost certainly lies in the act of 1672. The advocates may well have 
capitalised on the ill-feeling this caused to further their own aims, but the burghs’ 
grievances, not the advocates’, directed the convention’s response. All of the letters 
from the convention to the king and Lauderdale covered the problems the royal burghs 
were facing due to the communication of foreign trade to the burghs of barony and 
regality, without the latter taking on any more public burdens. This includes the draft 
that was sent in 1674 and that which was not, the letter to Lauderdale in January 1675 
                                                 
80
 M. Lynch, ‘The crown and the burghs 1500-1625’, in Lynch, Early Modern Town, 64. 
81
 Mackenzie, Memoirs, 274-5; MacIntosh, Parliament, 146-7, 187. 
 276  
and those to him and the king in July.
82
 The convention was united in its desire to have 
the act of 1672 reversed, even though this brought it into conflict with crown policy. It 
was not united in deciding how this should be done, but it is clear that the interests of 
the estate as a whole drove the convention’s action and in this it was continuing to 
fulfil its role.  
 
The convention achieved nothing in the short term from sending the letter to the king. 
It was forced to backtrack and restore the rules on qualifications as the king had asked, 
declaring that none should be elected to parliament, conventions of estates, general or 
particular conventions unless they were ‘merchand traffiqueris, present residenters 
within the burgh comissionating them, and who bears common burdeen with the rest of 
the inhabitants, and are such persons who can gaine and lose in the concerns of 
borrows’. Stringent penalties were decreed for any who elected unqualified persons or 
any who accepted commissions when unqualified.
83
 Yet perhaps in the longer term the 
convention did achieve something, due to its effusive declarations of loyalty in 1675 
but also due to the letter. Under James, as commissioner and as king, the issue of the 
change or revocation of the 1672 act was discussed in parliament. Admittedly, 
interference in burgh elections after Lauderdale’s demise had produced a theoretically 
more compliant convention while James had his own agenda for which he wanted 
support. But perhaps those in power held the convention in enough respect that the 
vigour with which some members had tried to protect their trading interests, even 
though it brought them into conflict with the crown, caused the crown to recognise just 
how important an issue this was for the burghs and to act to change things. 
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Crown encroachments 
Royal interference in urban affairs was notable in the Restoration period and highlights 
the role the crown could perform as an opponent of the convention. It has already been 
seen how the opposing interests of the landed elites and of the crown hindered the 
burghs’ attempts to maintain their privileges in parliament and in their lobbying 
efforts, notably in Lauderdale’s support of the 1672 act. Devine sees the period 1660-
1700 as one in which ‘an increase in national economic power became the aim of both 
Scottish government and the landed elites which it represented’, and the exclusion of 
the burghs from that statement is telling.
84
 In the union negotiations with England in 
1670, the burghs were absent except for Lauderdale’s supporter Sir Andrew Ramsay as 
their expertise was ignored in favour of the landed interest, and particularly 
Lauderdale’s own supporters, crown-appointed bishops and officers of state.
85
 The 
king’s role in granting manufacturing rights to individuals and companies and his 
foreign wars against the Dutch and French which would not have been fought by 
Scotland are highlighted by Smout and Keith as undermining the royal burghs’ 
privileges and hindering their trade.
86
 Even though the influence and expertise of the 
convention continued to be respected by the privy council and others throughout the 
period, this respect was limited, extending only to where it sat comfortably with the 
landed and royal interests. Brown states that the crown was a bigger threat to the royal 
burghs than the landowners, especially as the privy council took over more of its 
responsibilities.
87
 It cannot be forgotten that the convention, particularly when 
mobilising the support of the council, was able to influence royal policy to a degree, 
but again this was only when its desire did not directly clash with the king’s. 
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The crown was seeking to exercise greater control over the burghs and this inevitably 
caused it to encroach on the convention’s jurisdiction. One of the areas in which this 
was done was in the administration of the individual burghs’ common good funds, 
which the convention had taken upon itself in order to prevent their misuse. According 
to Pagan, between 1660 and 1683 the exchequer called for yearly accounts to be 
presented to it thus taking on the convention’s role in examining these.
88
 However, the 
exchequer records suggest that this did not happen regularly, even allowing for loss of 
records, and it was not an innovation of the post-Restoration period. A number of 
burghs record an order from the king, communicated by the treasurer and treasurer 
depute in September 1684, for the common good accounts since 1660 to be sent to 
them for examination, so that they could ‘acquant his majestie if the same hath beine 
profitablie expendit or not’.
89
 Although only a few of these accounts remain, and fewer 
burghs record the order, it indicates a desire to improve the crown’s regulatory 
jurisdiction over the burghs, removing it from the convention. 
 
It has already been seen how the convention had to apply to the privy council for the 
enforcement of rules on weights and measures and in other matters, while chapter five 
showed how the committees and council of trade were stripping influence from it in 
matters of trade. Any jurisdiction it had had over fishing, in which the royal burghs 
had the greatest interest, was also damaged with the establishment of fishing 
companies in response to the act of parliament in 1661. The privy council passed a 
number of acts, in response to appeals from these companies, setting dues that had to 
be paid by anyone not in the companies and even allowing a Dutchman to join a 
                                                 
88
 Pagan, Convention, 107, 113. 
89
 WDA, Dumbarton Council Records, 1/1/4, 416; HCA, Inverness Council Minutes, 1/1/6, 11 Nov. 
1684; PKA, Perth Town Council, B59/16/10, f.53r; NAS, E82. 
 279  
company set up by merchants in Glasgow to contribute his expertise.
90
 Later, a 
national fishing company was established, with the privy council adding its authority 
to acts passed by it.
91
 These companies were established and run primarily by 
burgesses in royal burghs, indicating that although their sanctioning had come from 
central government and was thus challenging the convention, they needed the 
participation of those it was supposed to represent. As seen in chapter one with 
merchants trading outside their burghs, challenges to the convention could come from 
within its membership as well as outside. A more direct form of outside intervention 
was seen early in 1684 when the privy council sanctioned the convention’s new tax 
roll, which it had not done in 1670 when the roll was last altered.
92
 Thus in areas 
which were clearly the convention’s jurisdiction, whether in law or merely in practice, 
central government was taking control in regulating more of the affairs of the royal 
burghs. 
 
One main area of interest to the burghs over which the convention had traditionally 
exercised authority was the regulation of the staple port in the Netherlands. After 1672 
it might not be surprising that the convention’s jurisdiction there was at least reduced 
as, although staple commodities were still monopolised by the royal burghs, they were 
no longer sole possessors of the right to foreign trade.
93
 Yet the interference of the 
crown in this area began straight after the Restoration. The staple was ably discussed 
by Davidson and Gray at the beginning of last century and so the detail need not be 
rehearsed here. However, those authors were writing ‘a study in the economic history 
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of Scotland’ from the point of view of the staple port and so much of the wider 
significance of what happened in the Restoration period is not seen.
94
 
 
After Charles II’s return, there were two rival claims for the position of conservator, 
and the burghs allowed the king’s favoured choice, Sir Patrick Drummond, to be 
reinstated. The general convention in 1660 had a committee sitting to discuss matters 
relating to the staple, but it became clear by the time of parliament that the king would 
take an active role in directing its affairs. He had given specific orders to Drummond 
regarding anyone transporting goods by the staple instead of through it, while the ‘Act 
for the councill for trade’ stated that the council would ‘give out orders and directions 
to all Scots factors and staples abroad’.
95
 Drummond did not last long, dying in 
October 1661, and Edinburgh called a particular convention in anticipation of the king 
taking up his ‘right and constant custome’ of presenting a nominee, rather than 
appointing Drummond’s rival who had been fulfilling the role previously.
96
 Davidson 
and Gray indicate that this was not actually the king’s ‘constant custome’, but that the 
convention was unwilling to show any opposition to him in the early days of the 
Restoration. Such a claim seems to ring true considering its resolution ‘to leave the 
nominatione of the person for the exerceis of the said office to his Maiestie, reserveing 
to thamselves thair richtis for the futur to nominat as they sall sie caus’.
97
 Sir William 
Davidson was duly appointed by the king both as ‘Conservator of the Priviledges of 
the kingdom of Scotland in the United Provinces’ and ‘commissioner for erecting 
manufactories in Scotland’, as well as ‘King’s Agent for the affairs of England and 
Ireland’. Despite the potential threat to its authority and influence that he represented, 
and the conflicting interests evident in this triple role, the convention continued in its 
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submissiveness, sending him a congratulatory letter noting ‘the good fortun of the 
burrowis that it hath pleased his gratious Maiestie to pitch wpon so eminent a persone 
and ane so nearlie concerned in the burrowis interestis’.
98
 Even when Davidson 
appeared with a patent for the office to pass to his son on his death the convention 
acquiesced, further indicating its unwillingness to stand up against the royal will.
99
 
 
The next challenge to the convention’s role as regulator of the staple was of its own 
doing. It had decided that there was a need to change the location of the staple, with 
Rotterdam as a possibility because so much trade was illegally going there already. It 
sought permission from the king to send commissioners to the Netherlands to treat 
with various ports, starting with Veere, but with the condition that if the king should 
choose a port it would treat only with his choice. It did try to retain some authority in 
the decision by stating that if his choice did not offer as favourable terms as Veere it 
would cancel all negotiations, but in the end the king’s choice, Dordrecht, was 
accepted. This was a far from popular choice, with a general recognition of the fact 
that it was not as easily accessible as Veere while Aberdeen, Montrose and Kinghorn 
made formal protests against any move of the staple.
100
 But the convention seems to 
have bound itself to the will of the king in the matter and on Davidson’s resignation 
(for himself and on his son’s behalf), it again accepted the king’s appointment of a new 
conservator and wrote to Lauderdale thanking him for his care in providing such an 
able replacement.
101
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Complaints against the unsuitability of Dordrecht forced the convention to seek 
another change of port in 1671, only two years after the initial change, and it had to 
write to Lauderdale to ask him to encourage the king to ‘concerne himselfe in the 
same’. When after five years of negotiation and discussion the port was moved back to 
Veere, it was done so only on approval of the king. Aberdeen did, however, receive a 
letter from Lauderdale claiming that the king had accepted the articles for settling the 
staple at Veere because the convention had subscribed them.
102
 It therefore cannot be 
assumed that the convention had lost all authority in the staple and it did continue to 
apply its rules there. It decided that its acts regarding the staple were sufficient for 
resolution of certain disputes between the conservator, several factors and the keeper 
of the ‘consergerie house’. It also stated (despite Aberdeen’s protest) that coal was not 
and had never been a staple commodity and that the conservator could not exact dues 
upon it, and it sought to stop burghs of regality and barony transporting staple 
commodities from which they were barred. Acts continued to be passed regulating 
aspects of the staple trade and the officials there, and though the privy council was 
asked to support the convention in this, it challenges Davidson and Gray’s assessment 
that the burghs only showed a ‘revived interest … in their own claims on matters 
concerning the Staple’ after Kennedy was appointed conservator in 1682.
103
 
 
Kennedy was another crown appointee positioned after the previous conservator, 
among other officials, was found guilty of embezzlement and ordered to step down or 
be reported to the king. The convention asked Lauderdale for permission to 
recommend a conservator and on receiving the king’s nomination was not willing to 
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accept unquestioningly. It appointed a committee to consider ‘what interest the 
burrows hes in the nomination and election of the conservator’, and though it 
unanimously approved the king’s gift in favour of Kennedy it was done ‘under 
protestation of reserving the burrows priviledges of choiseing and nominateing ane 
conservator in tyme cuming as accords of the law’.
104
 In this Davidson and Gray’s 
assertion of the ‘revived interest’ of the burghs holds true and, though their interest had 
never died, from this point on there is evidence of a renewed vigour in protecting their 
right of jurisdiction over the staple. When a factor was called to Edinburgh to answer 
to an accusation of communicating with rebels, a number of burghs successfully 
stepped in and gained a delay as their interests would be damaged if he left the Low 
Countries at that time.
105
 The convention did concede to James VII’s request for 
Kennedy to have a proper salary instead of being paid through small dues on certain 
goods, but said that it would find it difficult to do so because the burghs were 
struggling after the communication of trade to burghs of regality and barony and 
sought redress for this.
106
 In 1686 the convention directly opposed the king when he 
awarded the conservator ‘severall considderable impositions’ on Scottish ships and 
merchants, presumably because a salary had not been forthcoming. After an appeal it 
was told that it could redeem the gift as long as it paid handsomely for it.
107
 
 
Davidson and Gray highlight how the conservator was the burghs’ representative in the 
Low Countries and was there to act on their behalf, though Charles II did not 
acknowledge this and had his own nominees placed as conservators.
108
 As has been 
seen the convention did show that it could remove the conservator when he acted in an 
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unsuitable manner and also retained the right to instruct him and enforce its own 
regulatory rules. Though it lost power in the appointment of the conservator, it showed 
an ability to act independently of the crown in restoring the staple to Veere, having 
bowed to Charles in its initial move, and was able to directly challenge James over the 
conservator’s dues. This ability to act independently seems to have paid off as, on 
Kennedy’s death in November 1688, James responded to a request for a new 
conservator by saying that he thought good not to appoint one 
untill that wee have your opinion both as to the expediency of supplying this 
vaccancy and the continuing of this office, and alsoe vpon the conditions and 
rules wherby it may be best regulated for the better advancement of trade, and 
vpon the rate and manner of the allowance fit to be given to the person that 
shall be named to it, declaring in the meantime that wee [do not] purpose to 
renew that extraordinary imposition upon goods and passengers … judging it 
ane unnecessary and too heavy a burthen upon your trade and commerce.
109
 
This came at a time when James had so interfered in burgh elections as to produce 
conventions that were crown-approved if not nominated, but it does indicate that the 
convention was regaining some of the power in this area which it had previously lost 
to the crown and was still able to influence crown policy on the staple. It seems that 
James was seeking to gain the convention’s favour at a time when pressure on him was 
building, just before the Revolution. This fits with his actions in England at the time, 
when he partially reversed the interventions he had made in urban government in the 
preceding years.
110
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Central intervention in urban politics was not a new phenomenon in the Restoration 
period. MacDonald shows that in the century preceding the period of this study, crown 
imposition of magistrates and councils was not uncommon, particularly in periods of 
authoritarian government, as under Arran, and national crisis, with the 1640s seeing a 
time of particular interference.
111
 That which happened under James was at least on a 
par with that in the 1640s, but though it was the most obvious, it was by no means the 
first case of interference in burgh affairs in the period. The actions of both Charles and 
James have been well-documented, with the focus particularly on the period after 
1681. They are often used as examples of the increasing absolutist tendencies in the 
monarchy, responses to both the threat and reality of opposition among the burghs, 
with Brown going so far as to say that under James ‘the crown was determined to 
control burgh politics’.
112
  
 
English boroughs also saw the crown taking an increased level of control over their 
politics. Soon after the Restoration the Corporations Act was passed, which, as 
happened in Scotland, forced potential office holders to sign a declaration against the 
Solemn League and Covenant and take an oath against resistance to the king. Charles’s 
aims were more stringent even than this, wanting the power to choose mayors, but 
parliament blocked this. The Act did, however, allow for the removal of even those 
who had passed both tests and this seems to have happened, resulting in a purge of the 
magistracy of many towns. Towards the end of his reign Charles appears to have 
stepped up his pressure on the boroughs, and this increased into the reign of James. He 
extended Charles’s policy of altering the charters of corporations in order to remove 
his opponents. As well as breeding opposition in the boroughs this seems to have bred 
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chaos, as it ‘precipitated political and administrative disorganisation’, made worse by 
the reversion of the policy in 1688.
113
 Although some links have been drawn between 
the English and Scottish situations in the historiography, the most recent work 
remarkably seems to fail to see any connection, not even discussing the tests imposed 
in Scottish burgh elections in 1660-1.
114
 
 
Evidence of direct crown interference in the convention is scarce, other than when 
Lauderdale discharged the meeting of the general convention in 1667 for unfortunately 
unknown reasons.
115
 Yet control over the burghs which constituted the convention had 
an indirect impact on the collective body. There were a number of forms of intrusion, 
with disputes over legal jurisdiction within burghs and the right to elect ministers 
occasionally arising, as seen in chapter one. There are also examples of burghs being 
expected to act against conventicles within their liberties with fines imposed if they 
failed, while the inhabitants as well as the magistrates of the burghs in 1678 were 
commanded to take a bond to keep the peace as a response to religious dissent.
116
 This 
fear of religious dissent was one of the reasons behind some of the restrictions on 
burgh elections seen throughout the period. 
 
Restrictions on elections were the first, most significant and most common form of 
direct interference. They started with Glencairn’s letter to the burghs ordering them to 
ensure that in the 1660 elections ‘such onlie may be maid choise of as ar of known 
fidelitie and loyaltie’.
117
  The oath of allegiance enacted by parliament in 1661 was 
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followed by an order for it ‘to be taken and the act for the royall prerogative to be 
signed be all magistrats and councill within burgh at thair first meiting after sight 
heirof’.
118
 The privy council also gave an order for only those loyal to the king and 
qualified as the acts of parliament stated to be elected within the burghs. In 1662 this 
was followed by the ‘Act concerning the declaration to be signed by all persons in 
publict trust’ in 1662. The Declaration declared loyalty to the king and the church and 
foreswore the Covenants, and calls for its subscription were repeated regularly by the 
council.
119
 MacIntosh claims that the ‘little evidence of widespread manipulation of 
local elections’ for parliament in 1669 shows ‘that the oath of allegiance and the 
declaration of public trust had largely succeeded in preventing any known opponents 
from obtaining election’.
120
 This of course meant that any opponents would also be 
excluded from representation in the convention, which would in theory then be more 
compliant to royal wishes.  
 
There were many examples of interference in elections under Charles II, but the first 
expression of dissent was, interestingly, dealt with by the convention. In 1661 a 
number of Dumfries councillors and two of its bailies failed to take the oath of 
allegiance, so the convention authorised a new election.
121
 From this point on, 
however, the privy council took over such matters, whether a new election was 
required due to death, in the case of Linlithgow’s provost in 1663, or dissent, as in the 
difficulties experienced by Ayr and Irvine in finding people to take office as many 
refused to sign the Declaration.
122
 In 1663, the magistrates of Kirkcudbright were 
actually imposed on the burgh by some of the local nobility, after the provost and 
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others had supported a tumult against the ministers.
123
 On occasion particular 
instruction was given by the crown as to the composition of all or part of a council. 
Ayr was ordered to maintain its provost and council in the 1660s and Edinburgh had to 
keep its council in place rather than holding an election in 1674. Edinburgh was also 
threatened with the prospect of having no burgh leadership at all if its 1673 election 
was irregular, while in 1675 certain people were barred from holding office in the 
capital.
124
 The barring of people from public office was not uncommon in the period, 
affecting the burghs in particular, and was one of the grievances recorded in a 
pamphlet in 1679 describing the abuse of government under Lauderdale.
125
  
 
Direct imposition of favoured candidates was rare until after the introduction of the 
Test Act, a new oath of allegiance to the church and king, in 1681.
126
 This bears 
comparison with the English experience, as Charles’s interference stepped up in the 
1680s. That he used less direct means in Scotland than in England perhaps testifies to 
the influence of the convention, as a more organised burghal estate would more readily 
foster opposition to direct action such as the alteration of charters. MacIntosh claims 
that 1674 was when direct interference began, but these examples show that there were 
few instances before 1681, and some of these came before 1674. After the dissent 
shown by the convention in 1674 it is not surprising that every burgh was ordered to 
send to the privy council a copy of the Declaration signed by their newly elected 
magistrates, but no further impositions were felt necessary at this stage.
127
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After subscription of the Test was made a requirement of holding office, the level of 
interference in influencing the composition of burgh councils was stepped up by 
Charles’s council. This would of course have meant that the commissioners to the 
convention were more likely to have been specifically approved or appointed by the 
king or council, further reducing the likelihood of the convention acting in any way 
which was opposed to the king, even if it was in the best interests of the burghs. There 
are a number of examples from that year and in later years of burghs (particularly in 
Fife and the south-west, including in 1681 Irvine, Renfrew, Dunfermline, 
Inverkeithing, Linlithgow, St Andrews and also Selkirk) failing to hold elections due 
to a refusal among old officials and officials-elect to take the Test. When this 
happened, the right to hold an election was stripped from the burgh for a year and the 
privy council chose the magistrates and council. Disputes within Ayr’s council, with 
the problems perhaps exacerbated by some elected officials refusing the Test, were the 
pretext for extensive intervention there in 1682-4, though a similar situation in 1685-6 
saw only a supervised election and no direct intervention.
128
 A further measure taken 
to try to regulate elections – previously a convention role – was the demand for each 
burgh to send in an exact account of its constitution in 1682.
129
  
 
A new degree of intervention was reached in March 1683 when the earl of Linlithgow 
was appointed provost of Queensferry until Michaelmas 1684, the burgh having 
chosen no magistrates or council in the previous year, though he was told to make a 
list of persons within the burgh who were suitable to hold office. A similar situation 
was seen in Linlithgow later that year when the earl of Linlithgow was granted 
jurisdiction over the burgh to suppress disorders and then Lord Livingston was placed 
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as provost for almost a year.
130
 These appear to be the first occasions in this period 
when the residency qualifications for burgh officials, reiterated by Charles himself in 
1674, were flouted by his own administration. Mackenzie drew a stark line between 
Charles’s attempt in 1674 to exclude ‘factious’ country gentlemen from the burghs and 
James’s opposite stance, but these instances show that the lines are not so clear.
131
 
When the burghs seemed to require more controlling, Charles was quite willing to 
achieve this by ignoring the rules he had tried to enforce. 
 
This increased interference could be attributed to the increased role of James, duke of 
Albany, in Scotland, especially given his even greater impositions on the burghs from 
1686 as James VII. Yet it could also be attributed to the absence of Lauderdale, from 
whom James took over as commissioner. Lauderdale, as has been seen above, had 
been the burghs’ agent at court since 1660, wielding a great deal of influence among 
them. When he was removed from the picture, direct crown control increased – and 
this, as far as the Test goes at least, did not just affect the burghs but anyone in public 
office. The burghs bore the brunt of this increased control, and it is possible that 
Lauderdale had been viewed by Charles as his agent of control over them. Apart from 
the period from 1672, culminating in the incident in 1674, for which their apologies 
were almost as profuse to Lauderdale as to the king, the burghs collectively in the 
convention had shown little or no opposition to the crown. With Lauderdale gone, a 
new method was needed to ensure that such good behaviour continued, and this 
perhaps explains both the carrot of assurances over the removal of the 1672 act, 
discussed in chapter five, and the stick of the Test and interference in burgh elections. 
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James VII’s own meddling in the burghs’ electoral affairs reflects this dual approach. 
It happened after his defeat in 1686, when the burghs contributed to the failure of his 
attempts to introduce toleration of Catholicism. His impositions on the burghs were 
supposed to create ‘lobby-fodder’ for any future parliament after the opposition earlier 
that year; as Fountainhall put it, ‘to secure the elections of the Commissioners to the 
nixt Parliament better than they ware last’.
132
 It also again reflects the English 
situation, though now James sought to meddle in urban politics in as direct a way (or 
more direct, as Harris suggests) in Scotland as in England. The privy council had 
discharged Edinburgh’s right to an election in 1685 and then chosen its provost, but it 
was the following year that the intervention reached new levels.
133
  
 
On 16 September 1686, just before the burghs were due to hold their elections, the 
privy council received a letter from the king suspending elections in the burghs until 
further notice. This also happened in the following two years. Glasgow was allowed to 
proceed as normal, probably due to the archbishop’s involvement in elections there, 
some burghs such as Lochmaben apparently had elections stopped completely, but 
most saw some form of direct crown interference. Many had their magistrates 
nominated by James, with many gentry and nobles, unqualified as they were not 
resident traffickers, being placed as provosts of prominent burghs – for example, John 
Graham of Claverhouse became provost of Dundee.
134
 James’s interventions clearly 
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had some effect, as in 1689 there was concern that if burgh council elections went 
ahead as usual, dominated by the current incumbents, the estate would remain 
favourable to James. To avoid this, elections were thrown open to all Protestant 
burgesses, which created some conflict but ultimately saw the Revolution party 
winning in most cases.
135
 
 
These impositions would of course affect the convention, as its commissioners would 
be elected by the crown nominees and thus would in theory be even more liable to toe 
the royal line. Some of these nominees were themselves elected commissioners, and 
the convention was faced with the problem of having commissioners present who were 
excluded according to the laws reiterated in 1675.
136
 It thus passed an act in 1687 
declaring that the residency qualifications for commissioners 
shall not be understood to comprehend such commissioners as shall be nominat 
magistrats or councellors of the royall burrowes by the Kings Majestie, bot 
leaves it arbitrary to such burghs to insert or not insert in their commissions the 
forsaid qualifications contaned in former platforms as they shall think fitt.
137
 
Dumbarton accordingly changed its set commission to state that commissioners should 
be God-fearing men but without the specification that they should be Protestant.
138
 A 
comparison of the commissions for 1685 and 1688 also show that this was taken 
advantage of by the burghs. The 1685 commissions overwhelmingly follow the set 
pattern, with the commissioner’s qualifications specified, while those in 1688 are 
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much more varied, that part of the commission being ignored by those burghs which 
were sending an unqualified crown-nominee.
139
  
 
Despite the influence this interference had on the convention’s constitution and its 
ability to act primarily in the burghs’ interests, Keith noted that the convention, 
regarding municipal elections, ‘did not make any remonstrance to the government 
about the infringement of these liberties’.
140
 In one sense this is not surprising as, once 
the infringement had taken hold, many of those who made up the convention at any 
meeting were there because of the infringement and could not be expected to challenge 
it. However, there were indications even before James came to the throne that crown 
manipulation was increasing, and there was no united effort to challenge it. Peebles 
was one burgh which did oppose it, knowingly electing in 1682 two councillors who 
had been declared incapable of holding office by the privy council and agreeing that 
‘Incaice the present Magistrats and counsell shall sustaine any coast skaith dammage 
and expenss through ther electing [these councillors] shall be defended upon the 
publict charges of the burgh and no particular person shall be burdened therwith’.
141
 
Such boldness was not displayed by the convention which failed to speak out to try to 
limit royal intervention and protect the burghs’ liberties. 
 
Given increasing royal interference and the fact that power in certain areas was being 
taken from the convention and was going to the crown it is not entirely surprising that 
burghs went to the privy council and bypassed the convention in certain matters, as 
they did to a small extent with parliament, and as is discussed in chapter one. The fact 
that certain direct challenges to the burghs’ authority went unchallenged by the 
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convention, in individual cases such as Dundee’s dispute with Hatton over the 
constabulary as well as over burgh elections, cannot have helped this. Perhaps what is 
surprising is that the pattern of appeals, on all sorts of issues, does not move more 
towards the crown administration, with burghs still heavily using the convention. In 
the face of this royal assertion of power, as well as aggressive landed classes attacking 
burgh privileges, the convention remained an able advocate for the burghs, and 
retained its influence and authority among its constituent members. The government, 
particularly James, seems to have recognised this, as his letter to the privy council 
referred to in chapter one suggests, as he recommended that the convention be used as 
judge in burgh matters. Whether this was born of a desire to relieve the privy council 
of tiresome burdens, or was another attempt by James to gain the favour of the burghs 
before the 1686 session of parliament, it is unlikely that he would have made such a 
suggestion if he viewed the convention as incompetent. 
 
Conclusion 
The general picture of the convention’s relationship to the king and his administration 
in Scotland is similar to that of its relationship to parliament. The burghs struggled to 
have their interests promoted due to the competition from the landed interest and the 
crown’s own desires. Yet the convention was far from impotent and used many means 
to promote its interests, often effectively, using different arms of government for 
different issues and maintaining a strong lobbying network. There is no doubt that, 
overall, the collective attitude of the burghs was one of submission to the royal will, 
with the occasional attempt to shape that will to their own. At times the convention 
gained the support of the crown in its aims, but on one occasion at least it found itself 
in direct opposition to the crown. It emerged from that affair chastened, and later found 
the burghs under pressure as councils were extensively shaped to reflect the crown’s 
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desires. Given this, it is remarkable that the convention continued to be so active and 
effective, and that the burghs continued to rely on it to the extent they did. 
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Conclusion 
 
The convention of royal burghs is worth studying in its own right, as a unique 
institution key to the government and trade of urban Scotland. However, studies such 
as Pagan’s which focus simply on the convention itself seem to miss something. Its 
activity gives fascinating insights into the government of Scotland as a whole and into 
the wider economic picture of the later seventeenth century. Given this, it is to be 
hoped that its scant treatment in most of the historiography of Scotland, or even of 
European urban history, can be redressed. 
 
There is no question that writing off the convention in the period after 1651 is 
somewhat presumptuous. It is, however, understandable that it has happened, given the 
other assumptions made about Scottish history in the period. In 1991, David Stevenson 
wrote about the need for more scholarly research into Scotland in the seventeenth 
century, noting the fact that both unionists and nationalists tended to see it negatively. 
It was either the ‘twilight before night’, the century in which the descent into the ‘long 
black night of Union’ began, or the ‘darkness before dawn’, when the country’s 
backwardness became ever more pronounced before the Union of 1707 brought about 
‘everything credible in eighteenth-century Scotland’.
1
 Thankfully this void in 
Scotland’s history is steadily being filled. Yet because the seventeenth century has 
been largely written off, the convention in that century was also written off. Even the 
burst of interest in it in the first quarter of the twentieth century tended to cast 
aspersions on its usefulness and efficacy in the seventeenth century. 
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Some of the other assumptions about the post-1651 period also explain the habit of 
writing off the convention. Scotland was initially under foreign occupation, entirely 
under the sway of the English regime, and thus the convention could have no 
influence, even though it survived. After the Restoration, the crown held almost 
absolute power, ruling from London with a parliament which rubber-stamped its 
wishes. With such a top-down system, there would be little place for the convention to 
retain any influence. Again these underlying assumptions have been challenged, as the 
introduction shows, and as the convention is released from their strictures it provides 
further evidence to show that the assumptions are short of the mark. 
 
Considering the fact that the government of Scotland has been portrayed as being 
dominated by the English in the 1650s and the absolutist tendencies of the crown, from 
London after the Restoration, it is a little odd that the Interregnum has been viewed as 
exactly that: an interregnum, an anomalous period, between the Covenanting period 
and the Restoration. Even under the traditional assumptions, the links between the 
Interregnum and the Restoration seem self-evident. Though the extent of the 
dominance of government in London can be challenged, the convention provides many 
links between the two periods. The 1650s saw an unprecedented level of control 
exerted by the regime over the convention’s activities and, throughout the decade, it 
was absolutely clear that it could only continue to meet at the regime’s pleasure. It was 
to the convention’s credit that, despite some interruptions, it was allowed to continue 
to meet. Individual corporations, however, did not have freedom over their elections, 
as only those willing to cooperate with the regime could hold office, and this would 
inevitably have an impact on the convention. 
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Although after the Restoration there was little direct threat to the convention’s ability 
to meet – only being prevented from doing so on one occasion – the type of restrictions 
on elections seen under the English regime were seen throughout the period. As 
Lauderdale’s influence over the burghs was lost in 1679, central intervention increased 
beyond what had been attempted in the 1650s. As individual corporations were 
manipulated to ensure loyalty to the crown, the convention would take on a more 
royalist complexion, as the crown sought to make the burghs acquiescent to the 
crown’s wishes and to provide a safe vote in parliament.  
 
Incidentally, the parallels between the interference in the Scottish burghs and English 
towns in the period are striking, perhaps showing the folly of past failures to consider 
more genuinely ‘British’ history. If anything, at least until James’s reign, the attitude 
towards English towns showed more absolutism than that towards the Scottish burghs, 
which is fascinating given the accepted view that, in general, Scotland was ruled more 
absolutely. Again here the convention can shed light on this, as its existence probably 
prevented higher levels of interference earlier in the period. 
 
In terms of the crown’s desire to create a safe burgh vote in parliament, the reality was, 
of course, not so straightforward. There was little opposition in the convention to the 
English regime in the 1650s, with the combination of sympathetic commissioners, 
concessions to the burghs and the threat of further direct action against the convention 
enough to ensure its loyalty. This did not of course mean that it did not try to influence 
policy for its own ends, and it was prepared to challenge some of the decisions the 
regime made. If the convention’s opposition is used as a gauge, it seems that 
occupation was a more absolute form of government than that imposed at the 
Restoration. The burghs certainly sought to demonstrate their loyalty but were not 
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always prepared to simply lie back and allow their interests and privileges to be 
overridden. While the convention seems to have recognised its limits – rightly or 
wrongly – and decided not to protest against certain things, such as the increasing 
electoral interference in the 1680s, it often campaigned against prejudicial legislation 
and in 1673 and 1685-6 joined the opposition against the crown. It was clearly an 
important part of parliament as far as both crown and opposition were concerned, and 
was even able to muster support for its own legislative agenda. Though its failure to 
protest in 1672 against the greatest attack to the burghs’ trading rights is striking, it 
perhaps reflects the convention’s recognition of its limits. Rather than attack the act 
directly, it used the opposition to Lauderdale and Sir Andrew Ramsay in 1673, and to 
the crown in 1674, to express its anger at the 1672 act and to raise its desire for its 
repeal. 
 
This willingness to act against the crown may have contributed to the revival, under 
James, of a tactic used in the 1650s, combining repression and concession. While 
James was willing to take direct action to get those he favoured (and who favoured 
him) onto burgh councils, he recognised that this had the potential of simply fostering 
more opposition. As the English had given concessions to the burghs, so James 
attempted to do, particularly in his attempts to aid their cause against the 1672 act. 
When this failed to secure the toleration of Catholicism he desired, the repression of 
electoral freedom deepened – yet James still offered concessions to the burghs, such as 
over their right to choose a conservator. The influence of the burghal estate throughout 
the period was such that, except in the early 1650s as the English regime sought to 
settle the government of Scotland, governments recognised that the convention could 
not simply be trampled down.  
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One of the reasons the convention was allowed to continue to meet in the 1650s was 
that the English recognised its expertise as it sought to improve trade and, even though 
the final say in matters of trade had passed out of Scottish hands, it wielded a 
significant amount of influence in this area. The English needed the convention if they 
were to rule effectively on matters of trade in Scotland while continuing in their aim of 
reducing the power of the nobility.
2
 After the Restoration the English Navigation Acts 
and the Scottish ‘act asserting his majesties prerogative in the ordering and disposall of 
trade with forraigners’ meant that this removal of control was at least continued, if not 
furthered. Yet the convention’s influence told on a number of pieces of trade-related 
legislation. Any hope that it may have had, given this legislative success, of 
dominating Scotland’s trade agenda was finally dashed when the 1672 act indicated 
that the landed classes had matched the power to dominate with a desire to do so. 
 
It is possible that the nobility were reacting against the burghs’ strengthened position 
in the 1650s. In this case, the relatively high level of influence the convention held 
under the English regime may actually have led to a long-term weakening of its 
position. The resurgent nobility occasionally acknowledged the burghs’ influence in 
parliament, courting their support in the opposition to Lauderdale, but generally they 
were overwhelming opponents of the burghs’ trade privileges. Even when the crown 
supported the removal of the 1672 act in the 1680s, it was maintained due to the power 
of the landed interest which had promoted it in the first place. The convention’s failure 
in this case, like its success in others, gives further evidence of the continuing strength 
of the Scottish parliament and the limitations of both Charles’s and James’s attempts at 
absolute rule, as recently demonstrated by MacIntosh and others.
3
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Another feature of both pre- and post-Restoration periods was the move of many 
burghs away from the convention towards central government in seeking aid. Although 
the convention was influential in trade matters under the English regime, it was losing 
influence in matters relating to individual burghs. As its position weakened after the 
Restoration, this trend increased. Central government took more control of impositions 
and contributions, and burghs sought government control in some areas as they would 
get more benefit than the convention could offer. Opposition from the landed classes 
may have contributed to it, but the economic condition of the burghs left the 
convention in a difficult position before assaults on the burghs’ privileges after 1660. 
Because of the burghs’ difficult financial situation, the convention could not get the 
resources to help them. So many burghs had economic difficulties that there were not 
enough in a healthy enough situation to be able to help. Of course, the economic 
condition of the burghs in the period was not uniform, though certain trends, and 
particularly increasing difficulties in the 1680s, are identifiable. This is an area which 
would certainly benefit from a dedicated study. The larger burghs were more likely to 
bypass the convention, probably because they could afford to, though Dundee is one 
example of a burgh which may simply have been too proud of its status to seek outside 
help. The smaller burghs, those least able to put resources into the convention, were 
also those which needed most assistance. 
 
Just as the burghs were not in a uniformly bad condition, the ability of the convention 
to help was not uniformly poor. Perhaps the most surprising fact is that the move away 
from the convention in appeals for aid did not happen on a much greater scale, as many 
burghs continued to rely heavily on it despite the difficulties in getting help and the 
increased crown role. The level of reliance is clear in the fact that, despite the burghs’ 
problems, only three made a serious attempt to resign their privileges – the fact that 
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two were prevented from doing so also provides further evidence of the convention’s 
ability to resist parliament. Reactions to Edinburgh’s position within the convention 
also indicate the continued importance of it for the burghs. If they were losing faith in 
the convention, they would not have been so concerned about how Edinburgh was 
acting as it bore the brunt of the responsibility and cost of its leading role. Incidentally, 
during the Interregnum and after the Restoration, the government recognised 
Edinburgh’s dominant position and interfered more in its internal affairs than those of 
any other burghs, partly as a means of controlling the estate. This was not always 
successful, as the removal of Ramsay showed, because while the burghs valued 
Edinburgh’s role and relied on the capital to a great deal, they policed its position 
carefully. 
 
The situation over burgh appeals highlights a paradox for the convention. It was able 
to help the burghs politically, as it gained and shaped favourable legislation. Even 
considering acts which prejudiced the burghs, without a united voice it is likely that 
they would have been far more vulnerable to assaults on their privileges by 
landowners. This probably contributed to the fact that more burghs did not go to the 
crown to seek aid. Given this, the burghs continued to attend parliament in large 
numbers, and continued to meet together as an estate during parliament. The 
convention was losing control over the composition of the estate as the crown 
summoned eight burghs to parliament before they had been enrolled by the convention. 
Yet these burghs sought enrolment, recognising, with the other burghs, the value in 
united action in parliament. In many cases before parliament and the crown, the 
convention and those to which it appealed considered it better to have appeals from the 
convention rather than multiple appeals, which could only be effective if the 
convention was viewed by both sides as representative. 
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Yet, while helping the burghs politically, the convention probably hindered their 
economic development. The monopolistic trade agenda it pursued may have actually 
prevented the burghs from improving their condition, as they struggled to compete in 
trade. It was caught between the rock of its own monopolistic agenda and the hard 
place of the noble opposition, two problems which were inextricably linked. The first 
exacerbated the second, which in turn caused the convention to fight harder to 
maintain and then restore its monopoly. Because of its own political success, therefore, 
the convention could not respond so effectively to the needs of individual burghs, 
which further exacerbated their problems. The landowners were less likely to want to 
cooperate in trade with an intransigent burghal estate, so focused on creating their own 
market centres rather than supporting or even investing in the existing ones, an issue 
which might be made clearer by further study into the interaction between individual 
burghs and the landed classes. Not only this, but the convention’s resistance to greater 
economic openness may have contributed to the trend of landowning encroachments 
on burghs’ lands and jurisdictions, against which the convention was very active and 
quite successful in defending. 
 
Perhaps equally damaging, merchants (notably from Edinburgh and Glasgow) 
responded to the convention’s adherence to its trade agenda, and refusal to consider a 
more liberal policy, by bypassing the convention and themselves trading through 
unfree burghs, and also trading through other royal burghs and damaging these burghs’ 
own trade. Landowners still needed the merchants in trade, and merchants were willing 
to undermine their own representative body when it suited them. This raises another 
issue about the burghs’ economic condition which would benefit from further study. 
The fact that Dundee, a more important trading burgh, had a smaller common good 
income than Perth indicates that the wealth of a burgh as a corporation is not equal to 
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the wealth of a burgh as an economic unit, in the trade in which its inhabitants were 
engaged. Some burghs saw relatively healthy trading activity, yet the corporations 
were struggling and the convention may actually have contributed to this problem. 
  
It is possible that, had the convention not been such a strong advocate for the 
continued privileges of the royal burghs in trade, and for their relative political 
freedom from the increasingly aggressive landed classes, this may have benefited the 
burghs in the long term. It has been argued that, as towns in England welcomed gentry 
intrusion into their political and economic life, they were able to gain a stronger 
political voice in parliament and also move forward economically, freed from the 
strictures of the old economic regulation.
4
 Of course the existence of the convention 
meant that Scottish burghs did not have the same difficulties in representation at a 
national level as the English towns, which did not have a united voice. Glasgow is also 
a possible example of how this rule does not always work. It has been argued that, for 
all its progress in the previous forty years and more, Glasgow’s growth was restrained 
by its lack of freedom in elections and it was only on getting this freedom on the 
abolition of episcopacy in 1690 that it was really able to challenge Edinburgh’s 
position as the leading burgh in Scotland.
5
 On the other hand, Glasgow already had a 
far more open socio-political structure than most burghs. The argument that urban 
independence, under the old restrictive political and economic structures, was to some 
degree incompatible with increasing trade and wealth, may well be applicable to 
Scotland. Perhaps taking a study of the burghs into the post-Revolution and post-
Union periods would provide some answers, especially as it is already understood that 
the gentry were taking more of the burghs’ parliamentary representation, partly due to 
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some burghs’ inability to afford commissioners, after the Revolution.
6
 Until that is 
done, it can be but speculated that, had the convention suffered more disadvantage in 
parliament and been unable to prevent more widespread invasion of the burghs by the 
landed classes, an openness may have been created that would have allowed the burghs 
to flourish. 
 
While the convention may not have been entirely beneficial to the burghs in the long 
term, it did of course work in their immediate interests, given that without them it 
would not have existed at all. In this way, too much criticism should not be levelled at 
it as a body. It was the voice of the royal burghs, and while without it they may have 
been in a situation, like many English towns, which was more conducive to improving 
economic fortunes, giving up their freedoms was not on the agenda for the burghs, and 
thus was not on the agenda for the convention. However damaging this may have been, 
it served one crucial purpose: protecting the relative independence of its members. 
This may well have been incompatible with another purpose, furthering their trade, but 
it was to a large extent done successfully. It could not be entirely successful, and given 
the political reality of both the 1650s and the post-Restoration period, it would be 
extremely naïve to think that this was even possible. In the face of an occupying 
power, aggressive landowners and a crown seeking to increase the extent of absolute 
rule, the burghs did lose some of their freedoms. But the convention was a remarkably 
effective representative and advocate despite all this.  
 
It was also remarkably resilient. It adjusted quickly to the entirely new situation of 
operating in an occupied country, displaying a vigour and effectiveness that belied the 
fact that it remained in existence only at the wish of the English regime. It sought to 
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make the best of the situation for the burghs, and when the situation changed again it 
quickly adapted once again, making representations to the king from the earliest days 
of the Restoration. By the time of Charles II’s first session of parliament, it was ready 
to coordinate the burghs’ action and continued to do so throughout the next three 
decades. It clashed with the king spectacularly in 1674, but in general showed an 
intelligent expediency. It was quick to show loyalty and sought to ensure the favour of 
those in power for the burghs, but where necessary and possible it would fight even the 
royal will to secure the best for them. The claim in 1685 that the convention was ‘now 
of little significancy’ was neither true at that point nor at any other point in the period.
7
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Appendix I: Appeals to the Convention
1
 
 
Table 1: Responses to appeals to the convention 
Grants Awarded Visits Ordained
c
Dues/Fines Discharged Exemptions Granted
e
1651-60 1
a
13 7 21
1661-70 5
b
0 6 22
1671-80 10 8 27 32
1681-88 14 13 89
d 
20
 
a
One further appeal rejected due to lack of common funds. 
b
Burghs were asked to give a voluntary contribution in all cases in 1661-70 and one case in 1677. 
c
Only in relation to appeals based on poverty. 
d
Only nine burghs are named in this period. However, in July 1686, all fines for absence from the 
general conventions in 1684 and 1685 (with 58 burghs absent which were not previously excused) were 
discharged, largely due to poverty. In 1689, all 22 burghs absent from the 1688 general convention had 
their fines discharged and are thus included here. 
e
Almost entirely given for three years – in 1657 four were given for five years, in 1666 five for five 
years, and in 1680 one for one year. 
 
Grants Awarded 
[December 1658, Dumfries (no funds available, helped to appeal to council of state)] 
July 1660, Whithorn 
July 1669, Burntisland, Kinghorn, Culross, Forres, Nairn (burghs to give supply) 
July 1671, Dornoch, Tain, Anstruther Easter, Inverurie 
July 1675, Inverurie 
July 1677, Whithorn (burghs to uplift voluntary contributions) 
July 1678, Whithorn 
July 1680, Linlithgow, Arbroath, North Berwick 
July 1682, St Andrews, Dysart, Pittenweem, Wigtown 
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July 1683, Arbroath, North Berwick 
July 1684, Selkirk 
July 1685, North Berwick 
July 1686, Arbroath 
July 1687, Renfrew 
July 1688, Kirkcaldy, Montrose, Whithorn, Renfrew 
 
Visits Ordained 
October 1653, Arbroath 
July 1654, Crail 
July 1655, Inverness, Arbroath, Montrose, Queensferry, Forres, Tain, Lanark, 
Dingwall, Whithorn 
December 1658, Tain 
July 1660, Nairn 
July 1673, Ayr, Irvine, Dumfries, Pittenweem 
July 1678, Anstruther Easter 
July 1680, Kilrenny, Anstruther Wester, Cromarty 
July 1682, Crail 
July 1686, Dysart, Anstruther Easter 
July 1687, Kirkcaldy, Montrose 
July 1688, Glasgow, Ayr, Rutherglen, Inverness, Tain, Peebles, Irvine, Sanquhar 
 
Missive Dues/Fines Discharged 
July 1654, Dundee, Inverness, Elgin, Forres, North Berwick, Cullen 
July 1655, Rothesay 
February 1662, Ayr 
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July 1665, Sanquhar, Cullen 
July 1670, Dornoch, Tain, Anstruther Easter 
July 1675, Crail, Cupar, Kinghorn, Brechin, Tain, Banff, Forfar, North Berwick 
October 1676, Glasgow, Cupar 
July 1677, Forres, Arbroath, Dumfries, Dumbarton 
July 1679, Stirling, Glasgow, Dumfries, Pittenweem 
July 1680, Inverbervie, 8 unnamed burghs 
July 1683, Selkirk, Dumbarton, Kirkcaldy 
July 1685, Elgin, Banff, Kirkcudbright, Renfrew, Kirkwall 
July 1686, 58 further burghs excused for absence from 1684 and 1685 conventions, 
fines discharged 
July 1687, Ayr, Irvine 
July 1688, Dysart 
July 1689, 22 burghs excused for absence from 1688 general convention, fines 
discharged 
 
Exemptions Granted 
July 1654, North Berwick, Cullen, Rutherglen 
July 1655, Dingwall, Whithorn (both for an undefined period), Nairn 
July 1656, Tain, Cullen, Forres, Sanquhar, North Berwick, Dingwall, Kilrenny, 
Pittenweem 
October 1657, Elgin, Dingwall, Rothesay, Inverary (all for five years) 
December 1658, Tain 
July 1660, Tain, Nairn 
March 1661, Rothesay 
July 1664, North Berwick 
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July 1665, Cullen, Fortrose, Wick, Kintore, Inverurie, Nairn 
August 1665, Dingwall, Banff, Tain 
July 1666, Forfar, Rutherglen, Renfrew, Cromarty, Anstruther Wester (all for five 
years) 
July 1669, Nairn, Forres, North Berwick, Cullen, Whithorn, Wick 
July 1671, Irvine, Anstruther Easter, Anstruther Wester, Crail, Cromarty, Inverurie, 
Inverbervie 
July 1673, Forres, Jedburgh 
July 1675, Irvine, Selkirk, Forfar, Kintore, Inverurie, Rutherglen, Inverbervie 
July 1676, Kirkcudbright, Lauder, Nairn, Dingwall, Tain, Cullen 
July 1678, Kintore, Inverurie, Wick, Whithorn, Forres 
July 1680, Sanquhar (one year), Dingwall, Nairn, Tain, Cullen 
July 1681, Wick, Lauder, Kirkwall, Kintore, Inverurie 
July 1682, Cullen, Tain, Forres, Inverbervie 
July 1683, Nairn, Dingwall 
July 1685, Forres, Kirkwall, Wick, Inverbervie 
July 1686, Tain, Cullen 
July 1687, Nairn 
July 1688, Anstruther Easter, Kirkwall 
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Appendix II: Common Good Account Balances 
 
Thirteen of the burghs in this sample were also used in the sample for the thesis, and 
have been selected for this appendix based on the quality of their treasurers’ accounts. 
These records were combined with the treasurer’s accounts in the National Archives of 
Scotland, from which source the remaining two burghs were chosen as those with the 
fullest accounts recorded there. 
Figures in brackets represent debt totals recorded in accounts. 
 
Aberdeen
1
 
1651-2: +£2370 0s 6d.   1670-1: -£12538 12s 11d. 
1652-3: +£3000 16s 5d.   1671-2: -£22625 14s 5d. 
1653-4: +£2836 16s 1d.   1672-3: -£1186 3s 4d. 
1654-5: +£3115 16s 9d.    1673-4: -£6866 18s 3d. 
1655-6: -£303 1s 11d.    1674-5: -£5360 8s 11d. 
      1675-6: +£612 15s 2d. 
1657-8: -£601 11s 5d.    1676-7: +£666 3s 9d. 
      1677-8: +£433 17s 5d. 
1659-60: +£1616 8s 11d.   1678-9: -£219 19s 11d. 
1660-1: -£2139 6s 9d.    1679-80: +£3434 4s 5d. 
1661-2: -£3123 12s 4d.   1680-1: +£1977 12s 10d. 
1662-3: -£4379 17s 2d.   1681-2: +£5343 2s. 
1663-4: -£604 1s.    1682-3: -£1955 6s 2d. 
1664-5: -£5594 13s 4d.   1683-4: +£7293 4s 11d. 
1665-6: -£4256 9s 10d.   1684-5: +£10072 18s 5d. 
1666-7: -£9681 17s 7d.   1685-6: +£1028 3s 7d. 
1667-8: -£8015 13s 1d.   1686-7: +£1623 5s 5d. 
1668-9: -£9301 17s 5d.   1687-8: +£380 14s 4d. 
1669-70: -£10731 9s 11d.   1688-9: -£1159 17s 9d. 
 
                                                 
1
 ACA, 10/6, Treasury Accounts, vols. i
3
-ii. 
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Figure 1: Aberdeen Common Good Balances 
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Ayr
2
 
1656-7: +£41 13s 2d.    1673-4: -£578 2s 4d. 
      1674-5: +£976 9s 6d. 
1661-2: +£175 14s 0d.   1675-6: +£750 3s 8d. 
1662-3: +£418 7s 4d.    1676-7: -£53 16s 6d. 
1663-4: -£49 6s 6d.    1677-8: -£342 10s 6d. 
1664-5: +£49 17s 9d.    1678-9: -£410 18s 7d. 
1665-6: +£28 4s 7d.    1679-80: -£603 18s. 
1666-7: +£26 18s 10d.   1680-1: -£39 5s. 
1667-8: +£88 0s 10d.    1681-2: +£10 14s 6d. 
1668-9: +£77 11s 8d.     1682-3: -£1208 15s 8d. 
1669-70: +£67 13s 2d.   1683-4: +£86 7s 8d. 
1670-1: +£595 4s 6d. 
1671-2: +£582 15s 3d.    1685-6: -£7. 
1672-3: -£60 11s 1d. 
 
Figure 2: Ayr Common Good Balances 
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2
 AAC, Ayr Accounts etc., B6/37/1. 
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Figure 3: Tack of Ayr's Common Good (items relating to trade) 
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Brechin
3
 
1661-2: £0.     1673-4: -£214 18s 2d. 
1662-3: £0.     1674-5: +£105 8s 2d. 
1663-4: -£60 1s 10d.    1675-6: +£91 5s 4d. 
1664-5: £0.     1676-7: -£1 5s. 
1665-6: +£66 14s 2d.    1677-8: +£97 8s 3d. 
1666-7: +£14 18s 11d.   1678-9: -£196 7s. 
1667-8: £0.     1679-80: -£51 7s 11d. 
1668-9: +£2 15s.    1680-1: -£98 7s 11d. 
1669-70: +£59 14s.    1681-2: -£170 7s 7d. 
1670-1: +£97 7s 8d.    1682-3: -£159 17s 1d. 
1671-2: +£64 11s 8d.    1683-4: -£126 1s 9d. 
1672-3: +£15 12s 4d. 
 
 
 
Dumbarton
4
 
1661-2: +£216 5s 2d.    1675-6: -£196 9s 5d. 
1662-3: -£461 19s 10d.   1676-7: -£774 19s 11d. 
1663-4: +£176 3s 8d.     1677-8: -£1200 3s 4d. 
      1678-9: -£2250 19s 6d. 
1666-7: +£250 1s 7d.    1679-80: -£2466 1s 10d. 
      1680-1: -£2909 1s 3d.  
1668-9: +£480 10s 3d.   1681-2: -£3185 9s 6d (£4824 2s 10d). 
1669-70: +11s 8d.    1682-3: -£20 0s 7d (£5850 6s 8d). 
1670-1: +£75 17s 4d.    1683-4: +£450 2s. 
1671-2: -£407 14s 9d.    1684-5: +£321 1s 3d (£4953 2s 11d). 
1672-3: -£98 16s.    1685-6: +£208 6s 6d (£6260). 
1673-4: -£128 5s 7d.    1686-7: -£893 10s 3d (£7618). 
1674-5: -£175 2s 3d.    1687-8: -£506 3s 5d. 
 
                                                 
3
 NAS, Common Good Accounts etc: Brechin, E82/8/1-24. 
4
 WDA, Dumbarton Council Records, 1/1/3-4. 
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Figure 4: Dumbarton Common Good Balances 
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Dumfries
5
 
1654-5: +£154 13s.    1667-8: -£724 17s. 
1655-6: -£6 14s 7d. 
1656-7: +£161 2s.    1670-2: +£1064 
1657-8: +£576 17s 4d.   1672-3: +£1009 6s. 
1658-9: +£525 3s 8d.    1673-5: +£771. 
      1675-6: +£700. 
1660-1: -£100.    1676-7: +£29. 
1661-2: -£100.    1677-8: -£1161 6s 8d. 
1662-3: +£24 5s 8d. 
      1687-8: -£268 12s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 DAC, Dumfries Treasurers’ Accounts, GG2/13/13-14, GG2/14/4-6; Dumfries Council Books, WA2/2-
4. 
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Dundee
6
 
1651-2: +£155 2s 6d.    1670-1: -£1911 2s 6d (£39328 13s 4d). 
1652-3: -£673 14s 8d (£38966 13s 4d). 1671-2: -£1381 6s 8d (£39328 13s 4d). 
1653-4: +£999 15s 11d (£32866 13s 4d). 1672-3: -£1502 4s 2d (£28012). 
1654-5: -£616 7s 7d (£32792).  1673-4: -£6390 12s 10d (£29133 6s 8d). 
1655-6: +£164 6s (£28326 13s 4d).  1674-5: -£840 18s (£28133 6s 8d). 
1656-7: +£2198 13s 1d (£26989 6s 8d). 1675-6: -£1870 8s 2d (£28133 6s 8d). 
1657-8: -£40 3s 4d (c.£26000).  1676-7: -£3034 14s 4d (£25466 13s 4d). 
1658-9: +£288 16s 2d (£35133 6s 8d). 1677-8: -£3015 3s 2d (£25466 13s 4d). 
1659-60: -£754 17s 6d (£37666 13s 4d). 1678-9: -£3434 8s (£25466 13s 4d). 
1660-1: -£1449 (£37933 6s 8d).   1679-80: -£940 17s (£22133 6s 8d). 
1661-2: -£1430 1s 2d (£42430).   1680-1: -£1029 13s 10d (£20800). 
1662-3: -£1196 4s 8d (£39440).  1681-2: +£451 6s 6d (£15134 13s 4d). 
1663-4: -£510 4s 5d (£42003 6s 8d).  1682-3: -£1508 4s 4d. 
1664-5: -£1958 9s 4d (£43865 6s 8d). 1683-4: -£1580 5s 6d. 
1665-6: -£2561 (£45798 13s 4d).  1684-5: -£2841 4s. 
1666-7: -£2650 6s 9d (£46198 13s 4d). 1685-6: -£2534 7s 7d. 
1667-8: -£2997 14s 6d (£46678 13s 4d). 1686-7: -£5974 5s 7d. 
1668-9: -£1869 19s (£42662 13s 4d).  1687-8: -£2553 7s 4d (£24400). 
1669-70: -£1943 12s 4d (£39328 13s 4d). 1688-9: -£6384 13s (c.£31200). 
 
Figure 5: Dundee Common Good Balances 
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Figure 6: Dundee Debt 
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6
 DCA, Treasurer’s Account Book 1646-96. 
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Edinburgh
7
 
[Debt in 1650: £622046].   1666-7: +£622 8s 4d. 
1651-2: +£20 11s 2d.    1667-9: +£168 12s 8d. 
1652-3: -£5501 7s 4d.    1669-71: +£3959 17s. 
1653-4: -£4433 8s 2d.    1671-3: +£2630 0s 11d. 
1654-5: -£6160 9s 4d.    1673-4: +£6614 15s 10d. 
1655-6: -£195 3s 6d.    1674-5: -£12071 9s. 
1656-7: -£7666 4s 3d.    1675-6: -£3568 16s. 
      1676-7: -£7095 2s 1d. 
1658-9: -£1792 18s 10d.   [Debt in 1677: £439559 1s 4d]. 
[Debt in 1660: £708327].    
1660-1: -4s 4d.     1678-80: -£6069 19s 7d. 
1680-2: -£4092 6s. 
1662-3: +£3624 1s 8d.   1682-4: -£12981 10s 11d. 
1663-4: -£22 12s 3d.     
1664-5: -£782 7s 10d.    1686-8: -£5090 19s 4d. 
1665-6: +£1400.     
 
Figure 7: Edinburgh Common Good Balances 
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7
 Edin. Recs., 1642-1655, 1655-1665, 1665-1680, 1681-1689, 1689-1701. 
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Elgin
8
 
1661: -£459 19s 6d.    1673: -£313 12s 8d. 
1662: -£307 18s 10d.    1674: -£69 5s. 
1663: -£288 18s 10d.    1675: -£100 19s 10d. 
1664: -£510 9s.    1676: -£63 9s. 
1665: -£166 2s 4d.    1677: -£61 5s 6d. 
1666: -£489 15s 8d.    1678: -£179 18s 2d. 
1667: -£111 12s 2d.    1679: -£380 9s. 
1668: -£67 12s 2d.    1680: +£44 17s 6d. 
1669: -£301 12s 2d.    1681: -£266 16s 2d. 
1670: -£333 15s 2d.    1682: -£447 19s 6d. 
1671: -£182 14s 2d.    1683: -£49 1s 10d. 
1672: -£287 14s 8d. 
 
Figure 8: Elgin Common Good Balances 
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Forfar
9
 
1658-9: +£135 5s 10d.   1679-80: -£28 0s 4d. 
1659-60: +£13 12s 10d.   1680-1: -£3 19s 6d. 
1660-1: -£1 4s 10d. 
1661-2: -£36 1s 6d.    1683-4: -£58 16s 10d. 
1662-3: -£53 8s 5d.    1684-5: -£210 13s 8d. 
      1685-6: -£170 14s 4d. 
1676-7: -£110 6s 8d.     
      1687-8: -£67 14s 4d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 NAS, Common Good Accounts etc: Elgin, E82/23. 
9
 AA, Forfar Town Council Minute Books, F1/1/1-2; Forfar Treasurers’ Accounts, F5/1. 
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Glasgow
10
 
April-September 1652: +£634 12s 8d. 1668-9: +£931 19s. 
1652-3: +£345 13s 10d.   1669-70: +£1610 4s 11d. 
      1670-1: -£1267 14s 10d. 
1654-5: +£892 14s 6d.   1671-2: -£3935 0s 6d. 
1655-6: -£637 10s.    1672-3: +£47 5s 8d. 
1656-7: -£67 18s.    1673-4: +£1161 8s 2d. 
1657-8: -£1595 9s 4d.    1674-5: -£1588 4s 8d. 
1658-9: +£311 1s 11d.   1675-6: +£88 8s. 
1659-60: +£1758 3s 5d.   1676-7: +£145 6s 6d. 
      1677-8: +£570 1s 8d. 
1661-2: +£589 8s 10d .   1678-9: +£521 4s 10d. 
1662-3: +£190 2s.    1679-80: -£2246 10s 6d. 
1663-4: +£1559 16s 9d.   1680-1: +£819 12s. 
1664-5: -£283 5s 1d.    1681-2: -£1928 15s. 
1665-6: -£15 10s 5d.    1682-3: +£783 9s. 
1666-7: +£1008 13s 3d.   1683-4: -£255 18s 10d. 
1667-8: +£1767 2s 8d.   1684-5: +£311 12s 4d. 
 
Figure 9: Glasgow Common Good Balances 
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10
 GCA, Council Minute Books, C1/1/12-7; Glas. Recs., 1630-1662, 1663-1690. 
 319 
Figure 10: Tack of Glasgow's Common Good (items relating to trade) 
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Montrose
11
 
1655-6: £0.     1671-2: -£270 16s. 
      1672-3: -£280 14s 2d. 
1657-8: -£51 10s 6d.    1673-5: -£499 4s 8d. 
1658-9: +£39 9s. 
      1680-1: -£628 12s 8d. 
1661-2: -£86 14s 6d.    1681-2: -£327 10s 1d. 
1662-4: +£551 1s 4d.    1682-3: -£670 9s 11d. 
      1683-4: -£958 8s 2d. 
1665-7: +£26 4s 9d. 
1667-8: +£228 10s 3d.   1685-6: -£375 6s 11d. 
1668-9: +£61 3s. 
1669-70: -£393 10s 2d.   1688: -£681 17s 11d. 
1670-1: -£35 5s 2d. 
 
 
Peebles
12
 
1662-3: -£41 5s.    1679-80: +£1288 9s. 
1663-4: -£200 11s 8d.    1680-1: +£1112 1s. 
      1681-2: +£1344 14s 10d. 
1666-7: -£315 18s 4d.    1682-3: +£1386 12s 10d. 
1683-4: +£299 7s 2d. 
1668-9: -£324 5s.    1684-5: +£728 10s 8d. 
1669-70: -£427 5s.    1685-6: +£280 19s. 
      1686-7: +£527 8s 4d. 
1675-6: +£1988 8s 8d.   1687-8: +£860 2s 10d. 
      1688-9: +£1322 5s 6d. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 AA, Montrose Council Books, M1/1/2-3; Montrose Treasurers’ Accounts, M3/2. 
12
 NAS, Common Good Accounts etc: Peebles, E82/45; Peebles Council Minutes, B58/13/2-3; Peebles 
Accounts (Bundle 2), B58/17/16. 
 320 
Perth
13
 
1654-5: -£1057 16s 4d (£28124 13s 4d). 1673-4: -£3338 3s 5d (£67733 6s 8d). 
1655-6: -£2078 5s 2d (£28562).  1674-5: -£1441 2s 11d (£71833 6s 8d). 
      1675-6: -£1325 18s 6d (£82903 6s 8d). 
1660-1: -£1911 3s (£40219 6s 8d).  1676-7: -£2883 14s 1d (£77633 6s 8d). 
1661-2: -£1809 8s (£28066 13s 4d).  1677-8: -£1228 12s (£72566 13s 4d). 
1662-3: -£1425 6s 7d (£45478).  1678-9: -£414 12s 8d (£68833 6s 8d). 
1663-4: -£884 11s 7d (£51391 6s 8d). 1679-80: -£1021 8s 5d. 
1664-5: -£1770 9s 5d (c.£56466 13s 8d). 1680-1: -£190 6s 4d. 
1665-6: +£1024 14s. 
1666-7: -£343 12s 11d.   1682-3: -£229 15s 6d. 
1667-8: -£450 2s 3d.    1683-4: -£194 10s 5d (£55300). 
1668-9: +£1168 1s 8d (£48600).  1684-5: -£667 19s 5d (£52008). 
1669-70: +£2153 8s 6d.   1685-6: -£1031 3s (£53275 6s 8d). 
1670-1: +£3202 8s (£61733 6s 8d).  1686-7: -£2303 5s 10d (£55858 13s 4d). 
1671-2: +£239 4s 8d (£62466 13s 4d). 1687-8: -£3021 19s 2d (£51008 13s 4d). 
1672-3: -£749 17s 3d (£64466 13s 4d). 
 
 
St Andrews
14
 
[May 1666]: -£157 18s 3d.   1673-4: -£18 10d. 
[June 1670]: -£68 16s 6d.   1674-5: +£9 12s 4d. 
[September 1670]: +£95 17s 2d.  1675-6: +£812 19s. 
      1676-7:  +£108 14s 10d. 
1664-5: -£2 7s 6d.     
1679-80: +£21 6s 2d. 
1666-7: -£49 10s 6d.    1680-2: +£634 7s 10d. 
      1682-4: +£369 10s 10d. 
1669-70: +£42 6s 4d.    1684-6: +£583 17s 4d. 
1670-2: -£25 3s 1d. 
                                                 
13
 PKA, Perth Treasurers’ Accounts B59/19 & B59/25/4/2; Perth Town Council, B59/16/8-10. 
14
 SAUA, St Andrews Council Minutes, B65/11/1-2. 
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Stirling
15
 
1650-1: -£2443 17s 8d.   1670-1: -£307 17s (£22200). 
1651-2: -£4145 11s 8d.   1671-2: -£600 6s 4d (£21133 6s 8d). 
1652-3: +£424 18s 2d.   1672-3: -£1518 7s 10d (£20200). 
1653-4: -£542 18s 8d.    1673-4: -£4306 2s 4d (£20866 13s 4d). 
1654-5: +£1009 7s 2d (£25000).  1674-5: -£1299 5s 4d. 
1655-6: +£238 5s 4d (£26400).  1675-6: -£525 3s (£23900). 
1656-7: +£428 6s 10d.   1676-7: -£663 14s 4d (£23566 13s 4d). 
1657-8: -£254 4s 4d.    1677-8: -£1905 9s 5d (£23900). 
1658-9: +£718 2d.    1678-9: -£5083 12s 4d (£25100). 
1659-60: +£1309 13s 10d.    
1660-1: +£249 4s (£18200).   1680-1: -£1731 9s 6d. 
1661-2: +£230 3s 8d.    1681-2: -£2654 4s 4d.  
1662-3: -£99 12s 7d.      
1663-4: +£326 10s 9d (£22200).   1683-4: -£1223 1s. 
1664-5: +£1472 12s 11d (£22866 13s 4d).  
1665-6: -£827 10s 6d (£22200).  1685-6: -£11 16s 8d. 
1666-7: +£1003 10s 10d.   [Debt in 1686: £55588 14s 8d]. 
1667-8: +£1150 16s 1d (£23133 6s 8d). 1686-7: -£120 0s 4d.  
1668-9: +£1155 2s 5d (£22200).   1687-8: -£330 0s 2d. 
1669-70: -£314 12s 10d (£24133 6s 8d). 
 
Figure 11: Stirling Common Good Balances 
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15
 SCA, Burgh Treasurers Accounts: B66/23/1 (1634-1720); Council Records B66/20/4-6; 
NAS, Common Good Accounts etc: Stirling, E82/55/5; Stir. Recs., 1519-1666, 1667-1752. 
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Figure 12: Tack of Stirling's Common Good (items relating to trade) 
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Appendix III: Conventions and Absentees
1
 
 
Figure 13: Absentees from general conventions, by proportion 
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Figure 14: Absentees from particular conventions, by 
proportion
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Notes: 
Unless otherwise stated, meetings were held in Edinburgh. 
Meetings in bold are conventions of all the burghs, and thus counted as general 
conventions, even if named in the minutes as particular conventions. 
When multiple conventions were held in one year, they are counted together in the 
graphs. 
                                                 
1
 RCRBS, iii, 358-674; RCRBS, iv, 1-88. 
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1651 58 burghs enrolled. 
1652 general convention (August) 
20 burghs absent. 
Particular convention (November-December) 
19 burghs called, 6 absent. 
 
1653 particular convention (October) 
30 called, 16 absent. 
 
1654 particular convention (March) 
12 called, 5 absent. 
General convention (July) 
35 blank. 
Particular convention (August) 
16 called, 8 absent. 
Particular convention (November) 
16 called, 6 absent. 
 
1655 particular convention (February) 
17 called, 5 absent. 
General convention (July) 
19 absent. 
Particular convention (December) 
16 called, 6 absent. 
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1656 general convention, Haddington (July) 
12 absent. 
Particular convention (July) 
14 called, 2 absent. 
Particular convention (August) 
20 called, 10 absent. 
Particular convention (August) 
20 called, 7 absent. 
Particular convention (October) 
20 called, 10 absent. 
Particular convention (November) 
19 called, 13 absent – no business. 
Particular convention (December) 
20 called, 10 absent. 
 
1657 particular convention (February) 
18 called, 4 absent. 
Particular convention (June) 
17 called, 7 absent. 
Particular convention (July) 
24 called, 10 absent. 
General convention, Glasgow (October) 
22 absent. 
Particular convention (December) 
22 called, 10 absent. 
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1658 general convention (July) 
16 absent. 
 
1659 particular convention (January) 
20 called, 4 absent. 
Particular convention (March) 
20 called, 9 absent. 
Particular convention (July) 
26 called, 9 absent. 
 
1660 particular convention (January-February) 
40 called, 12 absent. 
Particular convention (May-June) 
40 called, 15 absent. 
General convention (July) 
19 absent. 
Meeting of commissioners (July) 
17 called, 5 absent. 
Particular convention (September) 
27 called, 12 absent. 
Particular convention (November) 
21 present. 
General convention (December) 
15 absent. 
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1661 Fortrose, Cromarty, Kintore, Inverurie, Wick enrolled – total 63. 
1661 general convention (December 1660-July) – parliament 
4 absent. 
Particular convention (September) 
16 called, 9 absent – no acts recorded. 
Particular convention (November) 
21 called, 10 absent. 
 
1662 particular convention (January) 
17 called, 8 absent. 
General convention (February-March) 
37 absent. 
General convention (May-September) – parliament 
34 absent. 
 
1663 general convention (June-October) – parliament 
24 absent. 
 
1664 particular convention (May) 
26 called, 11 absent. 
General convention (July) 
31 absent. 
 
1665 general convention, Aberdeen (July) 
43 absent. 
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Particular convention (August) – convention of estates. 
23 absent. 
 
1666 general convention (July) 
24 absent. 
 
1667 particular convention (December) 
25 called, 12 absent. 
 
1668 general convention (March) 
31 absent. 
Particular convention (August) 
24 called, 12 absent. 
 
1669 particular convention (March) 
25 called, 15 absent. 
General convention (July) 
24 absent. 
Particular convention (October-November) – parliament 
10 absent. 
 
1670 Kirkwall, Inverbervie added (65). 
1670 general convention (July) 
39 absent. 
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1671 general convention, Dundee (July) 
33 absent. 
Particular convention (August) 
22 called, 7 absent. 
Particular convention (October) 
27 called, 13 absent. 
 
1672 general convention, no sederunt – parliament 
 
1673 general convention, Perth (July) 
30 absent. 
 
1674 general convention, Stirling (July) 
28 absent. 
General convention (August) 
37 absent. 
 
1675 particular convention (January) 
25 called, 8 absent. 
General convention, Glasgow (July) 
28 absent. 
 
1676, general convention (July) 
23 absent. 
Particular convention (October) 
25 called, 11 absent. 
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Particular convention (December) 
25 called, 9 absent. 
1677 general convention (July) 
28 absent. 
 
1678 general convention (June-July) – convention of estates 
15 absent. 
 
1679 general convention (July) 
46 absent. 
Particular convention (November-December) 
25 called, 7 absent. 
 
1680 particular convention (April) 
25 called, 6 absent. 
General convention (July) 
22 absent. 
 
1681 general convention (July-September) – parliament 
7 absent. 
 
1682 general convention (July) 
19 absent. 
 
1683 Stranraer added (66). 
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1683 general convention (July) 
27 absent. 
 
1684 general convention (July) 
26 absent. 
 
1685 Cromarty expunged (65). 
1685 general convention (April-May) – parliament 
6 absent. 
General convention (July) 
37 absent. 
 
1686 particular convention (April) 
24 called, 6 absent. 
General convention (April-May) – parliament 
6 absent. 
General convention (July) 
19 absent. 
 
1687 general convention (July) 
24 absent. 
 
1688 general convention (July) 
22 absent. 
Particular convention (November) 
25 called, 11 absent. 
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Appendix IV: Correlation of Estates and Burghs
1
 
 
Table 2: Dates of parliament/conventions of estates and conventions of burghs, with numbers of 
burghs in the sederunts 
Start End Burghs Start End Burghs 
1661 1 January 12 July 60 28 December 12 July 59
1662 8 May 9 September 38 9 May 3 September 29
1663 18 June 9 October 42 18 June 8 October 39
1665 2 August 4 August 44 28 July 9 August 40
1667 9 January 23 January 48
1669 19 October 23 December 57 14 October 17 November 53
1670 28 July 22 August 59
1672 12 June 11 September 59
1673 12 November 2 August 1674 45
1678 26 June 11 July 59 20 June 9 July 50
1681 28 July 17 September 59 25 July 19 September 58
1685 23 April 16 June 62 16 April 4 May 59
1686 29 April 15 June 61 27 April 17 May 59
Parliament/Estates Convention of Royal Burghs
 
1661: Three burghs in sederunt for parliament but not convention of burghs 
(Lochmaben, Inveraray, Wick); two in sederunt for burghs but not parliament 
(Anstruther Wester, Kilrenny). 
 
1662: Thirteen burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Kirkcaldy, Anstruther 
Easter, Inverkeithing, Pittenweem, Arbroath, Elgin, Peebles, Whithorn, Kintore, 
Sanquhar, New Galloway, Dingwall, Fortrose); four for burghs but not parliament 
(Dumfries, Burntisland, Rutherglen, Wick). 
Commissioner for Linlithgow at parliament: Andrew Glen; commissioner at burghs: 
George Bell. Edinburgh’s craft commissioner different at both meetings. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 RPS, 1661/1/2, 1662/5/2, 1663/6/2, 1665/8/2, 1667/1/2, 1669/10/2, 1670/7/2, 1672/6/2, 1673/11/2, 
1678/6/3, 1681/7/2, 1685/4/2, 1686/4/2; RCRBS, iii, 531, 558, 562-3, 582, 617; RCRBS, iv, 7-8, 24-5, 
49, 62. 
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1663: Eight burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Anstruther Easter, 
Selkirk, Lanark, Arbroath, Anstruther Wester, North Berwick, Sanquhar, Dingwall); 
five for burghs but not parliament (St Andrews, Montrose, Dumfries, Wigtown, 
Forfar). 
Commissioner for Tain at parliament: Andrew Ross; commissioner at burghs: John 
Forrester. 
 
1665: Eight burghs in sederunt for convention of estates but not burghs (Anstruther 
Easter, Selkirk, Renfrew, Whithorn, Rutherglen, North Berwick, Kilrenny, 
Lochmaben); four for burghs but not estates (Brechin, Irvine, Rothesay, Anstruther 
Wester). 
Edinburgh’s craft commissioner different at both meetings. 
 
1667: No minutes of a convention of burghs at the time of the convention of estates, 
but burgh commissioners were sent to both.
2
 
 
1669: Five burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Culross, Rothesay, 
Kintore, Dingwall, Inveraray); one for burghs but not parliament (Dornoch). 
Commissioner for Lochmaben at parliament: John Johnston; commissioner at burghs: 
William Crame. 
 
1670: No convention of burghs during parliament, but the general convention sat 
between 5 and 13 July; twenty-seven burghs were present.
3
 
 
                                                 
2
 See for example: Angus Archives, M1/1/2, Montrose Council Book, 1639-1673, 207; St Andrews 
University Archives, B65/11/1, St Andrews Council Minutes, 1656-71, 145-6. 
3
 RCRBS, iii, 621-3. 
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1672: No sederunt for the convention of burghs which sat during parliament, record of 
only two days’ meetings (13 July, 12 September).
4
 
 
1673: No sederunt for the convention of burghs which sat during parliament.
5
 
 
1678: Nine burghs in sederunt for convention of estates but not burghs (Tain, Culross, 
Whithorn, Rothesay, Nairn, Lauder, Dingwall, Inveraray, Fortrose). 
Commissioner for Lanark at estates: Thomas Stoddart; commissioner at burghs: 
William Tueddell. 
 
1681: Two burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Inverkeithing, Forfar); 
one for burghs but not parliament (Cromarty).
6
 
Commissioner for Selkirk at parliament: Andrew Angus; commissioner at burghs: 
William Scott.
7
 
Commissioner for Dunbar at parliament: James Hamilton; commissioner at burghs: 
James Kellie. 
Commissioner for Peebles at parliament: William Williamson; commissioner at 
burghs: William Plenderleith. 
 
1685: Three burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Renfrew, Dornoch, 
Queensferry).
8
 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 632-3. 
5
 See particularly: NLS, Yester Papers, MS 7006 ff.64, 66, 68, MS 7034 f.48. See also for example: 
Dundee City Archives, Dundee Council Book, vol. VI, 1669-1707, f.52v, f.54r; Fife Council Archives, 
Carleton House, Markinch – B/KDY/1/1/1, Kirkcaldy Burgh Council Minutes 1663-1680, f.120r; NAS, 
B58/13/2, Peebles Council Minutes Jul 1652-27 Nov 1678, f.90v; Perth & Kinross Archives, B59/16/9, 
Register of Acts of Perth Town Council, 1671-80, f.40v; St Andrews University Archives, B65/11/2, St 
Andrews Council Minutes, 1673-1707, 12. 
6
 See chapter 3 – although Cromarty had been allowed by parliament to resign its privileges as a royal 
burgh, it had not been expunged by the convention and continued to appeal for this. 
7
 The original commissioner was elected for both meetings, but was unqualified: see chapter 5. 
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1686: Three burghs in sederunt for parliament but not burghs (Dumfries, Renfrew, 
Queensferry); one for burghs but not parliament (Dysart). 
Commissioner for Lochmaben at parliament: John Rule; commissioner at burghs: 
James Hill. 
                                                                                                                                             
8
 The commissioner for Inverkeithing is shown as the laird of Pitliver in RPS and John Dempster in 
RCRBS. This is the same person: Young, Parliaments of Scotland, 181. 
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